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Abstract 
 
Public Inquiries are significant, authoritative institutions established by governments to 
address some of the most important and controversial issues in public policy and society. 
Inquiries are powerful mechanisms to investigate and advise on matters of public concern. 
They are designed to right wrongs and address egregious breaches of public trust. However, 
Public Inquiries are not just tools of government. They are also tools of society, and they 
express a significant dimension of the social contract, the reciprocal acceptance of 
obligations between citizens and their government. Public Inquiries often respond to crises, 
scandals, or the incremental development of inadequacies, which violate public expectations 
of the reciprocal obligations between State and citizens.  
 
The central objective of this thesis is to assess the success of Public Inquiries in Australia. 
Public administration scholars and political scientists generally contemplate success from 
the point of view of government. This is problematic because it has resulted in less than 
adequate recognition of the ‘public interest or common good’ served by Public Inquiries 
(Prasser and Tracey 2014, p. 227). On the basis of illustrative case studies, the thesis 
argues that including citizen perspectives provides a powerful means by which to assess the 
success of Public Inquiries in repairing breaches of societal expectations. 
 
The literature review (Chapter 2) is utilised systematically to distil three recurring 
propositions regarding the assessment of success of Public Inquiries. These propositions 
suggest that an assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in 
which a Public Inquiry: 
 has responded to a crisis and restored legitimacy;  
 given voice to the public, including stakeholders, ‘victims’ or experts; and  
 provided the opportunity for policy change and improved outcomes.  
 
Based on these three propositions, and their theoretical foundations, an analytical framework 
is derived to assess the success of Public Inquiries (Chapter 3). Three Public Inquiries are 
selected as case studies for analysis, each corresponding to a distinct ‘type’ of Public 
Inquiry. The first type is the ‘Investigatory Inquiry’ (Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies 
in Relation to the UN Oil for Food Programme 2006; Chapter 4). The second type is the 
‘Policy Advisory Inquiry’ (Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry 2013; Chapter 
5). The third type is the ‘Hybrid Inquiry’ (Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2012, 
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Chapter 6). The analytical framework is applied to each case study (respectively in Chapters 
4, 5 and 6). 
 
The thesis then draws out the implications of these findings for scholarship (Chapter 7). For 
Public Inquiries to be positioned as part of the social contract, the perspectives of citizens 
could be more effectively incorporated. The case study analyses reveal various proxies or 
markers of citizen perspectives. These include media commentary, subsequent Inquiries, 
and legal action. Further analysis of the case studies using these proxies provides significant 
insights into how citizens assess the success of the Public Inquiry. 
 
The thesis then moves to theory building and argues that despite their many variations, the 
overarching purpose of a Public Inquiry is to rebuild the social contract after breach. Three 
enduring functions of Inquiries are identified: to respond; to hear; and to prevent. The 
analytical framework applied to the three case studies is revised to include citizen 
perspectives in order to assess success. That is, an assessment of the success of a Public 
Inquiry should examine three characteristics. First, the ways in which the Public Inquiry is 
trusted to make sense of the events or the violation of expectations. Second, the ways in 
which people were heard. Third, the ways in which the Public Inquiry rights wrongs and thus 
changes policy, processes or outcomes for the better.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to the Thesis 
Public Inquiries are powerful institutions established by governments to address some of the 
most distressing, disturbing and controversial issues and events of public policy and society. 
They occupy a special, often revered, place in many societies. Public Inquiries are 
mechanisms by which many societies around the world aim to discover the truth, redress 
wrongs, restore the public’s confidence, and give voice to the most disempowered and 
aggrieved members of society. Public Inquiries are the ‘the highest form of inquiry on 
matters of substantial public importance’ (Australian Law Reform Commission [ALRC] 2009, 
p. 31). They are established by governments as trusted, wise, impartial investigators or 
advisers.  
Public Inquiries are a tool of government. This thesis posits, however, that they are also a 
tool of society. The central argument of the thesis is that Public Inquiries express a 
significant dimension of the social contract between State and citizens, and that the 
overarching purpose of a Public Inquiry is to rebuild the social contract after it has been 
breached.  
 
The social contract is an enduring concept in political philosophy, and, as argued by 
Verschoor (2018, p. 4), offers ‘one of the most dominant normative frameworks for 
evaluating political structures and acts’. The social contract is the agreement between State 
and citizens to cooperate for reciprocal social and economic benefit. It is the shared norms 
and expectations on which society rests. The social contract confers reciprocal obligations 
between citizens and the authorities to which they subject themselves (Hill 2017). Citizens 
agree to live together under common laws and create enforcement mechanisms for our 
social contract and the laws upon which it is formed (Elahi 2005). When such obligations or 
expectations are breached there are consequences. The breach requires repair and remedy: 
for an individual, such consequences may be prosecution in a court of law and possibly 
imprisonment; for society, it may be the establishment of a Public Inquiry to investigate the 
breach and advise Government. 
Yet despite their importance, the significant matters they investigate, the expectations and 
trust citizens vest in them, and the wide powers delegated to them, researchers have not yet 
adequately addressed the question of how successful Public Inquiries are, nor how success 
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might be assessed. This is the central research question of this thesis: how can the success 
of Public Inquiries be assessed? 
There is a significant gap in the literature on how to assess the success of Public Inquiries 
generally, and specifically with respect to investigating and repairing breaches of societal 
expectations. Perspectives on success which are offered through public administration and 
political science literature contemplate success principally from the point of view of 
government. This is necessary, but insufficient, and does not acknowledge citizens’ 
expectations of repair and remedy of the social contract. 
This thesis demonstrates that citizens’ perspectives can provide a powerful means by which 
to assess how successful a Public Inquiry has been in repairing the breach of societal 
expectations. Public Inquiries are a public good and, as such, citizens’ perspectives are 
central to any assessment of success.  
Chapter 1 introduces the literature on Public Inquiries, draws the link between the social 
contract and Public Inquiries and positions Public Inquiries as a public good. It then draws 
parallels with Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, as institutions most similar in form and 
function to Public Inquiries. Chapter 1 then discusses why success, not ‘effectiveness’, 
defined by Prasser and Tracey (2014, p. 225) as ‘the persuasiveness of [the Public Inquiry’s] 
arguments and the quality of its report’, is the focus of this thesis. The research design is 
introduced, and the structure of the thesis is outlined. 
1.2 What are Public Inquiries and what do they do? 
Public Inquiries are established by, but are not part of, executive government. Governments 
establish Public Inquiries to investigate matters of public importance and ‘as an aid to policy 
formulation’ (Banks 2007, p. 1). 
Public Inquiries are temporary, ad hoc, non-judicial bodies appointed by executive 
government: to provide advice or to investigate an issue; whose members are drawn from 
outside government; have public processes; seek community input and release their reports 
(Prasser 2003, pp. 55-56; Prasser and Tracey 2014, p. 2). Inquiries typically sit outside the 
‘usual’ policy making processes and structures (Prasser 2003, p. 8). They are intended to 
operate with independence from political processes and the state bureaucracy. According to 
Banks (2014, p.131), ‘public inquiries provide a useful mechanism for penetrating 
complexity, and countering asymmetric political pressures on government’. 
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Public Inquiries have advisory powers only and their findings do not have any legally binding 
status (Prasser 2003, p. 56). They are established to provide recommendations to 
government, but they have no power or role in relation to the implementation of their 
recommendations or their subsequent administration (Banks 2013, p. 3). Public Inquiries are 
not part of government’s bureaucratic structures, processes and systems. In formulating 
their recommendations for change, Public Inquiries do not routinely apply the ‘usual’ policy 
making considerations, nor do they ‘thoroughly anticipate the political, policy and 
administrative challenges that await approved policies after enactment’ (Lindquist and 
Wanna 2011, p. 4), as that is the task of public administration. Public Inquiries ‘do not and 
cannot consider the budget implications of their recommendations’ (Eburn and Dovers 2015, 
p. 499) or ‘think carefully’ about the political, strategic and capability considerations of 
implementing reform (Lindquist and Wanna 2011, p. 4). This is not their brief.  
 
Public Inquiries occupy a unique place in the Australian system of government, ‘being the 
highest form of inquiry on matters of substantial public importance’ (ALRC 2009, p. 31). 
Across Australia, Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation provides for the 
establishment of Public Inquiries.1 Public Inquiries vary in terms of their brief, constitution 
and timeframe for reporting, but typically they have wide ranging coercive and investigatory 
powers.  
 
Public Inquiries are a recurring feature of the political landscape (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 
MacKenzie and Sesay 2012 pp. 389-90). Public Inquiries are often established in response 
to crisis; have many different purposes, forms, functions, scope and levels of participation; 
and usually undertake some information gathering, research and consultation (Prasser, 
2003). Taking some recent Australian examples, Public Inquiries2 have been established to 
investigate the management of natural disasters (for example, Queensland Flood 
Commission of Inquiry 2012; 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission); allegations of 
corruption (for example, Inquiry into UN Oil for Food Program 2006; Royal Commission into 
the NSW Police Service 1997) or systemic policy failures (for example, the New South 
                                                          
1 Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Commonwealth); Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW) and the 
Special and the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1983 (NSW); Inquiries Act 2014 (Victoria), formerly 
established under the Constitution Act 1975 (Victoria); Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 
(Queensland); Royal Commissions Act 1917 (South Australia); Royal Commissions Act 1968 
(Western Australia); Commissions of Inquiry Act 1995 (Tasmania); Royal Commissions Act 1991 
(Australian Capital Territory); the Inquiries Act 1991 (Australian Capital Territory), and the Inquiries 
Act 1945 (Northern Territory). 
2 The term ‘Public Inquiry’ refers to a temporary, ad-hoc body appointed by executive government to 
investigate and/or advise. A range of organisational forms and nomenclatures are used including 
Royal Commission, Commission of Inquiry. In this thesis ‘Public Inquiry’ is used as the broader term 
but as defined by Prasser’s (2003, pp. 55-56) classification system. 
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Wales Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection Services 2008, The Royal 
Commission into the Protection and Detention of Children in the Northern Territory 2017). 
Eburn and Dovers (2015, p. 495) establish that in the last 75 years there have been 50 
Public Inquiries in Australia. In relation to natural disasters specifically, there have been over 
30 inquiries since 1939 into fires, floods, storms, and emergency management 
arrangements. 
 
Public Inquiries will continue to be established, to investigate and to report on matters of 
public concern or importance (Prasser and Tracey 2014, p. 393). During the writing of this 
thesis a Royal Commission into Misconduct in Banking, Superannuation and Financial 
Services3 (Turnbull 2017) and a Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety 
(Morrison 2018) have been established, and there have been ongoing calls for a Royal 
Commission into Abuse of People with Disabilities (Beech 2017).  
 
Public Inquiries are also a recurring feature in other Westminster type democracies, possibly 
since the early 1800s (Stanton 2010, p. 9). Significant examples include the Scarman Inquiry 
established by the United Kingdom government after the Brixton ‘disorders’ in London, 1981 
(Bowling 1999), and the Walkerton Inquiry, 2000, which was established in Canada after the 
town’s drinking water system became contaminated with deadly bacteria (O’Connor 2002). 
Public Inquiries also regularly appear in different types of liberal democracies and 
parliamentary systems. Examples can be found in the Jerusalem banquet hall collapse 
Inquiry in Israel (2001), the Elbe Flood Inquiry in Germany (2002) and various Inquiries in a 
number of Scandinavian countries after the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami (Boin, McConnell and 
‘t Hart 2008; 2009). Significant examples in the United States include: the Roberts 
Commission after Pearl Harbour 1941; the Warren Commission after the assassination of 
John F. Kennedy 1963; the Ervin Commission after the Watergate scandal 1972; and the 
9/11 Commission 2002 (Parker and Dekker 2008 p. 255).  
 
All of these examples, and many more, establish the significance, the gravitas and 
importance of these powerful institutions and the matters they address.  
 
 
                                                          
3 On 30 November, 2017, the Prime Minister and Treasurer announced that there would be a Royal 
Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Sector, viewed 9 
December 2017, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/royal-commission-banks-and-financial-services 
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1.3 What is the connection between the social contract and Public Inquiries? 
This thesis positions the kind of events that trigger Public Inquiries as breaches of the social 
contract, of the shared expectations and reciprocal obligations between citizens and their 
institutions. When such events or breaches occur, citizens experience a ‘crisis of confidence 
in the integrity of public life or about other matters of vital public importance’ (Salmon 1967, 
p. 313). Such breaches contravene expectations of a ‘good society’. Citizens build pressure 
for an independent and powerful body to investigate, right wrongs and strengthen our society 
and systems so such events or breaches are properly and impartially investigated and can 
be avoided in the future. 
1.3.1 What is the social contract? 
‘We the people’ (Rousseau 1764). 
The notion of the social contract lies deep within expectations of the role and functions of 
Public Inquiries. There is a wide continuum of political philosophy that contemplates social 
contract, ranging from Rousseau and Kant, to Locke, to more modern theorists including 
Rawls (Dobuzinskis 2000, p. 688). Within the social contract tradition there have also been a 
‘certain range of problems [which have been] disputed for hundreds of years (Riley 1982, p. 
10). The essential point in the context of this thesis is that the enduring justification for 
political obligation is that, although citizens are naturally self-interested, citizens are also 
rational (Friend n.d.; Elahi 2005). Citizens choose to submit to authority (a sovereign, a 
collective body, an elected assembly) in order to live in a civil society, which is, of course, 
conducive to their own interest (Elahi 2005). The only justified authority is that which is 
generated out of these agreements, covenants or compacts. Authority is accountable (Jos 
2006, p. 143, p. 151). 
Citizens agree to live together under common laws and create enforcement mechanisms for 
the social contract and the laws upon which it is formed (Elahi 2005), or, citizens submit their 
individual wills to the collective or general will, created through agreement with other free 
and equal persons (Elahi 2005). In so doing, individuals become ‘the people’ 
(Rousseau,1764, Book I, Chapter VI). The general will is directed to the common good, 
understood and agreed to collectively. It is in Rousseau’s version of the social contract that 
the notion of reciprocal duties emerges (1764, Book I, Chapter VII). The ‘authority’ is 
committed to the good of individuals and individuals are committed to the good of the whole. 
Citizens give over their power to these laws, the judges that adjudicate them, and the 
executive power required to enforce them. Citizens are obliged to respect and obey the 
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State. The State is obliged to provide stability and protection (Elahi 2005). Citizens and State 
share these beliefs in societal values and norms (Parsons 1960, pp. 172-187). 
The social contract ‘is the most fundamental source of all that is good and that which we 
depend upon to live well…which guarantees equality and protection for all’ (Friend n.d.). The 
social contract is based on our ‘common interests that create durable social bonds’ (Jos 
2006, p. 148). Once the social contract is formed we are all expected to keep our promises, 
cooperate and act within societal norms and laws. If we break these laws or breach 
expectations, there are consequences.  
According to Locke, when the conditions under which the compact with government is 
destroyed not only are we justified in resisting the authority of government, we are indeed 
obliged to (Elahi 2005, p. 3). When the ‘authority’ has breached these expectations, when 
these most fundamental promises are broken, citizens advocate for redress, for a trusted 
voice to investigate impartially, forensically and authoritatively. In our contemporary 
democratic context, this can take the form of a Public Inquiry. 
Indeed, Rousseau contemplated such ‘checks and balances’ in order to ‘temper’ 
governments, in the form of tribunes and censors (1764, Book IV, Chapter V). Tribunes were 
not part of government but ‘merely serve to balance’ executive power, not exercise it (Riley 
2010, pp. 216-7). Censors issued public declarations of cultural norms (moeurs) ‘persuading’ 
citizens and authorities to engage in certain actions and refrain from others. Censors, like 
tribunes, and like Public Inquiries, have no authority to enact laws or employ coercive forces 
themselves. They are ‘countervailing powers’ (Riley 2010, p. 219) designed to keep citizens 
and government in balance; guardians of the public good.  
Rousseau (1764, Book IV, Chapter V) foreshadowed the importance of the Tribune when he 
wrote: 
Though it can do nothing, it can prevent everything…It is more sacred and more 
revered as the defender of the laws, than the prince who executes them , or the 
Sovereign which institutes them…The tribuneship, wisely tempered, is the firmest 
support of a good constitution…It can overturn everything’. 
To strengthen the parallel with Public Inquiries even further, Rousseau also asserted that the 
best way of utilising such formidable bodies was to ensure they were temporary (as are 
Public Inquiries). 
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1.3.2 Limits of social contract theory and the possibility of other political theory 
perspectives 
While it is an enduring, classical concept in political theory, social contract theory has its 
limitations and critics. Given the centrality of social contract theory to the assessment of 
success of Public Inquiries, these limitations are acknowledged and explored in the following 
section.  
This section also acknowledges that social contract theory is but one lens of conceiving 
state-society relations. A sample of other political theories which may have informed the 
thesis are also briefly described. 
Lessnoff (1986, p. 2) defines social contract theory as a ‘theory in which a contract is used to 
justify and/or to set limits to political authority, or in other words, in which political obligation 
is analysed as a contractual obligation’. For contractual theorists a contract is premised both 
on a promise as well as legal enforceability (Lessnoff 1986, p. 3). If a contract is breached 
there are consequences. 
However, is there, or was there ever, an actual social contract? If so, does it have any 
relevance to political obligation? Who are the parties to this contract? What is the nature of 
consent? Are all the parties equal (Lessnoff 1986, p. 87)? 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to examine the history of states, whether governments 
have been founded on ‘actual’ contracts4, or ‘covenants’5. The general view is that they have 
not (Lessnoff 1986), yet the notion of a social contract remains an enduring concept. 
Rousseau’s social contract is an ‘ideal’ contract based on how government ideally ‘ought to 
have been established, rather than how it actually was established’ (Lessnoff 1986, p. 74, 
italics in original). Legitimate political authority stems from the ideal, not any actual contract.  
Immanuel Kant also theorises that the social contract is ‘not an actual event, but a regulatory 
ideal’ and that ‘the idea of a social contract can and should be used to test [political 
institutions’] rightness’ …’the idea of the social contract provides a criterion for the ideal 
constitution of the state’(Lessnoff 1986, pp. 90-91). More recently for John Rawls (1972), the 
social contract ‘is not an historical event, but a thought-experiment’ (Lessnoff 1986, p. 159, 
Weale 2013 p. 16). 
                                                          
4 For a fuller analysis on this question, see Lessnoff 1986. 
5 Crocker 1968, p. 60; Höffe 2013, p. 13 
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As an idealised, or ‘experimental’ notion therefore, the social contract, has been criticised as 
lacking rigour, being abstract and ambiguous, ‘hopelessly unrealistic’ (Lessnoff 1986, p. 85), 
or ‘emotional fantasies’ (Crocker 1968, p. 6).  
Lessnoff (1986, pp. 97-122) describes a range of competing social contract theories from 
individualist theories based on the ‘abstract’ individual and individual interests, through to 
Marxist traditions of universal interests (which are in fact, the interests of the dominant social 
class and the basis of class struggles). He concludes that social contract theory ‘appeals not 
only to self-interest, but also to a due concern for the interests of one’s fellows. It seeks to 
balance the equally legitimate interests of all’ (Lessnoff 1986, p. 121). This fact, Lessnoff 
argues, accounts for the ‘continuing popularity of the idea in present-day political discourse’ 
(Lessnoff 1986, p. 122). 
In A Theory of Justice (1972) John Rawls encapsulates a contemporary version of social 
contract theory. Rawls’ focus is on the justice of social systems and social structures. Social 
justice requires the basic structure of society to conform to just principles which are desirable 
and feasible (Kukathas and Pettit 1990, p. 36), principles which ensure ‘the appropriate 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation (Rawls 1972, p. 4), and a 
proper assignment of basic rights and duties (Rawls 1972, p. 5). These principles6 guarantee 
fundamental individual liberties (for example, of speech, worship) and ‘ensure that the social 
and economic inequalities are arranged to offer the greatest possible benefit to the worst off 
in society, while upholding fair equality of opportunity’ (Kukathas and Pettit, p. 36). The 
principles are based on three postulates: self-interest; rationality and equality (Rawls 1972, 
p. 302, Lessnoff 1986, p. 133, Kukathas and Pettit 1990, p. 43). Rawls (1972, p. 11) argues 
that these are the principles that would be chosen by the parties to the ‘hypothetical’ 
contract. 
The basic premise of Rawls’ theory is that principles which our self-interest would lead us to 
agree to as the terms of a contract made in an ideally fair situation7, are just; and that 
therefore such principles are morally obligatory for us’ (Lesnoff 1986, p. 136). Rawls 
                                                          
6 Rawls (1972, pp. 302-303) outlines two principles. In summary, the first is that each person is to 
have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties. The second principle is 
that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are firstly, to the greatest benefit 
to the least advantaged, and, secondly, attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity. The principles are ranked in lexical order so it is the first principle of 
liberty that has priority. 
7 Rawls (1972, p. 12, pp. 17-22) calls this the ‘original position’, a purely hypothetical situation where 
‘no-one knows his place in society, his class position or social status’, nor ‘his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities’. The principles of justice are chosen ‘behind this veil of 
ignorance’ and thus the fundamental agreements reached are fair. 
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‘operationalises’ the application of the principles of justice in his basic structure of a just 
society (Rawls 1972, pp. 195-201). 
The role of justice in society is to resolve conflict over the distribution of social primary goods 
(rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth), which each citizen 
wishes to maximise.  Rawls (1972, p. 302) offers an account of the just political constitution 
(upheld by the principle of liberty) and just economic arrangements (upheld by the principle 
of addressing social and economic inequalities), (Rawls, 1972, pp. 302-303). Rawls 
addresses ‘the question of the nature of the obligation of people in the imperfect world…to 
comply with the laws of an imperfectly just society’ (Kukathas and Pettit 1990, p. 48). 
However, while laws and institutions provide a stabilising influence on society, if they are 
unjust they must be changed (Höffe 2013 , p. 6). 
In the context of this thesis, the first principle (liberty) is most relevant. Rawls conceives of 
the state as an association of equal citizens (Rawls 1972, p. 213). A government may limit 
liberty but only when the common interest in the public order of security is at stake. The 
principle of equal liberty requires that citizens have the opportunity to participate in political 
processes. However, a society can never be perfectly just and there must be checks on 
authority to guard against the ‘graver wrongs a society should avoid’ (Rawls 1972, p. 201). A 
just political constitution limits the powers of government. Liberty requires checks and 
balances on the powers of legislatures (for instance, separation of powers, bicameral 
legislatures – and by extension for this thesis, Public Inquiries).  
Rawls is not without his critics. Kukathas and Pettit (1990, pp. 74-151) detail a range of 
critiques , as well as Rawls’ own self critique as he develops his theory. Ellis (2006, p. 544) 
notes that while the language of social contract permeates  a broad range of spheres from 
politics to media and sport, there remain two recurring ‘complaints’: how can political 
authority derive from contract theory’s ‘hypothetical, ahistorical description’ and how can 
authoritative consent be granted by citizens ‘subject to conditions ranging from imperfect to 
utterly disabling?’ (Ellis 2006, p. 544). 
Social contract theory is only one of the possible lenses offered by the broad church of 
political science theory and philosophy. Other political science perspectives highlight 
different aspects of state-society relations and the bases of political obligation, all of which 
could have been chosen to inform and structure this thesis.  
For example, Marxist theories offer an analysis of power that challenges the notion of the 
state as a natural, benevolent or ‘good’ arbiter. Marxist approaches characterise the state as 
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the defender of class domination and exploitation (Heywood 2004, p. 81). Marxist views 
emphasise the emancipation of workers from bourgeois exploitation, social ownership of the 
means of production and an end to class struggles through revolution to bring down 
capitalism and establish a communist state. In Marxist terms, depending on the ‘stage of the 
revolution’, a Public Inquiry could be cast as defender, either of the state, or of the people. 
Weber focusses on institutions and positions power and struggle as the ‘primordial 
components of state-society relations’ (Dusza 1989, p. 73). Power and struggle give rise to 
particular structures in which power is institutionalised. Institutional structures, rather than 
class, give concrete form and direction to political struggle.  
As a form of power, authority is a means of gaining compliance. Weber’s categorisation of 
the three ‘ideal-types’ of authority are traditional authority (based on respect for long held 
customs and traditions), charismatic authority (based on the power of an individual’s 
personality) and legal-rational authority (which attaches to an ‘office’ not office holder, and is 
based in the rule of law). Weber’s view is that legal rational authority is the most dominant 
form of organisation in modern industrial societies and is characteristic of large-scale 
bureaucracies with clearly defined rules (Heywood 2004, p. 135). The exercise of power is 
depersonalised. It is an ‘office’, not an ‘office holder’. Political struggle in the state concerns 
the acquisition of office. While Public Inquiries are ad-hoc, temporary structures, in Weberian 
terms, they may be cast as examples of legal-rational authority. 
Post-industrial societies have seen a shift from individuals as producers and members of a 
class, to individuals as consumers in a fragmented and pluralist society that is more reliant 
on knowledge and communication (Heywood 2004, p. 7).  Post-modernist schools of thought 
have emerged which eschew certainty; assert that all knowledge is partial; and that the 
language that expresses ideas and concepts is itself steeped in complex power relations 
(Heywood 2004, p, 7). Post-modernists emphasis a ‘discourse of power…a subsystem of 
social relations and practices that assign meaning and therefore identities to those that live 
or work within it’ (Heywood 2004, p. 128). Discourses structure relations between people. As 
such, an analysis of Public Inquiries in post-modernist thought would focus on the power 
struggles underpinning the knowledge production and discourse of the Public Inquiry and its 
directions for reform. 
The focus and limitations of this thesis preclude a fuller elaboration of these and other 
perspectives. The brief exposition of these schools of thought serve only to demonstrate a 
small sample of the variety of perspectives and traditions that could have potentially and 
fundamentally informed this thesis, and hence the positioning of Public Inquiries. 
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This thesis also acknowledges that social contract theory ‘presents a wide range of 
perspectives on human nature and the social processes that shape conflict, cooperation, 
and compliance’ (Jos 2006, p. 150). The limits of this thesis prevents a fuller analysis of the 
critiques and variances of social contract theory (however some further exploration is 
undertaken at 2.2.1.2). However, Lesnoff’s deep and intricate examination of social contract 
theory over centuries, and his examination of the contest of ideas about its form, function 
and relevance, draws him to conclude that social contract theory remains a relevant way ‘to 
think about our own society’(Lessnoff 1986, p. 157). In her analysis, Ellis (2006, p. 545) 
takes a step further concluding that the ‘social contract idea remains the basis of 
contemporary democratic politics’. 
Social contract theory is a durable, classical construct. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
author has selected social contract theory to inform the investigation of the research 
question. The author argues that the concept has relevance to the positioning of Public 
Inquiries as powerful tools of the state and citizens to provide checks and balances, and to 
investigate and repair breaches of the social contract. 
1.3.3 Public Inquiries as a public good 
There are a range of theoretical views on the public good that relate to the role and function 
of Public Inquiries. This thesis does not attempt to settle timeless debates about what is the 
public good, public interest, common good or even public domain. However, given the 
positioning of this idea as being central to assessing the success of Public Inquiries this 
warrants some contemplation.  
 
From the means by which Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ works to improve human society 
(Meek 1973, p. ix; Wight 2007, p. 341), Spann’s (1967, p. 23) ‘authoritative “central value 
system” in society’, to Rousseau’s ‘ever constant, invariable and pure’ general will 
(Rousseau 1764, Book I, Chapter VI), there have been many erudite and profound 
dispositions of what constitutes the public good. Perspectives on the public good span from 
Aristotle’s consideration of virtues (MacIntyre 2007; Morrell 2009, 2012, 2016) to 
Habermas’s consideration of post national constellations, the ‘new political configuration’ 
beyond the nation state (Giesen 2004, p.1, Lebeck 2003). In his review of public 
administration reforms in Australia, Nethercote (2003) concludes that ‘Government remains 
in the business of public good, protecting the disadvantaged, promoting economic growth 
and stability and protecting rights’. 
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This researcher respectfully acknowledges the tussles between the great philosophers, and 
the ambiguities and definitional contests that have been contemplated by many great 
thinkers. Yet, even though ‘nearly everyone is convinced that the public interest is vital in 
public policy and governance, [and] there is little agreement as to exactly what it is’ 
(Bozeman 2007, p. 84), it continues nonetheless as a durable, normative concept. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, this researcher adopts Shergold’s (1997) pragmatic working 
definition: the public good is a shorthand signal for shared benefit at a societal level. What is 
this shared benefit? Crooks (2012, p. 1) offers one description of the common good, the 
terms of our social contract and citizens’ expectations:  
We acknowledge that our shared responsibility as citizens in a democracy is to 
debate with tolerance, directly and through our elected representatives, the best 
means to create opportunities, regulations and services that meet the basic needs of 
the population and sustain the environment. There is a general understanding of the 
principle of the separation of powers, with government, the judiciary and the public 
service working independently as part of an integrated system. 
 
We install governments in the expectation that each will serve its full term and act in 
accordance with its mandate to implement policies that advance the common good. 
We recognise the importance of our governments being transparent and 
accountable. At the same time, we see them as having a critical role in promoting 
fairness, social cohesion, economic prosperity and the protection of the most 
vulnerable.  
Morrell (2009) argues that there is a well-established account of what ‘the good’ means in 
political thought, most clearly in Aristotle’s account of virtue. Aristotle suggests that different 
activities ‘aim’ at different good things, ‘the end of the medical art is health; that of 
shipbuilding, a vessel; that of strategy, victory; that of economics, wealth’ (Morell 2009, pp. 
546-547). These can be understood as proximate ends, which is to say each of these ends 
is in themselves subordinate to other activities and ends. Health is not an end in itself, but it 
enables us to pursue other activities and live a good life. 
 
Using this structure, to what ‘end’ does a Public Inquiry contribute? What ‘good’ does an 
Inquiry aim to achieve for its citizens? The ‘end’ of a Public Inquiry is ‘truth’ and ‘though it is 
worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer…to attain it for a nation or for city 
states’ (Morrell 2009, p. 547). Extending this idealised notion, this proximate end, the Public 
Inquiry, contributes to the political administration creating the conditions within which citizens 
can live ‘the good life’ (Morrell 2009, p. 547). Public Inquiries are an important instrument in 
support of the reciprocal obligations between citizens and their governments, or ‘the 
attainment of collective goals’, which are based on the shared values between citizens and 
State (Parsons, 1960, p 187). 
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Marquand (2004, p. 51) offers a different insight. He defines the public domain or public 
realm as ‘the realm of citizenship, equity and service, where pursuit of the public interest 
takes precedence over private ties and market transactions’ which is ‘coterminous with, or at 
least guaranteed and protected by the democratic state’. Marquand (pp. 52-53) argues that 
the public domain: 
depends on public institutions (notably the rule of law), but is not confined to them. 
[The public domain] is best understood as a dimension of social life, with its own 
norms and decision rules, cutting across sectoral boundaries: as a set of 
practices…It is symbiotically linked to the notion of a public interest, in principle 
distinct from private interests; central to it are the values of citizenship, equity and 
service...[In the public domain] citizenship rights trump both market power and 
kinship or neighbourhood bonds; the duties of citizenship take precedence over both 
market incentives and over private loyalties. 
 
In concrete terms, Marquand (2004, p. 53) proposes a list of goods in the public domain 
which includes:  
Fair trials, welcoming public spaces, free public libraries, subsidized opera, mutual 
building societies, safe food, the broadcasts of the BBC world service, the lobbying of 
Amnesty International, clean water, impartial public administration, disinterested 
scholarship, blood donors, magistrates, the minimum wage, the Pennine way and the 
rulings of the Health and Safety Executive.  
Within the social contract tradition, Weale (2013, p. 21-22) states that a viable society must 
possess institutions that enable social cooperation to produce goods and services valued by 
its members. In order to pursue individual interests, individuals accept ‘command over their 
person’ (for example, secure freedom of movement; freedom of expression and 
communication). However, since social cooperation is a necessary condition for these 
individual interests, individuals also have a stake in the public interest, which is made up of 
the interests that they share in common with other members of society. Public goods that 
support this purpose include: 
[A] functioning system of law and order, defence from external armed threats, 
methods of adjudicating conflicts that arise between private interests, general literacy 
and education, protection from environmental hazards, management of common land 
and resources, sanitation and provision against communicable disease, a system of 
transport, agreed weights and measures, maps and geographical information 
systems and instruments of public communication together with a system of news 
reporting and recording that ensures that the use of political power is tested for its 
purpose and justification. 
 
These ‘lists’ constitutes a reasonably stable category, acknowledge the diversity of goods in 
the public domain and offers a more nuanced and flexible approach to defining goods that 
are in some senses public (Morell 2009, p. 542). This thesis posits that Public Inquiries are 
part of these ‘lists’ of goods in the public domain.  
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Critically, Marquand (2004, pp. 55-56) argues that the public domain and its practices are: 
the sources of public trust…public trust, like the domain itself, is an artefact. It is a by-
product of the argument and debate which are part and parcel of the public domain, 
and of the institutions that embody and transmit its values: an epiphenomenon of the 
practice of citizenship… In the public domain, citizens collectively define what the 
public interest is to be, through struggle, argument, debate and negotiation.  
 
Marquand argues that in the public domain, where relationships are necessarily long term: 
‘accountability can come only through Voice - in other words through argument, discussion, 
debate and democratic engagement’ (2004, p. 57). In the public domain Marquand (2004, p. 
55) states: 
Citizens trust each other because, and to the extent that, they are citizens: because, 
and to the extent that, they know that public institutions are governed by an ethic of 
equity and service. If that ceases to be true, if the public domain succumbs to the 
ever-present threat of invasion by the market and private domains, if justice is on 
sale or public offices go to kinsfolk or clients, if professionals behave as if they were 
market traders and nothing else, trust and citizenship are both undermined.  
Marquand argues that a ‘crucial task of the state is to do everything in its power to ensure 
that this does not happen. [The state] is - or ought to be - the guardian of the public domain’ 
(2004, p. 55).  
 
A Public Inquiry is a powerful mechanism by which the State asserts its authority as 
guardian of the public domain. This guardianship is underpinned by the trust of citizens. The 
focus of the literature examined in this thesis (Chapter 2) is on the exercise of this 
guardianship in the form of a Public Inquiry. A focus on the success of a Public Inquiry must 
include consideration of citizens’ views on whether the breach of the social contract, the 
violation of societal norms and expectations is repaired. 
The following Australian examples demonstrate the connection between the breach of the 
social contract and the Public Inquiry they triggered: 
 
Table 1. The connection between the breach of the social contract and the Public Inquiry. 
 
Breach Public Inquiry Response 
Trusted clergy abuse and betray children and 
are subsequently protected by their institution 
(Wright, Swain and McPhillips 2017). 
Royal Commission into Institutional Responses 
to Child Sexual Abuse 2017. 
 
Trusted officials allegedly act corruptly and 
breach Australia’s international sanctions 
The Inquiry into certain Australian companies in 
relation to the UN Oil for Food Programme 
2006. 
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obligations and gain from holding positions of 
power (The Economist 2006, ‘Wheat Scandal’). 
 
Family, friends and neighbours die in floods 
because they were unaware of the proximity 
and intensity of danger, or because help failed 
to arrive (Murray n.d.). 
Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 
2012. 
 
Parents who are well known to the statutory 
child protection department continue to neglect 
their seven-year-old child and she dies alone 
and in squalor because the department failed to 
act (ABC News, 9 November, 2007). 
NSW Special Commission of Inquiry into Child 
Protection 2008. 
 
A news program broadcasts children being 
brutalised and tortured in juvenile detention 
centres (Vanovac 2017). 
Royal Commission into the Protection and 
Detention of Children in the Northern Territory, 
2017. 
After a ‘string of scandals’ (Hutchens 2018) and 
the Australian Broadcasting Commission’s 
‘biggest crowd sourced investigation’, the Four 
Corners Program “Who Cares’, ‘reveals the 
shameful lack of care and dignity experienced 
by many elderly Australians’ (ABC Four 
Corners, 17 September 2018) 
Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and 
Safety, 2018 
The political science and public administration literature contemplates the uses, functions 
and operations of Public Inquiries, their political context, how the Commission is established, 
its terms of reference, processes, report and recommendations. Prasser and Tracey 2014, 
pp. 385-6) conclude that the: 
potential of a public inquiry to serve the public interest lies in its capacity to inform 
debate, clarify facts, develop consensus and improve the quality of public life. Like 
good public policy, there are no hard and fast rules that will guarantee the success of 
an inquiry, nor is there any easy and obvious measure of effectiveness. 
 
This thesis emerges from dissatisfaction with the notion that we relegate the factors of 
success, or even effectiveness, to ‘accidental factors’ [such as] timing, people and political 
events’ (Prasser and Tracey 2014, p. 139), or to ‘”virtu” and “fortuna”’ (Bovens, ‘t Hart and 
Peters 2001, p. 604).  
This thesis finds that there is a gap in the examined literature regarding the extent to which a 
Public Inquiry has ‘served the public interest’ and by this omission, underplays the significant 
place of these powerful bodies for citizens. There is value is pursuing this agenda in order to 
develop a more holistic analytical perspective. 
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1.4 Overview of the Public Inquiry literature 
There is not an extensive empirical or theoretical literature on Public Inquiries. Prasser’s 
(2003, 2006) definitive work in mapping the landscape of the use of Public Inquiries in 
Australia builds on previous work by Smith and Weller (1978) and Weller (1994). Prasser 
(2003, pp. 51-52) argues that Public Inquiries are a largely ignored area of study and that 
accurately defining Public Inquiries is a long-standing problem. Prasser argues that this has 
contributed to a lack of recognition of Public Inquiries ‘as a distinct type of advisory body with 
particular features and therefore possibly serving certain roles in the political system’ 
(Prasser 2003, p. 52). However, Prasser’s (2003, pp. 51-65) seminal work on defining what 
a Public Inquiry is, and differentiating it from other forms of advisory functions, provides a 
critical benchmark in this literature.  
Further, given the varied nature and purposes of Public Inquiries, there have been a number 
of attempts at classification. Inquiries have been variously classified by function, 
membership, organisational form, process and policy issues (Peachment 2006, pp. 28-29, 
Prasser 2003, pp. 43-44). However, as Public Inquiries tend to share features and 
processes, a clear classification system has proven elusive. According to O’Connor (2007), 
‘fact finding’ or ‘investigatory’ inquiries are most often established in the aftermath of a 
tragedy or scandal, usually with political implications where the public’s confidence or trust in 
a public institution has been shaken. ‘Policy’ based inquiries are mandated to examine a 
particular area or issue of public policy and make recommendations for future policy 
direction. Some Public Inquiries share the elements of both categories of Inquiry and are 
both investigatory and policy advisory (such as the Queensland Flood Commission of Inquiry 
2012; 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission). For the purpose of this research these 
Inquiries will be referred to as ‘hybrids’. 
However, questions pertaining to the success of Public Inquiries are typically eschewed in 
the literature, with a cursory, explanatory note that the role of Public Inquiries is only to make 
recommendations to government. It is the responsibility of government to accept or reject 
recommendations, to choose the mechanisms and timing of implementation, and to meet 
funding obligations. It is therefore unfair or misplaced to assess the success of a Public 
Inquiry by virtue of the extent to which its recommendations were accepted and have led to 
positive outcomes. Recommendations for reform are provided to government on a ‘take it or 
leave it basis’ (Banks 2013, p. 3). Once it has reported, the Public Inquiry ‘shuts up shop’ 
(Hanrahan 2016). Findings may or may not inform policy or new legislation. Reports and 
deliberations of Public Inquiries can be met with a variety of responses; from enthusiasm to 
falling ‘on stony ground’ (Bulmer 1981, p. 374).   
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Most discussions of success, therefore, revert to the internal workings of the Public Inquiry, 
namely, its processes of consultation and deliberation, whether it came within budget and 
met its reporting deadlines. Given society’s expectations of Public Inquiries, such 
assessments fall short of recognising the significance of these powerful institutions.  
 
In fact, attempts to assess the success of Public Inquiries in the literature are rare.  
Research in this area is hampered by a lack of clear research questions and is typically 
based on individual case studies (Barnes and Harris 2011; Cunneen 2001) where ‘we are 
repeatedly provided with descriptive narratives of what different inquiries did and proposed’ 
(Prasser 2003, p. 46; Gilligan 2002, p. 292). Some articles and books are written as 
reflections of those who have been involved in, or led, Public Inquiries (Barnes and Harris 
2011; Cunneen 2001; Davies 2014; Hodgetts 2007; O’Neil 2001). Banks (2014, pp. 118-
130) considers the preconditions for an effective Inquiry and proposes ‘six determinants of 
success that are in the control of government’, including asking the right questions and 
ensuring transparency. 
 
This thesis examines the institution of Public Inquiries, that is, as a shared construct 
organised by rules, norms and strategies (Frederickson and Smith 2003, pp. 71-72), and as 
a recurring feature of political systems in many countries around the world (Prasser 2003). 
The focus of this research is broader than any one Public Inquiry. It is on assessing the 
success of the institution of Public Inquiries itself, not on the outcomes or perspectives of a 
particular Public Inquiry.  
As such, the thesis does not use the lenses provided by organisational or legal theory to 
examine the structure or operation of any particular Public Inquiry, its legal parameters or 
conventions. Nor does the thesis look inside the entity known as the Public Inquiry to assess 
the relative merits of organising in various ways, the type of leadership provided by the 
Commissioner(s), the logistics, composition, resourcing, governance arrangements or quality 
of evidence. Undoubtedly much is to be learned by looking into this ‘black box’ of the ad-hoc 
organisation that is the Public Inquiry, and which factors contribute to the success or 
otherwise of the Inquiry, and the quality of its outcomes. They are not the focus of this thesis. 
The invisibility of attempts to address the question of the success of Public Inquiries is 
puzzling. Eschewing such questions runs contrary to public administration trends. All 
Australian governments over recent decades have strived to introduce transparency and 
accountability systems for the expenditure of public funds, program and outcome evaluations 
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and consumer feedback mechanisms (Nethercote 2003). Yet, why is there no ‘overarching 
framework of analysis and comparison’ with regard to Public Inquiries (Prasser 2003, p. 46)? 
Why is there so little discussion, let alone agreement, about what types of measures or 
factors might be used to assess success, nor how these might be applied across a range of 
cases (Brahm 2007, p. 24)? One argument is that Public Inquiries ‘are too diverse in their 
effects to be tied down to a uniform explanatory model’ (Gilligan 2002, p. 289). Such 
questions could be the basis of a rich research agenda, though they are not the purpose of 
this thesis. 
 
According to Peachment (2006, p. 29) ‘assessing overall effectiveness in terms of the 
reforms and system change a given commission helps bring about, is the most important 
question to be posed and the most difficult to comment upon’. Mackie argues (2012, p. 8) 
there are few empirical or theoretical foundations to know whether ‘the outcome of Inquiries 
made any discernible difference to the conduct of public life’. It is to this issue that the thesis 
aims to make a contribution.  
1.5 Parallels with Truth Commissions 
There are strong parallels between the literatures on Public Inquiries and Truth 
Commissions. Truth Commissions are defined as bodies set up to investigate past human 
rights abuses and to examine a pattern of human rights abuses over time, rather than a 
specific event (Brahm 2004, p. 16). Truth Commissions are temporary bodies, and are 
officially sanctioned, authorised and empowered by the State (Brahm 2004; Hayner 2001). 
They do not have prosecutorial powers to bring cases to trial, nor do they act as judicial 
bodies to investigate individuals accused of crimes (Chapman and Ball 2001, p. 2). The role 
of a Truth Commission is truth finding, or more precisely, documenting and acknowledging a 
legacy of conflict and human rights violations as a step toward healing (Hayner 1994, pp. 
607-608). A Truth Commission can also ‘go beyond a court of law and render a moral 
judgement about what was wrong and unjustifiable’ (Chapman and Ball 2001, p. 3). There 
are clear parallels between Truth Commissions and Public Inquiries as defined in this thesis. 
In fact, Stanton (2010, p. 15) characterises Truth Commissions as a specialised form of 
Public Inquiry, and that it is ‘the ability of a commission of inquiry to “search for truth and 
justice” that made it suitable for adaptation to the human rights context’. 
Over past decades the establishment of Truth Commissions has been a recurring feature of 
post-conflict processes; ‘a “staple” of transitional justice mechanisms and an “imperative” for 
societies emerging from repressive regimes or intra-state conflict’ (Ben-Josef Hirsch 2014, p. 
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811).  While ‘counting rules’ differ between authors about how many have been established 
(Brahm 2004, 2007, 2009; Taylor and Dukalskis, 2012; Tepperman, 2002), there is broad 
agreement that Truth Commissions have become institutionalised as ‘a permanent feature of 
transitional and post-conflict practices’ (Ben-Josef Hirsch, p. 811). Yet, like Public Inquiries 
there is ‘scant evidence-based assessment of their successful impact’ (Ben-Josef Hirsch, p. 
811). As with the literature on Public Inquiries in general, Brahm (2007, p. 16) states that: 
most studies focus on a small biased sub sample of cases, rely on anecdotal 
evidence and normative conviction, and fail to follow the Truth Commission’s legacy 
beyond its immediate reception. What is more, although a range of purposes have 
been put forward for Truth Commissions, there is little consensus on what criteria 
might be used to assess them. 
 
Studies usually take the form of case studies and small-N comparisons and, like the 
literature on Public Inquiries, much of this literature is dominated by those who have led, or 
worked on, the Commission. This raises the potential for bias. There are ‘no established 
methods or mechanisms for measuring the impacts of [Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions]…[and there are] contradictions and inadequacies in existing efforts to 
measure the impacts and successes of commissions’ (Ben-Josef Hirsch, Mackenzie and 
Sesay 2012, p. 386). 
 
For Truth Commissions, like Public Inquiries, Ben-Josef Hirsch, MacKenzie and Sesay 
(2012, p. 387) state that: 
empirically assessing their assumed positive effects has been challenging. In fact, 
there is little knowledge and next to no consensus about the actual long-term 
consequences and impact of [Truth and Reconciliation Commissions]. Moreover 
there are virtually no established mechanisms for measuring these consequences 
and therefore for assessing the overall success of the commissions in achieving their 
stated objectives. 
 
Given the similarity of challenges across these powerful institutions, of which society has 
high expectations, this thesis draws on the Truth Commission literature where possible in 
order to apply any lessons that are pertinent to the research question.         
 
 
 
 
 
1.6 Why success? Why not effectiveness? And what’s the difference?  
 
Success: ‘pleasing to the eye and comforting to the ear’  
(McConnell 2010b, p. 2), 
20 
 
 
The research question for this thesis is deliberately framed around success, in full 
knowledge that success has both objective and subjective elements. There are many lenses 
on success. At its most elemental, success can be defined simply - did the Public Inquiry 
fulfil the duties assigned to it (Brahm 2007, p. 17)? Given the diversity of purposes, 
structures, powers and political environments within which they operate this idiosyncratic, 
particularised assessment of success is relatively straightforward. It may indeed be part of 
the reason that most existing attempts to assess success take the form of a single case 
study approach. 
 
Objectively it is possible to examine a Public Inquiry’s processes and determine how 
successful it has been at being inclusive and consultative, for example, by way of the 
number of submissions, number and scope of public consultations. It is also possible to 
objectively measure the number of successful prosecutions occurring as a result of a Public 
Inquiry, or count the number of recommendations accepted by government. These ‘counts’ 
may be important, but there is no benchmark against which to establish whether these are 
large, small or average numbers, or whether such comparisons are useful at all. 
 
It is a truism to say that success means different things to different people at different times 
(Bovens and ‘t Hart 1996). Subjectively, and as a relational term, success depends in great 
measure on who you are, where you sit, and your interest or investment in the area under 
scrutiny by a Public Inquiry. Success for a senior bureaucrat under intense scrutiny because 
of an inadequate emergency response will be different to success for a politician facing 
corruption charges, a government aiming to drive a particular agenda, or the mother of a 
child who has been sexually abused in foster care because of the failures of child protection 
policy and practice. Ransley (2014, p. 69) provides, as an example of the different 
perspectives on success and failure, the 1963 Gibbs Royal Commission, which, while it 
failed to uncover systemic police corruption, ‘did succeed in the government’s objective of 
taking police corruption off the public agenda for the next 25 years’. Citing the ‘planning 
disaster’ that was the construction of the Sydney Opera House, Bovens, ‘t Hart and Peters 
(2001, p. 20) also remind us that issues that seemed highly controversial at the time have a 
temporal component and may have since ‘evaporated or changed shape’, fundamentally 
changing our assessment of success or failure.  
 
Success is also relative to intention, that is, what was the intention of the policy change or 
reform (Harrison 2001, p. 277)? Success can also be assessed on a comparative basis - 
was the Inquiry successful as compared with what would have been achieved through a 
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judicial process, a parliamentary inquiry, regular democratic or policy processes? 
Significantly, success is also multi-dimensional, so success may be partial8. On some 
measures an Inquiry may be able to be assessed as successful, but not on others. For 
instance, whilst the majority of recommendations of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody are yet to be implemented, there is broad agreement that this Inquiry 
forever changed public discourse and continues to influence policy and contemporary 
narratives (Cunneen 2001).9  
 
Assessing success could also focus on outcomes. For example, was the Public Inquiry 
successful in achieving its intended outcomes, did the recommendations achieve better 
public policy, programs, services and outcomes? However, as previously noted, this 
approach is flawed because a Public Inquiry is not responsible for implementation. Policy 
choices, timeframes and resourcing of the implementation of accepted recommendations 
rest with government, not the Inquiry. Monitoring and reporting on implementation and 
outcomes rests with government, not the Inquiry.  
Assessing success therefore emerges as a complex, nuanced task. This is highlighted 
empirically in Bovens, ‘t Hart and Peters (2001) foundational comparative work comprising 
24 case studies across six European states. Bovens, ‘t Hart and Peters (2001, pp. 20-22) 
focus on notions of success and failure across different governance tasks and key 
governance challenges in four different sectors. Often their assessments are equivocal. 
Typically, their assessments contain a mix of successes and failures. 
 
Critically, success is always a judgement which is deeply contextual, and probably temporal. 
Bovens, ‘t Hart and Peters (2001, p. 10) claim that a study of success and failure: 
is inevitably also a study of politics. The assessment of success and failure of 
particular policies or programmes is in the end a political judgement…because the 
criteria for success and failure are in the end dependent on implicit visions of the 
good life and the power of man to influence fate…[and] because political actors, such 
as interest groups, politicians, journalists and voters are the main judges. 
 
Edelman (1998, p. 43) argues that ‘[beliefs] about success and failure are among the most 
arbitrary of political constructions and perhaps the least likely to be recognized as arbitrary’. 
                                                          
8 McConnell (2010, pp. 55-80) dissects the success/failure of process, programs and politics on the 
following spectrum:  success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success, failure. 
9 See also Duffy and Huggins 2016, viewed15 September 2016, 
https://changetherecord.org.au/blog/news/a-generation-of-government-failure-time-for-change. 
Further, on the 25th anniversary of the Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody, see the Special Report in The Conversation, 15 April 2016 viewed 18 January 2018, 
https://theconversation.com/au/topics/royal-commission-special-report-26622 
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Judgements about success or failure are also ‘highly contingent’, and ‘malleable’ (Bovens, ‘t 
Hart and Peters 2001, p. 178, p. 180) and inevitably involve biases. Bovens, ‘t Hart and 
Peters (2001, p. 180) distinguish between structural, agency-centred, institutional or cultural 
accounts of success or failure. The authors also contemplate asymmetries between political 
and programmatic performances, that is, why programmatic success may not be political 
success and vice versa (pp. 22-25, p. 606). 
 
McConnell’s (2010a, 2010b) research also highlights the asymmetries between 
programmatic, policy and political success. According to McConnell (2010b, p. 3), despite its 
critical relevance across many disciplines, there is a paucity of research on policy success. 
In some senses it may be easier to identify failure. For example, did the Public Inquiry fail to 
investigate thoroughly, did it fail to deliver an evidence-based report, did it fail in getting 
government to take its recommendations seriously? 
 
The measure most often used in the literature examined in this thesis is effectiveness, not 
success (for example, Prasser and Tracey 2014, pp. 225-232). Effectiveness is essentially 
the degree to which something is successful in producing a desired result. But what is the 
desired result? Public Inquiries are established by governments, so this begs the question; 
why did the government establish the Inquiry? What was the result desired by government? 
Sometimes the answers to these questions are less than explicit, and as Sulitzeanu-Kenan 
(2010, p. 632), observes, ‘are typically covert, and – in the unlikely event that they are 
articulated by office holders – unreliable’. Further, this thesis argues that government is not 
the only interested party in the success, or even effectiveness, of Public Inquiries.  
Another lens on effectiveness is provided by Prasser and Tracey (2014, p. 225). They state 
that ‘the real measure’ of [a Public Inquiry’s] effectiveness, lies in the persuasiveness of its 
arguments and the quality of its report’. However, this definition is particular to an Inquiry and 
underplays the significance of these powerful institutions for citizens. 
This thesis finds that there are yet few robust propositions or frameworks to assess how 
successful Public Inquiries are in resolving public problems, particularly from the perspective 
of citizens. Effectiveness does not equal success. Success is broad and assessed in many 
ways and from many perspectives. Effectiveness may be part of assessing success, but it is 
particular and pertains to a specific Public Inquiry; its processes, function and outputs. Given 
the power and status of these institutions, the importance of the matters they investigate and 
society’s expectations of them, a lens of effectiveness is important, but insufficient. 
Effectiveness does not take into consideration the significance of Public Inquiries for society 
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and its citizens. Effectiveness pertains to a particular Public Inquiry and does not provide any 
explanatory power across Public Inquiries. Effectiveness goes to questions of the extent to 
which a Public Inquiry; met its terms of reference; was inclusive; the number and type of 
submissions it received; the breadth of its hearings; the quality and scope of its research or 
investigatory efforts; whether it came within budget; met its reporting deadlines; the quality of 
its report and recommendations. Some of these are in the control of the appointing 
government, for example, terms of reference, timing, resources. Others are the responsibility 
of the Public Inquiry itself, like independence, expertise, processes and recommendations 
(Prasser and Tracey 2014, p. 228). These are all important matters, but their focus is the 
Public Inquiry itself and the extent to which the Inquiry effectively performed the functions 
given to it by government. The focus of this thesis is not the internal workings of a Public 
Inquiry.  
In Making Inquiries (2009, p. 165), the Australian Law Reform Commission states that given 
‘the many and varied functions of Public Inquiries, their effectiveness is measured in a 
number of ways, for example, by implementation of reports, critical feedback from experts, 
judicial and academic citation of reports, or even the way that recommendations affect 
popular thinking on social issues’. This amorphous ‘influence by osmosis’ thesis may be 
alluring but empirically is difficult to test (Sheriff 1983, p. 678). 
 
A promising but nascent approach may be assessing impact. Prasser and Tracey (2014, p. 
227) suggest that an: 
appropriate measure of the impact of a public inquiry is a judgment about the value of 
the policy changes it recommends, assessed in terms of the public interest or 
common good…followed by a second more meaningful question…is the outcome of 
the inquiry better public policy? …The soundness of an Inquiry’s findings rather than 
their actual implementation is therefore what should be measured. 
 
This two-step process is also echoed by Banks (2013, p. 7). This is a promising approach 
but is yet to be reflected in the literature. This thesis expands on the centrality of the notion 
of the ‘public interest or common good’ in assessing the success of a Public Inquiry.  
 
1.7 Research design 
The central objective of this thesis is to assess the success of Public Inquiries in Australia. 
The intent of this thesis was not to predefine what success is, but to assess some of the 
recurring assertions in the literature about what a successful Public Inquiry looks like. Three 
recurring theoretical propositions are distilled from the public administration and political 
science literature which is reviewed in Chapter 2. These are that Public Inquiries: respond to 
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crisis and restore legitimacy of government; give voice to the public, including stakeholders, 
‘victims’ and experts; and provide the opportunity for policy change and improved outcomes.  
These propositions are developed into an analytical framework in Chapter 3 which is then 
applied to the three different types of Public Inquiries identified in the literature. These are: 
 Investigatory - a Public Inquiry which investigates allegations or seeks to find the 
cause of a particular catastrophic event such as a disaster or accident, or to check 
some suspected impropriety (Prasser 2003, pp. 85-91, after Hallett 1982). The 
investigatory case study in this thesis is the Inquiry into certain Australian companies 
in relation to the UN Oil for Food Programme 2006 (Chapter 4); 
 Policy advisory - a Public Inquiry which aims to inform, summarise and propose 
suggestions to government on the possible solution to a particular policy problem 
(Prasser 2003, pp. 85-91, after Hallett 1982). The policy advisory case study in this 
thesis is the Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry 2013 (Chapter 5); 
 Hybrid - a Public Inquiry which has both investigatory and policy advisory functions. 
The hybrid case study in this thesis is the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 
2012 (Chapter 6). 
 
An example of each type of Public Inquiry was selected in order to assess whether the 
analytical framework holds across Inquiry types or whether it is more relevant to particular 
types of Public Inquiries. The process and rationale for each case study selected for analysis 
is outlined at Appendix 1. 
 
By examining Inquiry reports, government responses, media and academic commentary, 
findings are drawn for each case study against each of the three theoretical propositions 
(Chapters 4 to 6). This analysis yields an equivocal result. However, the primary focus on 
how Public Inquiries serve governments, rather than how they serve citizens, is revealed. 
The lack of feedback sought from those who have participated in the Public Inquiry, or the 
public more generally, is also noted. Further analysis is then undertaken utilising citizen 
perspectives which are publicly available. These are drawn from various proxies such as 
media commentary, parliamentary processes, legal action and subsequent Inquiries. 
Analysis using these proxies provides significant insights into how citizens assess the 
success of the Public Inquiry. The value of incorporating citizen perspectives into the 
analysis of success is demonstrated.  
The analysis of the three illustrative case studies drives the argument that the three 
propositions for success drawn from the public administration and political science literature 
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provide significant insights, but focus primarily on the perspective of the State. This is 
undoubtedly important but, as this thesis argues that Public Inquiries express a significant 
dimension of the social contract between state and citizens, this perspective is incomplete.  
The analysis confirms the lack of focus on citizen perspectives. The propositions of success 
do not adequately address considerations of the ‘public interest or common good’ (Prasser 
and Tracey 2014, p. 227). They fail to capture the meaning and significance of a Public 
Inquiry to citizens, or the trust invested in its deliberations and outcomes.  
In none of the case studies analysed, or indeed in the examined literature, are there 
mechanisms for gauging citizens’ views or perspectives on success. The only available 
windows into these perspectives are through proxies such as the media and parliamentary, 
democratic or legal processes. There are no mechanisms that capture the views of those 
who participate, have an interest in, or who are affected by the workings and outcomes of a 
Public Inquiry, or that capture the place of a Public Inquiry in the social contract between 
government and citizens. However, in each case study, these proxies for citizen responses 
to the Public Inquiry are identified and then applied. These perspectives provide significant 
insights into whether citizens assessed that the Public Inquiry was successful in repairing the 
breach and rebuilding the social contract.   
The implications of these findings for scholarship and further research are articulated 
(Chapter 7). These insights form the basis of a revised framework for assessing success 
which emerges inductively from the research process. Regardless of their varied forms, 
processes or subjects, this thesis argues that, as part of the reciprocal obligations shared 
between citizens and government, the overarching purpose of Public Inquiries is to rebuild 
the social contract after it has been breached.  
Within this purpose, three enduring functions of Public Inquiries are identified: to respond, to 
hear and to prevent. These three functions provide a framework for assessing the success of 
a Public Inquiry. The propositions for success are reframed as: whether the Public Inquiry 
was trusted to make sense of events; whether people were heard; and whether the Public 
Inquiry rights wrongs and thus changes policy, processes or outcomes for the better 
(Chapter 7). This represents a significant shift from the propositions derived from public 
administration and political science literature.  
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
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Chapter 2 reviews an extensive literature on public administration and management, political 
science, public policy and crisis, as it is these bodies of literature that concern themselves 
with Public Inquiries. Chapter 2 concludes by distilling three recurring propositions of 
success from the literature, that is, an assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should 
examine the ways in which it responds to crisis and restores legitimacy, gives voice, and 
provides the opportunity for policy change and improved outcomes. These three propositions 
form the basis of the analytical framework which is then applied to three illustrative case 
studies (Chapters 4-6). 
Chapter 3 describes and defends the research design. This chapter concludes with the 
introduction of the analytical framework based on the three recurring propositions of success 
drawn from the literature. The following three chapters are the three Australian case studies, 
which form the empirical base of this research. The three propositions of success are 
applied to the case studies.  
Chapter 4 presents and discusses Case Study 1: The Inquiry into certain Australian 
companies in relation to the UN Oil for Food Programme 2006 - an investigatory Public 
Inquiry. Chapter 5 is Case Study 2: The Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry 
2013 - a policy advisory Public Inquiry. Chapter 6 is Case Study 3: The Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry 2012 - a hybrid Public Inquiry. 
Each case study includes a brief background to the establishment of the Public Inquiry, the 
parameters of the Inquiry itself, its report and findings and the government’s response. The 
three propositions of success derived from the literature are applied to each case study and 
an assessment is made regarding the success of the Public Inquiry. This process highlights 
and identifies the limitations of this analytical framework and the perspectives upon which it 
is derived. Each case study analysis concludes that the propositions, which are grounded 
mainly in the perspective of governments, yield ambiguous results. However, each case 
study also identifies markers or proxies which are indicators of the perspectives of citizens.  
Chapter 7 consolidates the findings of the case study analyses, confirms that the 
propositions of success focus on the perspective of the State, and highlights the significant 
omission of citizen perspectives. This chapter then conducts an analysis of each Public 
Inquiry utilising the proxies for citizen responses to the Inquiry revealed through the case 
study analyses. These include media, legal action, parliamentary processes and subsequent 
Inquiries. This analysis highlights citizens’ views and provides a clearer assessment of the 
success of the Public Inquiry. A number of questions arising from the case study analyses 
are also posed which challenge some of the recurring themes in the literature.  
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From these findings, the implications for scholarship are then identified. The thesis then 
moves to inductively building theory. The insights gained from the case study analyses, and 
revisiting a broader range of literature, inductively lead to the development of a new 
analytical framework. This revised framework is structured around the conclusions of this 
thesis as to the overarching, unifying purpose of Public Inquiries: to repair the breach of the 
social contract after breach, and their three enduring functions for society: to respond; to 
hear; and to prevent. The propositions of success are reframed as an examination of, first, 
the ways in which the Public Inquiry is trusted to make sense of the events or the violation of 
expectations. Second, the ways in which people were heard. Third, the ways in which the 
Public Inquiry rights wrongs and thus changes policy, processes or outcomes for the better. 
An alternate analytical framework is proposed, which incorporates citizen perspectives and 
is not centred mainly on the perspective of the State. The chapter then offers possible 
approaches drawn from a range of literatures to assess success. Promising literatures and 
empirical frameworks are explored which offer some potential to assess the success of 
Public Inquiries from this more holistic view. This nascent framework emerges as a 
contribution to the literature. 
 
Chapter 8 summarises the findings and implications of this research.  
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews an extensive inter-disciplinary literature on Public Inquiries that 
includes; political science, public administration, management and policy, crisis and change 
literatures, and examines contested perspectives on what characterises a successful Public 
Inquiry. These literatures have been examined as they offer insights into the role and 
function of Public Inquiries, as well as the political and societal contexts in which they are 
formed and operate. These literatures also offer perspectives on the outcomes of Public 
Inquiries.  In summary, for political scientists the criteria for success revolve around 
questions of whether the Public Inquiry provides a response to crisis, restores the legitimacy 
of government, and gives voice to stakeholders. In contrast, the public management 
literature focuses on questions of how successful the Public Inquiry has been in improving 
the responsiveness and efficiency of organisations and service delivery. From public policy 
and participation perspectives, the key questions of success relate mainly to the extent to 
which there have been better policy outcomes, broadened participation and changes in 
policy networks over the short and long term.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw on the literature to distil recurring propositions of how 
to assess the success of Public Inquiries. Three propositions are identified and these form 
the basis of the analytical framework that is applied to three selected case studies which are 
discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  These propositions suggest that an assessment of the 
success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in which a Public Inquiry: has 
responded to a crisis and restored legitimacy; given voice to the public, including 
stakeholders, ‘victims’ or experts; and provided the opportunity for policy change and 
improved outcomes. 
2.2 Theoretical perspectives on Public Inquiries 
The primary theoretical perspectives on the role and function of Public Inquiries are offered 
through the political science and public administration literature10. The literature offers a 
range of perspectives including those relating to: crisis; public policy; public management 
and institutional change; and public participation. Each perspective provides possible, but 
                                                          
10 The author acknowledges that many scholars work across the fields of political science and public 
administration. The intent is not to delimit the domain of each discipline (Wildavsky, 2004, p. 386). 
Distinctions are drawn for illustrative purposes only, that is, to highlight the various contributions and 
contested views on success. 
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different, propositions of success, and within each perspective, there are contested views. 
Further, these perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Much of the political science 
literature considers participation and policy networks.  Public policy literature contemplates 
policy coalitions. Public management literature contemplates institutional and organisational 
change. For the purpose of this thesis the attribution of propositions to various bodies of 
literature serves to delineate and crystallise elements that may together build an analytical 
framework to assess success. However, the core, recurring tension between all of the 
literature examined is the extent to which the central function of a Public Inquiry is ‘to blame’ 
or ‘to learn’. 
2.2.1 Political science, public administration and crisis perspectives 
There are many perspectives expressed about the role and purpose of Public Inquiries 
including policy making, avoiding blame and achieving political objectives. Each of these 
suggests different ways of assessing success.  
Considine (2005, pp 100-101) observes that apart from the responsible Minister, Public 
Inquiries ‘are the most common alternate sources of [policy] proposals’. Inquiries bring 
different types of expertise into policy debates and create an arena for interest groups to 
press their perspectives (Capling & Galligan 1992, Glezer 1982). Gilligan (2002, p. 296) 
asserts that they provide ‘breathing space’ for government by inserting an eminent Inquiry 
between events and the government’s response. Others argue that Public Inquiries insulate 
elites from blame and control the parameters of scrutiny focused on dominant policy systems 
and sub-systems (Boin, McConnell and ‘t Hart 2008; Prasser 2006; Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2006; 
2007).  
 
McConnell, Gauja and Botterill’s (2008) study of the Australian Wheat Board scandal 
contemplates the role of official Inquiries in helping frame contests over meaning and 
directing the spotlight away from government and its policies. Butler and Drakeford (2005 p. 
4) suggest that Public Inquiries ‘are important sites where a variety of professional, 
ideological and personal positions compete for dominance’ as well as being ‘foundations on 
which history can be rewritten’. The ‘establishment of an Inquiry ipso facto demonstrates that 
claims-makers have been successful in transforming a set of particular events into 
something of wider significance’ (Butler and Drakeford 2005, p. 234).  
What motivates a particular government to establish a Public Inquiry in some instances, and 
not others, is less clear. Sulitzeanu-Kenan’s (2010, p. 631) finds that ‘when things go wrong, 
the interplay of the politics of blame, public agenda (issue salience) and government 
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popularity determines the choice of whether to establish a commission of inquiry’. Banks 
(2014, p. 131) states that ‘experience tells us that governments do not always resort to 
public inquiries with noble intent’. Inquiries ‘have a political impact because that is the 
government’s intention in appointing them – to achieve clear vested political objectives’ 
(Ransley 2014, p. 60). Others emphasise that Public Inquiries are established to avoid 
blame and/or to reduce the level of public interest in the affair by ‘kicking the ball into the 
long grass’ (Public Administration Select Committee 2005, p. 9), by depoliticising the event 
and deflecting controversy (Woodhouse 1995, p. 25). Sulitzeanu-Kenan’s research finds that 
while the ‘long grass argument’ is not supported (2007, p. 641) there is some preliminary 
support for the feasibility of the role of Public Inquiries as a blame avoidance strategy 
(Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010 p. 613). D’Ombrain (in Stanton 2010, p. 10) concludes that 
sometimes Public Inquiries are established ‘more as a gesture of puzzled goodwill than a 
clear sighted initiative’.  
 
McConnell, Gauja and Botterill (2008 p. 600) build on the idea of the ‘role of official inquiries 
in directing the spotlight away from government and its policies’. Parker and Dekker (2008, 
pp. 255-282) propose that official inquiries play three roles: as fact finding mechanisms and 
learning devices; a realpolitik function (that is, as ‘arenas of opportunity’ where various 
players compete); and a symbolic function as interpretive authorities and in the protection 
and maintenance of key office holders. In this schema: 
if astute political leaders can, through their formal powers, steer investigative 
committees in particular directions, then they are steering the blame game and 
effectively closing off formal debate on alternative routes; closing off the possibility 
that ‘learning’ will involve unwanted change (in policies and/or leadership), but 
reinforcing this with the appearance of impartiality (McConnell, Gauja and Botterill 
2008, p. 605). 
 
Important or respected figures often head such Public Inquiries. This is ‘to ensure that their 
creation and deliberations remain above partisan or public reproach’ (Howlett and Ramesh 
2003, p. 116). O’Connor (2007) states that a Public Inquiry Commissioner combines a 
number of roles; ‘that of a fact finder, like a judge; a proposer for policy reform; a healer for 
traumatised communities; and a manager with responsibility for budgets and an 
administrative and legal staff’. 
 
Establishing a Public Inquiry may also serve to demonstrate that government is not being 
passive, symbolising ‘a reassertion of moral order’ (Hill 1990, pp. 207-209). According to 
Kennet (1937, p. 408) Public Inquiries perform three functions:  
‘[firstly] a tribal dance to persuade the general public to believe that something very 
active was in progress…[secondly] the medicine hut…into which [the medicine man] 
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retired for a long period with the object of persuading the tribe that something very 
important was going on and that it was essential that they should wait for his 
emergence…[and thirdly, the] dog-fight. When a Government finds itself extremely 
hard put to it to distract the attention of the public from one of the fundamental human 
ills for which the public expects a remedy from the Government, and for which the 
Government is sorry it can find no remedy, it promotes a dog-fight between the 
people with different views, and for starting a dog-fight there is no method so 
valuable as that of a Royal Commission 
 
For Hill (1990, pp. 207-209) Public Inquiries segregate abuse and abusers from the rest of 
society, preserving ‘cherished values’ and ‘exerting authority’. Inquiries are thus a mode for 
dealing with ‘moral panic’ (Parton, 1981, pp. 391-395), and ‘appease public disquiet’ (Hill 
1990, p. 207). Gilligan (2002, pp. 289-90, p. 296) argues that while Public Inquiries can be 
‘deeply ambiguous, both in their process and in their effects’, they are ‘an important 
component of official discourse’. Gilligan (2002, pp. 289-90) argues that Public Inquiries play 
a pragmatic role in that they investigate an issue, collect information, write a report and 
make recommendations for government but that they also play a ‘broader political or 
ideological function as a management strategy…for centralised authority’. Mackie (2012, p. 
7) argues that Public Inquiries play a ‘cathartic role-holding people and organisations to 
account for their actions, and rebuilding public confidence after a devastating event or after 
suggestions of significant harmful conduct’. Sheriff (1983, pp. 676-677) identifies the vital 
role that Public Inquiries play as ‘balloon raisers’ where, ‘it is not the quality or type of 
balloon that has been raised that is important, but rather the fact that it has been raised at 
all’. Sheriff argues that the value of Public Inquiries is that their reports ‘are not the result of a 
hidden discourse within the regular bureaucracy, but rather of an open forum with wide 
participation’ (1983, p. 676). The form and content of the recommendations hardly matter. 
What matters is that ‘their recommendations be used to test the temperature of public 
reaction so that the resulting policy can take such reaction into account’ (1983, p. 677). 
2.2.1.1 Crisis perspectives 
While varied in their purpose and structure, Public Inquiries are often established in 
response to a crisis of some form. Crisis literature therefore provides relevant perspectives 
on success.  In fact, Boin ‘t Hart, McConnell and Preston (2010) argue that Public Inquiries 
appear ‘a near inevitable by-product of crises’ (Boin ‘t Hart, McConnell and Preston 2010, p. 
707). The crisis may also be one of confidence, when ‘the restoration of public confidence in 
the integrity of a vital element of public life is the paramount public interest’ (Fitzgerald 1987, 
p. 10). Fitzgerald (1987, p. 350) argues that a Public Inquiry ‘is a body with extraordinary 
powers set up to cope with an extraordinary situation. The justification for its existence is a 
crisis of public confidence’. 
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 If, then, as is regularly asserted in the literature, Public Inquiries are established as a 
response to crisis, a clearer understanding of crisis is required to assist in refining the 
approach.  
Crisis disrupts the ‘patterns of politics, order and shared meaning’ (Frederickson and Smith 
2003, p. 71), at least temporarily. A further recurring assertion is that crises lead to change. 
However, there are contested views of what constitutes a crisis, why some events are 
framed as crises and others are not, and whether crises really do lead to change. While 
there is a recurring theme that crises ‘often cast long shadows on the polities in which they 
occur’ (Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 2009, p. 81; Edelman 1977, pp. 43-55), perusal of the 
literature suggests that despite many definitions ‘a consensus does not exist about a 
particular way of conceptualising or examining crises’ or even whether a consensus is 
actually required (Dayton 2004, pp. 165-194). However, for the purposes of this thesis the 
following definition is adopted (McConnell 2011, p. 63): 
Crises are extraordinary episodes which disturb and threaten established patterns of 
working and dominant assumptions about the way aspects of society operate. They 
can threaten lives, property, markets, infrastructure, public services, policy agendas, 
political careers and even governing paradigms. Such threats, combined with high 
uncertainty, place enormous pressure and responsibility on crisis managers.  
 
This thesis adopts the ‘constructed view of crisis’ as ‘events or developments widely 
perceived by members of relevant communities to constitute urgent threats to core 
community values and structures’ (Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 2009, pp. 83-4). To a large 
extent ‘crisis is in the eye of the beholder’ and it is ‘not the events on the ground, but their 
public perception and interpretation that determine their political impact’ (Boin, ‘t Hart and 
McConnell 2009, p. 83). According to Edelman (1988, p. 31) a crisis ‘is a creation of the 
language used to depict it; its identification is a political act, not a recognition of fact’. Boin, ‘t 
Hart and McConnell (2009 pp. 85-88) describe these ‘framing contests’ as being whether the 
event is described as a ripple or crisis, an incident or a symptom. The authors then theorise 
that how an event is framed has an impact on subsequent political and policy outcomes. 
 
Crises or the ‘disruptions of societal routines and expectations open up political space for 
actors inside and outside government to redefine issues, propose policy innovations and 
organisational reforms, gain popularity and strike at opponents’ (Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 
2009, p. 82). The outcomes of these ‘framing contests’ determine the ‘nature and severity of 
the crisis, its causes, the responsibility for its occurrence or escalation, and implications for 
the future’. When crisis ‘delegitimizes the power and authority relationships that… 
discourses underpin, structural change is desired and expected’ (Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 
2009, p. 81). 
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Herepath and Kitchener (2016, p. 1114) describe ‘breaches’ rather than crises. They argue 
that it is in cases of: 
the most severe and protracted institutional breaches, where loss of legitimacy of the 
social actors deemed to be responsible, compounded by reputational damage to the 
institutional field, render situated repair untenable…Once publicly disclosed, such 
severe breaches function as highly disruptive field-wide events that can in some 
contexts, prompt repair efforts by external actors through government inquiries. 
 
According to Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell (2009) political and policy outcomes in the 
aftermath of crisis are informed by how events are framed, that is, whether events are 
framed as symptomatic of broader issues; or unfortunate, but one-off aberrations; as 
‘wrinkles’ or ‘tears’ (Reay, Golden-Biddle and Germann 2006, p. 994). Building from 
Kingdon’s work (1995), the authors posit crisis exploitation theory, where, always on the 
lookout for ‘problems’ to which to attach their own ‘solutions’, political actors scan the 
horizons for problems to which to attach their preferred solutions and may seek to 
appropriate critical incidents of various kinds for precisely that purpose’ (Boin, ‘t Hart and 
McConnell 2009, p. 83). Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell (2009, p. 83) define their theory of crisis 
exploitation as ‘the purposeful utilisation of crisis-type rhetoric to significantly alter levels of 
political support for public office-holders and public policies’. The authors contemplate 
framing contests in the Inquiry area and posit that ‘office-holders appear to operate on the 
assumption that an expert-led (as opposed to parliamentary) Inquiry is less likely to turn into 
a political witch-hunt, reasoning that expert driven Inquiries tend to ‘go for policy substance, 
not for political skulls’ (Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 2009, p. 98) and that ‘elite escape’ is 
possible ‘on the wings of inquiry reports that spread blame around by emphasising the 
complex, multifaceted nature of the causes of crisis’ (Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 2009, p. 
94). In the reports of Public Inquiries canvassed by the authors they conclude that ‘whilst 
their tone was grave, their focus was mostly on regulatory, managerial and cultural factors’ 
(Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 2009, p. 98). They predict that crises investigated by expert 
commissions appear less likely to result in political fatalities and that in the presence of an 
Inquiry ‘incumbents are more likely to successfully survive the political game of crisis 
exploitation’ (Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 2009, p. 100, italics in original).  
 
Crises, and how they are framed, disrupt the norms of institutions and our understanding of 
how they function (March and Olsen 1984). Crises disrupt meaning. The perspectives 
offered by sensemaking theory provide another potent theoretical lens. Weick, Sutcliffe and 
Obstfeld (2005 p. 409) argue that sensemaking plays a central role in determining human 
behaviour. Sensemaking organises flux (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005, p. 411) and 
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determines how something comes to be an event, what the event means and by doing so 
helps order our worlds (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005, p. 410). Sensemaking involves 
the ‘ongoing retrospective development of plausible images that rationalise what people are 
doing’ (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005, p. 409). Sensemaking is ‘an issue of language, 
talk, and communication. Situations, organizations, and environments are talked into 
existence’ (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005, p. 409). Sensemaking occurs ‘when the 
current state of the world is perceived to be different from the expected state of the world’ 
and ‘to make sense of disruption’ (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005, p. 409). 
 
Boudes and Laroche (2009, p. 377) focus on the narratives associated with crises and 
characterise crises as ‘moments when sensemaking fails’. Official reports of post-crisis 
analyses ‘re-establish patterns of sensemaking’ (Boudes and Laroche 2009, p. 377). In their 
examination of seven official reports following a sudden and unexpected heatwave in France 
in 2003 which led to thousands of deaths, the authors take the reports as ‘elements in the 
sensemaking process’ (Boudes and Laroche 2009, p. 377). Official reports ‘transform the 
chaotic events of a crisis into an ordered and official story’ and, after Weick (2005), provide 
answers to ‘What’s the story’ and ‘Now what should I do?’ (Boudes and Laroche 2009, p. 
377). The authors explore the close link between narratives and sensemaking and conclude 
that narratives have been used as (Boudes and Laroche 2009, pp. 377-378): 
cognitive structures that help individuals and groups to cope with the confusion in 
their world of action (Bruner 2002; Cunliffe et al. 2004); communication devices 
(Barry and Elmes 1997; Martens et al. 2007; Weick and Browning 1986); repositories 
of knowledge to be transmitted and re-enacted (Boyce 1995; Orr 1996; Patriotta 
2003); taken-for-granted meanings that are to be re-used as guidance for 
subsequent action and interpretation (Ingersoll and Adams 1992; Mumby 1993; 
Wilkins 1984). 
 
Official accounts, or post-crisis Inquiry reports, deal with the ‘politics of meaning; how 
meanings are selected, legitimized, encoded and institutionalised at the organisational level’ 
(Patriotta 2003, p. 351). Inquiry reports are characterised as ‘story telling’ and follow a 
convention that differentiates between a state of normalcy preceding the occurrence of 
crisis, the crisis period itself, and the aftermath (Boin, Kofman-Bos and Overdijk 2004, p. 
380). Boudes and Laroche’s research (2009) suggest that a successful Public Inquiry is one 
where the Inquiry report depoliticises the disaster event and justifies actions taken; restores 
trust and legitimacy; and ‘reduces anxieties by elaborating fantasies of omnipotence and 
control’. Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2006, p. 647) qualifies this assertion with his finding that rather 
than performing a primarily normative ‘fact finding role’, Public Inquiries also play a 
descriptive, social role by ‘providing confirmation’. He describes ‘conditional credibility’, 
where prior to receiving the report of a Public Inquiry ‘public perceptions maintain a high 
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level of trust in the operation of the Public Inquiry, and retain this trust if a negative report 
emerges. This perception is, however, abandoned if an ‘overly’ positive report is delivered’ 
(Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2006, p. 647). Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2006, pp. 647-8) posits that ‘people 
form value judgments relatively early in the stages of an affair and seek the appointment of a 
Public Inquiry not [only] to reveal unknown facts, but to provide an authoritative confirmation 
of their ex ante judgements’. As expressed more directly in the context of the Queensland 
Floods Commission of Inquiry case study (discussed in Chapter 6) ‘[t]hey don’t want 
answers per se, they want answers that they agree with’ (Eburn 2012). 
 
Some breaches or crises profoundly call into question the legitimacy of our institutions. They 
‘hit at the heart of existing policy domains, exposing deficiencies in regulatory or service 
delivery arrangements’ (Alink, Boin and t’Hart 2011, p. 286). Alink, Boin and t’Hart (2011) 
argue that ‘institutional crises are periods in which a policy sector experiences major 
legitimacy shortfalls’ and provide a ‘major opportunity for issue advocates to raise the 
salience of the issue domain and reshape its hitherto dominant problem definitions and 
policy mixes’ (in Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 2009, p. 98). Governments ‘typically have 
access to much of the authority and resources to help resolve crisis situations, and there are 
strong expectations from the media, citizens and civil society generally, that they will do so 
‘successfully’ (McConnell 2011, p. 63). But what is a ‘major legitimacy shortfall’? More 
fundamentally, what is legitimacy? 
2.2.1.2 Crisis disrupts legitimacy. But what is legitimacy?  
Restoring legitimacy emerges as a recurring theme with regard to assessing the success of 
Public Inquiries. Further examination of this concept is therefore undertaken to explore the 
ways in which a Public Inquiry restores legitimacy. This section explores various contested 
perspectives on legitimacy and the role Public Inquiries play in restoring legitimacy.  
Legitimacy is one of the foundational concepts, an ‘anchor point’ of institutional theory 
(Suchman 1995; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). However, there are recurring tensions in 
the legitimacy literature. The sociological approach focusses on legitimacy as public consent 
and support (Lipset 1959), ‘willing obedience’ (Cromartie 2003, p. 93) or support and 
compliance (Heywood 2004, p.130). The philosophical approach describes legitimacy as 
principled justification (Rawls 1972, pp. 17-22) and equates legitimacy with appropriateness 
and justice (Hegtveldt and Johnson 2009, p. 395). Beetham (2013, p. 19, italics in original) 
draws a distinction as follows: 
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‘Legitimate power for the philosopher is power which is rightful according to rationally 
defensible standards or principles. Legitimate power for the social scientist is power 
which is acknowledged as rightful by relevant agents’. 
According to Heywood (2004, p. 141) legitimacy is ‘the quality that transforms naked power 
into rightful authority; it confers upon an order or command an authoritative or binding 
character, ensuring that it is obeyed out of duty rather than because of fear’. Suchman 
(1995, p. 573) reminds us that the question ‘what is legitimacy’ is intertwined with the 
question ‘legitimacy for what’? 
Ideas of legitimacy are highly contested (Abulof 2016). The contest of ideas turns on 
whether legitimate rule is that which best serves the people, or whether it rests on the 
general will (Heywood 2004, pp. 141-2). Within the enduring social contract tradition ‘political 
legitimacy, political authority, and political obligations are derived from the consent of those 
who create a government (sometimes a society) and who operate it through some form of 
quasiconsent, such as representation, majoritarianism, or tacit consent’ (Riley 1982, p. 1). In 
his seminal work Will and Political Legitimacy, Riley (1982) traces the five main theorists of 
the social contract tradition (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel), as well as more 
contemporary philosophers including Rawls. He observes the definitional contests regarding 
‘will’ and ‘consent’, and the ongoing ambiguities and inconsistencies in ‘setting up a 
philosophical framework that is adequate to explain the concept of consent as a source of 
authority and obligation’ (Riley 1982, pp. 9-10). Riley (1982, p. 214) concludes that given ‘the 
social contract tradition is alive…[it is vital to develop] ‘a coherent metaphysic of morals, a 
coherent account of the relation of will to political legitimacy’. Weale (2013, pp. 6-7) also 
acknowledges that social contract theory takes many forms11, but argues that ‘the various 
accounts are united by the thought that justifiable terms of social cooperation are to be 
understood on a model of a contract that each individual would have reason to make with 
other individuals, all taking due regard for their own prudential interests’.  
Rousseau’s fundamental question is ‘what makes curtailment on our freedoms’ legitimate 
(Mistrey 2008, p. 130)? According to Rousseau’s social contract theory, ‘because the people 
                                                          
11 Within various modern social theories, further contests arise from the different ways under which it 
is assumed the negotiation over the social contract occurs. In contractarian approaches, the 
negotiation is assumed to be one in which individuals are concerned with the rational pursuit of their 
own interests. They seek to establish a social contract that is to their mutual advantage. This links to 
individualist ideologies.  Contractualist approaches emphasise that each reasonable person will 
endorse the social arrangements and principles that are to govern their joint lives that could be 
accepted by all reasonable persons. Reasonable justification acts as a constraint on pure self-
interest. Contractualist theories link to collectivist ideologies (Riley 1982, Solum 2011, Weale 2013).  
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originally entered into the agreement voluntarily (or of their own free will), the power and 
legitimacy of the sovereign [or the State] is ultimately derived from the will of the people’ 
(Wilkerson 2014, p. 574).  The only justified authority or legitimacy is that which is generated 
out of this social contract, or the reciprocal obligation between citizens and the State. 
Legitimacy allows the State to exercise its authority and ‘facilitates a state’s efforts to form a 
social contract with the populace, making it possible to gain its citizens’ trust, create and 
enforce rules, use force and minimise the impact of actors looking to destabilise the state’ 
(Dagher 2018). Rousseau (1764, Book I, Chapter III) asserts that ‘obedience is only due to 
legitimate powers’. Locke goes further and states when the conditions under which the social 
contract with the State is destroyed citizens are obliged to resist the authority of government 
(Friend n.d.).           
According to Weber legitimacy refers to the ‘right to rule’ and as long as people are willing to 
comply, the system of rule is legitimate (Heywood 2004, p. 142). Suchman (1995, p. 574) 
defines legitimacy as ‘a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions’. Others argue that legitimacy is ‘little more than a façade 
concealing the domination of the ‘power elite’ or ‘ruling class’ (Heywood 2004, p. 145). All 
regimes manufacture legitimacy by manipulating what people know, think or believe 
(Heywood 2004, p. 142) and legitimacy is a form of ideological hegemony or dominance. 
According to these traditions legitimacy is produced by ideological manipulation and 
indoctrination and is designed to mask the self-interest of the ruling class (Parks 2011, p. 
31).  
 
The critical point in the context of this thesis, is that legitimacy ‘represents a relationship with 
an audience, rather than being a possession of the institution or organization’ (Suchman 
1995, p. 594, italics in original). While built on subjective perceptions, legitimacy is 
generalised, aggregated and objectified at the collective level (Berger and Luckman 1966, p. 
79, pp. 110-122). Critically, legitimacy is always conferred, it is ‘a social evaluation made by 
others’ (Bitektine and Haack 2015, p. 50). If, as argued in this thesis, citizens are part of the 
‘audience’ of Public Inquiries, it is critical that their perspectives are incorporated into 
assessments of the ways in which a Public Inquiry has been successful in restoring 
legitimacy. 
 
Beetham (2013, p. 20) examines the way legitimacy is brought about and proposes that 
power can be said to be legitimate if: it is exercised according to established rules (formal 
legal codes or informal conventions); these rules are justified in terms of the shared beliefs 
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of the government and the governed; and legitimacy is demonstrated by the expression of 
consent on the part of the governed. This is the basis of the social contract. Legitimacy is 
only conferred upon regimes that exercise power according to established and accepted 
principles. Liberal democracies, it is argued, guarantee their continued legitimacy by 
ensuring that government power is not unchecked or arbitrary but is exercised in accordance 
with the wishes, preferences and interests of the general public. This occurs through the 
rules of power (constitution) which protects individual liberty and constrains government 
power, and regular, open and competitive elections (Heywood 2004, p. 143). Arguably, as 
constituted under its respective legislation, a Public Inquiry functions as just such a check on 
power. 
 
Bitektine and Haack (2015) offer both a macro and micro level analysis of legitimacy. This 
constructive work suggests that legitimacy takes place at both the micro level within 
individuals, but also at the sensemaking level where actors make a legitimacy judgment at 
the macro level (Bitektine and Haack, p. 51). Propriety (the individual’s approval of the 
organisation and its actions and practices) and validity (the extent to which there appears to 
be a general consensus within a collectivity that the entity is appropriate for its social 
context) are both at play - and both can be manipulated and assessed. Media (the share of 
voice), government (regulatory and legislative decisions) and the judicial system (legal 
judgements) are the three critical sources of validity; ‘each of the judgement validation 
institutions provides some form of forum for debates over legitimacy and a mechanism for 
debate resolution’ (Bitektine and Haack 2015, p. 51). The authors describe this multi-level 
theory of legitimacy in states of institutional stability and instability. Using this schema, a 
Public Inquiry is a unique source of validity and a powerful forum for debate over legitimacy, 
in that is established by, but independent of government, has wide, coercive powers, like the 
judiciary, and is scrutinised closely by public and media. 
 
Scott (2014, p. 74) defines legitimacy by reference to the three pillars, or foundations, of 
institutions. The regulatory pillar emphasises the legitimacy of rules, relevant legal or quasi-
legal requirements. The normative pillar emphasises ‘a deeper, moral base for assessing 
legitimacy’ and is more likely to be internalised. The cultural-cognitive pillar rests on 
legitimacy that comes from conforming to ‘a common definition of the situation, frame of 
reference, or a recognizable role (for individuals) or structural template (for organisations)’. 
Institutions ‘exhibit stabilizing and meaning-making properties’ because of the processes set 
in motion by regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements…these elements ‘guide 
behaviour and resist change’ (Scott 2014, p. 57). Institutions ‘are underpinned by institutional 
logics’ (Brown, Ainsworth and Grant 2012, p. 299) and which provide organising principles 
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(Rao, Monin and Durand 2003, p. 797). These principles shape interpretations, define roles, 
constrain and enable agency (Peters 2012, pp. 174-175). Institutional logics may become 
‘misaligned or weakened’ (Brown, Ainsworth and Grant 2012, p. 299), possibly through a 
crisis. 
 
Habermas argues that challenges to legitimacy are inevitable. In ‘Legitimation Crisis’ (1988) 
Habermas argues that liberal democracies have ‘crisis tendencies’ or ‘structural risks’ which 
challenge the stability of regimes by undermining legitimacy. The core tension between the 
capitalist economic system and a democratic political system renders a capitalist democracy 
to be inherently unstable.  A crisis in the politico-administrative system results in a 
legitimation crisis which could ‘threaten the whole of the state apparatus with 
disintegration…the threatening crisis is offset, buffered, or diffused with…the contrived 
legitimations of ritual parliamentary elections’ (Pusey 1987, p. 96), or, by extension in the 
context of this thesis, the ritual of a Public Inquiry. 
 
Habermas argues that a great part of the substantial legitimacy of the nation-state is through 
the governance of regulating common risks, handling social problems and maintaining order’ 
(Lebeck 2003, p. 147). However, ‘crisis states assume the form of disintegration of social 
institutions’ (Habermas 1988, p. 3) and ‘as soon as belief in the legitimacy of an existing 
order vanishes, the latent force embedded in the system of institutions is released - either as 
manifest force from above (which is only a temporary possibility) or in the form of expansion 
of the scope for participation’ (Habermas 1988, p. 96). It is precisely this expansion of the 
scope for participation that some argue is a key success factor of Public Inquiries. 
 
Legitimacy is a form of social capital (Weede 1996, p. 222), a ‘reservoir of support’ for 
institutions and authorities (Tyler 2006, p. 381). However, when a crisis occurs rules, norms 
and expectations are breached resulting in a shortfall of legitimacy. Alink, Boin and ‘t Hart 
(2011, p. 281) argue that legitimacy cannot be measured in absolute terms but that it is 
possible to ‘assess and detect significant alterations in levels of legitimacy’, through 
indicators such as the extent and content of media coverage, parliamentary attention, 
number and nature of administrative appeals, court and ombudsman rulings regarding a 
sector.  
 
Sheriff (1983, pp. 670-671) asks why Public Inquiries are set up in some circumstances and 
not in others. What are the exceptional circumstances requiring the establishment of a Public 
Inquiry to undertake a task that would otherwise be undertaken by the regular bureaucracy 
which has the expertise to deal with routine and non-routine matters. Sheriff (1983, p. 672) 
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identifies one of the key tasks of the State in capitalist society is the legitimisation function, 
whereby the State maintains or creates the conditions for social harmony. Sheriff (1983, p. 
672) argues that as a powerful mechanism sitting outside the state bureaucracy and a 
crucial element of the State apparatus, Public Inquiries are set up: 
in exceptional circumstances when the task must not only be dealt with but seen to 
be dealt with, and that what differentiates their task is that they are more effective in 
performing the legitimization function that cannot be carried out in the hidden 
recesses of the regular bureaucracy. 
 
With respect to the recurring theme in the literature that successful Public Inquiries restore 
legitimacy, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) provide a helpful heuristic. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) termed the ‘iron cage’ of isomorphism, that is, where firms were influenced by crisis, 
proximity, prestige and other forces of diffusion over time and came increasingly to resemble 
each other. Resting on the three-pillar model of institutions, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
describe three types of pressures towards isomorphism: mimetic (pressure to copy or 
emulate – cultural cognitive pillar); coercive (often associated with legal requirements – 
regulative pillar); and normative (impact of professional standards and norms –normative 
pillar). Each pillar offers a different basis for legitimacy:  legally sanctioned (regulative pillar), 
morally governed (normative pillar), and comprehensible, recognisable and culturally 
supported (cultural-cognitive pillar), (Scott 2014, p. 60). 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that organisations yield to the isomorphic pressures that 
confront them, otherwise they risk their legitimacy and survival. In Suchman’s (1995) terms, 
in uncertain environments, organisations pursue cognitive legitimacy (comprehensibility and 
taken-for-grantedness) which is based on cognition rather than on interest or evaluation 
(Suchman 1995, p. 582) through mimetic isomorphism, that is, by mimicking the most 
prominent and secure entities in their field (Suchman 1995, p. 589). 
 
The critical point in the context of this thesis is that legitimacy is essential for the 
maintenance of any system of political rule (Heywood 2004, p. 147). Legitimacy is conferred, 
and as such, citizen perspectives are at the heart of considerations of legitimacy. Our 
institutions require the trust and confidence of citizens to maintain their legitimacy (Parks 
2011, p. 1). Restoration of legitimacy is a critical task for central authorities (Suchman 1995).  
The establishment of a Public Inquiry is a powerful tool which can be used by governments 
to achieve this task. Amidst the contested approaches to legitimacy outlined above, it is 
generally agreed that one of the key roles of Public Inquiries is to restore legitimacy and 
confidence (Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2006, 2007) and that Inquiry reports ‘make a case for 
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institutional change by altering perceptions of legitimate processes of organizing’ (Brown, 
Ainsworth and Grant 2012, p. 299). 
 
In summary, taking the key, recurring themes from the literature detailed above, the following 
proposition is established: 
 
Proposition 1  
An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in which it 
has responded to crisis and restored legitimacy.  
2.2.2 Participation perspectives  
A Public Inquiry signals the possibility of a participatory process. How is this done? What are 
the mechanisms used to secure participation? How are the views of experts, stakeholders, 
and those affected by the issue that led to the creation of the Inquiry balanced? Who’s voice 
counts? 
There is an extensive, rich and contested literature on participation which provides relevant 
insights on the ways in which the success of a Public Inquiry might be assessed on this 
dimension. This section explores such perspectives. 
Public Inquiries are not ‘faceless’ bureaucratic systems. They are intended to be open, 
transparent, public processes. Prasser (2003, p. ii) argues that it is ‘precisely their 
“publicness” that gives Public Inquiries a particular standing and legitimacy’ to investigate 
and advise on a range of issues. He argues that Public Inquiries satisfy other requirements 
of the policy process and political system such as promoting participation, providing forums 
for debate and putting issues on the agenda (Prasser 2003, p. 308). There are various 
mechanisms and types of participation in Public Inquiries. Depending on the type of Public 
Inquiry (investigatory, policy advisory, hybrid), these generally vary from quasi-judicial 
processes like: issuing subpoenas; calling for witnesses; calling on experts to give evidence, 
to broader forms of public participation like: open public hearings; consultation; calling for 
submissions; and providing detailed documentation, transcripts and updates via websites.  
Participation is an important element of impartially and thoroughly investigating the ‘who, 
what, where, when and how’ of the subject of the Inquiry. Participation through a Public 
Inquiry is a ‘pivotal feature in how societies produce authoritative accounts of ‘what went 
wrong’ (McConnell, Gauja and Botterill 2008, p. 614). Prasser (2006, p. 86, p. 97) notes that 
through their processes of gathering evidence and participation, Public Inquiries often 
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assume the authoritative statement on crisis and perform the roles of fact-finder, auditor, 
reformer and/or apportioner of blame. Butler and Drakeford (2005, p. 4) however, remind us 
that the Report of the Inquiry is only one record of events and that media, official papers and 
‘recollections’ by those present ‘are equally articulate commentaries’. Butler and Drakeford 
2003, p. 219) argue that despite the usual claims of ‘objectivity and veracity’ the Report of an 
Inquiry is ‘only one partisan version of many possible accounts’. Inquiries too are social 
processes. 
 
From the public’s perspective much is expected of and attributed to Public Inquiries and 
once established coverage of their processes, deliberations and outcomes attract much 
media attention and commentary. According to Kerr (2014, p. 281): 
Scandal. Incompetence. Mismanagement. Negligence. And corruption…are all 
pertinent…as their scope and scale can lead our politicians to throw up their hands 
and promptly dump the problem into that legalistic too-hard basket, a royal 
commission. And the media do love a royal commission. There’s really nothing quite 
like it. These are often ‘the hottest ticket in town’. 
 
However, the public’s view of Public Inquiries is also contested. Not everyone welcomes yet 
another Public Inquiry or has faith in its outcomes. In an inquiry into Public Inquiries 
commissioned by the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution between 2011 and 2015, more 
than half of those surveyed found Public Inquiries ‘too long and too costly, and did not 
believe recommendations were implemented’ (Mackie 2012, p. 8). 
 
Some members of the public want more Inquiries ‘to inform and energise a new generation 
of democratic action and political decision making’ (O’Neil 2001). Others stress the 
importance of the Inquiries in bringing people to justice and preventing further abuse, for 
example, ‘[t]he most important outcomes people want from the inquiry are that abusers and 
those who protected them be brought to justice, along with preventing further child sexual 
abuse’ (Zwartz 2012). However, others are sceptical: ‘[y]et another royal commission is not 
going to alter the mistrust…it's seen as another stalling tactic by government to avoid 
assuming its real responsibilities…You can't put out a fire with paper’ (Wagamese 1991); 
and, ‘[c]ommissions will likely limp across the finish line and produce voluminous, overdue 
reports…Will you as a taxpayer, consumer and citizen be any better off?’ (Gessell 1996). 
 
As the literature notes, however, Public Inquiries can provide an opportunity for people to 
have their say in an open and transparent manner: 
The reconciliation afforded by the process is critical for those directly affected by the 
tragedy. This is why the process was so important and, in the case of the royal 
commission into the Victorian fires, is probably its greatest achievement. The 
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painstaking opportunity for people to have their say and to be heard is an integral 
part of this coming to terms (Holmes 2010, p. 389). 
 
Whilst a contested area, whenever and wherever they are established Public Inquiries flag 
the prospect of participation12, carry the weight of public expectations, the inevitability of 
media scrutiny, the requirement for a government response and the possibility of some 
change. 
 
A recurring assertion in the literature about the impact of Public Inquiries is the inclusion of 
voices and ideas that, typically, may not have been heard, that is, those outside the policy 
elites or epistemic communities; and a Public Inquiry’s impact on public discourse. Some 
authors suggest that one of the key outcomes of Public Inquiries is the extent to which they 
contribute to public discourse (ALRC 2009; Regan 2014). Regan suggests that there are 
three dimensions of influence or impact; impact on research, public discourse and policy. 
Regan suggests that if a government accepts the recommendations, the review has had 
some impact, although she acknowledges that policy reform may have happened anyway. If 
a government rejects the recommendations the Public Inquiry may have failed to influence 
policy, but it may have ‘engendered new research and analysis and fostered public debate 
or improved public understanding’ (Regan 2014, p. 51). Regardless of whether the 
government accepts or rejects the recommendations the review may have been a ‘paradigm 
shaper’ (Regan 2014, p. 51).  
 
Sheriff (1983, p. 672) however, argues that the success or failure of a Public Inquiry: 
must be evaluated not mainly on the basis of the extent to which their 
recommendations are implemented, given that the regular bureaucracy is quite 
capable of suggesting policy…but rather on the basis of the extent to which their 
functioning has provided sufficient and appropriate visibility for the topic under 
scrutiny. 
 
According to Sheriff, Public Inquiries activate the ‘participative state’ where ‘the bureaucracy 
provides for representatives of various sectors to participate directly and democratically in 
the definition of desirable policies’ (1983, p.673). 
 
Sheriff concludes that it is the form, rather than the content of the Inquiry that is important, 
that is, ‘the opportunity to bring in representatives of a great variety of viewpoints, which is 
                                                          
12 Participation occurs through various mechanisms that typically include hearings, calling for 
witnesses and/or experts, submissions and consultations. Depending on the nature of the Public 
Inquiry, participants will usually include experts, those affected by whatever triggered the Inquiry, 
advocates and a range of stakeholders which many include businesses, insurers and unions. 
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facilitated by the appointment of Commissions and which contributes towards this 
participative image of the modern state’. It is ‘not so much what policy is formulated but how 
it is formulated that takes precedence’, that is, ‘the legitimisation or participatory aspect of 
commission functioning that is an important but neglected aspect of the purpose of 
commissions’; ‘when the task must not only be dealt with but seen to be dealt with’ (1983, 
pp. 671-674, italics in original). 
A Public Inquiry is a particular form of deliberation13 with its own distinctive features, 
opportunities and constraints. However, it is never a ‘collegial form of organisation’ where 
individuals gather to reach agreement (Eriksen and Weigård 2003, p. 213). This raises the 
question; what does participation mean and what kind of communication characterises 
participation in the context of a Public Inquiry? What are the models of participation relevant 
to assessing the success of a Public Inquiry? 
 
Arnstein’s ladder of participation (1969) offers one heuristic of direct relevance to this 
question. Arnstein observes ‘the exacerbated rhetoric and misleading euphemisms’ 
(Arnstein 1969, p. 216) that are used in discussions of participation. In Arnstein’s typology 
(1969, p. 216), each of the rungs of the ladder corresponds to citizens’ power in determining 
the level and type of participation, and the influence on outcomes. Arnstein (1969, p. 216) 
notes the ‘critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and 
having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process’. There are ‘significant 
gradations of citizen participation’ and the ways in which citizens can ‘make institutions 
responsive to their views, aspirations, and needs’ (Arnstein 1969, p. 217). 
 
Habermas (1981) also offers insights on the structural characteristics of participation to 
ensure rational and legitimate processes. These are explored in the next section. 
 
                                                          
13 For the purposes of clarity, although sometimes used interchangeably, deliberation is not the same 
as participation. For example, Pateman’s (2012) view of participatory democracy has a higher 
threshold than Dryzek’s (2015) deliberative view of democracy. For Pateman (2012, p. 7) ‘deliberative 
democracy is a form of citizen participation’. She argues that ‘deliberative democracy still leaves intact 
the conventional institutional structures and political meaning of “democracy”’ (2012, p. 10). 
Participatory democracy, however, requires structural changes to ‘reform undemocratic authority 
structures (Pateman 2012, p. 10). There is active scholarship and debate about the features, sites 
and benefits of participatory and deliberative democratic processes (for example, Dryzek, 2001, Ercan 
and Dryzek 2015, Curato, Dryzek, Ercan, Hendriks and Niemeyer 2017, Pateman, 2012). However, 
the key point in the context of this thesis is how, and in which ways, a Public Inquiry’s processes have 
incorporated participation and its outcomes have secured legitimacy (Dryzek, 2001, p. 651, p. 652).  
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2.2.2.1 Habermas: Linking communication and participation with legitimacy 
In his Theory of Communicative Action (1981), Habermas ‘regards a public sphere of 
rational debate as the only possible foundation for democratic politics in the contemporary 
world’ (Kulynych 1997, p. 320). For Habermas, democracies are ‘systems that achieve the 
formation of public opinion and public will through a correct process of public communication’ 
(Kulynych 1997, p. 320). The ‘legitimacy of democracy depends not only on constitutional 
processes of enacting laws, but also on the “discursive quality of the full processes of 
deliberation leading up to such a result”’ (Bolton 2005, p. 2). Of particular relevance to Public 
Inquiries, particularly policy advisory Inquiries, Habermas (1998-99, p. 940) writes: 
Rational discourse is supposed to be public and inclusive, to grant equal 
communication rights for participants, to require sincerity and to diffuse any kind of 
force other than the forceless force of the better argument. This communicative 
structure is expected to create a deliberative space for the mobilisation of the best 
available contributions for the most relevant topics.  
 
According to Habermas (1998-99, p. 941) ‘collective actors of civil society’ may influence 
public opinion but: 
such ‘influence’ is transformed into ‘power’ only by an interaction of the informal and 
diffuse communication flows of the public sphere at large with formally organised 
opinion-and will-formation processes first embodied in the parliamentary and the 
judiciary complex [or a Public Inquiry]. ‘Communicative power’ is produced according 
to the democratic procedures of elected and deliberating bodies and then, in 
accordance with legislative programs and court decisions, transformed into the 
administrative power of the executive agencies, available for the purpose of 
implementation. 
 
It is the ‘communicative power and the conditions that fashion its formation which ensure the 
legitimacy of law’ (Eriksen and Weigård 2003, p. 174). In this context ‘participation equals 
discursive participation; it is communication governed by rational, communicatively achieved 
argument and negotiation’ (Kulynych 1997 p. 320). Habermas (Kulynych 1997, pp. 320-321): 
distinguishes two types of discursive participation: problem-solving or decision-
oriented deliberation, which takes place primarily in formal democratic institutions 
such as parliaments [and arguably Public Inquiries] and is regulated or governed by 
democratic procedures; and informal opinion-formation, which is opinion-formation 
"uncoupled from decisions... [and] effected in an open and inclusive network of 
overlapping, subcultural publics having fluid temporal, social and substantive 
boundaries”.  
 
Habermas characterises the former as the ‘strong’ public sphere and the latter as the ‘weak’ 
public sphere (Eriksen and Weigård 2003, p. 185). 
 
For Habermas (1998-99, p. 941) the: 
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structural features of political communication are more important than individual 
properties; such as the capacity for rational choice or good intentions or appropriate 
motivations. Public communication must be inclusive and selective at the same time; 
it must be channelled in such a way, that relevant topics come up, interesting 
contributions and reliable information come in, and good arguments or fair 
compromises decide on what comes out. 
 
These structures and procedures ensure that deliberation is conducted in ‘such a manner 
that the issue under discussion is sufficiently illuminated before a decision is made, and that 
decisions can claim to be qualified, that is, rational’ (Eriksen and Weigård 2003, p. 125). 
Habermas shifts ‘the focus of participation away from policy making and toward redefining 
legitimate democratic processes that serve as the necessary background for subsequent 
policy making’ (Kulynych 1997, p. 321). In these terms, a Public Inquiry can be seen as an 
arena which links the ‘public sphere’ to the state and through which ‘influence’ may be 
transformed into ‘power’.  
Of relevance to assessing the success of a Public Inquiry, therefore, is the ways in which its 
structural features enable rational discourse; the ways in which the communication structure 
is equitable and inclusive (Kulynych 1997, p. 323) and thus legitimate. This is particularly 
relevant to Public Inquiries established as policy advisory or hybrid Inquiries, as at the core 
of these Inquiries is the attempt to gather evidence and knowledge from broad perspectives, 
and upon which to make recommendations to government. 
A consideration of the various mechanisms for participation are therefore relevant, namely, 
the extent to which a Public Inquiry calls for and balances inputs from experts and 
advocates, as well as those with lived experience (non-experts who have been affected by 
the events which triggered the Public Inquiry).  
Potts (2008, pp. 20-22) operationalises these structural features of active and informed 
participation, or ‘having voice’, as having the following elements: 
 Institutional mechanisms to ensure people can participate – these include ensuring 
that participation is undertaken in an appropriate way which is accessible by different 
groups and that barriers to participation are addressed (for example, physical 
barriers, economic barriers, ensuring representatives are duly authorised and 
accountable to their constituencies; and 
 Capacity building for participation, where necessary. 
 
This provides an important schema against which to assess the extent to which a Public 
Inquiry has facilitated participation and given voice. 
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2.2.2.2 Redefining ‘expertise’: opening the window for paradigm shift 
In addition to considering how successful the mechanisms of participation have been, a 
further lens on success may be to examine whether the inputs, or, ‘voices’, have broadened 
as a result of a Public Inquiry. Public Inquiries can change the regular dynamics of a policy 
system (Howlett and Ramesh 2003, p. 116). New ideas and knowledge can challenge 
existing policy networks and can lead to the dissolution of established networks, the rise of 
new actors or existing actors adopting new issues (Sabatier 2007, pp. 142-143). Howlett and 
Ramesh (2003, p. 106) suggest that this: 
involves alteration of the government’s authority to elevate the views of some policy 
actors above others in formal and informal policy processes. Commissions or 
Inquiries are based on preferential recognition extended by states to specific policy 
actors, enhancing their access to decision-makers and their voice in policy 
deliberations. 
As such, suggested factors of success may be the extent to which a Public Inquiry has been 
open to, and incorporated, new ideas and policy perspectives, or to including different policy 
systems and actors in order to inform the Inquiry and suggest reform. This perspective 
contemplates policy entrepreneurship, policy networks and advocacy coalitions. These are 
explored in this section. 
A number of theoretical approaches use the policy network concept. For example, policy 
networks are variously described as governance systems, as descriptive of possible patterns 
and interactions among players within specific policy systems, or as a quantitative approach 
to social network analysis (Adam and Kriesi 2007, pp. 129-130). Various authors (for example: 
Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Considine, Lewis and Alexander 2009; Gains 2003; Kingdon 
1995) identify ‘small networks of policy specialists who discuss particular issues, set agendas, 
formulate policy alternatives outside formal bureaucratic channels, who serve as brokers for 
admitting new ideas into decision-making circles’ (Haas 1992, p. 31). 
 
In his study of international policy coordination Haas (1992, p. 2) examines: 
the role that networks of knowledge based experts - epistemic communities - play in 
articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states 
identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific 
policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation. 
 
If ‘rationality is bounded, epistemic communities may be responsible for circumscribing the 
boundaries and delimiting the options’ (Haas 1992, p. 16) and, as Schattschneider (1975, p. 
66) notes ‘the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power’. 
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Haas (1992, p. 14) also notes that ‘[d]ecision makers do not always recognise that their 
understanding of complex issues and linkages is limited, and it often takes a crisis or shock 
to overcome institutional inertia and habit and spur them to seek help from an epistemic 
community’. As previously established, the precursors to Public Inquiries are often such 
‘shocks’ and the ways in which a Public Inquiry opens up the space for new voices to inform 
policy and direction is significant, and may constitute a factor of success. 
 
Thomas (1997) ‘imported’ Haas’ concept of epistemic communities and tested some of the 
hypotheses of epistemic influence using a case study of interagency cooperation. Thomas 
found that ‘context mattered greatly in shaping epistemic influence because public officials 
search out and heed new advice when they are confronted by anomalous situations and 
uncertainty’ (p. 243-44), as may be the case when a Public Inquiry is established. 
 
Considine (1998) confirms that context matters. In his analysis of issues selection and 
agenda setting, Considine (1998, pp. 298-9) found that over time a relatively small group of 
policy influentials in each functional policy field are responsible for answering the questions 
raised by external events and internal governmental opportunities. In contrast to studies that 
show randomness in the distribution of agenda setting influence, Considine’s ‘structured 
influence model’ finds considerable impact of structural features on likely levels of power. His 
study of six policy sectors14 and agenda items by policy field over three years found that 
‘specific structural characteristics play a decisive role in determining which issues will gain 
attention in the agenda setting process (Considine 1998, p. 307).  
 
Considine’s (1998, p. 315) findings suggest far more coherence than contingency or 
‘primeval soup’ (Kingdon 1995, p. 19) models suggest. The structure of agenda setting 
influence is more likely to be field specific and outside driven15. Considine’s findings suggest 
a nuanced way of assessing success in terms of examining to which groups a Public Inquiry 
has given voice, and which voices have had an impact on outcomes.  
 
                                                          
14 The six policy fields studied were economics, environment, education, transport, health and welfare 
(Considine 1998). Considine finds that the six fields are characterized by important differences in the 
representation of policy influentials. For example, ‘Economic policy appears to be dominated by 
business and by politicians…Health is heavily populated by doctors and hospital administrators and 
welfare is marked by strong representation from service providers; in this case the various private 
non-profit agencies. These specific structural characteristics play a decisive role in determining which 
issues will gain attention in the agenda-setting process’ (Considine, 1998, p. 307). 
15 Of the six policy fields only ‘two fields, transport and environment, are dominated by groups internal 
to government. In both cases bureaucrats appear to have a crucial significance’ (Considine 1998, p. 
310). 
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Another theoretical approach, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), developed by 
Sabatier and Jenkins (Sabatier 2007, pp. 9-10) focuses on the distribution of power among 
policy actors. The ACF holds that policy subsystems are the most useful unit of analysis for 
understanding and explaining policy change over time (Sabatier 2007, p. 204). Most policy 
making occurs among specialists within a policy subsystem (characterised by both a 
functional/substantive dimension and a territorial/geographic one) but their behaviour is 
affected by wider political and socio-economic systems (Sabatier 2007, p. 196). Most policy 
subsystems are dominated by one advocacy coalition with one or more minority advocacy 
coalitions (Sabatier 2007, p. 204). Policy participants include the ‘iron triangle’ of legislators, 
agency officials and interest group leaders but also researchers and media that specialise in 
that area (Kingdon 1995). The ACF posits that the vast majority of policy making occurs 
within these policy systems but that there are two key exogenous factors that impact, one 
which is stable, the other dynamic.  
 
Stable parameters include the attributes of the problem, fundamental structure and values. 
These rarely change and rarely provide the impetus for behavioural or policy change within a 
policy subsystem. The more dynamic external factors include changes in socio-economic 
factors, governing coalitions, disasters, or policy decisions from other subsystems. These 
external shocks can lead to the replacement of the dominant coalition by a minority coalition 
(Sabatier 2007, p. 204). According to this analysis, a Public Inquiry is an external dynamic 
factor with the possibility of creating another subsystem, and hence has the capacity to bring 
about change in policy influencers (Sabatier and Weible 2007, p. 193). 
 
In summary, examination of this literature suggests a more nuanced approach to general 
statements that Public Inquiries give voice. Analysis must also consider new entrants and 
changes in the distribution of power among policy subsystems over time. The literature 
review suggests the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2 
An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in which it gives 
voice and: 
a) has promoted public and stakeholder engagement and provided a locus for public 
discourse; 
b) new ideas and knowledge have had an impact on the dominant policy 
coalition/subsystem, there has been a shift to another policy coalition or the 
emergence of new actors.  
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2.2.3 Public policy and public management perspectives  
There is an extensive body of literature on public policy, public management and policy 
implementation which variously examines conditions and factors of policy success. This 
literature is relevant as it considers the detail and process of policy development, the role 
and positioning of Public Inquiries, the influence of policy actors, the relative power of 
implementers at different levels (Considine 2005; deLeon and deLeon 2002; Hill 2003; 
Matland 1995; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973), as well as how to contemplate and frame 
success (McConnell 2010). 
The literature consistently espouses the benefits of Public Inquiries as policy making 
instruments: ‘for the appearance of rational policy making in the public interest, a public 
inquiry is an instrument without peer’ (Prasser and Tracey 2014, p. 133; Stanton 2010, p. 
15). Public Inquiries are described as ‘versatile instruments of public policy’ (Prasser 2006, 
p. 252) which play a useful role in responding to, and managing a crisis, gaining evidence, 
generating a range of policy options, bringing stakeholders into a policy debate that 
otherwise may struggle to have an input, apportioning blame and making recommendations 
(Prasser 2006; Banks 2013; Boin ‘t Hart and McConnell 2009).  Banks (2007, pp. 3-4) 
identifies the ‘combination of independence and public consultation’ brought by Inquiries as 
providing major advantages to the policy making process.  
 
However, despite Public Inquiries being a recurring institution and suggested as a legitimate 
means of policy making, there is limited attention in public policy literature to the specific 
context, contributions and outcomes of a Public Inquiry on public policy, as distinct from 
‘regular’ policy making processes. There is limited research about whether a Public Inquiry is 
just like any other policy advisory or investigatory body or whether there is anything 
distinctive about Public Inquiries as a trigger for public policy reform and public management 
change. Similarly, there are unanswered questions about whether different types of Public 
Inquiries (that is, investigatory, policy advisory or hybrid) are more successful in leading to 
changes in public policy and management than others.  
 
Unlike political science perspectives with their focus on blaming and insulating elites, public 
management literature stresses the opportunity afforded by Public Inquiries for learning. 
Elliot (2009, p. 158) argues that ‘efforts to identify lessons from failure, to avoid their 
repetition, are institutionalised in the form of the Public Inquiry’. Inquiries are important tools 
for organisations to learn from failure (Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 2008), establish 
accountability (Preston 2008, pp. 33-61) and better manage risk (Schwartz and McConnell 
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2008, pp. 208-231). Public Inquiries provide the opportunity for learning, to draw lessons to 
help prevent a similar event happening again (Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2006, p. 625; Sulitzeanu-
Kenan, 2010, p. 633). These purposes have been otherwise expressed as ‘learning, 
disciplining, catharsis and reassurance’ (Reder and Duncan 2004, p. 107). 
 
However Public Inquiries do not always prompt learning or bring about reform. Some authors 
suggest that ‘there is a remarkable reluctance to learn and adapt to the changes identified by 
these [I]nquiries, in so many professions’ (Hill, 2010). Boin (2008, p. 239) suggests that ‘in 
the aftermath of a crisis, politics intrude and can influence and impede subsequent learning’: 
The outside world imposes itself…upon the organisation that has ‘produced’ the 
disaster. Political elites, citizen outcries, victims’ relatives and media representatives 
create a climate in which organisational learning is subjugated, at least temporarily to 
the lessons learned of an outside body. 
 
Some public management authors find that Public Inquiries can have a detrimental effect. 
They note that the ‘blaming function’ of Inquiries can be counter-productive (Holmes 2010). 
Warner (2006, pp. 228-234) argues that the ‘blaming function of Inquiries has usurped their 
main intended function of facilitating learning’ and fostered the development of defensive 
professional practice and ‘doing things by the book’. Warner’s research demonstrates that as 
a result of Public Inquiries, social workers ‘increasingly gave priority to avoiding becoming 
the social worker at the centre of the Inquiry’, with more emphasis on’ covering your back’ (p. 
227). Elliot (2009) also highlights the repeated patterns of organisations failing to learn from 
crises in child protection and asserts that this is due to the separation of policy from practice 
and the lack of attention placed on the processes of knowledge transfer and assimilation. 
Lachman and Bernard (2006, pp. 964-965) note that Public Inquiries have led to the 
development of defensive attitudes which run counter to ongoing service improvement. 
Arklay (2015, p. 189) finds that Public Inquiries have the potential to alienate staff, 
destabilise morale and affect institutional memory. 
 
The literature also notes broad trends in public management which offer different 
perspectives on success. Various authors (O’Flynn 2007; Smith 2004) have traced the shift 
from traditional public management to new public management (NPM) to the newer 
paradigm of public value management (PVM), originally posited by Moore in 1995. As two of 
the key influences on public management, NPM and PVM are now explored in order to 
gather insights as to how such perspectives might inform the assessment of success of 
Public Inquiries. 
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NPM draws heavily from rational choice approaches and market theory. Such approaches 
include the introduction of competition, a focus on outcomes, the adoption of corporate 
values, objectives and practices in public service provision (Frederickson and Smith 2003, p. 
220), shifting power from public officials to ‘entrepreneurial activity’ in policy networks 
(Frederickson and Smith 2003, p. 218). Whilst lacking a ‘single definitive ‘manifesto’’ (Hood 
1991, p. 8), Hood describes the ‘doctrines’ of NPM as; professional management, explicit 
standards of measures and performance, greater emphasis on output controls, 
disaggregation of units in the public sector, greater competition in the public sector with 
private sector styles of management practice, and greater discipline and parsimony in 
resource use. Success, according to NPM approaches, would therefore reflect these 
elements of improved routines and efficiency, greater transparency and accountability, better 
management of performance and risk, and opening up to competitive markets and ideas, as 
these would lead to better services, policies, processes and outcomes. 
 
A more contemporary public management perspective is public value management. Public 
value management (PVM) is described variously as the contribution made by public services 
to economic, social and environmental well-being (Grigg and Mager 2005, p. 1), the 
paradigm that ‘presents the achievement of public value as its core objective’ (Stoker 2006, 
p. 42) and the value ‘that is ‘consumed’ collectively by the citizenry rather than individually by 
clients (Alford and Hughes 2008, p. 131). Moore (1995, pp. 70-72) argues that ‘public value 
offers a more holistic way of thinking about the goals and performance of public policy’ and 
that PVM’s strategic triangle ‘presents a framework to integrate politics, substance and 
administration in “envisioning” public value’.  
 
There are highly contested views of PVM. PVM has been described as ‘a yardstick for 
measuring public service reform’ to ‘actually increasing the integrity and transparency of 
government’ (Crabtree 2004, p. 54; Heaphy 2006, p. 3,). However, PVM has also been 
described as ‘theoretically poor’ and ‘methodologically bankrupt’ (Morrell 2009, p. 548) and 
‘a soft-soap rationale with little explanatory power’ (Crabtree, p. 55). There are engaging 
debates in the literature about the extent to which public value can be applied in the 
Westminster system, the primacy or otherwise of politics and the extent to which ‘public 
value’ is a self-serving, or at best, naive framework (Alford 2008; Gains and Stoker 2009; 
Rhodes and Wanna; 2008, 2009).  
 
Notwithstanding these debates, in the context of this thesis, the relevance of PVM is 
referenced as one of the ‘big ideas’ (Alford and O’Flynn 2009, p. 178) that has taken hold in 
government and public administration for some years. A public value lens on success 
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(Moore 2003, pp. 11-13) contemplates strategy (the extent to which the organisational 
strategy and resourcing was aligned to its mission); legitimacy and support (measures that 
monitor the strength of the relationship with financial supporters, public ‘legitimisers’ and 
‘authorisers’); and operational capacity, of the organisation as well as the broader sector or 
industry (productivity or efficiency measures, measures of financial integrity, staff 
capabilities, measures of learning and innovation). As with NPM approaches, it is argued, 
this would lead to better services, policies, processes and outcomes. 
 
In summary, review of the literature suggests that from a public management perspective 
success of a Public Inquiry would contemplate the ways in which: better routines and 
standard operating procedures are established; systems are put in place for effective 
management of crisis with the inevitable cases of deviance having better enforcement 
mechanisms in place (Peters 2012, p. 31); the reformulation of the institution to better cope 
with external demands (Peters 2012, p. 37); organisations become more efficient (Hood 
1991) and provide greater public value (Moore 1995).   
2.2.3.1 Change perspectives 
Public Inquiries are potentially powerful instruments of change. Their reports can be 
‘powerful disruptive devices’ (Brown, Ainsworth and Grant 2012, p. 299), which serve ‘as an 
authoritative moral voice and as a focal point for continued pressure’ (Brahm 2007, p. 29). 
Even though a Public Inquiry itself does not itself implement its recommendations, success 
must necessarily consider the extent to which change has occurred as a result of the Public 
Inquiry. Therefore, a broader view of institutional perspectives on change is required to 
inform the analysis.  
Within institutionalist literature there are varying perspectives on the readiness and 
responsiveness of institutions to change. However, one of the most enduring critiques 
against most forms of institutionalist theories is their limitations in explaining change. 
Although change is conceived differently in different approaches, the basic logic of 
institutions is a tendency to permanence, stability and predictability (Peters 2012, p. 119), 
‘an assumption that policy making systems tend to be conservative and find ways of 
defending existing patterns of policy’ (Peters, Pierre and King 2005, p. 1276). Institutional 
theory has been criticised for focussing on ‘structures over action, fixity over change’ and its 
subsequent inability to account for political and policy change (Mulé, 1999, p. 148; Peters, 
Pierre and King, p. 1278) However, others argue that ‘institutions must be relatively stable 
and durable if they are to be effective in helping to create order. The durability of institutions 
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makes them meaningful, but it also hinders efforts at institutional change’ (Kingston and 
Caballero 2009, p. 172). 
 
Mulé (1999, pp. 147-8) argues that influence on institutions is exerted from extra-institutional 
sources at the macro level and not in the organisation itself, possibly through a Public 
Inquiry. Institutions, like Public Inquiries, potentially provide the ‘agency’ (structures and 
resources) for ideas to change the course of policy. Peters, Pierre and King (2005, p. 1297) 
emphasise that it is the ‘significance of extra-institutional forces which command institutional 
change’. Public Inquiries can be conceived as extra-institutional agents of change and as 
powerful facilitators of new ideas. 
 
The work of Peters, Pierre and King (2005) provides a number of relevant insights into the 
question of how successful Public Inquiries bring about change. Peters, Pierre and King 
(2005, p. 1277) argue that one of the failings of institutionalism is that it masks widespread 
incremental change and that smaller changes are defined away. Dempster and Wildavsky 
(1979) contemplate this question, and ask how large does a change need to be before it 
ceases to be incremental? Peters, Pierre and King (2005, p. 1285) argue that it is critical to 
understand the ‘complex relationships existing among institutions, ideas and agency’ in 
explaining change. They argue that the identification of agents becomes the means through 
which internal dissensus and inputs from the environment can be translated into change 
activity and that a change agent is ‘required to mediate between the dynamic external 
environment and the internal inertia of the institution’ (Peters, Pierre and King 2005, p. 
1288). They also argue that ideas are crucial elements to place issues on the agenda and 
the form in which they will appear (Peters, Pierre and King 2005, p. 1295-1296). However, 
ideas in and of themselves are not a sufficient condition for change. They must somehow be 
articulated and inserted into the debate: ‘agency and ideas offer partial explanations for 
policy change; the fuller explanation rests in the collusion of these two factors. Ideas without 
agency cannot be effective, but agency without ideas cannot provide any direction to 
change’ (Peter, Pierre and King 2005, p. 1296). A Public Inquiry offers a powerful arena to 
bring together agency and ideas and hence bring about change. 
2.2.3.2 Do crises lead to change? 
As described previously there is little research on change emerging directly as a 
consequence of Public Inquiries. However, it is established that Public Inquiries are often, 
although, not exclusively, established in response to crisis. There is a body of literature on 
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whether crises lead to change and so it is to this literature that this thesis now turns to 
identify insights of relevance to assessing success. 
There are contested ideas about the propensity of institutions to adopt or resist change. The 
literature establishes that a crisis is not a sufficient condition to bring about change and that 
institutional forces may be activated in a number of ways to deflect or oppose the forces of 
change and reform, possibly arising from a Public Inquiry. If one of the fundamental 
purposes of a Public Inquiry is a signal that some change will occur how does this 
institutional reality temper notions of success? According to Dayton (2004, p. 172) ‘the crisis 
aftermath-when a crisis gives way to a new future - is one of the most interesting and 
understudied phases of the crisis process’. 
 
As argued previously, a crisis is essentially a socially constructed truth, a ‘political act’ 
(Edelman 1988, p. 31) or ‘political exercise’ (Ingram, Schneider and deLeon 2007, pp. 93-
126). It is the outcome of framing contests regarding an ‘external shock’, or ‘focussing 
event’. 
 
Birkland (2007, pp. 145-149) describes focussing events as sudden, disruptive, unusual 
events which may be catalysts for agenda and policy change. Focussing events can be 
‘normal’ (an event that might reasonably be expected to happen at some time), a ‘new’ 
focussing event (one that has never, or rarely, happened before) and ‘common events under 
uncommon circumstances’ (those generally common events that gain greater attention due 
to some unique and unusual feature that brings them to attention and makes them 
newsworthy). Such events may be used as examples of policy failure and produce a warrant 
for change. 
 
Brunsson and Olsen (1993, p. 6, p. 21-23) argue that the greater the gap between the 
values and norms professed by an institution and its actual behaviour, and the values held 
by surrounding society and the behaviour of the institution, the more likely reform  will be. 
However, Meier and O’Toole (2008), and Meier, O’Toole and Hicklin (2010) demonstrate 
how organisations ‘buffer’ their environments and mitigate shocks through structural and 
procedural routines. Lodge and Hood (2002, pp. 1-3) also remind us, that institutions ‘are not 
weathervanes that respond to any public pressure in an automatic way. Rather, such 
institutions are held to deal with external shocks in ways that fit with imperatives of their own, 
even when “forced” to respond to their environment’. Such ‘forced choices’ may be through 
investigations carried out, or recommendations made, by a Public Inquiry. 
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Lodge and Hood (2002, pp. 3-4) outline three types of institutional responses to external 
shocks:  
 entrepreneurial exploitation of ‘windows of opportunity’ to launch incubated 
proposals;  
 dynamic conservatism or system maintenance approaches, where institutions 
respond to disturbances in ways which seek to maintain their borders and 
established modes of operation; and  
 institutional biases colouring response, where organisations filter out the more 
demanding aspects of the change agenda and focus on the more readily ‘doable’, 
programmable or internally valued aspects. 
 
These are not mutually exclusive responses and in their comparative empirical work Lodge 
and Hood (2002) found elements of all responses. These periods of ‘forced choice’ incidents 
may cause periods of disequilibrium where an issue is forced onto the macro-political 
agenda’ (True, Jones and Baumgartner 2007, p. 160). At such times, with normal constraints 
on policy making removed, new possibilities emerge, however, ‘”normal” institutional 
constraints and processes tend quickly to reassert themselves once the media feeding 
frenzy (is) over’ (Lodge and Hood 2002, p. 10). Lodge and Hood provide examples of 
‘watering down’ or even revoking initiatives at the implementation stage and a return to pre-
existing behaviour and procedure. Lodge and Hood found evidence of institutions mediating 
forced choices by ‘the interests and positions that are developed in advance of a crisis and 
being promoted before the crisis event, and in the detailed way that regulatory tools and their 
application are developed during and after such events’ (Lodge and Hood 2002, p. 11). 
 
Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell (2009, p. 95) also find that ‘the mere occurrence of an 
emergency and/or the prevalence of crisis discourse in a polity does not guarantee that 
major policy changes will be made’. From the perspective of the ‘policy game of crisis 
exploitation’, Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell (2009, pp. 100-101) predict incremental rather than 
radical change will result, ‘even in the wake of destabilizing crisis episodes’. They conclude 
that crises are not a sufficient condition for policy change and they cast further doubt on path 
dependency theory’s idea of critical junctures as the explanation for change in stable policy 
environments. Research suggests that ‘overoptimistic notions of crises as devices for 
change’ should be ‘treated with considerable caution’ (Boin and Otten1996, p. 159). In their 
examination of fifteen crises Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell found that most changes that 
occurred ‘were of a relatively minor kind, although often there were large numbers of them 
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being enacted at the same time, often in response to “shopping lists” of technical 
recommendations put forward by inquiry reports’ (Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 2009, p. 95). 
 
Despite ‘turbulent, formative moments’ (Peters, Pierre and King 2005, p. 1276), Alink, Boin 
and ‘t Hart (2011, p. 303) state that the ‘logic of path dependence and policy “lock-in” does 
not stop at the moment of a crisis’ suggesting that the future course of the sector will 
continue to be influenced by the same institutional arrangements that preceded the crisis. 
While change may happen, the outcomes of crisis episodes are hard to predict (Boin, ‘t Hart 
and McConnell 2009, p. 81). Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell (2009, pp. 85-88) argue that the 
nature of change will be dependent on the outcome of competing narratives or ‘framing 
contests’, for example, whether the crisis is framed as an aberrant event, a mistake, or 
whether it is symptomatic of systemic or institutional failing. 
 
This notion of framing contests is derived from Kingdon’s (1995) comprehensive empirical 
work across two policy areas over four years in the United States of America which provides 
rich insight into a complex world of problems, participants, perspectives and politics. This 
work provides relevant insights on the question of how to assess the success of a Public 
Inquiry in bringing about change. Kingdon’s application of garbage can theory (Kingdon 
1995, p. 19, pp. 84-86) identifies three parallel but independent streams; the political stream, 
the policy stream and the problem stream. Each stream has its own life. Sometimes two or 
three streams connect, often they do not. Crises can be ‘policy windows’ that provide 
‘opportunities for pushing pet proposals or conceptions of problems’ (Kingdon 1995, p. 20). 
Triggers like a change in the collective understanding of problems, changes in political 
power, possible new ways of dealing with problems or a focussing event, can cause the 
streams to find each other (Frederickson and Smith 2003, p. 179) and, ‘the greatest policy 
changes grow out of the coupling of problems, policy proposals and politics’ (Kingdon 1995, 
p. 19). 
Public Inquiries can be ‘some of the times when the three streams are joined in a ‘single 
package’, that is, a policy window is opened. This ‘dramatically enhances the odds that a 
subject will become firmly fixed on a decision agenda’ (Kingdon 1995, p. 202). Conversely, 
partial couplings are less likely to rise on decision agendas, that is, problems without policy 
proposals, policy proposals without politics. It might be argued that the mere establishment 
of a Public Inquiry (that is, a policy window) is evidence that the three streams have come 
together, at least providing the possibility for change.  
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In summary, to restate, a Public Inquiry is not responsible for the implementation of 
recommendations. Noting also the literature which contemplates the extent to which 
institutions will resist or adopt change, based on the literature reviewed above, the following 
proposition is articulated: 
 
Proposition 3 
An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in which a 
crisis or ‘focussing event’ which has led to the establishment of a Public Inquiry, opens 
up a ‘policy window’ and the Public Inquiry has provided the opportunity for: 
 problems, policy proposals and politics to create policy change; 
 improved services, policies, processes and outcomes. 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined various literatures and noted the tensions and differing 
perspectives on ways in which to assess the success of Public Inquiries. Three recurring 
propositions of success have been distilled from this broad range of literature. In summary, 
an assessment of the success of Public Inquiries should examine the ways in which a Public 
Inquiry responds to crisis and restores legitimacy, gives voice and has provided the 
opportunity for policy change and improved outcomes. Chapter 3 takes each of the three 
propositions derived in this chapter, and based on the theoretical perspectives outlined in the 
literature review, develops the method and analytical framework for applying the propositions 
against three selected case studies.  
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Chapter 3 - Research Design 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws from the literature review in Chapter 2 to identify and defend the 
research design adopted to answer the research question: how can the success of Public 
Inquiries be assessed? Research design is the logic, plan, structure and strategy of the 
investigation of a research question (Burnham, Gilland, Grant and Layton-Henry 2008, p. 
39). It is the overarching framework involving ‘the intersection of philosophy, strategies of 
inquiry, and specific methods’ (Creswell 2009, p. 5).  
McNabb (2004, p.7) offers an overarching framework to conduct political science research. 
The six elements of McNabb’s approach are: 
Step 1: Identify a problem or question of interest or organisational need; 
Step 2: Form one or more hypotheses about the problem or question; 
Step 3: Determine the most efficient and effective way to study the problem or question; 
Step 4: Design a comprehensive system of approach and procedures for studying the 
problem or question; 
Step 5: Implement the study by investigating sources and collecting appropriate data; 
Step 6: Organise, summarise and interpret the findings of the investigation.  
McNabb’s framework has been selected as it is a systematic, comprehensive framework. 
This framework provides the organising structure for this chapter. The chapter concludes 
with the analytical framework to assess the success of Public Inquiries derived from the 
literature review (Chapter 2). 
3.2 Research design 
Step 1: Identify a problem or question of interest or organisational need. 
The literature review (Chapter 2) identifies the gap in the literature regarding how to assess 
the success of Public Inquiries generally, and specifically with respect to investigating and 
repairing breaches of the social contract by way of a Public Inquiry.   
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The research question of this thesis is how can the success of Public Inquiries be assessed? 
The literature review also notes contested views on success.  
Step 2: Form one or more hypotheses about the problem or question. 
Examination of the literature has led to the development of three propositions in order to 
assess the success of Public Inquiries (Burnham et al 2008, p. 3). The three propositions 
are: 
Proposition 1  
An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in which it has 
responded to crisis and restored legitimacy.  
 
Proposition 2 
An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in which it gives 
voice and: 
c) has promoted public and stakeholder engagement and provided a locus for public 
discourse; 
d) new ideas and knowledge have had an impact on the dominant policy 
coalition/subsystem, there has been a shift to another policy coalition or the 
emergence of new actors.  
 
Proposition 3 
An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in which a 
crisis or ‘focussing event’ which has led to the establishment of a Public Inquiry, opens 
up a ‘policy window’ and the Public Inquiry has provided the opportunity for: 
 problems, policy proposals and politics to create policy change; 
 improved services, policies, processes and outcomes. 
Step 3: Determine the most efficient and effective way to study the problem or question. 
There is always a range of ways to study a problem, different techniques to choose from, 
and a particular question does not necessarily suggest a particular method (Burnham et al, 
2008, p. 2). However, a critical consideration is which method is most appropriate to the 
research question (Burnham et al, 2008, p. 6). 
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This starts by making explicit the philosophical worldview held by the researcher. Creswell 
(2009, pp. 5-11) argues that this worldview is a key influencer of the selection of research 
design and he identifies four basic orientations; 
1. Positivist approaches are often characterised as ‘the scientific method’. This is a 
‘deterministic philosophy in which causes probably determine effects or outcomes’ 
(Creswell 2009, p. 7). It is reductionist and is based on observation and 
measurement of an ‘objective reality’. Such approaches test and refine theory. 
2. Social constructivists assume that individuals seek understanding of their world and 
develop subjective meanings of their experiences. These meanings are varied, and 
the researcher looks for this complexity, often relying on participants’ views. These 
meanings are constructed and negotiated socially and historically (Creswell 2009, p. 
8). Theories, or patterns of meaning, are generated inductively. 
3. Advocacy/participatory approaches advocate that research inquiry is intertwined with 
politics and a political agenda. Research is action oriented and aims to change the 
lives of participants and their institutions. Research is collaborative and often speaks 
to important social issues like inequality or discrimination (Creswell 2009, p. 9). 
4. Pragmatic approaches focus on actions and consequences rather than antecedent 
conditions and are concerned with ‘what works’. This approach focuses on the 
research problem and is not committed to any one system or approach. 
 
This researcher declares her constructivist view of social contexts and phenomena (Creswell 
2009, p.8; Crotty 1998, pp. 8-9; Neuman 2003, pp. 62-64), and is of the view that there is no 
one truth, and that ‘multiple social realities can exist around a phenomenon because those 
involved interpret the phenomenon differently’ (Shah and Corley 2006, p. 1823).  This 
researcher is of the view that context is critical to analysing Public Inquiries in their broader 
context to answer the research question. As previously argued in Chapter 1, success is 
framed as a relative term and the literature establishes the range of expectations and 
meanings ascribed to Public Inquiries. This researcher’s assumption guiding the research 
design is that the level or type of success of Public Inquiries will not be ‘discovered’ but that 
the assessment of success will be multi-dimensional, relative and, in all probability, 
contested. The research investigations will therefore not take a positivist approach of trying 
to ‘find the truth’ about the success of Public Inquiries, as measured by the ‘facts’, but rather, 
aim to apply a variety of propositions that different authors have made about what successful 
Public Inquiries look like, and use a range of sources to examine multiple perspectives. In so 
doing, the research design explores the possibility of applying and building an analytical 
framework for assessing the success of Public Inquiries, and inductively building theory. 
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A further consideration is whether data gathering should use qualitative or qualitative 
strategies of inquiry. According to Creswell (2009, p. 4), qualitative research is ‘a means for 
exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human 
problem’. Such research processes typically involve emerging questions and procedures, 
data analysis inductively building from specifics to general themes and the researcher 
making interpretations of data. Qualitative methodologies include ethnographic approaches 
(interviews and observation), narrative approaches and case studies (Creswell 2009, p. 13). 
Quantitative research is a ‘means for testing objective theories by examining the 
relationships among variables which can be measured and analysed’ (Creswell 2009, p. 4). 
Quantitative methodologies include surveys and experimental research (Creswell 2009, p. 
12). 
In order to investigate the research question both quantitative and qualitative elements are 
utilised. This research began by extracting recurring, but often untested, assertions from the 
literature and forming propositions. As is typical of quantitative research, concepts (for 
example, ‘legitimacy’, ‘voice’, policy change’) may be regarded as variables (Neuman 2003, 
p. 145). The research design contains both pre-determined (the propositions) as well as 
emerging methods (multiple forms of data drawing on all possibilities, interpretations across 
data sources), (Creswell 2009, p. 15). However, in terms of research process, qualitative 
approaches are selected as the most relevant to addressing the research question (Neuman 
2003, p.145). This is because ‘qualitative data provides rich information about social 
processes in a specific setting’ (Neuman 2003, p. 140), is ‘well suited for the purposes of 
description, interpretation and explanation’ (Lee, Mitchell and Sablynski 1999, p. 164) and 
enables in-depth analysis. Qualitative methods are also selected because assessing the 
success of Public Inquiries ‘needs to be understood because little research has been done 
on it’ and so the research is exploratory (Creswell 2009, p. 18). 
According to Neuman (2003, p. 145), qualitative approaches:  
 Capture and discover meaning during the process of being immersed in the data; 
 Search for themes and motifs in the data which is gathered from documentary 
sources, transcripts; 
 Develop generalisations and theory inductively from specific observations; and 
 Analyse themes or generalisations from the evidence and organise data to present a 
coherent picture. 
 
63 
 
Qualitative approaches are therefore selected for this research method as they enable 
exploration of the complexity of the social processes that are Public Inquiries and the 
examination of contested views of success. Such approaches also offer the possibility of 
inductively developing theory. 
Step 4: Design a comprehensive system of approach and procedures for studying the 
problem or question. 
Within qualitative approaches there are a range of techniques which may be used, including 
interviews, observation (participant and direct) and archival analysis (Shah and Corley 2006, 
p. 1828). 
Consideration was given to conducting interviews with key actors and participants. This 
would undoubtedly add much richness to the data. However, given the number and range of 
Public Inquiries chosen for analysis (Appendix 1) it was considered unrealistic to gain access 
to, and interview, the number and range of people who could provide perspectives on the 
research question and the theoretical propositions. There are also key questions about who 
should be interviewed, how this would be determined, and whether or not the researcher 
would have access to these individuals. Most importantly, however, it was considered that 
there could be considerable potential for unevenness in evidence gained through interviews 
depending on who was available for interview, and the period of time that has elapsed since 
the Public Inquiry.  For some of the Inquiries examined, this is a significant period of time. 
This could provide unreliability about recollections and observations and yield patchy or 
uneven data. 
Similarly, observation techniques were examined as a possibility but were considered less 
appropriate to the research question. For example, it is unclear what ‘instances’ should be 
‘observed’; the individuals, agencies, services, practices or policies which were under 
scrutiny by the Inquiry at the time of the Inquiry; what occurred after the Inquiry has 
concluded; and at what intervals or timeframes? 
A case study approach was selected to allow the examination ‘in depth, [of] many features of 
a few cases over time’ (Neuman 2003, p. 33). According to Vaughan (1992), case studies 
help researchers connect the micro level to the macro level, that is, the actions of individuals 
to large scale social structures and processes. Walton (1992) argues that case studies tell a 
larger story through the lens of a small case. 
The case study method was also selected as the research question is a ‘how’ question (how 
can the success of Public Inquiries be assessed?) being asked about contemporary events 
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over which the investigator has no control (Yin 1994, p. 9). According to Yin (1994, pp. 6-8) 
‘how’ questions are ‘explanatory’ and likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories and 
experiments as preferred research strategies. Yin suggests that the distinction between 
when these various forms are used depends on the extent of the investigator’s control over 
and access to actual behavioural events. When there is no access or control, and one is 
dealing with the ‘dead’ past, histories may be the preferred strategy. The ‘case study is 
preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviours cannot be 
manipulated’ (Yin 1994, p. 8).  
An assessment of success suggests that contextual conditions are highly pertinent. Using a 
case study approach for this research allows investigation of a ‘contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context, where the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident’ (Yin 1994, p. 13). This form of inquiry is considered appropriate for the 
following three reasons. Firstly, case studies cope with the distinctive situation in which there 
will be many more variables of interest than data points. Secondly, relying on multiple data 
sources and forms allows evidence to be triangulated. Thirdly, this approach benefits from 
the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis, as in 
this research (Yin 1994, p. 13). 
The unit of analysis in this research - or the case - is a Public Inquiry. Each case study 
examines a wide variety of aspects and the sequence of events in their ‘”messy”, natural 
settings’ (Neuman 2003, p. 148).   However, this research does not use a single ‘critical’, 
‘unique’ or ‘revelatory’ case study (Yin 1994, pp. 38-40). As outlined in Chapter 1, the 
literature has been criticised for this tendency to date. 
This thesis uses multiple case studies as illustrative of different types of Inquiries. Each 
Public Inquiry serves a particular analytic purpose, namely, to explore whether the 
theoretical propositions hold for that type of Inquiry (that is, investigatory, policy advisory or 
hybrid) and whether they hold for the different types of Inquiries. The theoretical propositions 
drawn from the literature do not differentiate between different types of Public Inquiries. 
Choosing different types of Public Inquiries therefore has the potential not only to apply the 
propositions, but also under which conditions they do or do not hold.  
The case studies are not intended as ‘samples’ representative of all Public Inquiries or types 
of Inquiries with findings therefore generalisable to all Inquiries. However, it is intended that 
the research will produce findings that are ‘analytically generalisable’ in which ‘a previously 
developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the 
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case study’ (Yin 1994, p. 31). Yin states that where two or more case studies are shown to 
support the same theory, replication can be claimed (Yin 1994, p. 31). 
In terms of the time boundaries to guide the investigation, attention is paid to the events that 
led to the establishment of the Public Inquiry, the Inquiry process itself, the immediate 
aftermath (that is, government response to report and recommendations), as well as the 
short term (planning, implementation planning and review), and any significant 
developments that may have occurred since that time. For two of the case studies (the 
Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry and the Queensland Child Protection 
Commission of Inquiry) this is typically a four to five-year time span. This time span is longer 
in the case of the Inquiry into certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil for Food 
Programme, as this case study also incorporates the findings of the Oil for Food Task Force 
which was set up as an outcome of the Inquiry and which took nine years to report. These 
long time spans are critical because the propositions for success which are applied 
(particularly, ‘restoring legitimacy’ and ‘providing the opportunity for policy change and 
improved outcomes’) cannot be assessed when the Inquiry submits its report to government. 
A longer term view is required. 
All three propositions are applied against each of the three Inquiries. Findings generated by 
three different case studies may provide a basis upon which to further refine propositions to 
assess success.  
However the limitations of this approach are also acknowledged. For example, an alternative 
methodology could be to apply each proposition against a different Public Inquiry, or against 
different types, or numbers, of Public Inquiries. Another approach could be to use different 
theoretical foundations as the basis of the various propositions, or different models or 
heuristics against which to assess success. The number of cases could be increased, 
studied over longer periods of time, using different case study selection criteria and 
propositions of success. 
Case study methods have their limitations. Given the focus on context, explanations and 
interpretations are complex. This can lead to distortions, or selective emphasis, and 
therefore, questionable analyses and partial findings. The literature acknowledges the wide 
variations in form and function of Public Inquiries so selecting just three cases for analysis 
may provide no explanatory function beyond the specific cases selected. Further, methods 
other than case study may have been chosen including comparative methods using 
quantitative variables, or focussing on field research and participant interviews. 
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These approaches would undoubtedly yield interesting results and may represent a future 
research agenda. However, given this researcher’s examination of the literature, and her 
commitment to examining the Public Inquiry in its social context (for example, what 
happened before, during and after the Inquiry, what were the reactions and responses by 
government, citizens, media and stakeholders),  the method outlined in this chapter is 
defended as the most relevant to investigating the research question. 
As Bovens, ‘t Hart and Peters (2001, p. 10, p. 180) observe, assessments of success or 
failure are, at heart, political judgements involving some bias. The researcher acknowledges 
that her own biases will have been at play throughout the research, possibly manifest 
through the selection and interpretation of media articles, choice of parliamentary debates in 
Hansard, an over- or under-emphasis on particular actors or narratives, judgements about 
certain events. The researcher has been highly sensitive to this dynamic throughout the 
case study analyses and the contemplation of findings. This researcher also acknowledges 
that in exploring success, placing particular events, policies or outcomes in particular 
categories is ‘more art than science’ (McConnell 2010b, p. 63). However, the researcher has 
at all times attempted to stay consciously and deliberately true to the broadest range of 
evidence and to authentically reflect contested perspectives.  
In applying all of the propositions to each case study, the research also aims to begin to 
build an overarching theoretical framework that may begin to construct a vehicle for 
generalising to new Public Inquiries in order to assess their success (Walter 2010, p. 9). By 
examining a number of different Public Inquiries the research also aims to make a 
contribution by utilising a method other than a single case study approach. 
3.3 Examples of Public Inquiries – the selection process  
This thesis examines Public Inquiries as a recurring institution in the political landscape. As 
outlined above, the researcher, therefore, considered it necessary for the research method 
to include a number of Public Inquiries. This poses some methodological considerations. For 
example, should they be the same, or different, types of Inquiries; should they be those 
commissioned by the same or different governments; should they be in the same period of 
time; should they include Inquiries from Australia as well as those from overseas? Each 
question is answered below. 
Prasser (2003, pp. 55-56) establishes the key features of Public Inquiries. These have been 
applied to commence the selection of Inquiries for inclusion in this research. Public Inquiries 
are: 
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1. Non-permanent, ad hoc, temporary bodies; 
2. Established and appointed by executive government; 
3. Funded totally by government; 
4. Appointed and exist at the discretion of executive government; 
5. Discrete organisational units, not part of any existing government agency, 
department or permanent advisory body; 
6. Members are typically drawn from outside the public service, government and do not 
include government ministers or backbenchers; 
7. Need to promote their existence to the wider community; 
8. Have clear terms of reference which are publicly stated; 
9. Need to seek public participation; 
10. Are expected to produce a report which should be submitted to executive 
government and should be made public within a reasonable timespan of the inquiry 
completing its task; 
11. Have advisory powers only. They can only make recommendations; they cannot 
implement their proposals. 
Prasser (2003, pp. 85-91, after Hallett, 1982) further distinguishes Inquiries by classifying 
them as inquisitorial/investigatory or policy advisory, as described in Table 2. 
Table  2. Types of Public Inquiries: features, topics and membership  
Public Inquiries Inquisitorial/investigatory inquiries Policy advisory 
Features More likely to be appointed as a Royal 
Commission as some witnesses may not 
want to come forward or certain information 
is not in the public domain This allows the 
use of their coercive powers. 
More likely to be appointed to 
gather evidence and consult 
on complex policy issues, 
provide advice to government 
on possible policy solutions. 
Topics, 
processes and 
tasks 
 
Topics investigated are about ascertaining 
and verifying the facts about particular events 
(disasters, accidents), the improper and 
possibly illegal actions of individuals or 
organisations, or a combination of both. 
 
As the topics turns on what actually 
happened or who did what, they are 
especially reliant on what witnesses saw, 
experienced or knew about a certain incident 
or alleged act. 
 
Cover most areas of policy and 
provide advice that is less 
prescriptive. 
Gain information by co-
operative consultation 
(hearings, submissions, 
supplementary research) 
rather than coercive measures. 
 
Rely on their status as 
executive appointed bodies to 
68 
 
More dependent on evidence collected first 
hand from witnesses through a hearing and 
cross-examination process, than from 
evidence collected through wide ranging 
consultation and/or research.  
attract submissions and 
support. 
 
Focus on listening, gaining and 
understanding of the issues 
rather than seeking the ‘one 
truth’ or ‘solution’ to an issue. 
Rarely use their coercive 
powers to obtain evidence and 
avoid excessively legalistic 
processes. 
Membership 
and size 
 
Resemble courts of law: as evidenced by 
their procedures; adversarial nature of their 
hearings; use of legal counsel. 
 
Membership dominated exclusively by legal 
profession and judiciary. 
 
Usually bodies with single members. 
 
Judgemental in tone. Apportion blame about 
the cause of a particular problem in relation 
to procedures or persons. 
 
Cannot launch prosecutions, but often their 
reports result in further action by relevant 
legal authorities. 
Usually more than one 
member drawn from a wide 
range of different professional 
groupings, interest groups or 
academic disciplines, to reflect 
their broader role. 
 
Source: Prasser 2003, pp. 85-91, after Hallett, 1982. 
Close examination of recent Public Inquiries in Australia, however, reveals that they do not 
always fall neatly into either category. For instance, recent Public Inquiries into natural 
disasters share features of both types of Inquiries. Both the Queensland Floods Commission 
of Inquiry (2012, p. 30) and the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (2010, pp. 38-41) 
were set up with the features of investigatory Inquiries as described above, but also to 
examine systemic policy and practice issues. These are described as ‘hybrid’ Inquiries. 
To assess the success of Public Inquiries within their context it is important to include 
examples of different types of Inquiries, that is, policy advisory, investigatory/inquisitorial 
inquiries, and those which are a hybrid form. Otherwise research findings may only be able 
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to be applied to a particular type of Public Inquiry. It is entirely possible that different types of 
Inquiries should be assessed by different means. Focusing on one type only would not 
provide this insight. Three different types of Public Inquiries were therefore chosen for 
analysis: one policy advisory; one investigatory; and one hybrid Public Inquiry. Public 
Inquiries which are very recent or underway at the time of writing are not examined. This is 
because deliberations are not yet complete, or Inquiry Reports are still under consideration 
or in early stages of implementation. 
The focus of this research is on Public Inquiries held in Australia. Consideration was given to 
including Inquiries held in other countries but a focus on Australia controls for some 
contextual differences and variances in parliamentary and political systems.  
Investigatory/Inquisitorial Public Inquiry 
Examination of recent investigatory/inquisitorial inquiries reveals a range of areas including 
responses to natural disasters (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2009; Queensland 
Floods Commission of Inquiry 2012), responses to allegations of corruption against a person 
or persons (Report of the Kapunda Road Royal Commission, South Australia 2005; Royal 
Commission into whether there has been Corrupt or Criminal Conduct by any Western 
Australian Police Officer 2004), or systemic allegations of corruption (for example, the 
Commonwealth Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation to the UN Oil for Food 
Programme 2005-2006, NSW Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service 1995-1997). 
On closer examination, however, the Victorian Bushfires and Queensland Flood Inquiries are 
hybrid forms (Appendix 1). 
The most recent investigatory Public Inquiry is that which was set up in response to 
allegations of corruption is the Commonwealth Inquiry into certain Australian companies in 
relation to the UN Oil for Food Programme 2005-2006 (the Cole Inquiry). 
Policy Advisory Public Inquiry 
The selection process for policy advisory Public Inquiries focuses on one major policy issue 
because this ‘affords assessment of the use and role of the public inquiry instrument 
promoting an issue on to the agenda, defining its boundaries, suggesting options, proposing 
policies for implementation, legitimising choices and evaluating its impacts’ (Prasser 2003, p. 
273). This analysis of policy advisory inquiries in the same policy area may also control for 
some of the possible variables which could influence the processes, outcomes and 
indicators of success, for example, jurisdiction, legislative base, communities of interest, 
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policy networks. A focus on one policy area is also cognisant of Considine’s (1998) 
‘structured influence model’ which holds there are structural and discernible differences 
across policy sectors in terms of issue selection and agenda setting.  
In recent decades most States in Australia have conducted inquiries into child protection.16 
These Public Inquiries have similar terms of reference in that they have been set up to 
investigate broad systemic issues, rather than investigate a particular case, and to provide 
advice to government. The most recent policy advisory Public Inquiry selected for 
examination in the area of child protection is the Queensland Child Protection Commission 
of Inquiry 2013 (QCPCI). 
While only one child protection policy advisory case study is conducted in depth (in Chapter 
5), an examination of two other child protection Inquiries which were established around the 
same time is also conducted (Appendix 5). This analysis explores the generalisability of 
findings, similarities and differences across this policy area. It also informs some of the 
research findings of this thesis.  
Hybrid Public Inquiry 
As noted above the Public Inquiries set up in response to natural disasters are more 
accurately classified as hybrids as their terms of reference include both investigatory and 
policy advisory functions. The ‘hybrid’ Inquiry chosen for analysis is the most recent one at 
the time of writing, the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2012 (the QFCI). 
Further details of the selection matrix and rationale for case study selection are in Appendix 
1. 
Step 5: Implement the study by investigating sources and collecting appropriate data. 
As with many qualitative studies, this research takes a nonlinear research path (Neuman 
2003, p. 141), in that the research process ‘makes successive passes through steps, 
sometimes moving backward and sideways before moving on…with each cycle or repetition 
a researcher collects new data and gains new insights’ (Neuman 2003, p. 141). Similarly, 
Wildavsky (2004, p. 9) characterises this approach as taking ‘steps through which, darting 
back and forth, difficulties are divided and decomposed until they are made manageable or 
discarded’, with its fair share of ‘blind alleys’ and ‘trial and error’.  
                                                          
16 There has been no similar Inquiry at the Commonwealth level as in Australia child protection is the 
jurisdiction of State and Territory governments. 
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Data analysis began early in the data collection phase. This served to inform and guide 
further data collection. Data analysis ‘stretch[ed] across all stages’ of the research process 
(Neuman 2003, p. 440) and was used to triangulate and validate findings. 
The source of data used is documentary analysis. Documentary analysis allows the 
researcher to ‘piece together the complex chain of past events’ (Burnham et al 2008, p. 1). 
All data analysed is that which is available in the public domain. The method relies on 
primary documents (for example, Public Inquiry reports, transcripts, Parliamentary debates), 
as well as secondary sources like expert commentary and analysis, and media coverage. 
Multiple sources of evidence are used to explore context and commentary, triangulate 
findings and assess whether there may be convergence around whether the Public Inquiry 
can be assessed as a success in answer to the research question.  
Each case study included a thorough examination and multiple re-readings of: 
 Inquiry Report and recommendations; 
 Inquiry discussion papers and consultation mechanisms;  
 Submissions to the Inquiry; 
 Hearing transcripts; 
 Government documentation - including official responses to reports, annual reports 
and budget statements, progress reports, evaluations of implementation, statistics;  
 Media and public commentary (including social media, campaigns, interest group 
websites) prior to establishment of Inquiry, during and after the Inquiry; 
 Academic commentary, scholarly articles and international perspectives regarding 
the Inquiry; 
 Parliamentary debates (Hansards) and political developments; 
 Court hearings, prosecutions, judgements and legal commentary. 
As noted above, gathering documentation and analysis typically spanned a four to five-year 
time frame (or longer in the case of the Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation 
to the UN Oil for Food Programme) to ensure contemporary developments like subsequent 
investigations, class actions or ‘repeat’ Inquiries were part of the evidence base. These post 
Inquiry developments prompted a return to, and re-examination of, original sources, 
analyses and recurring themes. 
 
Step 6: Organise, summarise, and interpret the findings of the investigation.  
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The literature review led to the development of three theoretical propositions about success. 
The theoretical foundations of each proposition described in Chapter 2 are used to develop 
an analytical framework which organises and summarises the basis upon which each case is 
examined and each proposition is applied. 
Each case study is a ‘whole’ study in itself in which data from multiple sources is gathered, 
analysed and revisited in order to demonstrate if each of the three propositions were or were 
not in evidence.  
The theoretical propositions from which the criteria for assessing success are distilled are 
elaborated in the next section. 
Proposition 1  
An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in which it has 
responded to crisis and restored legitimacy.  
A recurring assertion in the examined literature (as discussed in Chapter 2) is that one of the 
roles of Public Inquiries is insulating elites from blame. In their development of crisis 
exploitation theory, Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell (2009) turn specific attention to framing 
contests in the Inquiry arena. In their examination of fifteen crisis cases they confirm that the 
establishment of an Inquiry creates a new venue that actors will seek to explore (Boin, ‘t Hart 
and McConnell 2009, p. 97). As much as authorities may wish to do so, the establishment of 
Inquiries are not generally blocked, although they may be resisted.  
Two of the Public Inquiries selected for examination were established as a response to 
crisis; the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry, and the Inquiry into certain Australian 
companies in relation to the UN Oil for Food Programme. Recommendations will be 
examined to determine the focus of reform. Consequences for key actors will also be 
explored. 
The second theoretical foundation of this proposition is based on DiMaggio and Powell’s 
(1983) work, which identified ways that organisations within a field face pressures to 
enhance their legitimacy. The pressures toward institutional isomorphism are described as: 
mimetic (pressures to copy or emulate other similar organisations); coercive (pressures 
exerted by government, regulatory, or other agencies to adopt the structures or systems that 
they favour); and normative (pressures to conform to standards of professionalism and to 
adopt systems and techniques considered to be legitimate by relevant professional 
groupings). The major empirical prediction made by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) is that 
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organisations within a field will, over time, yield to the isomorphic pressures that confront 
them. Otherwise, their level of external support, and ultimately their survival, will be in 
jeopardy. If as is asserted, Public Inquiries restore legitimacy they could be expected to do 
so in the ways described by DiMaggio and Powell. 
Alink, Boin and ‘t Hart (2011, p. 281) further argue that legitimacy cannot be measured in 
absolute terms but that it is possible to ‘assess and detect significant alterations in levels of 
legitimacy’, through indicators such as the extent and content of media coverage, 
parliamentary attention, number and nature of administrative appeals, court and ombudsman 
rulings regarding a sector. As indicators of legitimacy these sources will also be examined to 
assess to what extent legitimacy has been restored as a result of the Public Inquiry. 
The third theoretical basis of this proposition is derived from Weick’s work on sensemaking 
which asserts that ‘to deal with ambiguity, interdependent people search for meaning, settle 
for plausibility, and move on’ (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005, p. 419). Sensemaking as a 
narrative process ‘is not about truth and getting it right’ (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005, 
p. 415).  Sensemaking ‘is driven by plausibility rather than accuracy (Weick 1995, p.55) and 
if ‘plausible stories keep things moving, they are salutary’ and guide action (Weick, Sutcliffe 
and Obstfeld 2005, p. 415). As such this provides a different perspective on success than 
that which is based on rational decision-making models with their emphasis on accuracy and 
getting the facts rights.  
As outlined in Chapter 2, this body of theory holds that ‘inquiry reports support the legitimacy 
of social institutions and extend the hegemony of prevailing system-supportive ideologies’ by 
persuading us to accept certain contestable ideas (Brown 2000, p. 48; Brown 2004). This 
approach requires a focus on the text produced by the Inquiry as an attempt to provide a 
narrative which is ‘plausible, authoritative and verisimilitudinous’ (Brown 2000, p. 65).  The 
approach to applying this proposition will rest on reviewing the Reports and 
recommendations of the selected Public Inquiries and surrounding commentary.  
Proposition 2 
An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in which it gives 
voice and: 
e) has promoted public and stakeholder engagement and provided a locus for public 
discourse; 
f) new ideas and knowledge have had an impact on the dominant policy 
coalition/subsystem, there has been a shift to another policy coalition or the 
emergence of new actors.  
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This will require a focus on the inputs into the Public Inquiries, that is, who they are, what 
they propose, whether there have been any changes in the policy coalitions or their 
respective impacts, and how enduring this has been.       
At the most basic level the first assessment of success will be whether the government 
accepted the recommendations (Regan 2014) and whether there is any ongoing reporting by 
government on implementation. Secondly, as participation is often referred to as a hallmark 
of Public Inquiries (McConnell, Gauja and Botterill 2008; Prasser 2003; Sheriff 1983) each 
Inquiry will be examined to determine the processes of participation and input, supports 
available, who used them, and how widely they were used. An assessment of the extent to 
which there has been an impact on public discourse (ALRC 2009; Regan 2014) will be 
gained by perusal of submissions, parliamentary debate transcripts (Hansard), media 
coverage, academic commentary and interest group campaigns.       
However, for the purpose of deeper analysis into the proposition that one of success factors 
for Public Inquiries is that they allow new voices into the policy field (Howlett and Ramesh 
2003), where possible from the examination of public documents, an assessment will be 
made about the extent to which new entrants and ideas have been given voice, whether 
there has been a shift in policy inputs and whether this is enduring (Sabatier and Weible 
2007). In particular, an analysis will be made whether participation went beyond the ‘iron 
triangle’ of legislators, agency officials and interest group leaders (Heclo 2007, p. 421, 
Kingdon, 1995, p. 33). 
Proposition 3 
An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in which a 
crisis or ‘focussing event’ which has led to the establishment of a Public Inquiry, opens 
up a ‘policy window’ and the Public Inquiry has provided the opportunity for: 
 problems, policy proposals and politics to create policy change; 
 improved services, organisations, policies, processes and outcomes. 
The first part of the proposition rests on Kingdon’s (1995, p. 85) identification of separate 
‘streams’ flowing through agenda setting and decision-making structures. Kingdon identifies 
three streams of problems, politics and policies, each of which has its own life. Sometimes 
two or three streams connect, often they do not. Public Inquiries can be ‘some of the times 
‘when the three streams are joined’ (Kingdon 1995, p. 201) in a ‘single package’ (Kindgon, p. 
202), and a policy window is opened. This ‘dramatically enhances the odds that a subject will 
become firmly fixed on a decision agenda’ (Kingdon 1995, p. 202). Conversely, partial 
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couplings are less likely to rise on decision agendas, namely, problems without policy 
proposals, policy proposals without politics. It might be argued that the mere establishment 
of a Public Inquiry (providing a policy window) is demonstration that the three streams have 
come together at least providing the possibility for change.  
The approach to applying this proposition in each case study will incorporate the following 
elements (Kingdon 1995): 
 Stream 1: Politics: Setting the agenda  
 The trigger - Identify the crisis and how it is framed  
 The response - examine the scope and terms of reference, that is, the ‘policy 
window’  
 Participants - identify actors, policy entrepreneurs, interest groups. 
Stream 2: Problems: Recognition and definition 
 The inputs - type, number, range, participants (politicians, academics, researchers, 
bureaucrats, interest groups, public) 
 The process - hearings, cross examination, witnesses, submissions. 
Stream 3: Policy proposals 
 Generation of policy alternatives, recombination of familiar elements of existing 
policies, innovation 
 Report and recommendations. 
Did the streams join and did this lead to change? 
 Response - government/media/public. 
The second part of the proposition is designed to examine the recurring assertions in the 
literature that successful Public Inquiries provide the opportunity to improve services, 
processes, policies and outcomes (Hood 1991; Moore 1995; Peters 2012). Assessments 
against this proposition will use a combination of the New Public Management (NPM) 
‘doctrine’ (as described by Hood 1991, pp. 4-5) as well as Moore’s (1995, 2003) concept of 
public value, as outlined in Chapter 2. 
Evidence of the introduction of NPM principles as a result of an Inquiry which is intended to 
improve organisational efficiency and effectiveness may include: improved management, 
transparency and accountability; clearer definitions of goals, targets, indicators of success; 
resource allocation linked to measured performance; break-up of centralised bureaucracy 
and establishment of corporatised units; competition, contracting-out, public tendering; 
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private sector management practices, and reducing direct costs. This analysis will be made 
from review of documentation in the public domain over a period of time, for example, annual 
reports, official government responses, statistics and evaluations (Hood 1991). 
 
In terms of whether the Public Inquiry led to better public value, each case study will, where 
possible, apply the lens of Moore’s strategic triangle (1995) as the heuristic, namely: 
 Strategy - the extent to which the outcomes of the Inquiry are integrated into or 
change organisational strategy; changes in funding allocations or organisational 
structure to support the outcomes of the Inquiry; 
 Legitimacy and support - as per data drawn from the analysis from Proposition 2; 
 Operational capacity - commitments to building staff capabilities or organisational 
learning in line with the outcomes of the Inquiry; changes to relationships with 
partners, co-producers in line with the outcomes of the Inquiry. 
3.4 Analytical framework to assess the success of Public Inquiries 
From these three propositions and their theoretical foundations, the following analytical 
framework has been developed to examine the recurring assertions of success outlined in 
the literature review (Chapter 2). For each proposition regarding success, elements of 
success have been identified from the literature, as well as indicators and measures. This 
analysis guides the evidence sought and analysed. This analytical tool applies the 
propositions to the three case studies. 
Table 3. Analytical framework to assess the success of Public Inquiries. 
Success 
Proposition 
Elements of 
success 
Indicators Measures Evidence/ 
source 
Responding 
to crisis and 
restoring 
legitimacy. 
 
Inquiry fulfils 
symbolic, learning 
and ‘realpolitik’ 
role. 
Reform in the 
regulatory, 
managerial or 
cultural spheres 
rather than on the 
role of political 
office-holders or 
political institutions 
Focus of 
recommendations. 
Inquiry Report 
depoliticises 
disaster event, 
justifies action, 
reduces anxieties 
by asserting 
control (Brown 
2000). 
Recommendations 
exhibit isomorphic 
Political office-
holders or political 
institutions 
unchanged. 
Reform in 
regulatory 
managerial or 
cultural spheres 
(Boin, ‘t Hart and 
McConnell 2009) 
Organisational 
response to 
Inquiry Reports 
and 
recommendations. 
Government 
response. 
Consequences for 
key actors.  
Media coverage 
and commentary. 
Parliamentary 
attention.  
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(Boin, ‘t Hart and 
McConnell 2009). 
Disaster/crisis 
depoliticised 
(Weick, Sutcliffe 
and Obstfeld 2005; 
Boin, ‘t Hart and 
McConnell 2009). 
Legitimacy of 
institutions 
restored (Alink, 
Boin and ‘t Hart 
2011). 
pressures to 
restore legitimacy 
(DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). 
isomorphic 
pressures to 
restore legitimacy 
(DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). 
Number and 
nature of appeals, 
court and 
ombudsman 
rulings (Alink, Boin 
and ‘t Hart 2011). 
Giving voice. Public and 
stakeholder 
engagement 
promoted 
(McConnell, Gauja 
and Botterill 2008; 
Prasser 2003; 
Sheriff 1983). 
Impact on public 
discourse 
(Australian Law 
Reform 
Commission 2009; 
Regan 2014). 
New/different 
policy ideas and  
new/different 
actors which are 
not transitory 
(Howlett and 
Ramesh 2003; 
Sabatier 2007). 
Level and type of 
public engagement 
and discourse 
(McConnell, Gauja 
and Botterill 2008; 
Prasser 2003; 
Sheriff 1983). 
Impact of new 
ideas on policy. 
Impact of new 
actors/voices on 
policy. 
Challenges and 
changes to policy 
coalition/ 
subsystem 
(Howlett and 
Ramesh 2003; 
Sabatier 2007). 
 
Inputs to Inquiries 
and processes of 
participation. 
Analysis of 
submissions.  
Analysis of 
government 
responses to 
recommendations 
and changes in 
policy inputs. 
Government 
response to 
recommendations. 
Submissions, 
media coverage, 
interest group 
campaigns. 
Changes to policy 
networks and 
influence.  
Creating the 
opportunity 
for policy 
change and 
Opening the policy 
window-bringing 
politics, problems 
and policy 
Politics: 
Identification and 
framing of the 
crisis (Boin, ‘t Hart 
Extent and type of 
policy change. 
Extent to which the 
outcomes of the 
Inquiry have been 
Inquiry 
participants: policy 
entrepreneurs, 
interest groups, 
‘victims’. 
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improved 
outcomes. 
 
proposals together 
(Kingdon 1995). 
Providing the 
opportunity for 
improved service 
delivery, 
organisations, 
policies, processes 
and outcomes 
(Hood 1991; 
Moore 1995). 
 
and McConnell 
2009). 
Examination of the 
response - scope 
and terms of 
reference of Public 
Inquiry. 
Identification of 
participants 
Problems: 
Inputs 
Process 
Policy proposals: 
Generation of 
policy alternatives, 
where possible. 
Report and 
recommendations 
Policy change. 
Improved service 
delivery. 
Improved policies, 
process and 
outcomes. 
Organisational or 
structural change  
(Hood 1992; 
Moore 1995). 
integrated into or 
change 
organisational 
strategy. 
Changes in 
management, 
transparency, 
accountability, 
structure, 
performance 
management, 
competition, 
funding, building 
staff capability. 
 
Inquiry process: 
submissions, 
hearings. 
 
Review of 
documentation in 
the public domain 
over a period of 
time including 
Annual Reports, 
Budgets, official 
government 
responses, 
statistics and 
evaluations. 
 
 
3.5 Implications of findings for scholarship – inductively building theory 
This thesis applies the analytical framework to the three selected case studies and presents 
its findings. The implications of these findings for scholarship are then identified and the 
thesis moves to inductively building theory (in Chapter 7). Theory building was not the 
original intent of this thesis. The original intent was to apply existing theory and recurring 
propositions in the literature about the ways in which the success of Public Inquiries may be 
assessed. Because this was not the original intent, the suggested staged process of building 
theory from case study research was not explicitly or systematically built into the 
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methodology (Eisenhardt 1989, pp. 532-550). Rather, it emerged inductively. As such it 
shares some of the elements of theory building from case study research but does not do so 
comprehensively. Specifically, the most significant omission, and therefore, limitation, of this 
research is the lack of direct participant data, for example, interviews, as part of the suite of 
data collection methods. Had the original intent of this thesis been theory building, interviews 
may have formed part of the research approach. This may inform a future research agenda. 
The sampling of Public Inquiries was not random. It represents an attempt to gather data to 
support the development of an analytical framework. The cases chosen for study were not 
‘representative’ but theoretically sampled because it was anticipated that each was 
‘particularly suitable for illuminating and extending relationships and constructs’ or would be 
‘revelatory’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, p. 27). By choosing different types of Inquiries, 
the attempt was to apply, and then refine and extend emergent theory, and examine its 
boundaries. The multiple case studies approach used in the research, therefore, should 
provide a stronger case for theory building (Yin 1994, pp. 44-48), with the significant caveat 
that the ‘a few additional cases can significantly affect the quality of the emergent theory’ 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, p. 27). 
Theory building has emerged inductively through this research. The researcher chose a 
question, then the analytic method (case study) and then the specific data collection 
methods based on the particular context of Public Inquiries, including Inquiry reports, media 
articles and parliamentary debate transcripts (Shah and Corley 2006, p. 1826). The process 
was also iterative involving reading of documentary sources, developing a baseline 
description of events with reference back to literature and relevant theoretical concepts 
throughout the analysis (Brown and Jones 2000, p. 659). Data collection occurred alongside, 
and was followed by, a lengthy process of data analysis. During this process the researcher 
consistently returned to the research question in order to check whether any reorientation 
was required in data collection or analysis (Shah and Corley 2006, p. 1826).  
A process of ongoing comparisons underpinned the research throughout the course of the 
study. Events and observations were compared, contrasted and followed up to gain 
additional perspectives. Data collection was open ended and flexible. For example, data 
collection was modified and expanded to include two additional child protection Inquiries 
(Appendix 5) to explore emerging ideas. Data collection was also expanded to examine any 
subsequent Inquiries or significant developments that were linked to the case study Inquiry. 
These include the Sofronoff Grantham Floods Commission of Inquiry 2015, the Queensland 
Floods class action (following the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry), and the civil 
prosecutions conducted by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (following 
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the Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation to the UN Oil for Food Programme). 
These analyses were undertaken in order to check whether these more contemporary 
developments provided any further insights on success. 
When the analytical framework was found to be wanting (as discussed in Chapter 7), the 
researcher revisited the literature in order to find an appropriate fit between the findings that 
had emerged and the focussing concepts from the literature (Brown and Jones 2000, p. 
659). Various theories from a broad range of disciplines were then explored in order to shed 
further insights on the research question. These are explored in Chapter 7. 
There is significant potential for a future research agenda to supplement the data gathered 
and the theory building using a range of research techniques to further develop theory. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research design and defended the choice of methodology. As 
outlined in Chapter 2 the institution of Public Inquiries is well documented, but an 
assessment of their success has received less attention. The thesis adopts a qualitative 
approach as the most appropriate to investigating the research question. A multiple case 
study approach is adopted to allow for a rich, in depth analysis within the specific context of 
each Public Inquiry selected for analysis.  
As described in Chapter 1, the theoretical propositions which are applied to the case studies, 
provide the analytical framework for the research and serve to guide the collection and 
analysis of evidence.  
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Chapter 4 - The Inquiry into certain Australian companies in 
relation to the UN Oil for Food Programme 2006 
Case Study 1: An Investigatory Inquiry 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter details Case Study 1: The Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation 
to the UN Oil for Food Programme, an investigatory Public Inquiry. The case study analysis 
is conducted using the analytical framework (from Chapter 3) based on the propositions of 
the success drawn from the literature.  
 
In relation to the first proposition, that an assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry 
should examine the ways in which it has responded to crisis and restored legitimacy, this 
case study finds that this Inquiry was a response to the ‘crisis’ generated by the Volcker 
Report (Volcker, Goldstone and Pieth 2005, henceforth, the Volcker Report) which confirmed 
the corrupt practices of the Australian Wheat Board (AWB). It did not, however, restore the 
legitimacy of government and was not successful in depoliticising the scandal. By the 
government prescribing its narrow terms of reference, the Inquiry was, however, very 
successful in shielding government elites and the public service from blame.  
 
With respect to the second proposition, that an assessment of the success of a Public 
Inquiry should examine the ways in which it gives voice, the Inquiry shone a light on the 
AWB’s practices and transformed them from non-issues to serious allegations requiring 
investigation. The Inquiry gave voice to the ‘rumours’ of the AWB’s corrupt conduct. 
However, as this Inquiry was conducted in a highly legalistic manner, apart from calling 
witnesses, the Inquiry did not give voice to those impacted by the practices of the AWB.  
 
With regard to the third proposition, that an assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry 
should examine the ways in which it provides the opportunity for policy change and improved 
outcomes, it was the scandal itself and the practices uncovered by the Inquiry that prompted 
significant policy reforms in Australia’s wheat marketing arrangements. These came about 
through regular democratic processes, not the Inquiry per se (Appendix 3). Policy changes 
arising directly from the Inquiry’s limited number of recommendations have, however, led to 
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increased transparency and accountability of Australia in relation to United Nations sanctions 
and clarification of legal professional privilege in the context of Royal Commissions. 
 
This chapter provides background to the Inquiry and outlines the Inquiry process and 
outcomes. It details the response to the Inquiry Report, including the establishment of the Oil 
for Food Task Force, and applies the three propositions of success. Assessments of 
success against the three propositions are articulated. 
4.2 Background to the Inquiry 
‘A scandal of such monumental proportions’ (Rudd 2005). 
The Oil for Food Programme was authorised through United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 661. Trade with Iraq could only legitimately and legally occur under United 
Nations (UN) supervision. The Australian Wheat Board (AWB) Limited was a statutory 
marketing authority. It was the monopoly single wheat desk for Australia’s wheat exports. 
The AWB was listed as a top 200 listed company in Australia. It held approximately 70 
percent of Australia’s bulk wheat export market (Grebe 2013, p. 119). 
There had been concerns about the conduct of the AWB for some time, however, ‘in the 
rough and tumble world of international trade competition’ (Botterill 2007, p. 11) these were 
dismissed as rumours and framed as nothing but competitive market strategy. For example, 
in 2000, the Canadian Wheat Board refused to make a payment to Iraq and, subsequently, 
did not get a key contract. The Canadian Wheat Board was allegedly told that similar 
arrangements had been made with Australia. The Canadian Wheat Board raised the matter 
with the UN which referred the matter to Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT). DFAT duly questioned the AWB. The AWB denied the allegations, claiming they 
were ‘bullshit’ (Report of the Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation to the UN 
Oil for Food Programme, Vol. 1, p. xxiii, henceforth, the Cole Report 2006). This was so 
reported back to the UN. 
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Oil for Food Programme ended. At that time 
documents came to light providing evidence of ‘kickbacks’ to President Saddam Hussein 
and his regime. In 2004, the UN established the Volcker Inquiry to inquire into the Oil for 
Food Programme. Volcker reported in 2005 and found that the AWB had been the ‘single 
biggest contributor of kickbacks to the Iraqi government’ (Botterill and McNaughton 2008, p. 
586). The size, scale and duration of the scandal had been documented by the Volcker 
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Report. Rumour was now established as fact.  The Australian Government was compelled to 
respond.  
On 31 October 2005 Prime Minister Howard announced that an independent inquiry would 
be established to determine whether there was any breach of law by the Australian 
companies referred to in the Volcker report. The Prime Minister announced that the inquiry 
‘should be armed with appropriate powers’ and that he was seeking advice what sort of 
inquiry would be appropriate (Howard, Hansard, p. 25, p. 31 October 2005). 
The framing contests began. The Opposition signalled at this early stage, even before the 
form of the inquiry had been announced or the Letters Patent issued, that the Prime Minister 
wanted the inquiry to (O’Connor, BPJ, Hansard, 9 November 2005, p. 96): 
focus on the companies and not on the government or any of its agencies. On this 
matter, Labor will not let this Prime Minister or his minister off…the government and 
its agencies cannot be allowed to slither out of the spotlight. 
The Opposition called for a royal commission with full powers of investigation ’to expose the 
truth’ and reveal how ‘$300 million goes on to fund an Iraqi insurgency and the Iraqi’s war 
against Australian forces in that country in 2003’ (Rudd, Hansard, 9 November 2005, p. 89). 
The Opposition claimed ‘that the people of Australia actually want to know what happened’ 
and alleged that ‘at a minimum, the Howard government is guilty of culpable negligence’ 
(Rudd, Hansard, 9 November 2005, p. 89). 
The Government framed the Opposition’s claims of ‘exaggeration and confected rage’ as 
distortions which ‘misrepresented the situation beyond the bounds of reality’ (McGauran, 
Hansard, 9 November 2005, p. 92). The Government did concede, however, that there were 
‘matters to satisfy the parliament and the Australian people about’ (McGauran, Hansard, 9 
November 2005, p. 92). Notably, the Government also took this early opportunity to shift 
blame and stress ‘that it was the UN, not the Australian government that ran the programme’ 
and that ‘there were shocking shortcomings in the United Nations administration of the Oil 
for Food programme’ (McGauran, Hansard, 9 November 2005, p. 92).  
 
On 10 November 2005 when the Letters Patent were issued, the Shadow Attorney-General 
(Rudd, Hansard, 10 November, 2005, p. 106) asked the Prime Minister:  
Isn’t it a fact that this commission of inquiry only has terms of reference to investigate 
three Australian companies and narrowly defined persons associated with those 
companies rather than powers to investigate the actions of Australian government 
ministers, advisors and their officials? Why is this inquiry not empowered to reach 
findings as to whether or not the Australian government itself has failed to meet its 
legal obligations to prevent breaches of global sanctions against Saddam Hussein? 
Prime Minister, if you are not empowering this inquiry to examine the government’s 
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own actions in approving this $300 million Saddam Hussein slush fund, aren’t you 
simply establishing, in advance, a 100 per cent rolled gold political whitewash? 
The Prime Minister responded that ‘[W]e are, to the letter, responding to the request made 
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations’ and that the terms of reference were 
‘entirely appropriate’ (Howard, Hansard, 10 November 2005, p. 106). Critically, this pivotal 
issue of the scope of terms of reference continued to be a recurring theme throughout the 
Inquiry and one around which the assessment of success turns. 
4.3 The Inquiry 
Justice Cole was appointed as the Commissioner of the Inquiry; ‘a lawyer of great integrity, 
great repute and great forensic skills and as a completely and fearlessly independent man’ 
(Howard, Hansard, 27 November 2006, p. 32). 
This was an investigative Public Inquiry which was conducted in a highly legalistic manner. 
Seventy-five witnesses were called and statements from a further 130 witnesses were 
tendered. Confidential hearings were held over five days with former employees of the AWB. 
Evidence taken in confidential hearings was subsequently made public. Public hearings 
occupied 70 sitting days. Hearings were recorded and transcripts were publicly displayed. 
The cost of the Inquiry was approximately $10 million (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 197).  
Commissioner Cole presented his final report on 24 November 2006. The report examines in 
great detail the transactions between AWB Limited and Iraq in relation to the UN sanctions 
and Australian law. The Inquiry found that between November 1999 and March 2003 the 
AWB paid to Alia (a Jordanian trucking company) transportation fees of around $US225 
million. After taking a 0.25 percent commission, Alia transferred funds to the General 
Maritime Transportation Company, the Iraq Public Ports Company or the Iraqi State 
Company for Water Transport. From there funds were distributed to various Iraqi 
government ministries: two thirds to the Ministry of Finance; 18 percent to ‘land’; 4 percent to 
‘ports’, and 1 percent to ‘water’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol 1, p. lxiii). This placed the AWB in the 
‘dubious position of being by far the major contributor to the schemes the Saddam Hussein 
regime had put in place in order to undermine the [UN] sanctions’ (Botterill 2007, p. 4). 
These payments were in direct contravention to the UN Resolution. In no uncertain terms, 
Cole described this as a ‘sham designed to deceive the United Nations’ (Cole Report 2006, 
Vol. 1, p. xv).  
The scandal was described in the media as ‘the most far-reaching and expensive scandal in 
Australian history; ‘[i]t involves one of our biggest export industries, one of our most 
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important departments and a sovereign nation that we invaded militarily’ (Carney 2006). 
More than ten years later it is still described as ‘the greatest international trade scandal in 
Australian history, a terrific stain on our good name’ (Overington 2016). The scandal 
involved both ‘unethical and illegal transgressions’ which were ‘further compounded by 
immoral and unethical behaviours like cover up and denial’ (Grebe 2013, p. 122). The 
scandal had potentially grave political implications and shook the public’s confidence in its 
institutions and, as predicted by O’Connor (2007), a fact finding, or investigatory, inquiry was 
established. 
 
In the prologue to his final report, Commissioner Cole (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. xi ) 
states that: 
the facts are now not in doubt. It is not my function to make findings of breach of the 
law; my function is to indicate circumstances where it might be appropriate for 
authorities to consider whether criminal or civil proceedings should be commenced. I 
found such circumstances to exist. 
 
After the Inquiry thirteen former AWB executives potentially faced criminal charges. The 
AWB lost its monopoly on wheat exports. A new Chairman and Managing Director for AWB 
were appointed and new governance arrangements were put in place (AWB Limited Annual 
Review 2009).  
4.4 The Letters Patent 
‘They put blinkers on the inquiry and tied both arms behind its back’ (Bevis 2006) 
There was ‘much parliamentary and public debate about the scope of the Letters Patent’ 
(Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 157, pp. 158-159, p. 163), particularly in relation to whether the 
terms of reference permitted findings to be made of illegality against the Commonwealth or 
any of its officers. Commissioner Cole stated that the Letters Patent did not permit him to 
make such findings and that it was ‘not the function of a Commissioner exercising the 
powers of a Royal Commission to set its terms of reference’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 
163). Nor did Commissioner Cole find any ‘material that is in any way suggestive of illegal 
activity by the Commonwealth or any of its officers. Thus, there was no basis to seeking a 
widening of the terms of reference in that respect’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 164). Simply, 
‘it is not the function of a commissioner to determine his terms of reference’ (Australian 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Reference Committee, Work undertaken by the 
Australian Federal Police’s Oil for Food Taskforce 2015, p. 51, henceforth OFFTF Report 
2015). 
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The Prime Minister asserted that the ‘greatest evidence of our bona fides was the 
establishment of the Inquiry’ (Howard, Hansard, 28 November 2006, p. 53). The Opposition 
took a different view with the Shadow Attorney General, Kevin Rudd, arguing repeatedly that 
the ‘gaping hole’ in the terms of reference was ‘that Commissioner Cole had no head of 
power whatsoever to determine whether the minister or the department did their job’ (Rudd, 
Hansard, 28 November 2006, p. 54). Rudd referenced a letter from Commissioner Cole 
stating that to request such additional power would ‘represent such a huge expansion of my 
existing powers that I could not possibly ask for that. The only way I could be given those 
powers is if the government gave them to me of its own accord’ (Rudd, Hansard, 28 
November 2006, p. 54).  Government was not so inclined. 
4.5 The Report 
‘I never had a doubt…the money was always going into Iraq’  
(Cole Report 2006, Vol 1, p.xlii)… 
‘AWB knowingly breached the sanctions’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol 1, p.xlv). 
Commissioner Cole concluded that the ‘conduct of AWB and its officers was due to a failure 
in corporate culture’ which he described as ‘a closed culture of superiority and 
impregnability, of dominance and self-importance’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. xi-xii). The 
AWB had failed to respect the ‘great privilege’ and ‘obligation to conduct itself in accordance 
with high ethical standards [of] a government grant, by legislation, of a monopoly power’ 
(Cole Report 2006, Vol 1, p. xii). Blame was further focussed on a ‘relatively small group’ in 
the AWB as most other employees including the Board, were unaware of the kickback 
arrangements (Botterill 2007, pp. 9-10). 
Commissioner Cole describes the AWB as going to great lengths ‘to hide the payments it 
was making to Iraq’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. xx), ‘disguis[ing] the fee’ [and] ‘distanc[ing] 
itself from the payments’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, pp. xx-xxi). Critically, Commissioner 
Cole found that the Australian Government was not to blame. 
 
Commissioner Cole notes on many instances in the report the AWB’s failure to genuinely 
cooperate with the Inquiry characterising it as ‘one of restricted disclosure and absence of 
true cooperation’, ‘a façade of cooperation with the Inquiry. In truth, it did not cooperate at all’ 
(Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 235). The AWB had also ‘resort[ed] to litigation to endeavour to 
keep from disclosure documents and material relevant to this Inquiry’ (Cole Report 2006, 
Vol. 1, p. 242). Commissioner Cole notes that ‘this is not a breach of any Commonwealth, 
State or Territory law’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 235) however he does observe that this 
approach ‘caused inestimable reputational harm to AWB’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 242): 
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shareholders lost half the value of their investment. Trade with Iraq worth more than 
$500 million per annum has been forfeited. Many senior executives have resigned, 
their positions being untenable. Some entities will not deal with the company. Some 
wheat farmers do so unwillingly, but are, at present compelled to do so. AWB is 
threatened by lawsuits both in Australia and overseas. There are potential further 
restrictions on AWB’s trade overseas. And AWB has cast a shadow over Australia’s 
reputation in international trade. 
 
Most significantly, in terms of shielding political elites from blame, Commissioner Cole found 
that at no time did the AWB tell the Australian Government or the United Nations of its true 
arrangements with Iraq’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p.xii) and that, in fact, the AWB had 
‘deliberately hidden or disguised the payment of the fee to Iraq and knew that neither the UN 
nor Australian Government was aware of it making payments to Iraq’ (Cole Report 2006, 
Vol. 1, p. xxi). This position is repeated many times throughout the Inquiry’s four volumes. 
The Volcker Inquiry (2005) had established that it was known that Iraq had asked many 
major companies from many countries to pay commissions, surcharges or after-sales-
service fees to inflate prices (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. lxxvii). Many major companies 
approached their national governments advising them of these requests and seeking 
guidance as to whether they breached UN sanctions. However, none of the Australian 
companies that received demands from Iraq for such payments advised the Australian 
government of those demands or sought advice about the legality of making such payments 
or whether they would infringe UN sanctions: ‘AWB was not prepared to raise with the 
United Nations the issue of the transportation fee for fear it might be prohibited by the United 
Nations, thus costing AWB its Iraq market’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. xv). 
However, on a number of occasions the Australian Government ‘warned and advised AWB 
that the provision of funds to Iraq would breach UN sanctions’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol 1, p. 
115; Botterill 2007, p. 8). When the UN, through Australia, inquired whether the AWB was 
making such payments to Iraq, ‘AWB emphatically denied that it was’ (Cole Report 2006, 
Vol. 1, p116). That was where the matter rested. 
Botterill (2007, p. 9) asserts that DFAT ‘did not in fact receive large amounts of information 
suggestive of inappropriate behaviour’ and that while it is ‘arguable that DFAT’s response 
should have been more proactive’ once it had received assurances from the AWB ‘that 
criticisms were baseless it had no authority to probe any further’. 
The political and media controversy and public debate around Volcker’s report, the 
involvement of the AWB in the Oil for Food programme, and the nature of the relationship 
between the AWB and the Commonwealth, was loud and unrelenting. However, 
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Commissioner Cole took a firm view that this public commentary was completely extraneous 
to the Inquiry and shone a ‘bright line’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 170) between the Inquiry 
and public discourse. 
4.6 Inquiry finding and recommendations 
The Inquiry Report is thorough, forensic and dense. It details in great depth what happened, 
when, and who at the AWB knew. It details misinformation, deceit and the ‘whatever it takes’ 
corporate culture and decision making that characterised the AWB. 
The Cole Inquiry was ‘fundamentally confined to the realm of the legal’ (Williams 2010, p. 
189) and so it is no surprise that much of the report is given to legal argument, advice and 
process. However, a striking feature of this very lengthy report is that it makes only one 
finding and five recommendations. Commissioner Cole’s finding was that: 
I am of the view on the material before me that the following breaches of laws might 
have occurred…[a]nd that the following persons might have constituted them 
accessories to the offences AWB Limited or AWB (International) Limited might have 
committed…[a]nd that Acts, conduct of the following persons might have constituted 
a breach of various sections of the Corporations Act 2001. 
 
It is worth reflecting on the word ‘might’. According to Bartos (2014, p. 239): 
the word ‘might’ was in no way an indication of doubt about the matters; the wording 
in the report and its findings conveys great certainty. It was simply a reflection of the 
words from the terms of reference.  
 
Commissioner Cole recommended that these matters be referred to the appropriate 
authority for consideration whether proceedings should be commenced for breach of the law 
(Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, pp. lxxxi-lxxxii). Commissioner Cole then made five 
recommendations (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, pp. lxxxiii-lxxxiv) which go to legal and 
contractual issues, as well as oversight of UN obligations and questions of legal professional 
privilege vis a vis Public Inquiries (Appendix 4). There were no recommendations regarding 
public service administration, advice or processes (Bartos 2014, p. 239).  
 
4.7 Response to the Report 
 
‘I have not read the report…[but] in my assessment, this is a first-class report  
(McArthur 2006).  
On the first Parliamentary sitting day after the release of Commissioner Cole’s report debate 
in the House of Representatives continued in the same feverish way as it had done since the 
scandal broke. The Leader of the Opposition, Kim Beazley, asked the Prime Minister why he 
was ‘so proud of himself ‘for being incompetent and not criminal’ and how he slept at night 
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after his neglect (Beazley, Hansard, 28 November, 2006, p. 32, p. 44). The Prime Minister 
responded that he was proud to lead a government that had the courage to have a full 
inquiry’ (Howard, Hansard, 28 November, 2006, p. 32). The Government kept its finger firmly 
pointed at the AWB executives (Downer, Hansard, 28 November, 2006, pp. 33-34).  
The Leader of the Opposition raised a censure motion against the Prime Minister, the 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (Beazley, Hansard, 28 November, 
2006, pp. 46-50). Whilst the motion was defeated it succeeded in raising the core issues of 
concern about the Government’s handling of the scandal; that the Government had been 
negligent in failing to act on the 35 ‘warnings’ it had received over five years, that it tried to 
cover up the scandal, for the cost to Australian farmers, for allowing $300 million to be 
funnelled to the Iraqi regime, and for the damage caused to Australia’s reputation. 
The Leader of the Opposition claimed that the ‘the government’s rorted terms of reference 
produced the only outcome they could produce’ (Beazley, Hansard, 28 November 2006, pp. 
47-48). The Commission would never ‘find these folk culpable of anything, because we 
understood from the outset that it was set up that way’ noting the Government had ‘dodged a 
bullet largely by its own manipulation’ (Beazley, Hansard, 28 November 2006, pp. 47-48). 
The Shadow Attorney General, Kevin Rudd stated that ‘the complaint is not against the 
umpire; the complaint is against the man who set the rules for the game within which the 
umpire operated, the man who set the rules for the match, the Prime Minister himself’ (Rudd, 
Hansard, 28 November 2006, p. 55). As he had done many times before, the Prime Minster 
refuted the claims that the terms of reference were deliberately restrictive. The Prime 
Minister also asserted that had he wished to do so, Commissioner Cole could have sought a 
widening of the terms of reference (Howard, Hansard, 28 November 2006, pp. 51-52). He 
did not do so, so they were not widened. 
Questions were also raised about the conduct of the Inquiry asserting that key witnesses 
had not been called and important evidence had been ‘completely overlooked’ (Thomson, 
Hansard, 28 November 2006, p. 172). Some characterised ‘the Cole Inquiry into Wheatgate’ 
as a whitewash, ‘just another expensive bit of political theatre’ in which once again the 
Australian public ‘had been taken for patsies’ and that ‘Australian democracy, ministerial 
accountability and integrity are being trashed while Labor struggles to get its act together’ 
(Singer 2006). The ‘damning findings’ of the Cole Inquiry made the AWB the ‘worst 
performing business on the S&P/ASX200 index’ in 2006 (Keenan 2006). 
An ‘embarrassed’ AWB ‘vowed to reinvent itself’ (McArthur G, 2006). The Board resigned as 
did the Managing Director. AWB proposed a ‘demerger’ (that is, split into the grower-owned 
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AWB Ltd and AWB International which oversaw the single desk) as a means of retaining the 
single desk and national pool as a stopgap measure to ensure the current wheat harvest 
was managed and shareholders were protected. The move was seen as buying time (Hart 
2006b) and ‘a bit like an animal that gnaws its leg off trying to escape a trap, except in this 
case it’s the head that’s in the trap so a certain reluctance creeps in’ (‘AWB plan just a 
stalling tactic’ 2006). Unsurprisingly, the plan was ‘dismissed’ stating that the Government 
would push for more fundamental reform (Lee and Grigg 2006). This fundamental reform 
commenced in December 2006 when the Government took the decision to remove the ‘veto’ 
over wheat exports from the AWB.  
If a key driver of success was the continuing successful sale of Australian wheat to the Iraqi 
government (van Iterson and Clegg 2008, p. 1127) the Cole Inquiry led the Iraqi government, 
which had taken around 10 percent of Australia’s export wheat to refuse to do business with 
the AWB (Botterill 2007, p. 12). 
4.8 The Oil for Food Task Force 
On 27 November 2006, the Attorney General announced that the Government would 
respond to the Cole Report by establishing a task force to consider possible prosecutions 
(Ruddock, Hansard, 27 November 2006, p. 45). On 20 December 2006 The Oil for Food 
Task Force (OFFTF) was established in consultation with the Commonwealth and Victorian 
Directors of Public Prosecutions. The Task Force was to be led by a senior former Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) officer and include a team of AFP officers, Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) staff and a member of the Victorian Police.  
The scope of the OFFTF was to investigate all allegations of criminality raised by the Cole 
Inquiry. The Attorney General warned that ‘although the government is moving quickly and 
decisively, it may take time for the independent task force agencies involved in the task force 
to thoroughly consider all the relevant material before commencing any prosecutions’ 
(Ruddock, Hansard, 27 November 2006, p. 45). 
 
The Taskforce reported nine years later in March 2015 (OFFTF Report 2015). A fuller 
description of the OFFTF is at Appendix 2. No criminal prosecutions were ever made against 
any former AWB executive. Civil convictions were recorded in two cases resulting in 
penalties being paid by the former Managing Director and the former Chief Financial Officer 
of the AWB. However, ASIC lost its long running case against the former AWB Chairman 
and a former executive, on all but one of its allegations of breaches under the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cwlth). All other AWB executives have escaped any penalty or conviction. 
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4.9 Success Proposition 1: Responding to crisis and restoring legitimacy 
The Government had little choice but to respond to the Volcker Inquiry Report (2005). It was 
no longer possible to play down the AWB’s conduct or dismiss allegations as pernicious 
rumours fuelled by rivals in the dubious, competitive world of international agri-business. 
Volcker had established these rumours as facts. The Government, however, carefully crafted 
the terms of reference to focus on the AWB and other companies, and not on government or 
its agencies. This shielded elites from blame but did it restore legitimacy? Were citizens’ 
concerns about the operation of their institutions addressed? Was the breach of the social 
contract repaired? 
The Prime Minister reassured the community that Commissioner Cole would get to the heart 
of the problem so that remedial action could be taken (McConnell, Gauja and Botterill 2008, 
p. 612) and lessons could be learned. The Government portrayed the Inquiry as ‘impartial, 
apolitical and rigorous’ (McConnell, Gauja and Botterill 2008, p. 612). In fact, the 
Government positioned itself, and the report, as a victory for democracy, with Prime Minister 
Howard announcing on the day after the Inquiry Report’s release, ‘I am proud to lead a 
government that had the courage to have a full inquiry - the only government in the Western 
world that had the courage to do this, the only government in the Western world that 
responded in a very comprehensive fashion’ (Howard, Hansard, 28 November 2006, p. 32). 
Some sections of the media agreed; ‘The Cole Inquiry has set a standard of clarity and 
transparency that the UN has yet to adopt and shows no signs of doing so’ (Rosett 2006).   
Prime Minister Howard reaffirmed that ‘all the allegations [the Leader of the Opposition] so 
falsely made against the honour and integrity of the foreign minister and the Deputy Prime 
Minister have been demonstrated to be completely wrong’ (Howard, Hansard, 28 November 
2006, p. 32). The Government had done no wrong. The Inquiry cleared the bureaucracy of 
knowledge of the kickbacks and did not make any findings on what departmental agencies 
should have done (Botterill and McNaughton 2008, p. 593).17  
Some argue that Commissioner Cole could have been more proactive in examining the role 
of the executive arm of government (Botterill 2007, p. 5). The terms of reference did not 
touch on the role of government or the public service, ‘one may be certain that this exclusion 
by the government was quite deliberate’ thus ensuring ‘that there could not be any formal 
attribution of responsibility to these bodies’ (van Iterson and Clegg 2008, p. 1125). 
                                                          
17 There was one exception. Commissioner Cole did find that the Wheat Export Authority (WEA) failed 
to monitor the conduct and performance of AWB. However, Botterill and McNaughton (2008, pp. 593-
594) argue that this is based on a misunderstanding of WEA’s role which was never charged with 
being a watchdog or industry regulator. 
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It is instructive to reflect at this point on what discretion may be exercised by a 
Commissioner with regard to terms of reference. In a matter that has resonance with this 
case study, Sir Richard Scott headed up an Inquiry into Matrix Churchill, a UK based Iraqi 
company selling ‘machine tools’ to Iraq. The Inquiry was set up in 1992 and reported in 
1996. Taking the government by surprise, Commissioner Scott interpreted his terms of 
reference to include government knowledge of exports in breach of the guidelines of export 
control legislation (Scott 1996). Scott insisted that all relevant individuals would be called to 
give evidence in public (except where this would damage the national interest) and ‘in order 
to encourage truth-telling, witnesses were granted immunity from prosecution, and civil 
servants were absolved from their responsibility to protect their ministerial bosses so that 
they could, with impunity, reveal ministerial wrong-doing’ (Brown and Jones 2000, p. 671). 
This was not the path taken by Commissioner Cole. According to Manne, ‘one of the most 
important tools of government is the capacity to establish what the anthropologist Ghassan 
Hage has christened “the exonerating inquiry” and the Cole Inquiry showed that the Howard 
government is now a true master of this art’ (Manne 2006). In careful crafting of the terms of 
reference the Government ensured that the Commissioner was restricted to questions of 
whether or not there had been breaches of the law, and not whether the government had 
been remiss. In appointing Cole as Commissioner, the Government selected ‘a black letter 
lawyer with both a powerful forensic capacity and a proven track record of swimming safely 
between the Government’s flags…an exonerating inquiry was the ambition and the 
predictable result’ (Manne 2006). 
The Inquiry was a reluctant, but carefully crafted response to the unequivocal findings of the 
Volcker Report. The slow burn of rumours and gossip could no longer be denied or 
dismissed. When the Inquiry reported, government claimed that the findings restored its 
legitimacy. It was the AWB’s fault, not government or its bureaucracy.  
However, legitimacy was not restored. The narrow terms of reference, and appointing an 
eminent Justice as Commissioner, skilfully deflected attention away from Government and 
focussed the spotlight squarely on the AWB. As per its terms of reference, the Report 
concentrates on the AWB, not what Government knew or did not know. The Report states 
repeatedly that the AWB at no time informed the Government of its real dealings. As there 
were no findings of wrongdoing by any Government Minister it could be seen to have 
restored the legitimacy of Government and served to reduce anxieties about our institutions. 
However, this is tempered by the ongoing doubts about the framing of the terms of reference 
as a means of shielding Government from too close scrutiny.  
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In the community there was significant and ongoing commentary that this Public Inquiry was 
unduly limited in scope by its narrow terms of reference and hence was never going to ‘get 
the bad guys’ (Hanrahan 2016). The Opposition, particularly the then Shadow Attorney 
General, Kevin Rudd, was tireless in its efforts to widen the terms of reference and call on 
the Ministers to be accountable. The prominence and relentlessness of the questions and 
debates in Parliament and in the media are evidence that the Inquiry did not succeed in 
depoliticising the issue or allaying the concerns of citizens. 
The case study analysis confirms the findings of McConnell, Gauja and Botterill (2008, p. 
613) that the ‘government successfully negotiated a blame minefield’. The Inquiry was 
successful in deflecting blame away from Government and ‘turning the tables’ on to the AWB 
as the cause of the scandal (McConnell, Gauja and Botterill 2008, p. 609). This is clearly 
demonstrated, for instance, in the claims of the Minister for Foreign Affairs: ‘The people 
responsible for the breach of UN sanctions and for deceiving both my department and the 
United Nations […] are the executives of AWB Ltd…AWB were responsible for defrauding 
the Commonwealth’ (Downer, Hansard 28 November 2006, p. 33, p. 35).  
These statements mark the pinnacle of the ‘retraction cascade’ described by Suchman 
(1995) where in a legitimation crisis, networks of support recoil to avoid guilt by association. 
This unequivocal dissociation by Government was apparent during the course of the Inquiry 
but never more so than in the Government’s response to Commissioner Cole’s report. 
As predicted in the literature, the Cole Inquiry prompted some reform in the regulatory, 
managerial and cultural spheres of the AWB and did not focus on the role of political office-
holders or political institutions. No Government member lost their job as a result of this 
Inquiry. Despite legal cases continuing for many years after the Inquiry, there was some, 
very limited impact on AWB management. Civil proceedings were brought by the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) against some members of the AWB, but no 
criminal proceedings. Some attention was also paid to reforming the structure and culture of 
the AWB. In Suchman’s (1995, pp. 597-8) terms, the AWB utilised classic ways of trying to 
repair their legitimacy. Firstly, building a ‘firewall’ between the past and the future by 
restructuring and installing new players, hence, ‘symbolically’ distancing the organisation 
from its past ‘bad influences’. Secondly, creating monitors and watchdogs and instituting 
scrutiny, risk management and grievance mechanisms. The AWB did both in an attempt to 
rebuild its position and trust in the community, and with shareholders (AWB Limited Annual 
Review 2009). There may have been some damage to DFAT’s reputation and standing but 
no public servant lost their job and there is no evidence of any changes to departmental 
practice or protocols as a result of the Cole Inquiry. 
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The Inquiry meticulously pieced together the series of events and the context in which the 
allegations of bribery and corruption were made. The Report is staggeringly detailed and 
dense. It is not an accessible read. The few recommendations are highly legalistic in nature 
and aim to ensure better accountability and give reassurance that Australia has strong and 
transparent accountability mechanisms. They are in the vein of recasting Australia as a 
better corporate citizen, and in that way aim to restore legitimacy.  
4.9.1 Finding 
The Cole Inquiry was a response to crisis but did not restore the legitimacy of Government. 
The assertions in the literature regarding the focus on administrative, regulatory and cultural 
reform are confirmed. The Government and its Ministers endured and were unharmed by the 
process or findings of the Inquiry. However, the Prime Minister was widely and consistently 
criticised for narrowing the terms of reference to the conduct of the AWB and other 
companies. Ministers, their agencies and some officials were doubted and distrusted. The 
scandal did inestimable damage to Australia’s reputation as a good corporate citizen 
internationally and domestically.  
In summary, the analysis confirms Prasser’s (2006, p. 51) findings that Cole Inquiry is an 
example of a Public Inquiry ’established for politically expedient reasons such as to show 
concern about an issue, give an illusion of action, show responsiveness to a problem, co-opt 
critics, reduce opposition, delay decision-making, and reassert control over a policy agenda’.  
4.10 Success Proposition 2: Giving voice 
This was an investigatory Public Inquiry conducted in a highly legalistic way governed by 
strict legal processes and norms. This Public Inquiry was not open to broad participation and 
community consultation. Considerations, evidence and proceedings were made public, but 
participation was on the Inquiry’s terms governed by the powers conferred to it under the 
Royal Commissions Act 1902. As described previously, for many ‘what was admissible as 
evidence was circumscribed by the terms of reference of the Inquiry, which were tightly 
circumscribed’ (van Iterson and Clegg 2008, p. 1123). According to one commentator, ‘the 
fire wall erected’ by the terms of reference ‘in order to protect the government was 
breathtaking in its audacity’ (Haigh 2006).  
It is instructive to trace how the ‘voice’ of the scandal itself emerged from the veiled world of 
gossip and denial to the direct scrutiny of the Cole Inquiry.  Looking internally into ‘the rough 
and tumble world of international trade competition’ (Botterill 2007, p. 11), van Iterson and 
Clegg (2008) examine the politics of gossip and denial and the role such gossip plays in 
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reducing uncertainty and facilitating sensemaking and problem-solving. The authors track 
the role of ‘rumoured gossip’ noting that once it has ‘acquired the status of official 
formulation it may impel (other) organisations to become more accountable and responsible’ 
(van Iterson and Clegg 2008, p.1121).  
The exclusion from consideration of certain issues is a subtle but highly powerful means of 
ensuring that those issues are not highlighted, attended to or resolved. Non-attention means 
that these issues are not on the agenda, they do not exist. In Edelman’s (1977, p.47) terms 
these are ‘semantically masked’ issues or crises. In shaping the terms of reference to 
exclude certain issues the government was essentially exercising the ‘second face of 
power’,18 or the politics of non-decision-making (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). Prior to the 
establishment of the Inquiry, Government had exercised its significant power to ‘not do 
things’. For example, arguably, Government did not pay attention; did not make decisions 
and did not respond to issues and developments about which it should have been aware. In 
crafting the Inquiry’s terms of reference, the Government continued to exercise the second 
face of power to ensure that the pivotal question about the Government’s involvement was 
not a question open to investigation. 
As noted in the case study, rumour of the AWB’s malfeasance began in ‘gossip’ by the 
Canadian wheat marketers in the late 1990s. The Canadians complained to the United 
Nations. Wheat marketers and politicians from the United States of America (USA) joined 
the fray ‘rumouring that from as early as 1998 the Oil for Food Program was being 
systematically abused and that the major miscreant was the AWB’ (van Iterson and Clegg 
2008, p. 1124). The Canadian and the USA wheat marketers were the AWB’s major rivals 
and so such actions were characterised as ‘self-interestedly sullying the reputation of the 
AWB’ (van Iterson and Clegg 2008, p. 1124). The Australian Government repeated the 
assurances it had been given by the AWB that such claims were false, or simply, ‘the way 
business is done in the Middle East’ (Botterill 2007, p. 11). 
However, twenty-one diplomatic cables had been received by government officials at DFAT 
alerting them to rumoured offences (van Iterson and Clegg 2008, pp. 1125-1126). These 
were met by silence, or framed as rumours and gossip, or ‘competitive strategy’. Further, just 
because a cable had been received did not mean it had been read or ‘formally 
communicated to government members’ (van Iterson and Clegg 2008, p. 1127; ‘I didn’t read 
cables: PM’, 2006). Kevin (2006) raises the distinction ‘between formal intelligence reporting 
                                                          
18 The first face of power concerns the outcomes of decisive battles, the more explicit issues which 
are visibly on the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). 
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and the constant, informal, deniable “buzz” that goes on orally’ and suggests that it is entirely 
plausible that while the AWB’s conduct would have been discussed such issues may have 
been ‘quietly set aside as something on which ministers did not require formal reporting’. 
During the Cole Inquiry when these cables were brought to the attention of the Prime 
Minister and Ministers ‘recollections simply failed’ and no-one could remember being 
‘formally advised’ (van Iterson and Clegg 2008, p. 1127). This analysis confirms the findings 
of van Iterson and Clegg; ‘by not attending to these data, a concerted effort to ensure that 
they remained non-issues for non-decision-making can be seen’ (van Iterson and Clegg 
2008, p. 1127. However, once the gossip ‘moved into legal circuits of power, its precise 
status as issue or non-issue came into central focus’ (van Iterson and Clegg 2008, p. 1127). 
These ‘circuits of power…authenticate[d] their provenance’ so they could no longer be 
denied. Despite the ‘politics of denial and systematic non-attention’, gossip was reconstituted 
as formal allegation which was then subject to legitimate determination (van Iterson and 
Clegg 2008, p. 1128, p. 1131) by ‘shining the bright light of this Inquiry on AWB’s conduct’ 
(Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. xi). 
However, it was the Volcker Inquiry, not the Cole Inquiry that put the matter of the AWB’s 
systematic and long standing breaches of the UN sanctions on the agenda. The rumoured 
gossip was substantiated by the Volcker report. As argued previously, the Government was 
compelled to act as the allegations could no longer be ignored or dismissed. The rumours 
were given voice and Volcker’s allegations demanded answers. van Iterson and Clegg 
(2008. p. 1129) conclude that the: 
approach of not attending to the allegations no longer had any credibility once the 
Volcker Inquiry addressed and confirmed them. The non-issue had become an issue 
because of the actions of organizational agencies extraneous to the Australian 
government and the AWB. 
The Cole Inquiry gave voice to these allegations albeit within limited, narrow terms of 
reference, and in a very legalistic way. The role of Government continued to be a non-issue 
for the Inquiry. However, this question was very much a feature of political and media debate 
and commentary. 
Commissioner Cole took a deliberate view not to engage with or respond media, public or 
political discourse. He claimed that this was necessary condition of conducting a highly 
‘independent’ process. Commissioner Cole acknowledged the deep public interest in the 
Inquiry and its outcomes (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, pp. 170-177) but interpreted his role as 
conducting the Inquiry on the terms as defined by Government. It was the Government 
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which was the keeper of the public interest. Commissioner Cole’s role was to take a black 
letter interpretation of the terms of reference and leave the public interest to others. 
4.10.1 Finding 
In the context of this highly legalistic, investigatory Public Inquiry, voice was primarily 
achieved through parliamentary processes and media commentary on the Inquiry, not by the 
Inquiry itself. Commissioner Cole ‘gave voice’ to those he deemed to be relevant within the 
Inquiry’s tightly prescribed terms of reference, using strict legal conventions and practices. 
However, the media covered every element of the Inquiry. Much of the public discourse and 
commentary centred on the issues raised by the Inquiry; the composition and terms of 
reference of the Inquiry; and the credibility of evidence. Voice was not given through direct 
participation by the public or the many thousands of wheat farmers and their communities 
directly impacted, or disadvantaged, by the AWB’s practices and dealings. 
However, it was the very existence and necessity of the Inquiry, rather than the deliberations 
of the Inquiry itself, which made the major contribution to public discourse on the future 
arrangements of Australia’s wheat market (Appendix 3). Public discourse on this issue was 
undoubtedly crystallised and shaped by the issues and practices raised in the Inquiry.  
The Inquiry indirectly contributed to new and different policy ideas and actors achieving 
prominence on the broader issues of Australia’s wheat marketing arrangements. In the main, 
however, these voices were not contributors to the Inquiry itself. There is strong evidence of 
the extensive engagement of wheat farmers over a protracted period with committed 
politicians representing positions on all sides of the wheat marketing debate (Appendix 3). 
The trigger for the Inquiry (the scandal), rather than the Inquiry itself, provided a significant 
arena for policy debate and change in the future of Australia’s wheat marketing 
arrangements as will be discussed in the next section. 
4.11 Success Proposition 3: Providing the opportunity for policy change and 
improved outcomes  
The single biggest policy change in the aftermath of the Cole Inquiry was the significant, 
historic change to Australia’s wheat marketing arrangements. This policy change is not 
however directly attributable to the Inquiry. It was the scandal itself, rather than the Inquiry 
that catalysed the eventual changes. 
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After the Inquiry handed down its Report, the Prime Minister acknowledged that ‘there is 
within the community a proper and healthy debate about wheat marketing arrangements 
(Howard, Hansard, 28 November 2006, p. 6). According to Bolt (2006) while: 
most Australians have long since started to glaze over the mere mention of 
kickbacks, monopolies and wheat, after endless headlines and lurid photographs 
chronicling the unscrupulous methods used by AWB staff to keep its lucrative 
business with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq [the situation] was reverse for the 25,000-odd 
farmers from central Queensland to the northern WA Wheatbelt who rely on the small 
white grain for much of their livelihood. Their turmoil has only just begun. 
Prophetic words as the matter of wheat marketing arrangements was to play out over many 
subsequent years (Appendix 3). 
From a ‘realpolitik’ perspective, the Government’s ‘success’ in avoiding blame for the 
scandal came at the cost of an iconic policy issue for its coalition partner, the National Party. 
Single desk wheat marketing came under significant scrutiny. On the day following the 
tabling of the Cole Inquiry Report, Prime Minister Howard stated that he was ‘aware, as I 
have said repeatedly, of the need, especially in the wake of the Cole inquiry, to look again at 
our marketing arrangements’ (Howard, Hansard, 5 December 2006 p.35; see also Mitchell 
2006; Grattan 2006b). Some Liberal Party members saw an opening in the policy window ‘to 
remove this last vestige of collective marketing of agricultural products’ (McConnell, Gauja 
and Botterill 2008, p. 614) and eventually, in 2008, under the new Labor Government, 
legislation was introduced which ended the export wheat monopoly (Appendix 3). The Wheat 
Export Marketing (Repeal and Consequential Amendments) Act 2008 effectively abolished 
the single desk arrangements which had been operating in various forms since 1939. 
However, ‘the end of the export monopoly was not a direct result of the Cole Inquiry’ (Bartos 
2014, p. 241) but rather, regular and robust democratic processes. 
 
The scandal also highlighted important tensions about how private companies (like AWB 
Ltd), seeking to maximise profits and returns, operate within a sanctions regime which 
impose obligations on the State. Botterill and McNaughton (2008, p. 589) argue that ‘like any 
other company or individual dealing with Iraq, AWB Ltd was an involuntary participant in 
implementing sanctions’. The authors raise the question of ‘the role of government in 
enforcing international obligations when the commercial incentive is to find a way around 
them’ (Botterill and McNaughton 2008, p. 589). As a privatised entity, AWB Ltd was ‘no 
longer a manifestation of the State and, as such, not an addressee of the international 
obligations’ (Botterill and McNaughton 2008, p. 591). Although the AWB’s behaviour was 
ethically questionable, it was entirely consistent with the behaviour predicted by sanctions 
scholars (Botterill and McNaughton 2008, p. 597): 
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Governments that commit to the implementation of sanctions need to back the 
symbolism of their support with the mechanisms for tracking down and prosecuting 
breaches. To do otherwise leaves implementation in the hands of private actors, who 
may or may not be committed to the objectives of international action, and who face 
conflicting objectives when offered opportunities to profit through sanctions-evasion. 
The implementation of Commissioner Cole’s recommendations regarding enforcing UN 
sanctions aim to address this paradox. Policy changes that are attributable to the Cole 
Inquiry are those designed to strengthen Australian law and administration of the domestic 
enforcement of UN sanctions (as stated in Recommendations 1-3) and ‘sought to apply 
Cole's recommendations in a way that improves all current and future UN sanctions regimes 
in Australia’ (Australian Government response to the Cole Inquiry, n.d.). By amending 
various Acts, creating offences and introducing penalties (Appendix 4), the Government 
strengthened Australia’s compliance with UN obligations. Arguably these are the most 
enduring legacies of the Cole Inquiry and continue to underpin better policy and outcomes. 
In this respect, Prasser and Tracey (2014, p. 228) argue that ‘judged purely in terms of 
follow-up action on recommendations’ the Cole Inquiry can be considered a success.  
The implementation of Commissioner Cole’s Recommendation 4 addressed issues of legal 
professional privilege and once again is an enduring legacy of the Inquiry. The government 
referred this matter to the Australian Law Reform Commission for review. This has served to 
clarify such questions for subsequent Public Inquiries (Privilege in Perspective, ALRC 2008).  
4.11.1 Administrative change  
‘Our healthy democracy has become flabby and blotchy’ (Thomson 2006).  
The AWB scandal raised significant concerns about public administration. Issues regarding 
ministerial and administrative accountability were raised throughout the Inquiry in political, 
public and academic commentary (O’Connor, BPJ, Hansard, 28 November 2006, p. 190; 
Megalogenis 2006; Weller 2006). McMullan called it ‘the big black hole in Australian 
accountability’ (McMullan, Hansard, 28 November 2006, p. 180) and O’Connor argued that 
what was at stake here was no less than ‘the future of democratic practice in this country 
and the great doctrine of ministerial responsibility under the Westminster system that lies at 
the core of our parliamentary system’ (O’Connor, BPJ, Hansard, 28 November 2006, p. 
190). The Australian newspaper concurred, saying that Commissioner Cole’s findings 
demonstrated ‘just how far we have departed from what is supposed to be a core principle of 
democratic government – ministerial responsibility’ (Steketee 2006). 
The role and functioning of Government’s agencies was also called into question. According 
to some, the Inquiry’s findings revealed ‘a failure of regulatory alarms as much as a political 
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scandal’ (Kingsford Smith 2006) and that ‘[a]n independent public service would have foiled 
AWB at the outset’ (Davidson 2006). What Ministers knew, or should have known, what 
DFAT knew or should have known were recurring issues in public discourse. According to 
Malone (2006): 
the real state of the [public] service was revealed by the Cole inquiry which showed a 
Government that had no clue what was going on in the public service, and ministers 
who never read the myriad of cables and reports prepared for them…the public 
service had never been more politicised or less accountable.  
The Australian stated that ‘as the findings of the Cole Inquiry show, it would seem that no-
one is now forced to take responsibility for anything in the public service’ (‘Government fails 
test on governance’ 2006). On the other hand, Sheridan (2006), in the same newspaper, 
argued that ‘overall DFAT is a magnificent national resource. Slandering it over AWB is 
absurd’. 
 
Commenting on the ‘surprising’ findings that ‘not one person employed by the 
Commonwealth – no public servant high or low, no elected politician – did anything wrong, 
according to Cole’, Carney (2006) commented that ‘if Cole’s conclusions stand, our system 
of accountable governance will fall’, and ‘ignorance and a total lack of responsibility are the 
two new twin engines of power’. Carney concluded that: 
political survival and plausible deniability are now the paramount objectives of public 
administration. Executive government and the bureaucracy are now seemingly 
inseparable, their fates intertwined. They exist to look after each other…which 
suggests that the rest of us will have to look after ourselves. 
According to Weller (2006), the Cole Inquiry was evidence that ‘our systems of accountability 
and delivery are at best ramshackle and at worst broken’. The system of accountability failed 
us and: 
at the least we should expect that ministers will be able to tell us how they will ensure 
these problems are never repeated, and what procedures have been implemented by 
their secretaries to guarantee that future signals will be read by ministerial and 
departmental staff with the technical knowledge to understand the programs they are 
required to supervise. If that happens, then some benefit will come from the Cole 
inquiry. 
 
The Ministerial office was described ‘one of the big problem zones in efficient, effective, 
transparent and accountable public administration’ (Waterford 2006). Waterford describes 
the ‘often deliberately vague practices of the Ministerial office and ambiguous questions of 
ministerial knowledge or consent’ concluding that: 
few observers of ministerial performance in the AWB affair would have great 
confidence in the competence of [Ministers] Downer or Vaille. The frightening thing, 
of course, is that so secure is the screen over the ministerial office that we have no 
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real means of knowing how many other offices are as ill-managed and ultimately 
unaccountable. 
As noted in the literature review (Chapter 2) measures of the success of a Public Inquiry 
from public administration and management perspectives might have been reform to the 
systems and process of government agencies, changes in management, improved 
transparency and accountability, building staff capability and performance management. 
Commissioner Cole made no recommendations to this effect and no Minister was inclined to 
review the administrative practices of his or her Department (Megalogenis 2006). 
In terms of Ministerial accountability, Howard was in fact, the first Prime Minister to establish 
a public ministerial code of conduct in 1996 (McKeown 2012). However, on 6 December 
2007, as one of his first acts as the new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd introduced his 
Standards of Ministerial Ethics which replaced Howard’s code. The Standards were well 
received as ‘imposing greater transparency’ and the ‘tough new ministerial code of conduct’ 
was seen as placing ‘ministers under unprecedented scrutiny’ (McKeown 2012, p. 3), 
arguably as a result of what had been revealed by the Cole Inquiry. 
4.11.2 Finding  
The Cole Inquiry brought together politics, problems and policy proposals. The problem was 
defined as a possible breach of UN sanctions by the AWB and other companies. The politics 
was successfully confining the problem definition to the AWB and tethering the terms of 
reference to this definition of the problem. In adopting Commissioner Cole’s 
recommendations, the policy proposals led to some changes to legislation to enhance 
Australia’s transparency and accountability. Prime Minister Howard and his Ministers 
successfully argued that the Inquiry demonstrated that Australia was committed to being a 
trustworthy player. The implementation of the Inquiry’s recommendations serves to 
strengthen that position. 
The reference of this matter to the OFFTF for consideration of prosecution took nine years. 
There were no criminal convictions for anyone involved and only low level civil prosecutions 
against a small number of former AWB executives. No policy change resulted from this 
process. 
Because the Inquiry was so narrow in its focus it did not address the much larger policy 
issues that were subsequently at the heart of much community debate, and ultimately 
reform, notably Australia’s wheat marketing arrangements. It was the scandal itself, and not 
the Inquiry, that led to this reform. There is clear evidence that new policy actors emerged in 
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this larger debate and that this continued to be an enduring feature of public policy regarding 
wheat marketing arrangements (Appendix 3). 
The scandal and the practices of the AWB which were uncovered by the Inquiry may be 
seen to have served the Liberal Party’s (and subsequently the Labor Rudd government’s) 
agenda to deregulate Australia’s wheat marketing arrangements and abolish the single 
wheat desk. This almost drove a permanent wedge between Coalition partners, the Liberal 
Party and the National Party. The scandal itself, not the Cole Inquiry, may be framed as 
providing the opportunity for improved policy and better public outcomes. Australia’s wheat 
marketing arrangements underwent significant, ‘durable’ reform (McConnell 2010b, p. 58) 
and the wheat industry is arguably now more transparent, accountable and competitive. 
However, it was the scandal that led to the Inquiry’s establishment which was the catalyst for 
major public policy change in Australia’s wheat marketing arrangements. Policy change and 
reform was brought about by regular democratic, political processes. 
The Inquiry’s major direct contribution to policy change is through the Australian 
Government’s acceptance and implementation of the Inquiry’s limited recommendations. 
These achieved increased transparency and accountability of Australia in relation to UN 
sanctions, and also clarified some enduring questions about professional privilege for future 
Public Inquiries (Appendix 4).  
4.12 Conclusion 
The analysis using the propositions of success drawn from the literature produces an 
ambivalent result. In relation to the first proposition of success, the Cole Inquiry responded to 
the ‘crisis’ of the Volcker Report’s confirmation of the AWB’s corrupt practices, but it did not 
restore the legitimacy of government. It was also not successful in depoliticising the scandal. 
The Inquiry was, however, very successful in shielding government elites and the public 
service from blame. With respect to the second proposition of success, giving voice, the 
Inquiry revealed the AWB’s corrupt practices and transformed them from ‘non-issues’ to 
serious allegations requiring investigation. The rumours were given voice. Apart from calling 
witnesses, however, the Inquiry did not give voice to those more broadly impacted by the 
practices of the AWB. In regard to the third proposition of success, providing the opportunity 
for policy change and improved outcomes, the scandal itself and the practices uncovered by 
the Inquiry were a clear indicator that Australia’s wheat marketing arrangements needed to 
change. These changes and policy reforms came about through regular, robust democratic 
parliamentary processes in which many people actively participated on all sides. Policy 
changes attributable to the Inquiry are those that related to increasing Australia’s 
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accountability for upholding United Nations sanctions and legal professional privilege vis a 
vis Public Inquiries. 
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Chapter 5 - The Queensland Child Protection Commission of  
Inquiry 2013 
Case Study 2: A Policy Advisory Public Inquiry 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter details Case Study 2: The Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry, 
February 2013. This case study is an example of a Policy Advisory Public Inquiry.  
The case study analysis is conducted using the analytical framework based on the 
propositions of success drawn from the literature, that is, an assessment of the success of a 
Public Inquiry should examine the ways in which it responds to crisis and restores 
legitimacy, gives voice, and provides the opportunity for policy change and improved 
outcomes. In relation to the first proposition, the major finding of the analysis of this case 
study is that this Inquiry buoyed the legitimacy of the new Liberal National Party (LNP) 
Government by being framed as a ‘once and for all’ systemic look into an overburdened child 
protection system, as well as settling a long running conspiracy theory (the ‘Heiner Affair’) in 
Queensland.  
With respect to the second proposition, the Inquiry gave voice using similar mechanisms as 
other child protection Inquiries held in different Australian states around this time, that is, 
calling for submissions, hearings, consultations, publishing transcripts on Inquiry website 
(Appendix 5). There is evidence that enduring changes have been made to broaden policy 
networks and actors, possibly in keeping with government’s broader public administration 
reform agenda. However, other than primarily through advocacy and service organisations, 
there is limited evidence that the children and families directly impacted by the child 
protection system had a direct voice in the Inquiry process.   
In relation to the third proposition, there is evidence that the Inquiry provided the opportunity 
for policy change arising from the implementation of the Inquiry’s recommendations but to 
date there is no compelling evidence of better outcomes for children and families. 
 
This chapter provides background to the Inquiry and outlines the Inquiry process and 
outcomes. It details the response to the Inquiry Report and applies the three propositions of 
success. Assessments of success against the three propositions are outlined. 
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5.2 Background to the Inquiry 
‘Getting on with the job of fixing our child protection system’ (Davis 2012a). 
Since 2000 there have been no less than 33 separate reviews, inquiries and commissions 
into child protection in Australia (Parenting Research Centre 2015).19 Inquiries have been 
established with varying terms of reference, powers, resourcing, and for various durations. 
All of the child protection Inquiries have made a raft of recommendations to prevent child 
abuse and improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of the child protection system. 
Most often child protection reviews or inquiries are convened after a horrific child death or 
scandal which is perceived, or framed, as demonstrating catastrophic failure of the child 
protection system. The Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry (QCPCI) was 
not. It was established to fulfil an election commitment. The QCPCI was the third child 
protection inquiry held in Queensland in thirteen years. 
5.3 The Inquiry 
‘To make Queensland the safest place to raise a child’ (Bleijie 2012). 
 
The Inquiry was established through Letters Patent received from the State’s Governor and 
included the terms of reference for the Inquiry and specified the reporting timeframe. The 
Honourable Justice Tim Carmody QC, was appointed as Commissioner. Justice Carmody 
was described as ‘the right person for this job’ and the Government expressed ‘every 
confidence’ in him (Newman, 2012).  
 
Justice Carmody was tasked with (Taking Responsibility: A Roadmap for Queensland Child 
Protection, p. xi, henceforth, the Carmody Report 2013): 
reviewing the entire child protection system root and branch to find out whether it is 
still failing our children, and if so, why… [and] to deliver a roadmap for the way 
forward, one that will take us, within a decade, to the best possible system for 
supporting families and protecting children that our state can afford. 
The Inquiry’s task was to look back as well as look ahead. The Inquiry was to review actions 
in response to previous Government Inquiries (the Forde Inquiry 1999; and the Crime and 
Misconduct Commission Inquiry into abuse of children in foster care 2004), as well as to 
review Government responses to allegations of historic sexual abuse in youth detention 
                                                          
19 This does not include the many more inquiries on specific issues like managing child sexual 
offenders, children within the legal process, children in the context of family violence, children in 
detention (Implementation of recommendations arising from previous inquiries of relevance to the 
Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Parenting Research Centre, 
May 2015, pp. viii-ix). 
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centres (known as the ‘Heiner Affair’). The Inquiry was also to make recommendations for 
reforms to Queensland’s child protection system including strategies to reduce 
overrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and legislative reforms 
(Newman, Hansard, 13 November 2012, p. 2465). The Inquiry would ‘have a look right to the 
guts of child safety in this state’ (Bleijie, Hansard, 6 March 2013, p. 394). 
 
The QCPCI was established on 1 July 2012 ‘to make Queensland the safest place to raise a 
child…[and] ensure that children are afforded the level of protection expected by the 
community and, in doing so, public confidence in the child protection system in Queensland 
can be restored’ (Bleijie, Hansard, 11 July 2012, p. 1134). The QCPCI engaged a twelve-
member advisory group which included specialists in child protection and safety. The 
Commissioner was also assisted by members of the Queensland bar at various stages. 
The announcement of the Inquiry fulfilled an election commitment of the, then, new Liberal 
National Party (LNP) Newman government which promised to ‘do whatever it takes’ to 
ensure children are safe (Newman 2012). Premier Newman intended to conduct a ‘full and 
comprehensive audit and overhaul of Queensland’s child protection laws’, ‘put a stop to the 
constant change and under-resourcing of this area’ and position Queensland as ‘world 
leaders in supporting families and protecting children’ (Hurst 2012). The Inquiry would 
demonstrate the Government’s ‘longer term commitment to create a sustainable and 
targeted child protection system in Queensland’ (Molhoek, Hansard, 13 September 2012, p. 
1989). 
This Inquiry was unlike previous Inquiries. It was the first time, in Queensland, ‘that an 
inquiry into child safety hasn’t been driven by a crisis that has dominated the news 
headlines. It is being driven out of a genuine desire to improve the system’ (Davis 2012a).  
The Inquiry was tasked with reviewing the whole child protection system. It was not 
established to investigate a particular case or matter of concern. It was to be a systemic, 
broad reaching attempt to look at child protection in the context of child rearing, community 
expectations and norms, and government responses. This meant that not only the relevant 
child protection agency was included but also other government agencies including Police, 
Health, Education, non-government agencies, out of home care service providers, as well as 
oversight agencies. A central theme to the QCPCI was that ‘children will thrive only in a 
society where everyone concerned with child welfare takes responsibility for their own 
particular role’ (Carmody Report 2013, p. xiii); ‘No single service or agency is in a position to 
respond effectively to all the needs of vulnerable children and families all the time’ (QCPCI 
Discussion Paper 2013, p. 53). The Inquiry was to also consider the public’s confidence in 
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the system and specifically addressed the issue of oversight of the system (Carmody Report 
2013, p. 395). 
The QCPCI placed advertisements in state and national media, established a website (which 
included terms of reference, how to make a submission, publishable submissions, schedules 
of visits, transcripts, issues papers), wrote to key agencies requesting information, obtained 
some information under summons, invited submissions, conducted regional visits or 
hearings (open and closed), visited services and non-government organisations, held public 
forums and held key stakeholder meetings. The Inquiry also undertook case file reviews and 
audits and conducted focus groups and surveys. 
 
The QCPCI received; 443 submissions from non-government organisations, 235 individual 
submissions and 12 from government agencies (Appendix 5, Table 10). The Inquiry also 
conducted consultations and hearings and regularly communicated its progress through its 
website and other public communication strategies. It was reported in Parliament that the 
QCPCI (Davis, Hansard, 6 August 2013b, p. 2264): 
heard nearly 400 hours of evidence from across the state and found that reports of 
child abuse had tripled in the past decade. Detailed hearings were held over 12 
months with a wide cross-section of professionals involved in child protection. More 
than 150 meetings were held with individuals and stakeholders with knowledge and 
expertise in the child protection system. Focus groups were held with children in the 
care system, and site visits were conducted to residential and therapeutic care 
facilities as well as non-government organisations that provide child protection 
services. An extensive academic literature review on child protection was also 
undertaken. 
5.4 The Letters Patent 
The key themes and issues of concern to the Inquiry reflected in the Letters Patent 
(Carmody Report 2013, p. xxiii) were: 
 The cost - over the prior decade the budget for child protection services had 
tripled, fuelled in particular by the growth on demand for out of home care 
services; 
 The focus on tertiary responses at the expense of prevention, early intervention 
and support services; 
 The practice of investigating all notifications – however, investigation reveals that 
only 20 percent meet the threshold for a notification, meaning 80 percent of 
notifications go no further; 
 The over representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait islander children in the 
child protection system; 
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 Duplication in monitoring and oversight without any discernible accountability 
enhancement;  
 An absence of a shared strategic direction supported by a whole of government 
structure. 
The terms of reference appeared ‘to fulfil the policy promise, except that they also include 
yet another examination of the already much-probed Heiner “Shreddergate” affair’ (Wenham 
2012). This significant ‘legacy’ issue was embedded in to the Commission’s terms of 
reference, namely: 
3(e) reviewing the adequacy and appropriateness of any response of, and action 
taken by, government to allegations, including any allegations of criminal conduct 
associated with government responses, into historic child sexual abuse in youth 
detention centres. 
 
3(e) referred to ‘Shreddergate’, or the ‘Heiner Affair’, (Carmody 3(e) Report 2013, p. 2), 
which was a ‘long-running conspiracy theory alleging mass, government-backed cover up of 
child abuse’ (Madigan 2013c). The ‘Heiner Affair’ centred on claims of a ‘cover up’ and refers 
to the shredding of documents (Madigan 2012b): 
gathered by Magistrate Noel Heiner in his 1989 inquiry into child sex abuse at the 
John Oxley Youth Detention Centre at Wacol. Heiner's inquiry was started by the 
Cooper National Party Government, but the incoming Goss Labor Government was 
advised it had not been set up properly and ordered the documents destroyed. There 
have been numerous inquiries at different levels into the affair. 
 
The shredding of those files ‘generated one of Queensland’s most enduring public 
controversies and conspiracy theories’ (Carmody 3(e) Report 2013, p. 2). There was some 
concern expressed about how the QCPCI would balance its different tasks (Wenham 2012): 
just how much of the inquiry's valuable time and precious resources this aspect of 
the review will eat up... [and] it is worrying this highly politically charged, historical 
issue - associated with the Goss government in 1990 shutting down and shredding 
evidence collected by the Heiner commission of inquiry into child abuse which the 
previous National Party government had set up but not properly empowered - is 
being dealt with as part of a ‘new road map’ to take Queensland's child-protection 
system forward in the next decade. 
It was suggested in the media that that the inclusion of this matter in the terms of reference 
may have been ‘possibly to assuage members of the old National Party who are convinced 
the “Heiner Affair'' represents a key into a world of Labor Party conspiracies concerning child 
abuse’ (Madigan 2012b). 
 
As Commissioner Carmody began to investigate this matter he wrote that (Carmody 3(e) 
Report 2013, p. 1): 
As the evidence unfolded it became increasingly apparent that there was real 
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doubt about whether any relevant action of, or response by the executive 
government to, ‘historic child sexual abuse in youth detention centres’ warranted 
investigation. 
Commissioner Carmody subsequently wrote to the Attorney General recommending 
(Carmody 3(e) Report 2013, p. 1): 
that consideration needed to be given to the possibility of an amendment to the Order 
in Council to achieve what I understood was the purpose of paragraph 3(e), namely, 
a review of relevant executive government responses and actions and whether they 
were connected to historic child sexual abuse or not. 
On 4 April 2013 paragraph 3(e) was amended to require Commissioner Carmody: 
To make a full and careful inquiry with respect to: 
reviewing the adequacy or appropriateness of (including whether any criminal 
conduct was associated with) any response of, or action taken by, the executive 
government between 1 January 1988 and 31 December 1990 in relation to: 
(a) allegations of child sexual abuse; and/or 
(b) industrial disputes; 
in youth detention centres, or like facilities (Carmody 3(e) Report 2013, p. 1). 
Some media reported the change to 3(e) as Commissioner Carmody ‘targeting the Goss 
era’20 (Madigan 2013d).  
Government granted leave to extend the investigations and the report which was due to be 
delivered at the end of April 2013 was extended to end June 2013.  
5.5 The Report 
The Final Report of the QCPCI was delivered in June 2013. The Report found that the child 
protection system (Carmody Report 2013, p. xii): 
is not only unsustainable but contrary to both policy intent and reasonable community 
expectations. As this report comprehensively demonstrates, without changing risk-
averse reporting rates and behaviours, curtailing over-inclusive risk and harm 
assessments, reducing over-servicing and overspending on high cost-low yield 
outcomes, altering errant funding policy and resource allocation, and finding viable 
safe alternatives to removal and retention, the statutory system is in jeopardy of 
collapsing under the weight of excess demand for reactive tertiary services and 
spiralling delivery costs. 
                                                          
20 Wayne Goss was the Labor Premier of Queensland from December 1989 to February 1996. 
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The Report is extensive and highly detailed. It describes; the current child protection 
situation, structure and the need for reform, the legislative context and legal system, current 
statistics and performance of all parts of the child protection system, workforce capacity and 
constraints, funding, regulation and oversight, research, relationships with other key 
providers (that is, interagency collaborations and the non-government system), and specific 
issues like domestic violence and the overrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander (ATSI) children in the child protection system.  
In addressing the many aspects of the child protection system and in keeping with the 
foundational principle that child protection is a shared responsibility, the Report makes a 
large number of recommendations. While the Government and its agencies have a key role 
to play, the Report stresses that child protection is a community wide responsibility. As such, 
recommendations address reform of the child protection system as a whole, but also 
universal services like Education, Police and the Courts, as well as workforce training and 
development, collaboration, specific approaches for ATSI children and culturally and 
linguistically diverse (CALD) children, regulation and oversight (Appendix 5).  
The Inquiry made 121 recommendations across a broad range of areas including; changes 
to mandatory reporting, better training and professional development of the workforce, better 
interagency collaboration, better family support services and more early intervention, better 
supported transition for young people moving out of home care, and better information 
management systems. An increased focus on, and funding of, early intervention is 
recommended as well as support for vulnerable families, and an increased role for the non-
government sector. 
The Report acknowledges that reform takes time and that the Inquiry had ‘charted a 
roadmap, not a fixed timetable or inflexible funding schedule. Nonetheless, sooner is 
generally better and cheaper in the long run. Childhood is short and every moment counts’ 
(Carmody Report 2013, pp. xiv-xv). 
5.6 ‘Shreddergate’ – the final word 
With respect to 3(e), the ‘Shreddergate’ term of reference, Commissioner Carmody issued a 
separate and detailed report (Carmody 3(e) Report 2013). He found that the only ‘response 
or action’ of executive government meeting the review criteria was the Goss Cabinet 
Decision No. 162 dated 5 March 1990 that the so-called ‘Heiner documents’ be handed to 
the State Archivist for destruction. With respect to whether there was any evidence 
suggesting that this Cabinet Decision was ‘a response of, or action taken by, the executive 
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government in relation to child sexual abuse allegations in a youth detention centre or like 
facility’, Commissioner Carmody found that ‘[t]here is no factual basis logically supporting a 
reasonable suspicion or rational belief that it was. Speculation or suggestions to the contrary 
are scandalous, disingenuous and groundless (Carmody 3(e) Report 2013, p. 7). 
In relation to ‘[w]hether any criminal conduct was associated with any response of or action 
taken by the executive government between 1 January 1988 and 31 December 1990 in 
relation to industrial disputes in youth detention centres or like facilities’ (Carmody 3(e) 
Report 2013, p. 7), Commissioner Carmody found that the evidence was sufficient for a 
judicial proceeding and therefore the possibility of conviction. However, he also found that:  
the same body of evidence is also capable of supporting competing inferences that 
are probably equally consistent with innocence [and that] the balance of policy and 
public interest considerations, including the lapse of time, does not favour a criminal 
justice response’ (Carmody 3(e) Report 2013, p. 7). 
Commissioner Carmody established that, contrary to long-running allegations, the 
documents had nothing to do with accusations of child sexual abuse and that the documents 
related to industrial strife at the John Oxley Detention Centre. However, he did find that the 
actual shredding may have breached the criminal code, but noted that the likelihood of a 
successful prosecution was minimal. Nevertheless, the Attorney General referred 
Commissioner Carmody’s report to the Director of Public Prosecutions ‘to consider whether 
a prosecution is warranted as a matter of law and whether it is in the overall public interest’ 
(Bleijie 2013, Estimates Hearing, Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee, Justice 
and Attorney-General, Hansard, p. 42). 
On 2 July 2014 it was reported in the media (Madigan 2014) that: 
The state’s longest-running conspiracy theory, the Heiner Affair, has reached its final 
chapter, with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions opting not to pursue an 
entire Labor Cabinet for shredding documents alleged to have been related to child 
sexual abuse…The DPP has now advised the Attorney-General that there are no 
reasonable prospects of success on a prosecution of any former Goss cabinet 
minister, and it would not be in the overall public interest to pursue a prosecution in 
relation to the shredding. 
5.7 Response to the Inquiry Report  
The Government’s response to the Carmody Report (2013) was released in December 2013 
(Queensland Government response to the Queensland Child Protection Commission of 
Inquiry Final Report 2013). The Government response accepts the position that child 
protection is a shared responsibility and commits to system wide reform. Specifically, the 
Government accepted 115 of the 121 recommendations. The remaining six 
recommendations were accepted in principle. The Government welcomed the 
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recommendations of the Inquiry announcing its intention to implement the reforms and to 
‘fundamentally reform how the child protection system operates’ (Davis 2013a). 
 
The Government response, Supporting Families Changing Futures reform program, commits 
to seven areas of reform: 
 Sharing responsibility for children's safety and wellbeing; 
 Supporting families earlier; 
 Working better with families in the child protection system; 
 Improving out-of-home care and post-care for children and young people; 
 Working better with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander families; 
 Delivering quality services through a capable, client-focused workforce; 
 Building a transparent and cost-effective system; 
 Services provided to vulnerable children and families will be high-quality and 
provided in an efficient, transparent and accountable manner. 
 
The aims of reform are to: 
 reduce the number of children and young people in the child protection system; 
 revitalise frontline services; 
 refocus on learning, improving and taking responsibility for a better child 
protection system (Queensland Family and Child Commission 2017).  
The Inquiry’s report was referred to the Health and Community Services Committee for 
consideration (Bleijie, Hansard, 20 March 2014, pp. 832-834) noting that ‘[t]his will bring 
Queensland into line with other jurisdictions in Australia such as New South Wales and 
Victoria’ (Bleijie, Hansard, 20 March 2014, p. 833). 
After consideration by the Health and Community Services Committee, when the 
subsequent Bills were introduced to Parliament, Attorney General Bleijie stressed that the 
Government was committed to implementing the QCPCI’s reforms (Bleijie, Hansard, 20 May 
2014, p. 1554). However, the Labor Opposition raised reservations. The Opposition stated 
that it:  
recognises that we must continually improve our child safety system, but we cannot 
support the legislation put forward by this government. This arrogant government is 
once again removing accountability and cutting funding to important organisations 
that are in place to protect those who are most vulnerable in our community - children 
(D’Ath, Hansard, 20 May 2014, p. 1561). 
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Ms D’Ath labelled the Bill as ‘essentially a cost-cutting exercise’ (D’Ath, Hansard, 20 May 
2014, p. 1561) motivated by ‘the government’s desire to remove all external accountability 
for their decisions’ (D’Ath, Hansard, 20 May 2014, p. 1562). 
The Opposition claimed that the Government was motivated by a desire to reduce 
expenditure and claimed that the Bills were being rushed through (D’Ath, Hansard, 20 May 
2014, p.1564). The Government characterised the Opposition’s concerns as 
‘scaremongering’ (Krause, Hansard, 20 May 2014, p. 1570) and ‘simply rants of ideologues’ 
(Shuttleworth, Hansard, 20 May 2014, p. 1574). The reforms recommended by the QCPCI 
were passed in Parliament on 20 May 2014 ‘following the Commission’s roadmap to build an 
effective and sustainable child protection system over the next decade’ (Bleijie and Davis 
2014a).  
By the time the reform Bills were introduced into the House there was relatively little media 
coverage. Reporting on the passage of the three Bills ten months after Commissioner 
Carmody handed down his report, one article (Tin 2014) noted the Opposition’s position that 
it was a ‘weakening’ of the child protection system with the LNP stating that Labor was ‘living 
in the past’. Twenty-five million dollars was allocated in the 2014 to 2015 State Budget as 
part of an additional $406 million package over five years, to implement the key reforms of 
the QCPCI (Newman and Davis 2014; Nicholls and Davis 2014). In April 2016, Supporting 
Families Changing Futures: Advancing Queensland’s child protection and family support 
reforms was released (Queensland Commission for Children and Young People and Child 
Guardian 2016). It reports on the progress of implementation of the recommendations of the 
Carmody Report and sets out key actions for a ten-year reform agenda.  
Given the ubiquity of child protection inquiries, an analysis of two other Public Inquiries 
which occurred in other States around the time of the QCPCI is included at Appendix 5.  
Comparisons are drawn between processes, structures and participation, as well as the 
recommendations and outcomes of the respective Inquiries. This comparative analysis is 
informative in demonstrating the isomorphic pressures at play in child protection systems 
and inquiries and the overlap of influential voices which are clearly in evidence in the 
QCPCI. 
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5.8 Success Proposition 1: Responding to crisis and restoring legitimacy  
‘A genuine desire to improve the system’ (Davis 2012b), or,  
‘The conspiracy theory that won't die?’ (Madigan 2013a)  
This was an unusual Inquiry, particularly in the context of child protection. There was no 
specific crisis to which the Inquiry responded. There was no legitimacy shortfall which the 
Government sought to restore. This Inquiry was instituted by the new LNP Government 
which had won a landslide victory over long standing Labor incumbents. The LNP had made 
the Inquiry an election commitment and identified it as a key first-100-days-in-power election 
commitment (Madigan 2012b). 
Just what prompted the LNP to commit to launching an inquiry before the election was 
‘unclear’ (Wenham 2012). There had:  
been no critical mass of evidence pointing to dire child protection system failure - 
certainly not like the years before the Forde inquiry and then between Forde and the 
Corruption and Misconduct Commission (CMC) Inquiry, during which time appalled 
Queenslanders learnt of many horror stories’ (Wenham 2012). 
The LNP gave Commissioner Carmody wide terms of reference, including the investigation 
of historical allegations of child abuse, among them claims of a cover-up of sexual abuse at 
the John Oxley Youth Detention Centre (the ‘Heiner Affair’). In Commissioner Carmody’s 
words this was ‘no doubt intended to authoritatively resolve, once and for all, distracting and 
divisive debate about the adequacy, propriety and lawfulness of Cabinet Decision No. 162 of 
1990’ (Carmody 3(e) Report 2013, p. 2). Carmody ‘very wisely split his inquiry in two and 
used some of his time to deal specifically with the Heiner affair’ (‘Carmody report is just the 
start’ 2013). 
The Government consistently framed the Inquiry as a commitment ‘to making Queensland 
the safest place to raise a child’ (Bleijie and Davis 2013) and framed it as being different to 
previous inquiries in that it was holistic, not driven by crisis and ‘would take an honest look at 
the system’ (Davis 2012a). The Government consistently stated that it had inherited an 
‘unsustainable’ (Davis 2012a) and ‘overburdened’ system (Bleijie and Davis 2014b) from the 
previous Labor government. The Government claimed that the former Labor Government 
had ‘failed to act on recommendations from their own inquiries into this important issue’ 
(Bleijie and Davis 2014a) and that they were following through ‘to deliver a strong plan that 
ensures all children are given a voice’ (Bleijie and Davis 2014a). Commissioner Carmody 
was perceived as having taken ‘a well-paid brief that could have been little more than an 
excuse to rake over the Heiner affair. Instead he has shone a torch down every unsavoury 
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burrow in the state in an attempt to give vulnerable Queensland children a better future’ 
(Madigan 2013b) offering ‘new hope for at risk kids’ (Madigan 2013f). 
The ‘contest’ regarding how this Inquiry was framed revolves around the extent to which it 
was an attempt to resolve once and for all the Heiner ‘conspiracy theory’ or was a legitimate 
response to an overburdened, unsustainable child protection system. Could it have been a 
pre-election deal between coalition partners to resolve the Heiner affair that provided the 
impetus for this Inquiry? An intriguing question but no evidence was found to support this 
assertion. The Queensland Government continued to reinforce its legitimate interest in this 
issue and successfully position itself as being committed to child protection reform and 
willing to bring about real change.  
It is worth noting, however, the absence of a strong Opposition during this period. ‘In the 
largest recorded swing in Australian political history-15.7 per cent against the ALP’ (Holmes, 
B 2012, p. 37) the Newman LNP Government was elected in 2012 winning 78 seats. Labor 
lost 44 sitting MPs and retained only seven seats, the Katter Party held two seats and there 
were two independents. A severely weakened Opposition could do little to challenge such 
consistent messaging. 
5.8.1 Finding 
This Inquiry was not a response to crisis, it was an election commitment. ‘Fixing the child 
protection system’ was one way in which the LNP sought to differentiate itself from the 
incumbent Labor Government. The LNP argued that Labor had been in Government too 
long, had not acted on the recommendations of previous Inquiries, and had failed to keep 
children safe from harm. 
Political office holders changed after the 2012 election but not as a result of this Inquiry, 
even though a whole previous Labor Cabinet faced the possibility that they may have been 
prosecuted as a possible outcome of the secondary Inquiry into the Heiner Affair. There is 
also no evidence that senior bureaucrats changed as a direct result of the Carmody Inquiry. 
Where there were changes they were as a consequence of post-election machinery of 
government changes, not a result of the Inquiry (Scott 2012).  
Unlike previous Inquiries in Queensland or indeed in other States or Territories, there was no 
specific ‘disaster’ or ‘crisis’ to de-politicise. However, the Inquiry itself was established and 
used in a highly political sense in that it fulfilled an election commitment and promised to 
differentiate the new LNP from the previous Labor government’s ‘inaction’. The LNP 
promised to ‘fix the system’ and asserted its commitment to bringing about change and 
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engaging stakeholders. The legitimacy of the LNP was buoyed by the Inquiry – particularly 
as it also promised to finally ‘put to bed’ the longstanding conspiracy theory surrounding the 
Heiner affair. 
Reform recommended by the Inquiry was focussed in the regulatory, managerial or cultural 
spheres rather than on the role of political office-holders or political institutions. 
Recommendations focussed on the three pillars identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983): 
mimetic (to bring Queensland in line with child protection practice in other States), coercive 
(legislative changes including changes to mandatory reporting), and normative (changes to 
professional practice and training). This is unsurprising as the focus was on the system, not 
on a particular catastrophic failure or crisis. The Inquiry certainly resulted in regulatory 
reform (amendments to child protection legislation) and cultural reform (interagency work, 
professionalisation of workforce). In fact, the recommendations clearly exhibit isomorphic 
pressures to restore legitimacy for Queensland’s child protection agencies and bring it in line 
with similar systems in other Australian states (Appendix 5). The Inquiry’s recommendations 
also bear striking similarity with all the other child protection Inquiries held around that time, 
namely, whole of government responsibility, changes to child protection legislation, 
increasing thresholds of risk of harm, professionalising the workforce, changes to referral 
processes and broader engagement of stakeholders (Appendix 5). 
In conclusion therefore, whilst there was no crisis per se, the Inquiry was successful in 
reinforcing the legitimacy of the new LNP Government. 
5.9 Success Proposition 2: Giving voice 
The QCPCI gave voice using similar mechanisms as other child protection policy advisory 
Inquiries conducted around this time (Appendix 5), that is; establishing a website, calling for 
submissions, conducting meetings and hearings, site visits and case file reviews. However, 
in addition, the QCPCI employed an innovative attempt to speak directly to those affected by 
the issues of concern to the Inquiry. At the request of the Inquiry, the peak advocacy body, 
the CREATE Foundation, convened and facilitated three focus group meetings with 47 
children in the care system (Carmody Report 2013, p. 591). This is a highly creditable 
attempt to include voices that are not typically heard. 
In terms of ongoing impacts on the dominant policy coalitions, there is evidence that 
enduring mechanisms have been established as a result of the Inquiry which institutionalise 
the input of broader voices than child protection agencies or government agencies alone. 
These are typically non-government organisations and particular academics. 
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To exemplify:  
 Recommendation 4.13 (Carmody Report 2013, p. 116) establishes a Child Protection 
Reform Leaders Group, to lead the reform of the child protection system and report 
to the Premier on implementation. The group comprises senior government 
executives as well as non-government organisations. This group is tasked with 
supporting ‘a coordinated approach to child protection across government agencies 
and with child protection stakeholders’ (Bleijie, Hansard, 20 May 2014, p. 1554). 
 Recommendation 6.2 (Carmody Report 2013, p. 179) states that the Queensland 
Government forge a strong partnership between the government and non-
government sectors by: 
o including a non-government representative at all levels of the governance 
structure outlined in the Child Protection Reform Roadmap; and 
o establishing a stakeholder advisory group (comprising government and non-
government organisations) within the Department of Communities, Child 
Safety and Disability Services to implement policy and programs required by 
the Child Protection Reform Roadmap. 
The Government committed to recommendation 6.2 and established a stakeholder 
advisory group ‘to facilitate the co-design of the project responses as recommended 
by the commission and a stakeholder engagement strategy is being prepared as part 
of the project management plan’ (Bleijie, Hansard, 20 May 2014, p. 1554). 
 Recommendation 12.3 (Carmody Report 2013, p. 409) establishes the Family and 
Child Council to monitor, review and report on the performance of the child protection 
system. The Family and Child Council advises the Child Protection Reform Leaders 
Group and has access to an expert standing committee which provides advice on 
research and policy in matters within the Council's jurisdiction. The committee 
consists of up to eight non-government members and four senior government 
members and at least one Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander member. The Family 
and Child Council supports the development of collaborative partnerships across 
government and non-government service sectors, and regularly monitor the 
effectiveness and practical value of these partnerships (as per Recommendation 6.3, 
Carmody Report 2013, p. 179). 
 Regional Child Protection Service Committees were also established to draw on the 
expertise and resources of non-government organisations, academic institutions, 
local government, federal government and the corporate sector (Carmody Report 
2013, p. 427). 
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Non-government agencies (NGOs) and academics were key voices in the QCPCI. Many of 
these actors were the same academics and NGOs who participated in other child protection 
Inquiries around the same time (Appendix 5). 
The QCPCI, like other child protection inquiries, also recommended an expanded role for the 
private and non-government sectors. Bravehearts Inc, CREATE Foundation and Life Without 
Barriers are all national organisations which provide a range of services to vulnerable, or at 
risk children and families. Examination of their respective Annual Reports indicates that 
revenue from government grants grew steadily and significantly during and after the period 
of the Inquiry (Footnote 28, p. 158). 
There is also clear evidence that the QCPCI gave voice to a cohort of academics who were 
highly influential in shaping the Inquiry’s recommendations and discourse (Appendix 5). For 
example, Professor Eileen Munro, Professor of Social Policy at the London School of 
Economics; Associate Professor Judy Cashmore at the University of Sydney; and Professor 
Dorothy Scott, Foundation Chair in Child Protection and former Director of the Australian 
Centre for Child Protection at the University of South Australia. The QCPCI heavily 
references articles and publications by these academics. The QCPCI met separately with 
Professor Scott. Associate Professor Cahsmore is also noted as having provided specialist 
expertise to the Queensland Inquiry and critiquing some of the Commission’s early drafts 
(Carmody Report 2013, p. 584). 
The key ideas brought by these academics were all reflected in the Inquiry Report and its 
recommendations. For example, Munro’s (2011b) key ideas were drawn from a child 
protection review she undertook in the United Kingdom. Her proposals for reform were 
(Munro 2011b, p.6):  
intended to create the conditions that enable professionals to make the best 
judgments about the help to give to children, young people and families. This 
involves moving from a system that has become over-bureaucratised and focused on 
compliance to one that values and develops professional expertise and is focused on 
the safety and welfare of children and young people. 
Munro (2011a) argues that: 
experienced social workers should be kept on the frontline even when they become 
managers so that their experience and skills are not lost’, and that ‘The expertise and 
status of the social work profession should be improved with continual professional 
development that focuses on the skills needed in child protection’. 
Munro’s key ideas are reflected in QCPCI recommendations about the professionalisation 
and training of the child protection workforce and decision-making tools and processes. For 
example: 
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 QCPCI Recommendations 7.1 - practice framework/decision making; 
 QCPCI Recommendations 10.1 and 10.2 - regarding the need for tertiary 
qualifications and professional development. 
Munro’s ideas also formed the basis of some of the submissions to the Inquiries. For 
example, Peakcare Queensland which represents sixty organisations contributed to the 
Inquiry advocating for mandatory qualifications for key child safety personnel. Peakcare 
heavily references Munro’s childcare study to build professional expertise and allow a more 
flexible approach to child safety (Wegener 2012, p. 21, p. 24, p. 83, pp. 89-90; Madigan, 
2012c). 
Scott (2006) argued that the child protection system was overburdened and that child 
protection policies and laws have become increasingly applied to situations where children 
are seen at risk. This has led to ‘dramatic net widening’ and the subsequent ‘epidemic of 
child protection notifications’. Scott advocates a public health approach to child protection 
arguing that this approach: 
lends itself to tackling the underlying causal and contributory factors related to child 
abuse and neglect from a whole of government perspective which includes health, 
education and child welfare service and draws in sectors such as housing and 
employment services’ (NSW Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection Report, 
2008, henceforth NSW SCI 2008, p. 203).  
Scott’s ideas are foundational to the integrated systems approach taken in the QCPCI as 
well as the introduction of ‘significant’ risk of harm as one means of reducing the burden on 
the system. For example: 
 QCPCI Recommendation 4.1 - risk of significant harm,  
 QCPCI Recommendation 4.2 - whole of government approach. 
Scott’s public health approach has also been adopted in Protecting Children is Everyone’s 
Business, The National Framework for Protecting Australia’s Children 2009-2020, endorsed 
by the Council of Australian Governments in April 2009.  
As well as being an acknowledged expert in child protection, Cashmore’s particular 
contribution was in regard to extensive longitudinal work she had done in relation to 
outcomes for young people transitioning from out of home care (OOHC). Cashmore’s 
research is reflected in the recommendations and outcomes of the Inquiry’s consideration of 
the need for better transition arrangements and post OOHC placement support for young 
people. For example: 
 QCPCI Recommendations 9.1-9.3 regarding transition from care. 
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As has been demonstrated above, the QCPCI clearly provided a forum to allow new ideas 
and knowledge to have an impact on the policy and operation of the child protection system. 
There is also evidence of new structures and mechanisms being established signalling a 
non-transient impact on the dominant policy coalition/subsystem. There has been an 
enduring shift to other policy coalition(s) and the emergence of new actors. Non-government 
organisations now play an enhanced role in service provision and advocacy and the ideas of 
key academics infused the approach and recommendations the QCPI. 
 
The QCPCI and other child protection inquiries around this time (Appendix 5) call for an 
expanded role for the non-government sector. The role of the NGO sector is described in 
detail, as is the need for government to be the provider of last resort, that is, the provider of 
tertiary responses (statutory child protection). The non-government sector’s role is to provide 
primary and secondary responses (prevention and treatment). However, the Carmody 
Report (2013) does not include a rationale for this approach or analysis of why or how the 
non-government sector is inherently better positioned to provide more effective services at 
the primary or secondary stages. This position, however, supports Government’s public 
management reform agenda of outsourcing and risk shifting (Hood 1991, pp. 4-8; Nethercote 
2003, Shergold 2008) and so may be described as a success for the Government. This 
suggests that there may be an additional criterion for success, that is, the extent to which 
Inquiry outcomes support the broader agenda of Government in relation to public 
administration and the provision of services. 
Considine’s (1998) finding that the policy area of welfare is influenced by leading groups 
outside government is confirmed in the context of this Inquiry. His further observation that 
this policy area is ‘clearly the field in which officials [do] best’ (1998 p. 310) is also confirmed 
as evidenced by the presence at hearings and the strong number of submissions to the 
Inquiry by relevant government child protection agencies and universal services (Appendix 
5). 
5.9.1 Finding  
The Inquiry established a number of mechanisms to provide input including submissions, 
hearings, and visits to various locations. These are similar to the engagement mechanisms 
used by other child protection inquiries around this time (Appendix 5), with one notable 
exception. The attempt to include the voices of children directly impacted by the child 
protection system is a highly welcome development. 
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Additional and influential voices including academics and non-government agencies helped 
shape the recommendations of the Inquiry and were reflected in a number of submissions. 
There were also enduring changes to policy and advisory structures as a result of this 
Inquiry to broaden inputs to government and its agencies. 
It is possible to trace the voice, ideas and impact of particular academics and some non-
government organisations. Notwithstanding the three focus groups conducted with children, 
it is impossible, however, to assess the extent to which those directly and indirectly impacted 
by the child protection system themselves felt they had a voice in the considerations or 
recommendations of the Inquiry. There is an inherent assumption that peak advocacy, 
service and religious organisations adequately represent the voices and interests of those 
impacted by the child protection system. Families and children who come into contact with 
child protection systems can be some of the most marginalised and vulnerable members of 
the community. It would not be unreasonable to expect that particular measures and 
supports would need to be in place, for those that choose to use them, to ensure equitable 
and inclusive participation. The three focus groups with children referred to above are a 
strong start, but more broadly, this refers back to the centrality of the capacity building 
element of participation outlined by Potts (2008). There is no evidence of such capacity 
building, support or feedback mechanisms to assess whether participants felt heard, or to 
assess their views of the Inquiry and its processes. 
The QCPCI is not alone in this respect. No Public Inquiry examined in this thesis has sought 
any feedback from individuals, families or participants on this question. If one of the recurring 
assertions in the literature is that Public Inquiries give voice, not to have some measure or 
assessment of the ways in which this has been supported and achieved is a significant 
omission, particularly for policy advisory and hybrid Inquiries. Input by ‘representative’ 
organisations can only be a partial proxy at best. 
In summary, the Inquiry gave prominence to the voices of the ‘usual’ stakeholder 
organisations; peak groups, non-government service providers, religious organisations, and 
academics. There is evidence that these voices continue to have a role in policy 
implementation and reform. There is also evidence that these organisations have been 
strengthened and benefitted from having this ‘seat at the table’ (Footnote 28, p. 158). 
Notwithstanding the three focus groups with children, the extent to which the Inquiry gave 
voice to children and families directly impacted by the child protection system is less visible.  
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5.10 Success Proposition 3: Providing the opportunity for policy change and 
improved outcomes 
The QCPCI provided the opportunity for problems (failures of the child protection system, 
high rates of reporting, high rates of unsubstantiated reports), policy proposals (more non-
government sector involvement, higher reporting thresholds, better systems and 
accountability) and politics (the Government’s commitment to make Queensland ‘the safest 
place to raise children’) to create policy change (the recommendations). The Queensland 
Government created a website to provide information on progress on policy and program 
implementation but to date there has been no independent evaluation of the impact of child 
protection reforms in Queensland. 
The extent to which reforms arising from the QCPCI have improved service delivery and 
outcomes is a vexed question. Evaluating changes to the child protection system is fraught 
with complexities, not least of which is linking which policy change with which outcome.  
Data capture issues and differing definitions also make comparison across time periods and 
state jurisdictions difficult (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, National Child 
Protection Data Collection 2014-15).  
The reforms to child protection systems in Queensland are focussed on making the system 
work better through better assessment tools, better coordination, more efficient reporting and 
response systems. Many of the measures of success are process measures, for example, 
measures of increased interagency collaboration, number of consultations with Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander communities. The focus of this thesis is not a thorough evaluation 
of the impact of the raft of changes in child protection systems as a result of the 
implementation of the QCPCI recommendations. No doubt there has been improvements in 
some services, systems, collaborations and programs but it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to assess the particular impact of specific changes and the extent to which each 
change has contributed to overall improvements in the system and, more importantly to the 
lives of children at risk of harm.  
The ultimate measure of success, identified by the Queensland Government itself (Appendix 
5; Table 15) is to reduce the number of children and young people in the child protection 
system and in out of home care (OOHC), and the extent to which this has fallen as a result 
of reform efforts.21 Appendix 6 examines Queensland and Australian data on child 
                                                          
21 Supporting Families, Changing Futures, Background, Queensland Government, viewed 8 
November 2015, https://www.communities.qld.gov.au/campaign/supporting-families/background 
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protection, in order to provide some indication of the extent to which policy changes arising 
from child protection Inquiries and subsequent reforms have resulted in improvements to 
service delivery and better outcomes for children and families. 
Unfortunately, the evidence analysed indicates that the number of children in the care and 
protection system has not reduced, the number of children in OOHC has not declined and 
that the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children in the system, and in 
OOHC, has not decreased. While there is no doubt that ‘the policy window was opened’ and 
there has been policy and practice change in child protection, there is no evidence yet that 
this has led to improvements on the key indicators nominated by the Queensland 
government itself as measures of success. 
The Inquiry opened a policy window by bringing politics, problems and policy proposals 
together. The politics were framed as an election promise to differentiate the LNP from the 
previous Labor Government who, despite numerous previous investigations and Inquiries 
had, allegedly, not responded adequately. The problem was defined as a system under 
pressure which was unsustainable. The policy proposal or promise was a systemic review 
and overhaul of the whole child protection system with a whole of community approach to 
making Queensland the safest place to raise a child. The Inquiry Report recommended 
comprehensive policy reform, changes to service delivery, organisational reform, and better 
engagement of users in decision making. The policy changes underpinning the 
recommendations were incremental and in keeping with isomorphic pressures on all child 
protection services in Australia. 
5.10.1 Finding 
The extent to which the outcomes of the Inquiry have been integrated into or changed 
government strategy is still an open question. The Queensland Government currently 
continues to implement a ten-year program of reform. This includes commitments to; 
improve management practices, enhance transparency and accountability, restructure, focus 
on performance management, enhance competition, increase funding, build staff capability, 
and improve relationships with co-producers or clients. There is currently evidence of 
outsourcing, professionalisation of child protection work, new structures and systems in 
response to the Inquiry’s recommendations (Queensland Government Response to QCPCI 
2013, Supporting Families, Changing Futures, Achievements). These are all indicators of a 
successful Public Inquiry identified in the public administration literature. 
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However, there is no evidence of real improvements in outcomes for children (Appendix 6). 
These policy changes appear ‘precarious’, operating ‘on the edge of failure’ in that there is 
little or no progress towards meeting targets (McConnell 2010b, p. 61). There is much 
activity but no clear evidence yet of better outcomes.  
Child protection policy has been subject to multiple reviews over many years. The QCPCI is 
just one of three reviews that occurred around the same time. This inevitably raises the 
question of the value of a process that fails to resolve a policy problem ‘once and for all’. 
Prasser and Tracey (2014, p. 230) argue, however, that policy making is iterative and that 
repeat Inquiries ’are not necessarily a signal of ineffectiveness’. They argue that policies 
need to continually adapt to changing circumstances, unexpected developments and 
different political, social and economic contexts’. Wildavsky (2004, p. 5, p. 83, p. 386) also 
reminds us that policy problems are always with us and that ‘problems are not so much 
solved as superseded’.  
However, the causes of child abuse and neglect, and the community’s expectations of child 
protections systems are relatively stable and enduring. These have not been subjected to 
‘unexpected developments’, ‘shifting contexts’ or ‘changing expectations’ as described 
above. The reasoning outlined above may be truer for emerging policy areas like climate 
change, privacy, counter terrorism, technology and innovation, but it is questionable to frame 
child protection policy in the same light.  
5.11 Conclusion 
The analysis using the three propositions drawn from the literature yields an equivocal 
assessment of success. In relation to the first proposition, responding to crisis and restoring 
legitimacy, there was no identified ‘crisis’ or ‘focussing event’ to which to respond. However, 
child protection was framed as a potent election strategy to differentiate the Opposition from 
the long standing, incumbent Government. The Inquiry served to buoy the legitimacy of the 
new LNP Government by being framed as a ‘once and for all’ systemic look into an 
unsustainable and overburdened child protection system. The Inquiry was also framed as 
the ‘once and for all’ investigation into Queensland’s long running conspiracy theory, the 
Heiner Affair.  The new LNP Government was able to undermine the legitimacy of the 
previous Labor Government which was portrayed as not adequately responding to its own 
previous Inquiries into the system.  
With respect to the second proposition, giving voice, the conclusion is again ambiguous. The 
Inquiry gave voice using similar mechanisms as all other child protection Inquiries held 
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around this time (submissions, hearings, publication of transcripts on websites - Appendix 5) 
– although its attempts to incorporate the direct voices of children is acknowledged and 
welcomed. There is evidence that enduring changes have been made to broaden policy 
networks and actors, possibly in keeping with Government’s broader public administration 
reform agendas.  
However, there is limited evidence that the voices of children and families directly impacted 
by the system were heard. Children and families were typically represented by peak 
advocacy, service and religious organisations. The extent to which these proxies are 
appropriate and truly representative is unknown. There is also no evidence of support, 
capacity building or feedback mechanisms for participants. Given that those who are part of 
child protection systems can be the most marginalised members of the community and that 
there is a risk of harm from participating in such Inquiries (Brahm 2007, p. 20), this is a 
significant omission.  
In relation to the third proposition of success, providing the opportunity for policy change and 
improved outcomes, while there has been much activity and various policy changes, to date 
there is no compelling evidence of better outcomes for children and families. 
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Chapter 6 - The Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2012 
Case Study 3: A Hybrid Public Inquiry  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter details Case Study 3: The Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (QFCI) 
2012. This case study is an example of a hybrid Public Inquiry, that is, one which has both 
investigatory and policy advisory functions. 
 
In relation to the first proposition, that an assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry 
should examine the ways in which it has responded to crisis and restored legitimacy, the 
analysis finds that while the Inquiry was a swift and humane response to the devastation of 
the Queensland Floods in 2010 to 2011, it did not restore the legitimacy of government. The 
Opposition successfully framed the management of the floods, and the QFCI, as 
symptomatic of a Government which was ‘out of touch’ and had been in power too long. The 
Inquiry promised to get to the heart of whether any more could have been done to avert the 
tragic loss of life and property, but for many, it failed to do just that. The credibility of the 
Inquiry was also significantly undermined by independent investigations conducted by The 
Australian newspaper which found shortcomings in certain evidence and prompted the 
Inquiry to conduct extra hearings.  
 
With respect to the second success proposition, giving voice, the Inquiry worked hard to 
encourage members of the public to participate, albeit in a legalistic environment. Some 
argued that these legalistic processes and procedures were a barrier to participation.  
 
In relation to the third proposition of success, providing the opportunity for policy change and 
improved outcomes, there has been some policy change as a result of the Inquiry and the 
inclusion of new policy entrants. The question of better outcomes is more contentious. 
 
This chapter provides background to the Inquiry, outlines the Inquiry process and describes 
the Inquiry’s Interim and Final Reports. It details the response to the Inquiry Reports, 
including reference to the Crime and Misconduct Commission, a subsequent Inquiry and a 
current class action. The chapter applies the three propositions of success to the QFCI. 
Assessments of success against the three propositions are outlined. 
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6.2 Background to the Inquiry 
‘Our Summer of sorrow’ (Bligh 2011).  
 
Prolonged and intensive rainfall over large areas of Queensland, coupled with 
already saturated catchments, led to flooding of historic proportions in Queensland in 
December 2010, stretching into January 2011. Thirty-three people died in the 
2010/2011 floods; three remain missing. More than 78 per cent of the state (an area 
bigger than France and Germany combined) was declared a disaster zone; over 2.5 
million people were affected. Some 29,000 homes and businesses suffered some 
form of inundation (QFCI Interim Report 2011 p. 32). 
The floods in Brisbane and South East Queensland, followed by the Category 5 Cyclone 
Yasi caused the evacuation of over 70 towns, ‘washed away roads and railways, destroyed 
crops and brought Queensland’s $20 billion coal and export industry to a near halt, making 
the flooding one of Australia’s most expensive natural disasters’ (World Bank 2011, p. 1). 
The Queensland economy was ‘smashed by the combined effects of the brute and inhuman 
forces of global economics and then by the fury of Mother Nature’ (Fraser 2011, p. 2). All of 
Queensland’s ‘traditional strengths; mining, agriculture and tourism took a beating’ and the 
fiscal cost was estimated at $6.8 billion (Fraser 2011, pp. 2-3). A deficit of $2.127 billion was 
forecast in the Budget Papers (Queensland Budget Strategy and Outlook 2011-12, p. 1, p. 
57).  
 
Queensland has extensive experience dealing with natural disasters (World Bank 2011). 
Due to its ‘geography and population density Queensland has the greatest risk profile of any 
State in Australia (Arklay 2015 p. 187). However, the ferocity and impact of this particular 
event, the lives and properties lost and unrelenting questions about the management of the 
floods, particularly the operation of the flood mitigation dams, led to the establishment of this 
Public Inquiry. 
6.3 The Inquiry 
On 17 January 2011 the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (QFCI) was established 
by the Bligh Labor Government. The Inquiry was set up under the Queensland Commissions 
of Inquiry Act 1950 to inquire into seven matters arising out of the 2010/2011 floods, 
identified in the terms of reference as:  
 preparation and planning for the floods by governments, agencies and the 
community;  
 the adequacy of the response to the floods;  
 management of essential services;  
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 the adequacy of forecasts and early warning systems;  
 insurers’ performance of their responsibilities;  
 the operation of dams; and 
 land use planning to minimise flood impacts (QFCI Final Report 2012, p. 30).  
The Inquiry was headed by Commissioner Justice Catherine Holmes with the assistance of 
two Deputy Commissioners, James O’Sullivan AC and Peter Cummins. The Inquiry provided 
an Interim Report on 1 August 2011 focusing on matters of disaster preparedness that were 
a priority for implementation prior to the upcoming wet season. The Government responded 
to the Interim Report in the Queensland Government Response to the Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry Interim Report 2011. 
The original final reporting date for the QFCI of 17 January 2012 was extended to 24 
February 2012, and then to 16 March 2012 due to the ‘extensive public hearing schedule 
and the volume of evidence to be considered’ (QFCI Final Report 2012, p. 31). The Inquiry 
reported on 16 March 2012. 
6.4 The Reports 
6.4.1 The Interim Report, August 2011 
‘The blueprint’ (Bligh, Hansard, 2 August 2011, p. 2209). 
The delivery of the QFCI Interim Report (Holmes, 2011) was designed to give the 
Government ‘the opportunity to implement some changes before the next wet season’ (Bligh, 
Hansard, 2 August 2011, p. 2209). Premier Bligh accepted in their entirety the 
recommendations relating to State Government responsibility. The Premier also committed 
to working cooperatively with Federal and Local Governments to ensure that 
recommendations under their areas of responsibility were implemented (Bligh, Hansard, 2 
August 2011, p. 2209). The Premier committed an additional $14 million of investment over 
the 2011/12 financial year and a total of $76 million over the next five years to improve 
disaster response and flood infrastructure management (Bligh, Hansard, 23 August 2011, p. 
2506). The Premier established a dedicated unit in her Department of Premier and Cabinet 
to coordinate the response across government agencies and detailed its full response in the 
Queensland Government Response to the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 
Interim Report 2011.  
The response to many of the recommendations of the QFCI Interim Report were actioned in 
the Disaster Readiness Amendment Bill 2011. The Bill was an omnibus Bill that included 
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amendments to water, disaster management, transport and planning legislation which 
implemented the state’s legislative response to the Interim Report of the QFCI.22 The Bill 
was progressed as a matter of urgency to ensure that the amendments contained in the Bill 
were in place to support the state’s disaster preparations in readiness for the coming wet 
season (Robertson, Hansard, 25 October 2011, p. 3319). 
The Opposition supported the passage of the Bill through the House (Seeney, Hansard, 25 
October 2011, p. 3320) despite some members claiming it had been rushed through.23 The 
Government assured the House that there had been adequate time for consultation, 
particularly given that the recommendations from the flood inquiry ‘were well based in terms 
of public experience, as well as the experience of the relevant authorities in the state and 
local governments’ (Boyle, Hansard, 25 October 2011, p. 3329). Nevertheless, the 
Opposition claimed there had been insufficient time for ‘bipartisan support and inclusiveness 
of Opposition members’ (Stevens, Hansard, 25 October 2011, p. 3333). The Bill passed and 
the Premier urged members to ‘act together and in a bipartisan way when it comes to 
disaster preparedness and implementing recommendations of the Floods Commission of 
Inquiry’ (Bligh, Hansard, 25 October 2011, p. 3375). On 28 October 2011 the Disaster 
Readiness Amendment Act 2011 (Qld) received royal assent by the Queensland parliament. 
6.4.2 The Extra Hearings 
‘Those reprehensible headlines’ (Holmes, C 2012, p. 5313). 
One of the most controversial aspects of the floods was the operation of the flood mitigation 
dams; the Wivenhoe, Somerset and North Pine dams (QFCI Final Report 2012, pp. 436-
559). The Commission had considered the operation of the dams in its Interim Report but 
had focused on issues that could be resolved before the start of the 2011/2012 wet season. 
 
In its Interim Report the QFCI made a number of findings relating to the operation of 
Wivenhoe Dam based on sworn evidence to the Inquiry that the official report was accurate. 
The flood event report and the flood engineers’ testimony gave an account of the flood event 
that signalled compliance with the relevant manual in respect of the choice of strategy. The 
Inquiry had also relied on the views of a number of experts in hydrology and dam operations 
that the manual had been complied with (QFCI Final Report, pp. 438-439). 
                                                          
22 The Bill amended the Disaster Management Act 2003, the South East Queensland Water 
(Restructuring) Act 2007, the Sustainable Planning Act 2009, the Transport Infrastructure Act 1994, 
the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995, the Water Act 2000 and the Water 
Supply (Safety and Reliability) Act 2008 (Robertson, Hansard, 25 October 2011, p. 3319). 
23  See, Ms Bates, p. 3326; Mr Boyle, p. 3329; Mr Stevens, p. 3332; Hansard, 25 October 2011. 
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By end January 2012, the QFCI had ostensibly completed its hearings: however, on 23 
January 2012 The Australian newspaper published a story about the results of an 
investigation it had conducted into the strategies used at Wivenhoe Dam in the January 
2011 flood. The Australian’s investigations of ‘an abundance of contemporaneous evidence’ 
concluded that ‘these documents directly contradict evidence given weeks later at the public 
inquiry’ and alleged that ‘the Wivenhoe Dam was mismanaged in a serious breach of its 
manual for two crucial days’ (Thomas 2012). 
The QFCI conducted a review of the material identified by The Australian and concluded that 
(QFCI Final Report 2012, p. 441):  
the lack of any definitive contemporaneous record of strategy choice, suggested that 
there was sufficient cause to reopen public hearings in order to obtain sworn 
evidence from those who were involved in the operation of Wivenhoe Dam in 
January 2011 and in the preparation of records of those decisions. 
The QFCI reconvened and extended its final date of reporting from 24 February to 16 March 
2012. Additional hearings commenced on 2 February 2012, and were scheduled daily until 
11 February 2012. The appearance of what Justice Holmes called those ‘reprehensible 
headlines’ (QFCI Transcript of Proceedings, 5 February 2012, p. 5313) led to her deciding 
not to call on the services of Deputy Commissioner Cummins24 on the grounds that it was 
‘just simpler and puts everything beyond argument’ (QFCI Transcript of Proceedings, 5 
February 2012, p. 5313; Cranston 2012b).  
The exclusion of Commissioner Cummins was immediately questioned in the media 
(Thompson and Solomons 2012; Madigan 2012a).25 On the first sitting day of Parliament in 
2012 the Opposition questioned the conduct of the Inquiry: ‘[h]ow did the commission miss 
pointers to key evidence that forced the resumption of the inquiry’; and asked, ‘[c]an the 
Premier explain how her $15 million hand-picked commission of inquiry has degenerated 
into such a farce’ (Seeney, Hansard, 14 February 2012, p. 21)? 
The Opposition further aimed to undermine the Inquiry’s credibility questioning the decision 
to stand aside Commissioner Cummins and asked;  
                                                          
24At the Commissioner’s request, ‘Deputy Commissioner Cummins stood aside on becoming aware 
that a company for which he had contracted to work after the Commission’s close had been engaged 
by Seqwater to be part of a review committee examining technical work completed for the long term 
review of the Wivenhoe and North Pine dam manuals. While he remained a Deputy Commissioner, to 
avoid any possible perception of a conflict of interest, he did not take any further part in the 
Commission’s work’ (QFCI Final Report 2012, p. 35). 
25 Commissioner Cummins himself later ‘slammed’ the running of the Inquiry, claiming that he and 
fellow commissioner, Jim O’Sullivan, had little input into its final report and that the Inquiry been ‘a 
terrible system of inquiring into anything’ (Solomons and Thompson 2013). 
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[c]an the Premier confirm that Deputy Commissioner Cummins was her personal 
choice for the role? Can she explain why he was stood down? And how can the 
inquiry proceed without a dam expert and not be regarded as a total farce (Seeney, 
Hansard 14 February 2012, p. 22)? 
Premier Bligh stood firmly by the QFCI stating that it had acted ‘exactly as you would expect 
a commission of inquiry determined to get to the heart of the matter to do’ (Bligh, Hansard 14 
February 2012, p. 21) and that ‘unlike the Opposition [she] would not be seeking to erode 
public confidence in a commission whose work should not be underestimated in its 
importance’ (Bligh, Hansard 14 February 2012, p. 23). 
6.4.3 The Final Report, March 2012 
‘Leave no stone unturned’ (Bligh, Hansard, 14 February 2012, p. 21). 
 
The QFCI’s Final Report (Holmes, 2012) made 177 recommendations across a variety of 
areas including flood management, state and local planning instruments, development and 
flood considerations, building controls, emergency response and dam related issues. Many 
of the recommendations focussed on regulatory reform.  
The Final Report of the QFCI (2012, p. 440) states that while its Interim Report had: 
reflected favourably on the flood engineers…in the light of further investigations… 
[a]ny opinion expressed in section 2.6 of the interim report must now be qualified by 
reference to the conclusions contained in this chapter and the result of any further 
investigations. 
 
The Inquiry found that that Wivenhoe Dam was operated in breach of the manual from 8.00 
am on 8 January 2011 until the evening of 9 January 2011 (QFCI Final Report 2012, p. 504) 
and that (QFCI Final Report 2012, p. 509):  
the evidence is such as to warrant a recommendation that the appropriate law 
enforcement agency investigate the conduct of Mr Malone, Mr Tibaldi and Mr Ayre. 
Given that the relevant parties were public officials at the time of the events, and 
given the Commission’s obligations under section 38 of the Crime and Misconduct 
Act 2001,763 the Crime and Misconduct Commission is the appropriate agency. 
 
The QFCI Final Report (2012, pp. 527-528) stated that: 
It is unfortunate that there has been a conflation in some media reporting of two 
separate issues: whether there was non-compliance with the manual strategies and 
whether it caused unnecessary flooding. The Commission has found the first …As to 
the second…the problem is that the possibility exists that because the engineers 
failed to consider the releases open to them within the parameters of the 
correct…strategy, an opportunity may have been lost for earlier releases…[and 
therefore] the possibility exists of at least some improvement in the flooding outcome 
for Brisbane and Ipswich. 
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6.5 The Crime and Misconduct Commission 
‘A disgraceful whitewash’ (‘Case opens the floodgates’ 2014). 
As recommended by the QFCI the three flood engineers were referred to the Crime and 
Misconduct Commission (CMC) in relation to two issues. Firstly, the preparation of 
documents surrounding the January 2011 flood event, and secondly the oral testimony given 
to the Inquiry. The CMC was to determine whether the conduct of the flood engineers 
amounted to offence(s) against the Criminal Code, and/or official misconduct under the 
Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 committed by any, or all, of them. 
The CMC conducted its inquiries and on 20 August 2012 ‘found no evidence of criminal or 
official misconduct against three Wivenhoe Dam engineers’ (‘CMC finalises examination of 
Wivenhoe Dam Engineers’ Conduct – 21.08.2012’). The CMC further argued that: 
the dam manual was ‘‘conflicting’’ and at times ‘‘badly drafted’’ and that this was the 
reason for confusion about when particular flood strategies were implemented during 
last year’s floods… [and that] prosecution of the trio would be ‘‘oppressive’’ if they 
were simply trying to follow a manual that contained contradictory statements.  
The CMC Chairman stated that the probe had concluded that no further action is necessary. 
For many, the question of who was responsible for the flooding from the dams was left 
unresolved. In the media, the investigation was characterised as too narrow and was 
described as ‘a whitewash’ (‘Case opens the floodgates’, 2014) offering ‘little relief for flood 
victims’ (Small 2012). The fact that, despite the QFCI and the CMC investigations, ‘[the 
engineers] can’t point to anything they would do differently…. makes people in the shadow 
of the dam very nervous’ (Vogler, Solomons and Thompson 2013). 
Media reported residents’ discontent and said that many felt that they were ‘still no closer to 
knowing whether the southeast's dams were properly managed during the 2011 flood and 
whether any of the flooding of thousands of properties in Brisbane and Ipswich was 
avoidable’ (Solomons 2012a, 2012b). Other media reported that ‘thousands and thousands 
of people [are] signing up for a class action because they’re not confident over the CMC 
inquiry or indeed the outcome of the floods commission’ (Small 2012). 
6.6 Success Proposition 1: Responding to crisis and restoring legitimacy 
Early signs indicated that the Government would restore its legitimacy. Premier Bligh’s 
Government acted quickly. It did not wait for the establishment or report of the Commission 
of Inquiry to commence legislative, administrative and policy change. The first institutional 
response to the floods was the establishment of the Flood Recovery Taskforce and a special 
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Cabinet Committee in the Queensland Executive branch. This was quickly followed on 15 
February 2011 when the Premier established the Queensland Reconstruction Authority as a 
new independent statutory authority, with the support of the Opposition (Langbroek, 
Hansard, 16 February 2011, p. 189). The Premier took on the new Minister for 
Reconstruction portfolio and the Queensland Reconstruction Authority reported directly to 
her. The establishment of the Queensland Reconstruction Authority was a rapid response to 
the flood crisis. 
Similarly, the establishment of the QFCI on 17 January 2011 was a powerful and swift 
response. In the immediate terror of the floods the establishment of the QFCI received 
bipartisan support however this was not to last. By 19 January 2011 ‘the fragile truce 
between Labor and the Liberal National Party (LNP) was fractured’ as the leader called for 
an extension of the Inquiry to include a ‘catch all phrase to include any other matters the 
commissioner deemed appropriate’ (Barrett 2011a). The Opposition leader ‘reversing the 
praise he had heaped on Ms Bligh only 24 hours earlier’ (McKenna and Rout 2011) 
suggested that there were things ‘Queenslanders deserved to know, deserve to be brought 
out into the light of day’. The Opposition leader also claimed that he had been ‘snubbed’ and 
was disappointed that he had been informed of the Inquiry’s terms of reference through the 
media (Barrett 2011a). This was the first of many occasions on which bipartisan support was 
sorely tested. 
There were high expectations on the QFCI. After all, ‘these were ‘matters of life and death’ 
(Caldwell and Vogler 2011) and the Premier promised repeatedly that ‘no stone would be left 
unturned’ (Madigan 2011). The Premier would ‘honour those who have tragically lost their 
lives in this catastrophe […] by learning the lessons of the event’ (‘Inquiry launched into Qld 
floods’ 2011) and promised that ‘nothing would be swept under the carpet’ (Barrett 2011a). 
The Inquiry would be ‘uncompromising…and would have ‘the courage to lay responsibility 
where it is due’ (‘Judicial Inquiry is the right move’ 2011). 
However the establishment of the QFCI was also criticised from its first day for being a 
diversion of funds that would be better spent on flood victims (Cameron 2011), that would 
‘put undue pressure on flood-affected councils’ who were ‘struggling to restore some 
semblance of normality back to their communities’ (Dorizas 2011) or just another ‘field day 
for lawyers […] in a sea of expensive suits’ (Murray 2011) who would be laughing all the way 
to their car brokers and travel agents’ (Cameron 2011). Some accused the Inquiry as being 
‘a very good tactic to stop people in government and the public service…from talking and 
discussing the matter publicly’ (Guse 2011). 
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The appointment of Justice Holmes, a sitting judge, to head up the Inquiry was also 
controversial. The Queensland Bar Association attacked the appointment of a sitting judge to 
head the high-profile inquiry (Barrett 2011b) claiming that this could ‘blur the separation of 
powers between the executive and the judiciary’ (Cowie 2011). The Bar Association noted 
that ‘public inquiries were inherently political and appointing a sitting judge could 
compromise their perception of independence’ (Cowie 2011). Nevertheless, the Inquiry’s 
opening session was described as a ‘box-office sell out’ (‘Keep it on track’ 2011). 
Queenslanders then ‘waited anxiously’ for the delivery of the Inquiry’s Interim Report 
(‘Goodna welcomes interim flood report’ 2011). 
When the Interim Report was delivered, the fierce opposition of the LNP stymied any and all 
attempts at restoring the legitimacy of the Bligh Government. The LNP unrelentingly 
questioned the Premier’s commitment, characterising her Government as untrustworthy as 
‘so many previous promises have been broken by the Premier’ (Seeney, Hansard, 2 August 
2011, p. 2215). The LNP called for the resignation of the Minister for Energy and Water 
Utilities because he ‘’failed to resolve the confusion that characterised the decision making 
around dam levels and unexplainably parked his decision about full supply levels’ (Nicholls, 
Hansard, 2 August 2011, p. 2215) and that he should, ‘for the sake of the heartbroken flood 
victims in the community […] apologise for his inactions and do the right thing, the 
Westminster thing, and resign’ (Rickuss, Hansard, 2 August 2011, p. 2222). The Premier 
dismissed these claims as ‘cheap attempts to turn this into a political football and politicise 
an event that I think should be above this kind of toing and froing’ (Bligh, Hansard, 2 August 
2011, p. 2224). 
 
However, the Interim Report continued to be highly politicised. The Opposition accused the 
Government of seeking ‘to blame everybody except their government, seek[ing] to shift 
responsibility to everybody except themselves’ and that this was: 
just one more indication of a government that has been in power for too long, a 
government that has lost the capacity to govern, a government that is now made up 
of too many failed ministers…[but that] the Premier is powerless to act because the 
cabinet and the caucus are plotting against her’ (Seeney, Hansard, 2 August 2011, p. 
2225).  
 
The Opposition alleged that the Premier was ‘refusing to sack any minister because doing so 
would bring on a much rumoured leadership spill’ (Seeney, Hansard, 3 August 2011, p. 
2327). The Opposition noted that the QFCI Interim Report failed to blame anyone specifically 
and characterised the Interim Report (Seeney, Hansard, 2 August 2011, p. 2270) as a: 
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damning report into this government’s preparedness for January’s devastating 
flood… a litany of failure and ministerial incompetence…It found a minister and a 
government were asleep at the wheel. Above all else, it is indicative of a government 
that has lost its capacity to govern. 
The Premier refused to agree and reiterated that Queensland owed it to those who had lost 
so much; ‘to take the report seriously and to learn from it’ (Bligh, Hansard, 2 August 2011, p. 
2273). Premier Bligh (Hansard, 3 August 2011, p. 2322) also reminded the Opposition that 
‘that there was a unanimous commitment from all parties and all agencies across all levels of 
government to work together to implement each and every one of the commission’s 
recommendations’. 
The Opposition also questioned the Premier’s fundamental commitment to ‘leave no stone 
unturned in cooperating with the inquiry’ (Langbroek, Hansard, 3 August 2011, p. 2331). 
They highlighted that the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service had not provided sufficient 
detail to the QFCI in response to allegations that they did not respond quickly enough to the 
events of 10 January 2011 (QFCI Interim Report 2011, pp. 173-174), branding this as yet 
another broken promise.26  
The Inquiry’s credibility was most significantly undermined when it had to reconvene after 
media allegations regarding shortcomings in certain evidence. However, as predicted in the 
literature (Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 2009) it was public officials, not politicians who were 
under scrutiny and it was the three flood engineers who were subsequently referred to the 
Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC).  This referral provided yet another opportunity 
for the Opposition to claim that the Premier knew more than she was admitting about the 
‘murky issue’ (‘Floods probe lapping at Bligh’s door’ 2012). This ‘shock’ recommendation 
was also framed as ‘vindication of media claims of a cover-up and as grounds for Australia’s 
largest class action’ (Cranston 2012a).  
Although the Inquiry may be assessed as successful in shielding political elites from blame, 
the Opposition effectively undermined the legitimacy of the Labor Government and of 
Premier Bligh herself. This was a significant achievement given the personal leadership and 
‘skyrocketing popularity’ (Stevens, Hansard, 25 October 2011, p. 3333) of Premier Bligh 
throughout the floods and in the establishment of the QFCI. In the months just prior to the 
floods ‘the Bligh government was facing political oblivion…[polls] recorded a primary vote of 
only 28 per cent…Bligh's satisfaction rating had slumped to 25 per cent - with 70 per cent 
                                                          
26 The responsible Minister outlined the reasons for this, and stated that it was ‘an absolute disgrace’ 
to suggest that ‘the people from the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service [who] have put their heart 
and soul into protecting Queenslanders in their hour of need […] would deliberately withhold 
information’ (Roberts, Hansard, 3 August 2011, p. 2333). 
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saying they were dissatisfied - raising more questions about her leadership’ (Davies 2011). 
However, by January 2011 Premier Bligh was being described as having ‘grown in stature’, 
‘a real leader’, ‘a rock in the midst of the tragedy, drama and confusion’, ‘a little less modern 
and a little more Churchillian’, ‘in control but caring deeply’, ‘statesman like’ (Davies 2011). 
Premier Bligh ‘enjoyed an unprecedented bounce in the polls, with her approval rating 
surging from 25 to 60 percent’ (‘Bligh’s poll rating shows massive turnaround’ 2011). The 
personal leadership shown by Premier Bligh during the flood events led to a ‘massive 
turnaround’ in approval ratings (Holmes, B 2012, p. 5) Premier Bligh ‘earned high praise for 
her raw and emotional performance at a flood briefing this morning, with the Queensland 
Premier's name rocketing up into Twitter's top 10 trending topics worldwide in the moments 
after her speech’ (Levy 2011).  
The Premier’s announcement of the QFCI was described as ‘sure footed’ (‘Wide-ranging 
Inquiry vital for closure on state disaster’ 2011) and ’politically astute as well as intrinsically 
correct’ (‘Judicial Inquiry is the right move’ 2011). As well as being timely she was ‘correct’ to 
have the Inquiry examine the floods throughout Queensland and not just those in the 
southeast where damage and loss of life was greatest (‘Wide ranging Inquiry vital for closure 
on state disaster’’ 2011), and ‘correct not to duck the big questions’ (‘Judicial Inquiry is the 
right move’ 2011). On 19 January 2011 the Premier ‘ruled out bolting to an early state 
election to capitalise on her well received handling of the floods’ saying that ‘this year would 
be about rebuilding, not politics’ (Barrett 2011a).  
However, as previously mentioned, the ‘fragile’ bipartisan support for the QFCI crumbled at 
the commencement of the QFCI and again when the Interim Report was delivered. The 
QFCI did not succeed in depoliticising the disaster. Further, when the Premier granted the 
Inquiry an additional round of hearings she ‘refused to rule out postponing the State election 
if the floods inquiry fails to meet its deadline’ stating that ‘Queenslanders should not be 
asked to vote until they had a chance to read the commission’s final report’ (‘Bligh wants 
election after flood report’ 2012). The Inquiry and its outcomes were highly politically 
significant. 
However, this decision meant that Local Government elections which had been scheduled 
for 31 March 2012 had to be postponed to 28 April 2012 in order to make way for the State 
election. A number of Local Government Councillors framed the Premier’s announcement as 
‘political opportunism’, ‘a disgraceful act of political deception’ which ‘smacks of political 
undertones’; the Premier’s ‘decision to trample over councils in this way for her own political 
gain has no doubt severed any little faith councils had in her and her government’ (Drew 
2012).  
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On 19 February 2012 Parliament was dissolved and the elections were held on 24 March 
2012. Despite Premier Bligh being widely regarded as ‘the caring Premier [who] is seemingly 
on top of everything as she helps steer Queensland through its darkest hour’ (Davies 2011) 
the Queensland Labor Government lost the election. From holding 51 seats in 2009, Labor 
was reduced to holding just seven seats in 2012. The LNP increased their number of seats 
from 34 to 78 to win the largest majority government in Queensland history.27  
While no Minister lost their seat as a result of the QFCI, every Minister (apart from Bligh 
herself) responsible for overseeing the Inquiry’s recommendations lost their seat as a result 
of the election. No public servant lost their job as a direct result of the QFCI. While the QFCI 
Final Report (2012, pp. 511-513) was highly critical of particular individuals it generally found 
that ‘on balance, their failure to identify the differences [between conflicting accounts of 
strategies used to manage the flood] should not be characterised as anything more than 
unfortunate’ (QFCI Final Report 2012, p. 514), and, that it was ‘unremarkable’ (QFCI Final 
Report 2012, p. 517) that particular people had not picked up discrepancies in accounts of 
the flood event. 
On 15 May 2012 the new Parliament was sworn in and it was the new LNP Government 
which received the Inquiry’s Final Report and set about implementing its recommendations.  
The Labor Government had tried to frame the flood disaster and the Inquiry in very ‘human’ 
terms, as a chance to learn together as a community, and to get to the heart of what had led 
to the extent of the loss of lives and damage. However, the Opposition successfully framed 
the emergency response, disaster management and the QFCI in highly political terms. It 
successfully portrayed the Government as disconnected and ineffectual arguing that Labor 
had been in power for too long.  
The literature suggests that an emphasis on regulatory, structural and/or cultural reform are 
hallmarks of a successful Public Inquiry as a means of restoring legitimacy and shielding 
elites from blame. The QFCI’s recommendations rely heavily on regulatory and 
administrative reform including better training, coordination, communication and reporting. 
This is in keeping with what a hybrid Public Inquiry typically does, namely to investigate an 
                                                          
27 A review by the Labor party (Wright, Lee and Tebbutt 2012) scrutinised the ‘devastating loss’ and 
acknowledged that Bligh’s response to the floods lifted Labor’s stocks (Wright, Lee and Tebbutt 2012, 
p. 11). The scale of Labor’s loss was attributed to: the unpopularity and divisiveness of the sale of 
Government assets; problems with the delivery and cost of key services; the longevity of Government 
and the breakdown of relationships with key stakeholders; and concerns about the tone and conduct 
of the election campaign (Wright, Lee and Tebbutt 2012, p. 3).  
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incident or crisis, as well as conduct a broader systemic review and make recommendations 
for reform. 
 
However, for some expert commentators the QFCI recommendations represented a missed 
opportunity as they were not in keeping with contemporary practice or thinking about 
disaster management and recovery. For instance, McGowan (2014, p. 227) describes the 
findings of the QFCI as ‘lamentable’ and suggests that the focus should have been on 
prevention and preparedness initiatives rather than focussing on a ‘prescriptive regulatory 
framework’ (McGowan 2014, p.224). Further, McGowan (2014, p. 215) asserts that:  
In adopting a regulatory approach to disaster management, however, it regrettably 
ignored, or was unaware of, recent intergovernmental policy developments, 
particularly the strategic intent of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) of 
building individual and community resilience [and that[ the inquiry’s dependence on 
greater and more prescriptive regulation in its recommendations potentially conflicts 
with the agreement to reduce ‘red and green tape’ made at the COAG meeting of 12 
April 2012. 
There were also those who questioned the entire focus of the Inquiry. Eburn and Dovers 
(2015, p. 501) argue that in relation to post natural disaster Inquiries, focussing on what went 
wrong is ‘an incorrect and immature narrative of disasters’. What would be more beneficial 
would be to focus on what went well, and ‘a narrative that recognises that disasters are a 
product of the environment and human choices rather than a “failure” by government 
emergency services, land managers or individuals’ (Eburn and Dovers 2015, p. 501). 
Arklay (2015, p. 188) argues that other reviews of disasters have incorporated the lessons of 
current disaster management literature which emphasise the importance of information 
sharing, developing trust and collegial relations, an emphasis on relationships and ‘non-
structural aspects’ like land planning and community participation (Arklay 2015, p. 191, p. 
194). The QFCI’s focus however was on regulatory reform. Arklay argues that the emphasis 
of the Inquiry’s recommendations puts it odds with isomorphic pressures that characterise 
reform in contemporary emergency management approaches like building community 
resilience, reducing red tape, and an emphasis on building and sustaining relationships 
across agencies and within communities. This may explain the findings of a subsequent 
review of Queensland’s emergency management practices and processes which found 
significant shortcomings in the uptake of the recommendations of the QFCI (Arklay 2015).  
Initially the Inquiry was warmly welcomed as an eminent panel of Commissioners who would 
leave ‘no stone unturned’ in finding out the truth. The Inquiry’s Final Report (2012, p. 30) 
acknowledged that while there was a: 
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good deal of room for improvement in planning for emergency 
response…Queenslanders can be relieved that governments at all levels were able 
to provide a prompt, if not perfect, response, which compares favourably with the 
apparent paralysis of government agencies and breakdown in order apparent on the 
Gulf coast after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans. 
Queensland disaster management agencies and practices are in fact, considered in many 
regards world best practice (World Bank 2011). This, however, is as a result of years of 
responding to, and managing such disasters by all levels of government, not as a direct 
result of this or any other particular Inquiry. 
Nevertheless, the QFCI failed to reduce the communities’ anxieties and provide sufficient 
reassurance for many Queenslanders. The central question about whether the floods could 
have been better managed remained unfinished business. After the Inquiry, many in the 
community remained fearful and worried about next flood season. The post-Inquiry class 
action28 and the creation of another Inquiry29 by the subsequent Labor Government in 2015 
provide stark evidence of this. 
6.6.1 Finding 
The establishment of the Inquiry was a direct and swift response to the crisis but it did not 
restore the legitimacy of the Government. The Premier did not wait for the Inquiry’s 
outcomes to commence action. As noted, Premier Bligh introduced the Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority Bill 2011 and became the Minister for Reconstruction herself. She 
swiftly activated the National Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangement. She also 
responded decisively, if not perfectly, to recommendations of the interim Inquiry report.  
The Inquiry did not depoliticise the disaster. The Opposition’s unceasing challenges 
successfully framed the Inquiry as yet another example of a Government which had been in 
power for too long. This was reinforced by steady media reports which reported community 
concern with the finding that no one was to blame and ongoing anxieties about how future 
flood events would be managed. 
                                                          
28 Maurice Blackburn law firm filed a class action in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 8 July 
2014, seeking compensation for financial loss and damage caused by the negligent operation of 
Wivenhoe and Somerset dams during the January 2011 flood in South East Queensland. The trial 
commenced in the Supreme Court on 4 December 2017, and recommenced on 12 February 2018. 
The claim is being brought by over 6000 flood victims, viewed 3 January 2018,  
https://www.mauriceblackburn.com.au/current-class-actions/queensland-floods-class-action/ 
29 The Grantham Floods Commission of Inquiry 2015, headed by Walter Sofronoff SC, confirmed the 
findings of the QFCI, viewed 23 April 2016, www.granthaminquiry.qld.gov.au 
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As to shielding elites from blame, no Minister lost their job as a result of the QFCI, however, 
all of them (except Bligh) lost their seats at the following election. 
For the many thousands of people who are to this day part of a class action (Chapter 7) 
about the operation of the dams, the legitimacy of the Bligh Government was not restored. 
There was also some ongoing controversy over appointing a sitting judge as Commissioner. 
6.7 Success Proposition 2: Giving voice  
 
In her Opening Hearing (10 February 2011, p. 4) Commissioner Holmes stated that: 
subject only to the need to protect those who are suffering grief and loss, these 
hearings will take place in public. All who have an interest can assess the manner in 
which evidence is received and tested, and any concerns about political interference 
can be laid to rest. 
The Inquiry was committed to being ‘full, careful, open and independent’ and that ‘no amount 
of legal argument will prevent the Commission from inquiring into any matter of legitimate 
interest’ (Holmes, Opening Hearing 2011, pp. 5-6). Commissioners promised that ‘there will 
be an unprecedented opportunity for the public, or at least those with access to the internet, 
to monitor the process as it unfolds. By this means it is hoped to maintain public confidence 
in the conduct and conclusions of the Commission’ (Holmes, Opening Hearing 2011, p. 4).  
The media reinforced this view describing the Inquiry as providing ‘a forum for those who lost 
families, friends and homes in the disaster to have their stories told and documented’ (Tovey 
2011) and ‘to listen to the experiences of ordinary people and to find answers on their behalf’ 
(‘Keep it on track’, 2011). People were encouraged to share their ‘eyewitness accounts’ with 
the Inquiry stating that these were an important element of the evidentiary foundation for the 
Inquiry’s work (Farmer 2011). The Inquiry’s website was extensive and included: 
submissions; consultation timetables; hearings schedules; exhibits; transcripts; those who 
had been given leave to appear and those who had not.  
The QFCI received: written submissions; held community meetings and consultations; 
sought material from organisations and individuals with particular knowledge; held public 
hearings; and visited affected areas. The Inquiry’s police investigators obtained statements 
from local people affected by flooding. The Inquiry sought to ensure it was informed in a 
‘balanced way, receiving the views of the public and those of organisations which played a 
part in the preparation and response to the floods, across a range of perspectives from 
urban and regional areas’ (QFCI Final Report 2012, p. 33). The Inquiry provided timely 
information and updates on its website. 
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The issues covered by the Inquiry were consistent with the QFCI’s terms of reference and 
included: flood preparations; land use planning and development; recommendations for the 
future; safety of individuals and communities; individual stories; insurance matters; 
complaints about weather reports/forecasting; communications and information; dams; 
floodgates and mismanagement; essential services and power supply; climate change; levee 
banks; community responses and resilience; and vulnerable groups. The Inquiry used its 
powers under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 to obtain statements and documents 
from members of the public, experts, public servants and members of non-government 
organisations. Some of those individuals were also called as witnesses in the Inquiry’s public 
hearings. The Inquiry sat for 68 days in total. Three hundred and forty-five witnesses gave 
evidence in the Inquiry’s public hearings.  
Nevertheless, some people felt that the Inquiry simply did not give them enough time to 
participate. When the QFCI was recalled to hear nine days of evidence regarding the 
operation of the Wivenhoe dam, media reported the ‘renewed fears of Grantham residents 
that the review has not had sufficient time to properly investigate the causes of the 12 deaths 
in the town on January 10 last year’ (Gearing 2012). Residents in Grantham feared that the 
final report of the Inquiry might leave them ‘at risk in the future’ as it had not been possible 
for many ‘traumatised flood victims to give information to the inquiry when the hearings were 
being held’ (Gearing 2012). 
When the Inquiry’s Final Report was released ‘the website crashed’ and ‘was devoured by a 
public and media seeking answers to everything from the questionable conduct of insurance 
groups to the actions taken by government and dam operators’ (Cranston 2012a).  
Throughout the disaster Premier Bligh ‘kept it personal’. She spoke about the losses, the 
impact on people’s lives, the heartbreak and the tragedy, the strength of communities and 
the importance of hearing the voices of all Queenslanders (Bligh, Hansard, 2 August 2011, 
p. 2209). The Inquiry acknowledged the importance of broad participation however it was 
conducted in a legalistic manner. According to the QFCI Final Report (2012, p. 34), ‘hearings 
were open to the public and conducted within a legal framework: witnesses gave evidence 
and were cross-examined, exhibits were tendered and transcripts prepared’. For some, 
however, it was alleged that the legalistic conduct of the QFCI constituted a barrier to 
participation and this was at odds with the ‘openness’ promised (Thomas 2011a, 2011d). 
The Premier acknowledged that ‘the legal process can be quite confusing’ and ‘daunting’ 
and in order to encourage and support people to tell their stories, set up a counselling 
service to ensure the Inquiry did not ‘miss the voices of ordinary people who felt and 
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experienced these things firsthand’ (Bligh, Hansard, 8 March 2011, p. 333). These were 
important measures in support of broad participation. 
 
One example of the legalistic way in which the Inquiry was conducted was the requirement 
of seeking leave to appear before the Commission. This issue continued to be raised in the 
media and had the potential to undermine the Inquiry. For example, Thomas (2011d) argued 
that: 
By not granting funded opportunities for well-organised and large groups of affected 
residents and businesses to appear and engage lawyers to question those 
responsible for public policy and operational decisions. Many senior lawyers, already 
briefed at vast expense to protect bureaucrats and the government against 
potentially adverse findings will do everything in their power to limit exhaustive cross-
examination of their clients. In circumstances where those most directly affected are 
not directly represented, the risk to public confidence is inevitably heightened.  
 
This issue was also the subject of heated debate in the Queensland Parliament. On 9 March 
2011 the Opposition leader expressed his ‘extreme disquiet and unease at the flood 
commission’s refusal to allow leave to appear to those who have been severely affected by 
the floods’ and called on the Premier to ‘guarantee victims a right to appear’ (Langbroek, 
Hansard, 9 March 2011, p. 441; Bleijie, Hansard, 10 March 2011, pp. 534-535). The Premier 
responded by reassuring that the QFCI would ‘take evidence from anybody who wants to 
provide it’ (Bligh, Hansard, 10 March 2011, p. 535). The Premier stated that ‘the court will 
actually come to you and help you make a statement and a submission. It does not get much 
easier than that’ (Bligh, Hansard, 10 March 2011, p. 534). It was also noted that the QFCI 
had waived the closing dates for submissions from people who had been most affected by 
the floods and who ‘had much more immediate concerns’ (Rickuss, Hansard, 10 March 
2011, p. 598). Nevertheless, the Opposition was able to press the point that the legalistic 
conduct of the Inquiry had hindered the contribution of some voices. 
The QFCI was a recurring feature of the public discourse at the time, in Parliament and in 
the media. The media provided a running commentary on the work of the Inquiry and 
provided relentless scrutiny of every detail considered by the Inquiry including: rain and 
weather forecasting (Thomas 2011b, 2011c); dam construction; water levels and flood 
gauges (Houghton 2011; ‘Floods probe lapping at Bligh’s door’ 2012; Foley 2012); the 
operation of flood gates (‘We drowned in silence’ 2011); and drainage (‘Farm drains raised 
Emerald flood’ 2011). Because of the article in The Australian (Thomas 2012), the media 
played a pivotal role in the Inquiry hearing additional evidence and subsequently referring 
the flood engineers to the CMC. 
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The media also kept readers updated on changes being made as a result of the Inquiry, for 
instance: additional rescuers (‘Queensland flood-ready for summer’, 2011); better disaster 
management training (‘Council to be skilled, flood ready’ 2011); new flood alerts (Dam 
residents offered flood alerts’ 2011; ‘New weather warnings’ 2011; Kennedy 2011; ‘Council 
masterminds new ways to issue warnings’ 2011), and an emergency action plan notification 
list (‘Burdekin Falls Dam sms flood alerts’ 2011). 
In terms of changes to policy subsystems, one of the earliest enduring administrative 
changes made was in response to Recommendation 3.1 of the QFCI Interim Report. This 
recommended broadening the State Disaster Management Group to include ‘new voices’ at 
a significant level in responses to disaster, as announced in Parliament (Seeney, Hansard, 
25 October 2011, p. 3321). 
This inclusion of representatives of the Australian Defence Force and the Australian 
Red Cross in the planning and preparation for the next wet season by the State 
Disaster Management Group was a sensible recommendation of the inquiry in light of 
the critical role they have in responding to the events. I note that it is further proposed 
to add the Bureau of Meteorology and Surf Life Saving Queensland to the 
membership of the State Disaster Management Group  
More broadly, however, there is no compelling evidence that policy coalitions or subsystems 
changed in any substantive or enduring way as a direct result of the Inquiry. The Inquiry 
drew upon many technical experts, engineers, Local Councils, independent reviewers and 
insurance providers during its deliberations. However, ‘traditional’ allegiances and positions 
held firm. For example, non-Labor Local Councils continued to be highly critical of the Labor 
Premier (Solomons and Thompson 2013).  
 
Arguably, the most significant group of new policy entrants should have been Local 
Councils. The QFCI report, Government and commentators all acknowledged the centrality 
of Local Councils to emergency response and recovery efforts. As outlined in the 
Queensland Government Response to QFCI Final Report (n.d., p. 5), the implementation 
groups convened by the respective Directors-General to implement the recommendations of 
the QFCI acknowledge that: 
a collaborative approach with local government will be essential for proper state 
implementation of the Commission’s recommendations. There are many 
recommendations in the final report that will be the primary responsibility of either 
individual councils or councils generally. 
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There is some evidence of Local Government participation on some of the implementation 
groups30 but overwhelmingly the QFCI implementation groups are dominated by State 
Government agencies.31 
6.7.1 Finding 
The Inquiry was set up to be participatory and to give voice. It did so, but on its own terms. 
There is clear evidence that many people had their say and told their stories. Yet the 
Inquiry’s chosen method of operating was legalistic, considered by some as ‘a field day for 
lawyers’ (Cameron 2011). This may have limited voice and provided a barrier to broader 
participation, despite the provision of counsellors and support for participants. 
Critically, the failure to successfully engage and coordinate Local Government in post flood 
efforts and policy change also suggests failure on this criterion. It is entirely possible that on 
closer examination, by issue or by recommendation, some changes to policy coalitions or 
subsystems may be evident; however, relying on information available in the public domain, 
this is not apparent.  
A class action of residents against the Queensland Government, which is underway at the 
time of writing, provides a ‘new voice’ (Chapter 7). The class action continues to be a forum 
for many residents to be galvanised into local action groups to provide information and 
updates on proceedings, share their stories and continue to keep this issue in the public 
domain.32 For many it ‘represents the last opportunity for [victims] to be compensated for 
their losses’ (‘Case opens the floodgates’, 2014). The extent to which these voices have an 
impact on policy change remains to be seen. 
By virtue of the post Inquiry class action, ongoing localised action groups, and a subsequent 
Inquiry concluded in 2015 (Chapter 7) it is evident that the Inquiry may have succeeded in 
giving voice but that there were those who felt unheard.  
 
                                                          
30 For example, the Department of State Development Infrastructure and Planning’s Brisbane River 
Catchment studies group partnered with Brisbane, Ipswich, Lockyer Valley and Somerset Councils, 
Response to Recommendation 2.2, viewed 14 June 2015, 
https://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/publications/categories/reports/assets/gov-response-floods-
commission-inquiry.pdf 
31 For instance, the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection’s Environment and Mines 
Implementation Group includes representatives from relevant government agencies but no other 
stakeholders. 
32 For example, action groups like Brisbane River Floods 2011, Greater Goodna Flood Group, viewed 
15 March 2015, http://goodnaflood.blogspot.com.au/ 
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6.8 Success Proposition 3: Providing the opportunity for policy change and improved 
outcomes 
 
On 11 February 2012 Commissioner Holmes declared that the public hearings into the 
floods were completed.  Soon after, on 25 February 2012, the Premier announced an 
election date of 24 March 2012 (Holmes, B, 2012, p. 14). By the time the QFCI delivered its 
final report (16 March 2012) Queensland had changed Government. The LNP convincingly 
won Government from Labor and it was the new Premier, Campbell Newman, who tabled 
the Government’s response to the Inquiry and stated in Parliament; ‘I reiterate my 
government’s previous commitment to fully implement all of those recommendations for 
which we are responsible’ (Newman, Hansard, 7 June 2012, p. 629). 
Of the report’s 177 recommendations, 123 related to areas of Queensland Government 
responsibility, 56 related to Local Government responsibilities, eight related to 
Commonwealth Government responsibilities, and seven recommendations related to private 
entities. Many recommendations were directed at both State and Local Governments or 
were dependent on action by the State to establish a consistent framework for 
implementation at a local level (Queensland Government Response to the Queensland 
Floods Commission of Inquiry Final Report n.d., p. 4). 
The new Premier stated that 'my government is strongly committed to better planning and 
better protection for communities across Queensland. We are determined to learn from 
Queensland’s recent flood disasters and do everything possible to deliver better flood 
security for all Queenslanders’ (Newman, Hansard, 7 June 2012, p. 630). 
The Inquiry’s recommendations had policy and program implications for all tiers of 
Government and the State Government’s response stressed that implementation would be 
collaboration with Local and Commonwealth governments. Five key streams of activity were 
described and clear processes were established for implementation, monitoring and 
reporting (Appendix 7).  
There is also evidence of a significant restructure of Government agencies in 2012 (Scott 
2012), however these were the result of the change of Government, not in response to 
particular recommendations or outcomes of the QFCI. The focus of many of the QFCI’s 
recommendations was on regulatory reform and many required legislative change. Some of 
these legislative and policy changes had clear and uncontested bi-partisan support.33  
                                                          
33For example, the Water Legislation (Dam Safety and Water Supply Enhancement) and Other 
Legislation Amendment Bill implemented a number of the recommendations of the final report of the 
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Through late 2012 and 2013 there is also evidence of changes that had been achieved as a 
direct result of the QFCI recommendations. For example, the delivery of 56 flood boats 
which were part of the QFCI funded program (‘Ambulances, rescue vehicles, flood boats’, 
2013; ‘New boat for SES groups’, 2013; ‘Wide bay and Sunshine Coast stations and SES 
units get new flood boats’, 2013; ‘Pomona and Cooroy ready for next big wet with new boats’ 
2013), and funds for flood warnings (‘We drowned in silence’, 2011, ‘$82,000 for flood 
warnings’, 2012). Media also reported a new website offering ‘easy access to vital 
information when natural disasters strike’; ‘load testing’ the state disaster coordination 
centre’s capacity under a cyclone scenario; more trained rescuers and various other 
measures taken as a result of the QFCI to make Queensland ‘flood ready’ (‘Queensland 
flood-ready for summer: govt’, 2011). Presumably all of these have led to better services and 
outcomes for the community. 
However, by 2013 media turned its focus to things that had not been achieved leaving 
residents feeling ‘nervous about the current high dam levels’, fearing a repeat of the 2011 
floods’, and feeling ‘no safer today’ with one resident quoted as saying ‘I think we are worse 
off than we were two years ago’ (Vogler, Solomons and Thompson, 2013). 
A key area in which the QFCI provided the opportunity for significant policy and practice 
change is in the relationship between all tiers of government, notably Local Councils. The 
QFCI recommended stronger engagement with Local Councils. This was peppered through 
many of the Inquiry’s recommendations consistently acknowledging that Local Councils were 
central to response, reconstruction and rebuilding efforts. Multiple recommendations were 
made by the QFCI which had a direct impact on Local Councils, for example: flood plain 
management; changes to local planning instruments; development assessments and control; 
essential services and emergency responses; buy backs and land swaps. The critical role of 
Local Government was recognised by both Premier Bligh and Premier Newman when they 
presented their Government’s responses to the QFCI Interim Report and Final Report 
respectively. In the immediate aftermath of the floods, on 23 March 2011, Premier Bligh 
recognised the centrality of Local Councils to the recovery and reconstruction effort and 
expedited the flow of funds to impacted communities.34 Later, in the Government’s response 
to the QFCI’s Final Report the Premier reiterated that many of the QFCI’s recommendations 
                                                          
QFCI and also aimed to reduce the regulatory burden on some of the water services industry 
(McArdle, Hansard, 12 September 2012, p. 1843). The Opposition acknowledged the Bill’s role in 
implementing nine of the recommendations of the QFCI and supported the passage of the legislation 
through the House (Pitt, Hansard, 30 October 2012, p. 2230). 
34 18 disaster impacted councils were advanced $220 million to begin their reconstruction works 
under a process that was used for the first time in Australia (Bligh, Hansard, 23 March 2011, p. 708). 
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needed to be addressed by individual Local Councils and announced an allocation of $40 
million over three years for Local Council projects to implement recommendations of the 
QFCI (Queensland Government Response to the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 
Final Report n.d., p. 6). 
 
However, this research was unable to track Local Councils’ response to, and implementation 
of, the Inquiry’s recommendations for reform. The primary emphasis of the Inquiry’s 
recommendations for Local Councils rested on regulatory and procedural reform. The 
recommendations did not, however, resolve long standing tensions about respective areas 
of responsibility. As McGowan (2014, p. 222) observes, the QFCI recommendations in this 
regard are ‘a very prescriptive set of regulatory recommendations with multiple subsets of 
formal requirements, rather than a risk-based approach based on principles of floodplain 
management and planning’. McGowan (2014, pp. 222-3) predicted that the QFCI’s lack of 
clarity about who is responsible for what:  
is likely to result in ongoing arguments over which level of government should bear 
the costs of the implementation of these recommendations. Many local councils are 
simply not in a financial position to meet these additional costs. Future blame shifting 
between tiers of government following incomplete implementation of these 
recommendations seems inevitable. 
As predicted by McGowan (2014), this research was unable to track with any certainty the 
separate or coordinated responses to the QFCI by Local Councils.  
In contrast, the State Government response to the QFCI’s Interim and Final Reports were 
comprehensive and clearly outlined responsibilities, performance targets and timelines. 
Implementation updates can be tracked for the 123 State Government responsibilities and 
eight Commonwealth Government responsibilities. However, given the scope and limits of 
this thesis, it is impossible to track the remaining 71 recommendations which relate to the 
implementation of Local Government responsibilities. This research could not locate a 
coordinated or comprehensive response by Local Councils. Despite Local Councils being 
central to the implementation and coordination of the QFCI’s recommendations there is little 
transparency on policy change and better outcomes in this critical area. 
6.8.1 Finding 
The QFCI successfully opened the policy window bringing politics, problems and policy 
proposals together. However, there is no compelling evidence of significant or sustained 
shifts in policy subsystems or positions as a result of the Inquiry. There is a lack of evidence 
of a coordinated approach or transparency regarding implementation of the QFCI 
recommendations by Local Councils and hence whether better outcomes were achieved. 
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The State Government, on the other hand, drove a transparent and coordinated response to 
the Inquiry’s recommendations.   
In conclusion, the assessment of the Inquiry’s success in providing the opportunity for policy 
change and achieving improved outcomes is equivocal. Some services and processes are 
better resourced and coordinated but critically, given their pivotal role in emergency 
response and recovery efforts it appears that Local Councils generally failed to be engaged 
and well-coordinated. 
6.9 Conclusion 
The analysis using the three propositions of success drawn from the literature yields an 
ambivalent result. With respect to the first proposition of success, responding to crisis and 
restoring legitimacy, the Inquiry was a swift and humane response to the crisis and the 
devastation of the Queensland floods. The Inquiry was part of a suite of measures to 
respond to, learn, and recover from the floods. However, the Bligh Labor Government 
struggled to restore its legitimacy in the face of the Opposition’s successful framing of the 
management of the floods, and the QFCI, as symptomatic of a Government that was ‘out of 
touch’ and had been in power too long. The Inquiry promised to establish whether any more 
could have been done to avert the tragic loss of life and property: from flood preparation and 
land use; to the adequacy of forecasts and early warning systems; and the operation of 
dams. For many, however, it failed to do just that. Further, the credibility of the Inquiry was 
seriously undermined by the independent investigations conducted by The Australian which 
found shortcomings in certain evidence. This was further eroded by the subsequent Crime 
and Misconduct Commission findings which found that the flood engineers had no case to 
answer.  
In relation to the second proposition of success, giving voice, the Inquiry worked hard to 
encourage members of the public to participate and many people had their say. However, 
some argued that the legalistic way in which the Inquiry was conducted was a barrier to 
participation.  
 
With respect to the third proposition of success, providing the opportunity for policy change 
and improved outcomes, there was some policy change as a result of the Inquiry and the 
inclusion of new policy voices in institutional settings. Critically, however, the Inquiry and 
subsequent efforts by Government failed to consistently or effectively engage Local Councils 
which are central to response and recovery coordination. 
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Chapter 7 - Findings and implications for scholarship 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of this thesis (7.2), and outlines the various proxies which 
are suggestive of citizens’ assessments of success which have been identified through the 
case study analyses (7.3). Further questions arising from the case study analyses are also 
presented (7.4) which challenge and extend some of the key propositions arising from the 
examined literature. These questions include the role and purpose of Public Inquiries, whose 
voices are heard, and the distinction between policy change and improved outcomes.  
The chapter then turns to the implications of these findings for scholarship (7.5) and moves 
to building theory which has emerged inductively from the case study analyses. The 
significance of Public Inquiries is restated (7.5.1.1) and the analytical framework to assess 
the success of Public Inquiries is reframed to incorporate citizen perspectives (7.5.2). This is 
in keeping with the central argument of the thesis: that as part of the reciprocal obligations 
shared between citizens and government, the overarching purpose of a Public Inquiry is to 
rebuild the social contract after it has been breached.  
Three enduring functions of Pubic Inquiries are identified: to respond, to hear and to prevent. 
Within each of these functions, a reframed proposition of success is presented. For each 
reframed proposition a revised analytical framework is presented which suggests possible 
elements of success, indicators, measures and sources of evidence.  
These elements of success, indicators, measures and sources of evidence are drawn from 
various literatures and empirical frameworks (7.5.3, 7.5.4, 7.5.5), which are described as 
offering some potential to assessing success against these reframed propositions. 
7.2 Findings 
This section outlines the limitations of the analytical framework as applied to the case 
studies. It identifies the lack of focus on citizen perspectives as a missing element; however, 
various proxies or markers which are suggestive of citizen’s views are identified and 
discussed. 
The analytical framework developed for this thesis has enabled a nuanced dissection of 
various aspects of each Public Inquiry. It has achieved the central objective of the thesis: to 
assess the success of Public Inquiries in Australia. However, the assessment of success of 
each case study has produced an ambiguous result. The key finding of the analyses of the 
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three illustrative case studies is that the propositions for success drawn from the public 
administration and political science literature have been found to be incomplete. The 
propositions of success miss an essential perspective - the significance of Public Inquiries to 
citizens and the role Public Inquiries play in rebuilding the breach of the social contract after 
it has been breached. 
Further, the methodological strategy of choosing one of each of the three different types of 
Public Inquiry (investigatory, policy advisory and hybrid), has failed to highlight under which 
conditions, or which types of Public Inquiry, various propositions of success may or may not 
hold. Nevertheless, the analyses have facilitated some important insights and the analytical 
framework provides some guidance on the proxies for citizens’ views. These proxies include 
media and scholarly commentary, legal action and subsequent Inquiries. 
Even from the point of view of government, application of the analytical framework yields an 
equivocal result. The question of the ways in which each Public Inquiry was successful, 
against each proposition, is at best, both yes and no. On some propositions the Inquiry may 
have been assessed as successful, yet on others, not. This is what Bovens, ‘t Hart and 
Peters (2001, pp. 20-22, p. 606) refer to as ‘asymmetries’, that is, when success or failure 
can be demonstrated on one dimension but not on others. Further, within each proposition, 
the assessment, at times, does not yield a clear result.  
It is acknowledged that there are elements of success in each case study. The Cole Inquiry 
protected the Prime Minister and his Ministers from being seen to be too close to the 
allegedly corrupt practices of AWB executives, and strengthened Australia’s compliance with 
its international obligations. Some organisations and advocates who are part of the 
Queensland child protection system had their say, and a program of reform is underway. In 
Queensland, flood management, disaster planning and emergency warning systems were 
improved, and resources enhanced. 
Equally, however, there are elements of failure in each Inquiry. The Cole Inquiry failed at 
depoliticising the AWB scandal. It also failed to find anyone to blame for breaching UN 
sanctions, and arguably significantly delayed or stymied any subsequent prosecutions 
(OFFTF Minority Report, Chapter 6 2015). The Queensland Child Protection Inquiry has to 
date failed to ‘fix’ the child protection system and many children and families still do not 
experience better outcomes. The numbers of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children in 
out of home care continues to increase (Appendix 6). The Queensland Floods Commission 
of Inquiry failed to find anyone or anything to blame for the management of, and response to, 
the Queensland flood disaster, in particular managing the dam gates. This matter 
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subsequently became the centre of another Inquiry (Sofronoff Grantham Floods Commission 
of Inquiry 2015). A class action by Queensland citizens against the State is still underway at 
the time of writing. 
The case study analyses show that, where there is evidence that change has occurred, this 
has not necessarily been the direct result of the Public Inquiry itself. For example, 
fundamental changes to wheat marketing arrangements came about through regular 
democratic, parliamentary processes (Appendix 3). Changes in child protection may have 
come about through the regular isomorphic pressures within child protection systems 
nationally and internationally, and government’s pre-existing propensity to outsource 
government services to the non-government sector. Improvements to disaster management 
and response came about, at least in part, through the deep and vast experience 
Queensland has in responding to natural disasters. 
Perhaps the failure to find ‘clear-cut yes or no answers ‘(Albæk 2001, p. 466) is not 
surprising, as ‘[f]irst, different indicators will point in different directions. Second, neither in 
academic language nor in everyday parlance do we find clear definitions of success and 
failure’ (Albæk 2001, p. 466). 
This is understood and is not the key critique of the framework. The key critique of the 
analytical framework is that it fails to recognise the role Public Inquiries play in rebuilding the 
social contract after breach. The focus of the analytical framework is on how Public Inquiries 
serve governments. The missing lens on assessing the success of Public Inquiries is the 
perspective of citizens.  
7.2.1 The blind spot - citizen perspectives 
The case study analyses confirm that in the analytical framework derived from the literature, 
citizen perspectives on success are, in the main, invisible. In the case studies themselves, 
there is no evidence of direct mechanisms or sources to gauge citizens’ views on how they 
assess the success of the Public Inquiry. There are no post-participation surveys, no 
feedback mechanisms, and no formal processes of engagement to test recommendations. 
There are no measures or indicators to assess whether citizens trusted the Inquiry to make 
sense of the events or the violations of expectations, no surveys which indicate the extent to 
which citizens felt they had been heard, or trust that the Inquiry and its outcomes could 
prevent such events from occurring again, or the extent to which policies, processes or 
outcomes would improve as a result of the Inquiry. 
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There are, however, proxies in each case study which are suggestive of citizens’ views 
about how they assess the success or otherwise of each Inquiry. For example, media 
commentary provides some insight into citizens’ responses to Inquiries. Commentary by the 
media has been described through each of the case study analyses.  
There are also other clues, or markers, which are suggestive of citizens’ perspectives. This 
approach shows some promise in assessing success because, where such proxies have 
been found, the assessment of success is clearer. Using these markers, from the point of 
view of citizens, none of the case studies examined in this thesis could be assessed as 
successful in repairing the breach of expectations and rebuilding the social contract. 
The Cole Inquiry failed not only to depoliticise the AWB scandal but also failed to reassure 
citizens of the competence or legitimacy of their government. The Inquiry was roundly 
viewed as a whitewash and, arguably, the Inquiry process itself significantly delayed any 
subsequent legal action or prosecutions against AWB executives.  
Child protection Inquiries are ubiquitous, whether they are established in response to crisis 
(NSW SCI 2008), or as election commitments to establish the credentials of an alternative 
government and the incompetence of incumbents (QCPCI 2013, and the Protecting 
Victoria’s Vulnerable Children Inquiry 2012). It may be argued that the sheer number of 
Inquiries suggests that such Inquiries consistently fail to meet expectations of functional and 
responsive child protection systems.  
The QFCI failed to find anyone responsible for the devastation and loss of life and a class 
action remains underway to date. As described in the case study, many citizens were left 
fearful and anxious about how their government would respond to future natural disaster 
events. Because of ongoing community anxieties, devastating losses and unanswered 
questions, a successive government instituted a subsequent Inquiry (the Grantham Floods 
Commission of Inquiry 2015) and another Advisory Committee has since been established 
by the Queensland Government on these very matters (‘Newman government takes steps to 
strengthen Queensland’s flood resilience’ 2013). 
7.3 Proxies for citizen perspectives on the success of the three case studies  
Given the lack of direct feedback mechanisms from citizens, this section details each case 
study using the various proxies which are suggestive of citizens’ assessments of success 
which have been identified through the case study analyses. These include legal action and 
subsequent Inquiries, political change, ongoing media commentary, and in one case, 
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expression through the arts. These proxies provide an important, sharper lens on how 
citizens assess the success of the three Inquiry case studies. 
7.3.1 Cole Inquiry 2006 
Commissioner Cole acknowledged the ‘daily commentary’ and ‘intense political debate and 
widespread media coverage’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 170) about the AWB scandal and 
his Inquiry. However, Commissioner Cole interpreted his Commission unequivocally as 
serving Government, not the public interest. Cole clearly expresses this view in his report:  
It is the function of the executive government to define the scope of that which it 
wishes to have investigated…The Government knows the subject matter, and the 
scope of the subject matter, into which it wishes an inquiry to be conducted. It is not 
for a commissioner appointed to conduct such an inquiry to presume that he or she is 
the custodian of the public interest or the person authorised to determine the scope 
of any inquiry that might be related to or connect with the ‘peace, order and good 
government of the Commonwealth, or any public purpose or any power of the 
Commonwealth’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 165). 
 
As detailed in Chapter 4, however, citizens expressed ongoing doubts about government as 
the custodian of the public interest. Commissioner Cole acknowledged the great public 
interest in the matter but staunchly separated himself from it (Cole Report 2006, Vol 1, p. 
169, pp. 176-177). Commissioner Cole maintained that ‘there is a bright line to be drawn and 
maintained between what I shall call the legal aspects of this Inquiry, and the politics and 
media commentary which accompanies the holding of this Inquiry’ (Cole Report 2006, Vol 1, 
p.170). He made a clear decision not to intervene in, or comment on, any of the media or 
political debate surrounding the Inquiry (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 171). Commissioner 
Cole conducted his Inquiry in strict accordance with the Letters Patent, and did not seek to 
widen them. The public interest was not his concern. 
 
Commissioner Cole did, however, conduct the Inquiry in as public a way as possible. His 
view was that: 
public hearings are important in enhancing public confidence in commissions of 
inquiry or royal commissions as they allow the public to see the inquiry at 
work…conducting a royal commission or commission of inquiry in private ‘seriously 
undermines the value of the Inquiry. It shrouds the proceedings with a cloak of 
secrecy, denying to then the public character which to my mind is an essential 
element in public acceptance of an Inquiry of this kind and of its Report’ (Cole Report 
2006, Vol. 1, p. 177). 
However, the ‘publicness’ of this Inquiry did not enhance the acceptance of his Report. The 
central, enduring question for many remained: did Government know? For many, the 
accusations of cover up and incompetence, were not satisfactorily addressed: ‘If [the 
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government] is not guilty of a vast cover-up, then it must be guilty of culpable negligence and 
incompetence’ (Costello 2006). 
The terms of reference had been carefully constructed. Critically, they excluded investigation 
into the involvement of Ministers and government officials and did not examine policy 
(McConnell, Gauja and Botterill 2008, pp. 612-613). The AWB was under investigation, not 
Government or its Ministers. Ultimately, ‘no ministers were implicated in Cole’s report and 
there was no significant criticism of the original privatisation policy or the “light touch” 
regulatory regime´ (McConnell, Gauja and Botterill 2008, p. 600).  
The Cole Inquiry also represents a missed opportunity of enhancing the effectiveness, 
capability and transparency of public administration and government agencies. These 
matters were not addressed by the Inquiry. DFAT, a key player, was viewed as not having 
the required capability, and ‘lacked vigour’ in following up suspected breaches in this 
relatively newly privatised arrangement. The case study analysis confirms Botterill and 
McNaughton’s (2008) findings that DFAT had relied on advice provided by AWB Ltd who, 
after all, had been the experts and many of whom were the same people ‘who had provided 
reliable advice to government when they were employed by the Australian Wheat Board’ 
(Botterill and McNaughton 2008, pp. 592-3). DFAT had not had ‘time to develop the 
necessary expertise on the intricacies of export wheat contracts following privatisation before 
the kickbacks began’ (Botterill and McNaughton 2008, p. 592). This represents a missed 
‘opportunity to make institutional reform that might mean similar scandals can be avoided in 
the future’ and, as such, it failed to have a lasting impact on how government conducts its 
business (Prasser and Tracey 2014, p. 228).  
Once it had reported, there was pervasive ‘disbelief’ about the Inquiry’s outcomes. Some 
saw the findings as ‘plain wrong’ (Thomson, Hansard, 5 December 2006, p. 9) or as ‘self-
serving’ (Durie 2006). Bartos (2014, p. 234) notes that ‘whether or not ministers or officials 
were involved in aiding or abetting AWB remains a mystery’ (Bartos 2014, p. 234). 
Even though no Minister or official lost their portfolio there were ongoing doubts about their 
performance and integrity, and the machinery of government. According to Wanna (2007, p. 
287): 
[a]lthough the inquiry largely was seen as a whitewash exercise, many politicians 
and officials came out of it looking incompetent, indolent and unprofessional. Many 
had given evidence that they had not read cables, not asked questions, dismissed 
rumours, and not passed on information to ministers. 
There are also other insights into citizen perspectives. In the initial aftermath of the Cole 
Report (2006), the AWB lost half of its shareholder value, and eventually after the 
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deregulation of the wheat market, lost most of its market share of wheat exports (Bartos 
2014, p. 240). The AWB was also exposed to a number of legal actions. These included 
actions by wheat growers in the United States of America, a class action on behalf of 
shareholders, action by the Australian Tax Office to recover tax foregone in respect of illegal 
payments,35 and a class action on behalf of some wheat growers seeking to recover 
performance bonus payments (Crean, Hansard, 7 December 2006, p. 63). A civil lawsuit 
was also filed in an American court on behalf of the northern Iraqi people claiming AWB 
along with a European bank ‘cheated Iraqis out of humanitarian supplies’ (Crawshaw 2006). 
For these many thousands of citizens, the Cole Inquiry did not resolve the issues of most 
concern to them. 
When the Cole Report (2006) was released, law firm Maurice Blackburn Cashman was 
drafting a claim intended to be filed in the NSW Supreme Court claiming that the AWB’s 
payment of $290 million led shareholders to lose more than half the value of their stock and 
that Commissioner Cole’s findings had ‘strengthened their case’. The class action was to 
seek up to $60 million in damages with ‘substantial interest’ (‘Cole report more rope for class 
action’ 2006). 
The class action was commenced against the AWB on 10 February 2010 in the Federal 
Court. The Applicant concluded his opening on 12 February 2010 and on the morning of 15 
February 2010 the parties announced that the matter had been settled. The settlement 
resulted in AWB making a payment of $39.5 million (inclusive of legal costs) to the plaintiffs 
(OFFTF Report 2015 Appendix 3, p. 5). 
7.3.1.1 ‘Deeply offensive and utterly untrue’, Version 1.0, 2007 (Williams 2010) 
Perhaps a more unusual demonstration of the way in which this Inquiry was perceived by 
citizens, was the production and performance of ‘Deeply offensive and utterly untrue’ (2007) 
by the performance group, version 1.0 (Williams 2010). Version 1.0 ‘undertook a theatrical 
re-making’ of the 8,500 pages of the Cole Inquiry’s transcripts, 2,000 pages of the Cole 
Report (2006) as well as thousands of pages of journalism and commentary’ (Williams 2010, 
p. 189, p. 190). Williams describes the legal nature of the Cole Inquiry as characterised by 
‘complex legal manoeuvring’…‘the ritualised combative language of lawyers’, ‘obstructionist’ 
behaviour and ‘protagonists who engage in such excessive and, at times, virtuosic acts of 
avoiding straight answers’ (Williams 2010, pp. 190-191, p. 193). The impenetrability of the 
legal process was also compounded by Minister Downer’s oft-repeated refrain that it was all 
                                                          
35 The Australian Tax Office later ruled that the $294 million in ‘kickbacks’ paid to the regime could be 
claimed as a tax deduction (Coorey and Wilkinson 2006). 
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‘terribly complicated’ (Williams 2010, p. 195). According to Williams (2010, p. 195) this 
‘encouraged citizens to not waste their time thinking closely about it, and such strategic 
avoidance of thinking obviously served very particular legal interests’. However, the 
production and success of ‘Deeply offensive and utterly untrue’ did ‘encourage citizens to 
closely interrogate the processes by which their democracy operates, and the ways in which 
national representatives, both governmental and commercial, act in our name’ (Williams 
2010, p. 195). 
7.3.1.2 Political change – Kevin ’07 
In the lead up to the 2007 election, the handling of the AWB scandal had gained significant 
political capital. The long term incumbent Liberal National Party (LNP) coalition government 
framed the Inquiry as proof of their trustworthiness credentials in dealing with such a 
momentous scandal. A highly charged, and hopeful, Labor Opposition framed the Inquiry as 
a manipulative, cynical whitewash. According to Grattan (2006a) ‘reaction over AWB 
appears to have taken a toll on Prime Minister John Howard’s popularity and helped Labor 
increase its vote in the AC Nielsen/Age poll’ [and that] ‘seven out of ten Australians aware of 
the Cole Inquiry still believe the Government knew of AWB’s kickbacks to Iraq in the oil-for-
food scandal despite ministers and public servants being exonerated last week’. 
Also at play throughout this period was the leadership challenge in the Labor Party. Despite 
the ‘gradual improvement in the party’s electoral position’, Prime Minister Howard’s rating as 
preferred Prime Minister was consistently double that of the Opposition leader, Kim Beazley 
(Bennett and Barber 2008, p. 8). In the last half of 2006 speculation was rife about whether 
the Opposition Leader would be replaced. Doubts were fuelled about Mr Beazley’s health 
and capacity due to some errors and memory lapses which were quickly ‘employed to good 
use’ (Bennett and Barber 2008, p. 8). The Shadow Attorney General, Kevin Rudd, was seen 
to have ‘largely led the fight for the opposition in the fallout from the Cole Inquiry’ (Kerin and 
Crowe 2006). On 1 December 2006 Shadow Attorney General Rudd challenged the 
Opposition Leader for the leadership. The Opposition Leader announced a leadership ballot. 
Kevin Rudd and the Shadow Education Minister, Julia Gillard, challenged and won. They 
became Leader and Deputy Leader respectively. 
Despite concerns about this late change in Labor’s leadership, after eleven years of LNP 
coalition government, the Labor party convincingly won the 2007 election. The AWB scandal 
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was identified as part of ‘the baggage’ the government took in to the 2007 election.36 The 
AWB scandal and what Government knew or didn’t know  ‘played a part’ in the election 
defeat despite the fact that the Cole Inquiry ‘failed to deliver the smoking gun against the 
government that the opposition was praying for’ (Anderson, F 2006). 
In summary, given the perspectives and developments outlined above, from a citizen’s point 
of view, the Cole Inquiry cannot be assessed as successful in repairing the breach of the 
social contract represented by the AWB scandal. 
7.3.2 Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry 2013 
The analysis of the QCPCI demonstrates that the direct voices of those who are the clients 
of the child protection system are not prominent (Appendix 5). Workers and their unions, 
academics, government and non-government organisations, however, are well represented. 
The voices of vulnerable children, parents and families are relatively absent compared to the 
dominant voices of the organisations which are funded to represent their interests. 
Arguably, given that this case study is an example of a policy advisory Public Inquiry, it is 
critically important to ensure that there are effective mechanisms to guarantee that children 
and their families are encouraged and assisted to participate and that their voices are heard, 
however, there is limited evidence of this. Citizen perspectives, other than through service 
deliverers, organised peaks, faith based and advocacy organisations, are the least visible in 
this case study. Unlike the other case studies, there are few proxies, other than media 
coverage and academic commentary to draw upon. 
The absence of any feedback or measure of participation by clients of the child protection 
system means that an assessment of success by those most impacted is not available. A 
range of: 
complex and often chronic factors characterise many of the families coming into 
contact with the child protection system such as low income, unemployment, 
substance abuse, limited social supports, imprisonment, domestic violence and 
mental health issues. Many of these factors are interrelated’ (NSW SCI Report 2008, 
pp. i-ii).  
Further, child abuse and neglect are strongly correlated with other problems such as low 
birth weight, child behavioural disorders, low literacy, non-completion of school, juvenile drug 
use and teenage pregnancy (Scott 2006, p. 14). It is arguable, therefore, that it is for these 
                                                          
36 Along with other factors like the length of incumbency, the presence of Australian troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, David Hicks’ detention in Guantanamo bay, the military style intervention in the Northern 
Territory (Bennett and Barber 2008, p. 39). 
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very reasons that particular mechanisms should be in place to ensure participation, 
encourage voice, build capacity and receive feedback. 
Child protection is a recurring issue of concern to the community, whether because of gross 
systemic failings, horrific child deaths, underfunding, lack of appropriate services or 
coordination.  Child protection is not a marginal or peripheral issue affecting a small 
proportion of our community. In 2015/16, one in 33 children in Australia received child 
protection services.37 O’Donnell, Scott and Stanley (2008, pp. 325-326) characterise current 
Australian child protection systems as unsustainable and overloaded. In the face of rising 
notifications and investigations and an increase in the number of children entering out of 
home care, there is growing concern about the ability of child protection systems to cope 
with the increasing proportion of high risk and vulnerable families notified to the system.  
Child protection matters to the community. The fact that the QCPCI was established to fulfil 
an election commitment is testament to this (the Victorian Child Protection Inquiry included 
at Appendix 5 was also established to fulfil an election commitment). This commitment to 
address a matter of significant public concern has emerged as a potent election promise and 
as a way for a party in Opposition to differentiate itself from an incumbent government which 
has ‘failed’ to fix the child protection system and keep children safe from harm. 
Child protection is a complex area scattered with scandals and subsequent Public Inquiries 
(Tilbury and Mazerolle 2008, p. 283, p. 287). In child protection there are always ‘storms that 
swirl around for years’ (Daly 2014, p. 13); ‘[p]roblems with working practices in protecting 
children from harm are historic’ (Watkin, Lindqvist, Black and Watts 2009, p. 152). There are 
regular calls for Ministerial resignations, overhauls to the system and more funding for child 
protection workers  (Hyland And Holme 2009, p. 197). Testro and Peltola (2007, p. 24) argue 
that ‘it is unclear what gains have been made’ by multiple Inquiries.  
Some authors argue that Inquiries have become so prevalent that ‘nobody can any longer 
believe that they are a serious instrument of law reform’ (Sedley 1989, p. 469). The same 
sets of problems are identified over and over again and the same types of recommendations 
are made (Miskelly 2009). These typically include: better multidisciplinary work and 
information sharing; improving record keeping and data collection; enhanced supervision 
                                                          
37 Seventy-three percent of these children were repeat clients. 162,175 children had an investigation, 
care and protection order and/or were placed in out-of-home-care. The national recurrent expenditure 
on child protection and out of home care services was almost $4 billion in 2015/16, a real increase of 
$283.7 million (7.7%) from 2014-15, ‘Child Protection Australia 2015-16’, Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare. 
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and training; better management of caseloads and resources; improved assessment 
frameworks and practice; and legislative reform (Hill 1990, pp. 198-201, pp. 204-205; Tilbury 
and Mazerolle 2008, p. 285). Stated simply, there is not ‘much we do not already know 
(Miskelly 2009, p. 4). 
Given how ubiquitous they are it is arguable that multiple child protection Inquiries have 
been unsuccessful in meeting citizens’ expectations of their child protection systems. What 
is the purpose, then, of recurring Public Inquiries into child protection? Is it to allay the 
communities’ concerns, ‘allow an expression of grievances’ (Smith and Weller 1978, pp. 3-
5), or provide an opportunity for ‘communal catharsis’ (Warner 2006, p. 223, p. 226)? Is it 
just the very fact that an Inquiry ‘has sat, taken evidence and deliberated’ (Sedley 1989, p. 
473) that is important, not what the Inquiry has produced? Was the QCPCI any more 
successful than any of the other child protection Inquiries? There are no mechanisms to 
judge the validity of such assertions or answer such questions, so they remain in contention. 
7.3.3 The Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2012 
The QFCI and the subsequent Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) investigation 
failed to find anyone or anything responsible for the loss of life, severe flooding and damage 
to property. No Minister lost their job; no public servant was to blame. As described in the 
case study, these matters were reflected regularly in media commentary and in the 
organising around potential legal action, even while the Inquiry was underway. Trust in the 
Inquiry’s judgement and processes was also sorely tested when The Australian’s 
investigations sparked the additional hearings and the referral of the three engineers to the 
CMC. One of the Commissioners, Deputy Commissioner Cummins, publicly stated that he 
was very negative about the Inquiry and its processes (Solomons and Thompson 2013). 
Further, the Inquiry was conducted in a legalistic manner which many found inaccessible 
and daunting.  
Most importantly, however, for many citizens, the QFCI failed to alleviate Queenslanders 
general concerns about preparedness for flood disasters. For example, one of the matters of 
concern for the QFCI, the Lenthall Dam gates, was still being reported in the media in May 
2013 as ‘unresolved’ and that (Makim 2013): 
the safety concerns of the community had not been resolved despite the Queensland 
Floods Commission finalising a report on the issue in 2012…[which] ‘left the 
community feeling vulnerable and uneasy as to their safety…the community needs 
some certainty on this issue which has been going on for a long time. 
160 
 
In response to community pressure, in 2013 Premier Newman announced a new 
independent Advisory Council to ‘strengthen Queensland’s resilience’ (‘Newman government 
takes steps to strengthen Queensland’s flood resilience’ 2013).  
 7.3.3.1 The class action 
Another proxy, the current class action, provides important views of citizen perspectives of 
the QFCI. The lack of resolution, and dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the QFCI, remain 
live issues in Queensland. Those who were directly affected by the flooding did not wait for 
the outcomes of the QFCI before exploring legal avenues of redress. The possibility of a 
class action had been flagged early in the wake of the floods and by March 2012 more than 
1,000 people had already joined the class action (Banks 2012). 
 
By 2014 some media (Champion 2014) were reflecting on the ‘inadequate inquiries’ that had 
taken place and claimed that the QFCI: 
fudged some answers to the central questions about why this particular flood was out 
of the ordinary and resembled a tsunami rather than all the other floods which the 
locals experienced in recent decades. The commission held community meetings to 
find out what notions might be bouncing around in the locals’ heads, but took no 
evidence from them, relying instead on the experts. We already know, however, that 
the commission’s initial findings, bristling with supposed expertise, were deeply 
flawed.  
 
By 2014, Hall (2014) reported that more than 4,000 residents and businesses affected by the 
flood in Brisbane and Ipswich in January 2011 had launched legal proceedings, claiming 
engineers failed to operate the dams properly in the lead-up to, and during, the flood. 
The class action was filed in the NSW Supreme Court because there is no class action 
regime in Queensland. The claim is now being brought on behalf of around 7,000 flood 
victims (Moore 2017). The class action alleges that the negligent operation of the Wivenhoe 
and Somerset dams in the lead up to, and during, the 2011 flood significantly contributed to 
the extent and the level of flooding downstream of the dams and created a flood that was 
much worse than it would have been if the dams had been operated competently. The class 
action is being brought in negligence, against Seqwater, Sunwater and the State of 
Queensland as the operators of Wivenhoe and Somerset Dams (Queensland Floods Class 
Action, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers n.d.). 
No specific dollar amount is linked to the compensation claim, however some media report 
that estimates place it at about $1 billion, noting that ‘the exact figure will only be known if 
the class action lawyers can prove the operation of the dams created the flooding’ 
(‘Operators caused 2011 flood: victims claim’ 2014). The QFCI and the CMC had found no 
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evidence of collusion between the three engineers, however, the funder of the class action 
claimed that the firm's investigation was far broader than the CMC’s investigation ‘(Brisbane 
floods class action begins in NSW Supreme Court’ 2014). A flood action group was also 
established to provide information for the victims of the floods and those who have joined the 
class action. At the time of writing the matter is still underway in the NSW Supreme Court. 
For the 7000 people joined in the class action, the QFCI and the subsequent CMC 
investigation left many questions unanswered. For them, the QFCI did not restore the 
legitimacy of their government, their voices were not heard, and no policy change or 
improved outcome has adequately addressed their concerns or the losses they experienced. 
 
7.3.3.2 Postscript to the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2012 
‘They deserve and require further closure. .. 
They [still] want the truth to prevail’ (Palaszczuk 2015b, p. 279). 
 
On 5 May 2015 the new Labor Premier, Annastacia Palaszczuk, announced that the 
Queensland Government would hold a new Commission of Inquiry into the flooding of the 
Lockyer Creek between Helidon and Grantham which occurred in January 2011 (Palaszczuk 
2015a, 2015c). This would ‘allow independent modelling to take place’, making reference to 
‘a DHI consultant report published in The Australian newspaper [which had] suggested 
several inconsistencies’ (Thomas 2015b). Thomas (2015b) reported that: 
The new findings by DHI shed fresh light on the floods that hit Grantham on January 
10, 2011, causing the deaths of 12 people. The new report contradicts the findings of 
the $15 million royal commission-style floods inquiry, led by a Supreme Court judge, 
which stated conclusively in its final report in March 2012 that ‘none of the 
earthworks associated with the quarry caused or contributed to the flooding 
of Grantham on 10 January 2011’. The new findings say this conclusion from the 
floods inquiry is not supported by evidence reviewed by DHI. 
 
The Mayor and residents of Grantham had been calling for a new Inquiry. Premier 
Palaszczuk (2015a) stated that these people were: 
determined that the deaths of their friends and neighbours and family members on 
that day will not be in vain. The people of Grantham have suffered through an 
horrific, terrifying, fatal event. They deserve and require further closure. They want 
the truth to prevail.  
 
Mr Walter Sofronoff QC was appointed as Commissioner. The Grantham Floods 
Commission of Inquiry was set up specifically to investigate whether the particular way in 
which Grantham flooded on 10 January 2011 was a consequence of ‘any natural or man-
162 
 
made features of the landscape’.38 The central question for the 2015 Inquiry concerned 
whether, and the extent to which, a quarry owned by the prominent Wagner family, 
contributed to the flooding. Significantly, the terms of reference specifically state that the 
Inquiry is in to certain matters ‘but not so as to include a review or investigation of the way in 
which the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry was conducted’ (Grantham Flood 
Commission of Inquiry Terms of Reference 2015). 
 
Commissioner Sofronoff’s Report confirmed the findings of the QFCI (Sofronoff Report 2015, 
p. 88). According to Thomas (2015a) in The Australian, the Wagner family lawyers: 
are examining legal actions against Fairfax Radio and to rating 2GB broadcaster 
Alan Jones, who has alleged the family and successive Queensland premiers 
conspired in a criminal cover up over the quarry. Media reports that there will be 
‘disappointment’ at the findings because residents were planning ‘massive legal 
action’ against the Wagner family, many of whom felt ‘ignored, confused, or 
patronised’ by earlier inquiries.  
Noting that Commissioner Sofronoff's findings were virtually the same as those handed 
down by the QFCI, the State LNP member for Lockyer labelled the second inquiry as ‘a 
waste of taxpayers' money’ (Wilson 2015). 
7.4 Further questions arising from the case study analyses 
This section outlines a number of significant questions which have emerged from the case 
study analyses on which the literature provides limited guidance. These questions challenge 
and extend some of the propositions of success drawn from the examined literature. 
7.4.1 Public Inquiries as election commitments 
An election commitment establishes a promise with the electorate. The Government or 
Opposition promise to do, act, investigate, repair or fix something the community cares 
about, that is in the public interest. The promise of a Public Inquiry signals that the 
Government or Opposition will act on issues of concern to citizens by establishing a 
powerful, impartial, eminent Inquiry to investigate and recommend. The subject of the Public 
Inquiry is typically a matter where there has been a breach of public trust or expectations or 
where there is a perception that matters have not been satisfactorily resolved.  
                                                          
38 These referred to the presence of a quarry, the presence of an embankment around the quarry pit, 
or the breach of that embankment by flood waters, Grantham Flood Commission of Inquiry, Terms of 
Reference, viewed 23 August 2016, http://granthaminquiry.qld.gov.au/assets/counsel-assisting-view-
of-scope-tor.pdf 
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The pledge of a Public Inquiry as an election commitment is a promise to respond to a 
breach of societal expectations and to rebuild the social contract. This powerfully 
underscores the centrality of citizen perspectives in assessing the extent to which a Public 
Inquiry has been successful in fulfilling these expectations. This thesis refers to two Public 
Inquiries established to fulfil election commitments; the QCPCI and the Protecting Victoria’s 
Vulnerable Children Inquiry (Appendix 5).39 Both Oppositions at the time alleged ongoing 
inaction and incompetence by incumbent governments. The promise of a Public Inquiry was 
used as an effective election campaign strategy with both, then, Oppositions claiming that 
only they could bring about real and effective change (Lesman, Macreadie and Gardiner 
2011). Both Oppositions successfully claimed that the incumbent Governments had held 
previous Inquiries but had ignored them and had not acted on the recommendations.  
 
There are others examples. In the lead up to the 2013 Federal election Tony Abbott, as 
leader of the Opposition, promised to conduct a Royal Commission into the Labor 
Government’s Home Insulation Program (RMIT/ABC Fact Check 2016a). The Abbott LNP 
government won the election on 7 September 2013. The Royal Commission was established 
on 12 December 2013 and reported in August 2014 (Hangar 2014). As Opposition leader, 
Tony Abbott also made an election commitment to conduct a Royal Commission into Trade 
Union Corruption and Governance if elected (RMIT/ABC Fact Check 2016b; Australian 
Council of Trade Unions 2014). This Royal Commission was established on 13 March 2014 
and reported in December 2015 (Heydon 2015). At the time of writing, Labor’s platform in 
Opposition has been to establish a Royal Commission into the Banking and Financial 
Services Sector. This has now been superseded by the LNP’s Government’s announcement 
on 30 November 2017 of a Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry. This Royal Commission is currently 
underway (Turnbull 2017). 
The literature establishes that Public Inquiries are set up for a variety of purposes to 
investigate matters of public importance but is silent on the establishment of Inquiries 
specifically as election commitments. In the examples above, political parties used the 
promise of a Public Inquiry as a differentiator in the highly politicised context of an upcoming 
election. This is not something that emerged from the literature. Hence, there are no relevant 
propositions to draw on regarding how to assess the success of a Public Inquiry originating 
                                                          
39 The Victorian Inquiry was also established to fulfil an election commitment in the lead up to the 
2010 election. Both the 2012 Queensland election and the 2010 Victorian election toppled long 
standing incumbents. In Victoria, Labor had been in government for three consecutive terms. In 
Queensland, the ALP was attempting to win a ninth consecutive election victory. 
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in this context, and with this obvious political motivation. Perhaps it is as simple as whether 
the Party which proposed the Inquiry as an election commitment was elected. In a parallel 
context, it is also interesting to note that Truth Commission literature observes that such 
commissions are more likely to be established surrounding presidential elections (Brahm 
2009, p. 3).  
However, the critical point in the context of this thesis, is the fact that political parties use the 
promise of a Public Inquiry as an election commitment. This testifies to the significance of 
these powerful bodies for citizens. It also reinforces the imperative to incorporate citizen 
perspectives into the assessment of success. The promise of a Public Inquiry as an election 
commitment to address breaches or violations of expectations underscores the role of Public 
Inquiries in rebuilding the social contract. Citizen perspectives therefore matter to assessing 
how successfully they fulfil that role. 
7.4.2 Who’s voice? 
The literature review posits that Public Inquiries provide a powerful arena to give voice to 
those who may not otherwise have a chance to participate in policy making. As outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3, policy participants in a Public Inquiry generally include the ‘iron triangle’ of 
legislators, agency officials and interest group leaders but also researchers and media that 
specialise in that area (Heclo 2007; Kingdon 1995). To what extent have the examined 
Inquiries facilitated participation beyond these ‘usual suspects’? What mechanisms have 
been available for people to participate and how has the Public Inquiry tried to balance the 
views of experts, advocates and those with lived experience? 
As examples of policy advisory and hybrid Inquiries, analysis of submissions in the QFCI 
and the child protection Inquiries (Appendix 5; Table 10) confirms that it was indeed 
legislators, officials and interest groups that overwhelmingly formed the bulk of submissions. 
The Cole Inquiry, whilst calling many witnesses over many sitting days, was conducted as 
an investigatory Inquiry. Its public participation brief is therefore governed by legal and 
investigatory considerations rather than broad public participation. 
As discussed, children and families involved in the child protection system tended to be 
represented by non-government organisations and peak advocacy groups. Whilst particular 
individuals and families told their stories to the Inquiry their individual voices were 
overshadowed by the more coordinated and organised voices of non-government 
organisations and peak advocacy bodies. 
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It is also interesting to note that even though the QFCI went to great lengths to hear from 
individuals and communities affected by the floods, many were less than satisfied with the 
Inquiry’s processes and outcomes. Those affected by the floods were active participants in 
the Inquiry both through written submissions, and by providing testimony to the Inquiry. 
However, while they may have been given voice by the Inquiry there is some evidence that 
they may not have been heard. The class action in the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
provides some evidence of this.  
This phenomenon confirms Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2006) finding of ‘conditional credibility’, that 
is, people have trust in the Inquiry as long as it confirms their view of events.  This 
perception is, however, abandoned if an ‘overly’ positive report is delivered’ (Sulitzeanu-
Kenan 2006, p. 647). In the case of the QFCI legal action is being pursued, and, as 
described, various legal actions were commenced in the context of the Cole Inquiry. 
Through the QCPCI and the other two child protection Inquiries examined (Appendix 5) there 
is evidence of broad participatory processes including submissions, hearings and 
consultations. There is also evidence across all three child protection Inquiries that enduring 
mechanisms have been established which institutionalise the input of broader voices than 
just government agencies in the longer term. However, across all three child protection 
Public Inquiries there is also a great deal of evidence of overlap in participants, especially a 
recurring group of non-government agencies (NGOs) and particular academics. With regard 
to the NGOs, one of the recurring themes of all the three Inquiries was an expanded role for 
the non-government sector in child protection, particularly in the prevention and early 
intervention stages. None of the child protection Public Inquiries examined present any well 
rationalised, evidence-based argument as to why a greater role for the non-government 
sector will necessarily improve outcomes for families or children at risk, but this position is 
certainly consistent with the broader public management agenda of governments (Beyer 
2007; Lyons 2001; Verspaandonk 2001). It also reflects current government trends in the 
delivery of child protection across all States (Council of Australian Governments ‘National 
Framework for Protecting Australia’s Children 2009-2020’ Appendix A). 
A nascent proposition for success begins to emerge – that there may be a self-serving utility 
to be gained for external actors from their active participation in a Public Inquiry. In order to 
explore this idea, three of the main NGOs which contributed to all three child protection 
Inquiries (Bravehearts Inc, Life without Barriers and CREATE Foundation, Appendix 5) were 
selected for further examination. Examination of Annual Reports and financial statements 
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confirm that significant funds flowed from government to these three NGOs in the 
arrangements that were made post Inquiry.40 
This may provide another insight on success, drawn from the perspective of the advocacy, 
peak and service delivery agencies which participated in the QCPCI and other child 
protection Inquiries. The analysis demonstrates that such agencies have undergone 
significant growth as governments transfer funding and responsibility to the non-government 
sector. For these NGOs, their participation in the Inquiry may be considered to be a success. 
However, as the examined literature focuses on government, not citizens or its agencies, 
perspectives on this dimension are absent.  
It is also evident that there was a recurring group of academics whose ideas infused the 
recommendations of each of the child protection Inquiries. This has resulted in isomorphic 
pressures for child protection systems to become more consistent with each other. One of 
these academics, Professor Dorothy Scott, also became one of the Commissioners of a 
subsequent Inquiry, the Victorian Child Protection Inquiry 2012 (Appendix 5). 
It therefore emerges that a possible indicator of success may be the extent to which Public 
Inquiry outcomes support the broader agenda of government in relation to the provision of 
services, and that those who are invited in to be part of the broadened voice are those that 
support the public administration reform directions of government. 
7.4.3 An opportunity for policy change…but improved outcomes? 
As described in the literature, each Public Inquiry made a series of recommendations for 
change. In the main, the recommendations were accepted by Government. Each 
government response brought with it an allocation of significant funds dedicated to the 
implementation of agreed directions. 
Whilst, as established in Chapter 2, a Public Inquiry is not responsible for implementation, 
the assertion in the literature is that one of the elements of success for an Inquiry is that it 
provides an opportunity for improved services, policy, procedures outcomes. Banks (2014, p. 
117) suggests that ‘to be judged successful from a public interest perspective, an inquiry 
                                                          
40 CREATE Foundation government grants grew from $2.9m in 2011 to $3.4m in 2015 (CREATE 
Foundation Annual Review 2012, p. 48; 2015, p. 31). LWB government grants grew from $84m in 
2007 (LWB Annual Report 2007, p. 57) to $365.6m in 2015 (LWB Annual Report 2014-15, p. 94). 
Bravehearts government grants grew from $1.3m in 2013 to $1.9m in 2014. Bravehearts also 
received $2.9m in 2014 as part of an overall $5.1m grant over 3 years) to support the Royal 
Commission into Institutional Responses into Child Sexual Assault, ‘the single largest injection of 
funds to be received by Bravehearts since its inception’ (Bravehearts Annual Report 2013-14, p. 18). 
 
167 
 
needs to achieve more than having an impact on public policy; it needs to have an impact 
that is likely to lead to better outcomes’. Banks provides a nuanced approach by proposing 
two tests: whether there was policy change (the first test); and whether this led to improving 
outcomes in the public interest (the second test). Some Public Inquiries pass the first test, 
but fail the second; others may have contributed to the second but did not get past the first. 
What is the evidence from the three case studies? 
It is fair to say that, to date, there has not been a corruption scandal quite the scale of the 
AWB scandal. Policy changes have led to improved transparency and accountability 
(Appendix 4). These have no doubt improved Australia’s compliance with international 
obligations and clarified some legal questions regarding the conduct of Public Inquiries. 
However, the most significant policy change, the dissolution of the single wheat desk was 
not brought about by the Cole Inquiry. It was the scandal itself and the ensuing robust 
debates in the community and in Parliament that eventually led to the demise of the single 
wheat desk and an opening up of Australia’s wheat marketing arrangements (Appendix 3).  
In relation to child protection, the QCPCI Inquiry certainly prompted policy change – along 
the same lines as all the other child protection Inquiries held around that time (Appendix 5). 
These include changes in reporting thresholds, coordination across government agencies 
and a greater role for NGOs. However, given the strong isomorphic pressures at play in the 
child protection sector, would these policy changes have happened anyway even if there 
had been no Public Inquiry?  
Have these changes improved service delivery or led to better outcomes? The evidence 
suggests that this is not the case. The number of children in out of home care continues to 
grow, the proportion of Aboriginal children in out of home care continues to grow and risk of 
harm reports are on the increase (Appendix 6). There is scant evidence that the child 
protection Inquiries have led to improvements on the key indicators nominated by 
governments themselves as measures of success (Appendix 5).  
With regard to the QFCI, since 2011 there have continued to be natural disasters in 
Queensland. Doubtless the QFCI led to some policy and service improvements, better 
coordination between agencies and better outcomes. However, there are also to this day, 
many thousands of citizens for whom the QFCI failed to provide satisfactory outcomes. 
In summary each Public Inquiry has opened the window for policy change. Whether this has 
led to improving outcomes in the public interest is a more contested question. 
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7.4.4 Why have a Public Inquiry anyway? 
The Cole Inquiry raises interesting questions on the role of investigatory Public Inquiries 
more generally, and the extent to which they help or hinder subsequent legal and 
prosecutorial processes. As described in Chapter 4, the Prime Minister was compelled to 
respond to the findings of the Volcker Inquiry, but why by way of a Public Inquiry? John 
Agius (2008 p. 8). who had been the Senior Counsel on the Cole Inquiry, rebuked the Prime 
Minister’s decision to establish a Public Inquiry, arguing that while they are powerful 
instruments which can produce great benefit, ‘Public Inquiries such as the Oil for Food 
Inquiry cannot take the place of the administration of justice through the courts’. This point 
was also reinforced in media commentary. According to Sheridan (2006) the Prime 
Minister’s ‘one real mistake was setting up the Cole Inquiry’ in the first place. The Prime 
Minister should have referred the matter to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) to ‘see if any 
Australian laws were broken and left it at that’. The government should ‘not [have] let a 
confected policy scandal produce bad policy’ (Sheridan 2006). Davidson (2006) in The Age 
newspaper, also stated that if the terms of reference required Cole to look for breaches of 
the law, the matter should have gone to the AFP, Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) and the Director of Public Prosecutions rather that being a ‘political 
circus over 11 months costing $30 million’. Davidson (2006) went on to argue that ‘to be 
useful the Cole Inquiry should have looked at the governance processes to see how and 
why the AWB could get away with the rorting of oil-for-food process so easily and quickly 
without being uncovered by checks and balances in the DFAT, the responsible minister’s 
office and cabinet’. 
The AFP and ASIC faced immense difficulty in prosecuting individuals on any matters arising 
from the Inquiry. Arguably, the Inquiry also created significant delays in prosecuting 
individuals, in part because of the enormous task of having to re-gather evidence. In Making 
Inquiries, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) acknowledges this tension. It 
notes that Public Inquiries are executive inquiries and not judicial in nature. Principles such 
as due process are therefore less relevant. However, ‘this creates a problem when a royal 
commission recommends that judicial proceedings should be pursued, such as with the Cole 
inquiry’ (OFFTF Report 2015, pp. 50-51).  
Commissioner Cole himself quoted Justice Owen, who stated that 'a finding that the law has 
been breached is of no effect until it has been made by a court of competent jurisdiction' 
(Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, p. 159). The Chair of the OFFTF accepted that ‘the need to 
reconstruct evidence imposes a heavy burden on investigatory agencies and may even act 
to skew a subsequent investigation towards specific findings, closing down possibilities of 
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pursuing other avenues of investigation’ (OFFTF Report 2015, p. 51). The Chair also noted 
that ‘another problem with using a royal commission as an investigative body is that the 
scope of a royal commission's inquiry is limited to its terms of reference, as established by 
the executive of government’ (OFFTF Report 2015, p. 51). 
This thesis has established that the Government ‘dodged a bullet’ by establishing the Cole 
Inquiry. From the perspective of citizens, however, was an investigatory Inquiry the 
appropriate instrument to interrogate the AWB scandal? Like all Public Inquiries, the Cole 
Inquiry could investigate but could not prosecute. It could only recommend referral to the 
courts. However, this referral could only be done when evidence had been regathered in 
such a way as to make it permissible in a court of law. Further, as an investigatory Inquiry 
conducted in a highly legalistic manner, it was not a broad forum for public participation or 
for airing grievances. Nor did it address concerns about Ministerial accountability and public 
administration. Yet, and as acknowledged by Commissioner Cole, it was a matter about 
which citizens had a lot to say, and about which they were gravely concerned. From the 
perspective of citizens then this Inquiry, as constituted by Government, may not have been 
the appropriate instrument to successfully address the outrage at this breach of the social 
contract.  
7.4.5 ‘Success is not an all or nothing phenomenon’ (McConnell 2010, p. 55)  
Applying the propositions drawn from the literature about what a successful Public Inquiry 
looks like has fallen short of providing clear answers. It has also highlighted the lack of focus 
on citizens’ perspectives on success. The methodological decision to include different types 
of Public Inquiries as part of the research design to assess success under different 
circumstances has also proven to be of limited value because the analytical framework did 
not work sufficiently for any of the three different types of Public Inquiry.  
However, success is not all or nothing, and the analytical framework has achieved the 
central objective of assessing the success of Public Inquiries in Australia. The framework 
has proven useful in enabling a nuanced and multi-dimensional analysis. It has also 
provided a strong basis upon which to inductively frame further propositions and 
perspectives, namely those of citizens, which acknowledge the place of these powerful 
institutions for society, not just for government. 
Like Bovens, ‘t Hart and Peters’ (2001, p. 653) rich and complex comparative analysis of 
success and failure in governance, ‘[d]espite the somewhat indeterminate nature of these 
findings, we are not yet ready to say that this is a garbage can in which outcomes are purely 
situational and random. There are some regularity in these data’. It is in this spirit that this 
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thesis therefore draws out the implications of these findings for scholarship and moves to 
theory building. 
7. 5 Implications for scholarship 
7.5.1 Building theory - putting the ‘Public’ back into Inquiries 
The research question is: How can the success of Public Inquiries be assessed? There is 
value in addressing this question because of the serious matters Public Inquiries investigate, 
because they are a recurring feature of our systems of governance, because of the trust 
citizens invest in them and, of course, because of their significant cost. However, application 
of the analytical framework drawn from the literature which contemplates Public Inquiries has 
led to equivocal findings and more questions. The analyses have been of value in shedding 
light on various aspects of success, but they have been incomplete. Citizen perspectives are 
not prominent. This section revisits the significance of these powerful institutions and 
inductively builds theory about how to assess the success of Public Inquiries on the basis of 
the insights drawn from the case study analyses. It then explores other literatures which offer 
insights about how to assess success incorporating citizen perspectives.  
The primary focus of analysis in the public administration and political science literature is 
how Public Inquiries serve governments, not how they serve citizens. This thesis positions 
Public Inquiries as more than a tool of government. They are a tool of society and as such 
citizen perspectives are an integral part of any assessment of success. Such perspectives 
may be inferred from media commentary, parliamentary processes and so on, but there are 
also other proxies which are indicative of citizens’ views of success. These include 
subsequent Inquiries, changes of government and ongoing legal action. However, there are 
rarely, if ever, direct feedback mechanisms from those who have been impacted by the 
subject of the Public Inquiry, or from those who have participated in its processes. In the 
absence of these direct mechanisms the proxies outlined above are significant. 
This is not to suggest that all citizens are equally as interested or invested in every Public 
Inquiry that is established. Nor is it to assert that citizens are one homogenous group. As 
Benington (2009, p. 235) observes ‘the public sphere is heavily contested territory’. Weale 
(2013, p. 26) notes that ‘the fundamental conception of society that lies behind social 
contract theory…is one in which the members of society share certain common interests and 
equality of status, but in which they also have competing and sometimes incompatible 
interests’. Further, Weale (2013, p. 222) claims ‘nothing in this description [of the social 
contract] says that there will be political consensus’. However, it is precisely because of the 
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enduring nature of divisive issues and concerns in society that institutions such as Public 
Inquiries become an important public good.  Weale (2013, p. 223) argues that ‘because 
there will always be conflicting evidence and assumptions… it is in the collective interest’ for 
a body or process, [such as a Public Inquiry], to investigate and generate alternatives as a 
basis for decision making. 
It is, of course, true that some Public Inquiries are more relevant and important to some 
individuals, interest groups and sectors of the community than others. For instance, while 
there may be broad community outrage at child deaths and failed child protection systems, 
there may be a narrower community of interest in a Home Insulation Royal Commission 
(Hangar 2014). While there may be broad community concern about banking practices there 
may be narrower interest in a Public Inquiry into the costs and efficiency of grain storage 
(McColl 1988). However, every Public Inquiry will have a community of interest other than 
government. Within this community, people and organisations will have different interests. 
Their perspectives on success are relevant. 
7.5.1.1 The significance of Public Inquiries  
‘It really belongs to the nation’ (Gillard 2017). 
The literature establishes that Public Inquiries occupy a special and revered place in society. 
The uproar, the outrage, the public interest and the importance of the matters Public 
Inquiries are established to investigate are difficult to overstate. Even if some Inquiries may 
be characterised as ‘election stunts’ (Australian Council of Trade Unions, 2014), or as a 
‘witchhunt’ (Blackwell 2014) a Public Inquiry promises to discover truth, dispassionately 
investigate and get to the heart of a matter which has fundamentally violated the 
community’s expectations. It is for this reason that a Public Inquiry gains such political 
capital, for example, as demonstrated by using the promise of a Public Inquiry as an election 
commitment.  
 
There can be no more powerful example of just how important Public Inquiries can be than 
then Australian Prime Minister, Paul Keating’s famous ‘Redfern Speech’ on 10 December 
1992 (Keating, 1992). In arguably one of the most defining and significant speeches in 
Australian history Prime Minister Keating directly linked the acknowledgment of the wrongs 
done to Aboriginal people and the Royal Commission into Aboriginal deaths in custody. 
Prime Minister Keating said: 
We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life. We brought the 
diseases. The alcohol. We committed the murders. We took the children from their 
mothers. We practised discrimination and exclusion. It was our ignorance and our 
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prejudice. And our failure to imagine these things being done to us…As a 
consequence, we failed to see that what we were doing degraded all of us. 
 
If we needed a reminder of this, we received it this year. The Report of the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginals Deaths in Custody showed with devastating clarity that 
the past lives on in inequality, racism and injustice. In the prejudice and ignorance of 
non-Aboriginal Australians, and in the demoralisation and desperation, the fractured 
identity, of so many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. 
Keating’s Redfern Speech captures the essential point. Public Inquiries are an instrument of 
society, not just of government. They belong to us all. They are a revered part of the social 
contract, they provide a special place to right wrongs; ‘[t]hey will always be considered a vital 
instrument for discovering the truth, for good governance, for improving accountability’ (Kerr 
2014, p. 293). Along with other constitutional checks and balances, they ‘play an important 
and indispensable role in checking up on the leaders, in making them responsive to the 
longer term interests of a free society’ (Spann 1967, p. 10). According to Sheriff (1983, p. 
672), the contribution of Inquiries ‘to policy formulation is less important than is their 
contribution toward social harmony’. 
 
Writing in the context of the recent Royal Commission into the Protection and Detention of 
Children in the Northern Territory (November 2017), Deslandes (2016) reinforces this point: 
As public inquiries with far-reaching powers that report to the nation's highest 
authority, royal commissions do important moral work in Australia. They represent an 
attempt to reckon with systemic failures in leadership. As an exercise of moral 
authority they say something forceful about what is right…Indeed the term 
‘commission’ itself refers in some way to the delegation of trusted authority. 
 
Ahead of the release of the Report of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to 
Child Sexual Abuse on 15 December 2017, former Prime Minister Gillard (2017) stated; ‘[i]t 
really belongs to the nation this Royal Commission and so everything that it has found 
belongs to the nation, and has to be received by it’. 
 
Reflecting on the unethical practices uncovered by the Royal Commission into Misconduct in 
Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services, the chair of one of Australia’s major banks 
states, ‘It’s our job to rebuild public trust’ (Durie 2018). 
 
According to Kerr (2014, p. 284), Australians ‘understand that [a Royal Commission] is not 
just another inquiry. The term “royal” conjures up a certain degree of pomp…The word 
“royal” also imposes solemnity. And solemnity imposes importance and authority, the need 
for respect, a sense of occasion’. 
173 
 
Yet despite their significance, ubiquity, and cost to the public purse, scholars have not yet 
developed robust criteria to assess the success of Public Inquiries. An explanatory 
framework continues to remain elusive (Gilligan 2002, p. 289). The roles and functions of 
Public Inquiries have been comprehensively described within public administration and 
political science literature and theory. Properly these literatures go to questions of politics, 
public policy, administration and management. This research finds that this lens provides an 
important but incomplete perspective and fails to position Public Inquiries as a significant 
instrument of society, not just of government.  
The case study analyses suggest that criteria of a different order are required in order to 
assess success more holistically and to incorporate the perspectives of citizens. Other 
literatures and theories must be drawn upon in order to round out contemplation of how to 
assess the success of Public Inquiries.  
 
7.5.2 A revised analytical framework to assess the success of Public Inquiries 
Each Public Inquiry examined in this thesis is clearly different. Each was established for 
different reasons, to investigate matters of grave public importance in different ways. 
Fundamentally, however, they all have something in common. Drawing on the positioning of 
Public Inquiries as expressing a significant dimension of the social contract between 
government and citizens (Chapter 1), this thesis argues that the overarching, unifying 
purpose of Public Inquiries is to rebuild the social contract after breach.  
 
Within this purpose, three enduring functions of Public Inquiries are identified: to respond, to 
hear and to prevent. These functions hold across the variety of issues Public Inquiries 
interrogate, the conditions under which they are established and the various forms they take. 
These reframed functions bring the breach of societal expectations, restoring trust and the 
public good into the centre of the challenge of assessing the success of Public Inquiries. 
 
These three functions suggest a reframing of the propositions for success as outlined in 
Chapter 3, and provide the backbone for an overarching analytical framework against which 
success, or otherwise, may be assessed. This is outlined in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Revised analytical framework to assess the success of Public Inquiries 
Enduring functions of Public 
Inquiries 
Current propositions of 
success drawn from the 
examined literature 
Reframed propositions of 
success 
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To respond The ways in which the Public 
Inquiry responds to crisis and 
restored legitimacy. 
The ways in which the Public 
Inquiry is trusted to make sense 
of the events or the violation of 
the public’s expectations. 
To hear The ways in which the Public 
Inquiry gives voice. 
The ways in which people were 
heard. 
To prevent The ways in which the Public 
Inquiry provides the opportunity 
for policy change and improved 
outcomes. 
The ways in which the Public 
Inquiry rights wrongs and 
changes policies, processes or 
outcomes for the better. 
In the following sections suggestions are made about how the reframed propositions may be 
used to assess the success of Public Inquiries. The elements of success, indicators and 
measures are indicative only. Not all of them will be as relevant to different Inquiries 
established under different circumstances. However, they may provide a starting point upon 
which to shape relevant considerations to guide future assessments of success 
incorporating citizen perspectives. 
In this context, various literatures are examined which offer promising theoretical and 
empirical frameworks which may be applied to assess the ways in which a Public Inquiry has 
been successful in meeting these reframed propositions.  
Reframed Proposition 1 
To respond: An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in 
which the Public Inquiry is trusted to make sense of the events or the violation of the public’s 
expectations. 
 
Table 5. Revised analytical framework to assess the ways in which the Public Inquiry is trusted 
to make sense of the events or the violation of the public’s expectations. 
Possible elements of 
success 
Possible indicators Possible measures Possible sources of 
evidence 
Was the Inquiry 
trusted to openly and 
independently find out: 
what happened; what 
Extent to which the 
Public Inquiry 
produced a plausible, 
authoritative narrative 
Level of trust in 
Commissioner and 
his/her independence. 
Composition and 
processes of the 
Feedback from 
broader community 
and specific 
communities of 
interest. 
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went wrong; who is to 
blame? 
Did the Public Inquiry 
properly deal with 
whatever it was that 
led to its 
establishment? 
Was public trust 
restored? 
Was the Public Inquiry 
perceived to be 
authoritative and 
independent? 
Did it have accessible 
and inclusive 
processes 
(Fairclough1992). 
 
(Brown, Ainsworth and 
Grant 2012). 
Extent to which the 
Public Inquiry provides 
some meaning, some 
explanatory power to 
the events, why and 
how they happened 
(Boudes and LaRoche 
2009, Stapleton and 
Wilson 2017). 
Extent to which the 
Public Inquiry 
uncovered in a clear 
and compelling way 
the root causes of the 
events. 
Identification of who 
was responsible – 
individual and 
institutional 
accountability. 
 
Inquiry, levels of 
agreement with the 
scope and terms of 
reference. 
Scope and 
methodology of report 
Degree to which the 
subject matter is 
understood as a 
genuine matter of 
public importance, a 
‘witch-hunt’ or political 
posturing. 
Feedback from 
participants. 
Rigour and scope of 
recommendations. 
Acceptance of 
recommendations and 
openness in reporting 
implementation 
progress.  
Subsequent 
prosecutions, legal 
action or corrective 
actions. 
Media and academic 
commentary. 
Shifts in public 
discourse (Fairclough 
1992). 
Narrative templates 
(Stapleton and Wilson 
2017). 
Global and situational 
meaning-making (Park 
2010). 
 
7.5.3 Promising theoretical lenses – discourse theory, rhetorical perspectives, 
narrative and sensemaking theories 
This section explores various perspectives offered through discourse theories and analytical 
frameworks in order to assess the ways in which a Public Inquiry has been trusted to make 
sense of the events.  
Discourse theories are highly relevant because they concern the interplay between language 
and social processes, power and control (Jaworski and Coupland 2006). Discourse is not 
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just text, but the whole act of communication involving production and interpretation. 
Discourse analysis offers an examination of the way in which language and discourse are 
used to achieve social goals and the part this plays in social maintenance and change (Bloor 
and Bloor 2007). 
The origins of discursive change lie in the ‘problematisation’ of events. Events become 
problematised, which then become the focus for struggles at the institutional and societal 
level. These have the potential to cumulatively produce structural changes in discourse and 
shifts in power relations. In Edelman’s terms (1977, p. 3) it is ‘language that evokes most of 
the political “realities” people experience’. As referred to in the literature review (Chapter 2) 
there is a rich body of theory and empirical work on ‘framing contests’ and how some events 
come to be ‘crises’ (possibly triggering a Public Inquiry) while others do not (Boin, ‘t Hart and 
McConnell 2009). 
Discourse in social theory refers to different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and 
social practice. In social theory, discourses do not just represent or reflect social entities and 
relations, they ‘signify’ the world, construct or ‘constitute’ them and their meaning. Different 
discourses constitute key entities (for example, corruption, child abuse, natural disasters) 
and position people in different ways as social subjects (for example, child protection 
workers, victims, emergency workers). Shared meanings are ascribed to these entities. 
Fairclough’s (1992) analysis focuses on change and how different discourses combine under 
particular social conditions to produce a new complex discourse. Examples include shifts in 
narratives from ‘siloed government agencies’ to ‘joined up collaborative approaches’. In the 
context of this thesis, examples might include shifts in discourse: from the ‘rough and tumble 
world of international wheat trade’ to ethical, transparent international corporate conduct 
(Chapter 4); from child protection agency to shared responsibility for child wellbeing (Chapter 
5); and, from a focus on emergency responses to prevention and capacity building (Chapter 
6). 
Fairclough (1992, p. 64) provides a powerful, comprehensive method for investigating social 
change and details an approach to discourse analysis which investigates social and cultural 
change and the role of language in ‘the struggle and transformation in power relations’ 
(Fairclough 1992, p. 2). His analysis pays attention not only to text but also to the processes 
of text production and interpretation (Fairclough 1992, pp. 2-3). In the context of this thesis 
Fairclough’s (1992) social theory of discourse analysis may be applied to: 
 text - the reports and various communications of the Inquiry. This would include 
submissions, transcripts of hearings; 
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 discursive practice - the establishment, processes and outcomes of a Public Inquiry. 
This would include the extent to which Inquiry processes were inclusive and 
accessible; 
 social practice - an examination of whether existing ideologies and power relations 
are maintained and strengthened, or transformed.  This would include whether there 
were changes to policy inputs and networks. It would also examine whether the 
pervading narrative on the issue undergoes a shift, for instance, through media and 
public discourse. 
Such an analysis would provide significant evidence regarding the ways in which the Inquiry 
was trusted to make sense of the events. 
The theory of rhetorical institutionalism also offers insights on how to assess success on this 
reframed proposition. According to Berger and Luckman (1966 p. 82) ‘the edifice of 
legitimations is built upon language and uses language as its principle instrumentality’. There 
is an emerging field in organisation studies exploring rhetorical sources of legitimation. This 
literature argues that legitimacy is a social phenomenon and can be closely studied through 
analysis of language and discursive practices (Parks 2011, p. 51). In the context of a Public 
Inquiry, rhetorical perspectives and methodologies may be employed to assess the extent to 
which Public Inquiry texts have persuaded readers that they are truthful, plausible, 
authoritative and verisimilitudinous, that is, the extent to which they made sense of the 
events (Brown, Ainsworth and Grant 2012, p. 300). There is also a body of empirical work 
focussing on Inquiry reports as ‘active’ texts which ‘recognises the underlying agency of their 
authors’ (Herepath and Kitchener 2016, p. 1114), and as ‘artefacts of authoritative 
sensemaking (Boudes and LaRoche 2009; Brown 2004; Brown and Jones 2000). These 
studies provide directions and frameworks which may be applied to this task. There is also 
an emerging field of study in the use of rhetorical strategies to restore legitimacy post a 
Public Inquiry (Parks 2011; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). 
Narrative and sensemaking theories and literatures also provide promising insights into 
assessing shared understandings, and hence the possibility of factoring in citizen 
perspectives into an assessment of success. Narrative templates (Stapleton and Wilson 
2017) provide a way of interpreting the socio-political world. By drawing on these shared 
templates of events and actors, as well as by rearticulating existing sets of meanings and 
narratives, we make sense of, and position ourselves in the world.  
Stapleton and Wilson build on the idea of narrative templates which ‘underlie collective 
accounts [and] structure shared understandings and memories of events and outcomes’ 
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(Stapleton and Wilson 2017, p. 60). Inquiry Reports can play a powerful role in shaping 
these collective accounts and creating shared templates. To exemplify, the Report of the 
Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission describes itself as ‘an important part of securing the 
memory of the fires’ (2010, p. vii). 
Within narrative psychology narratives are a way of understanding cognition (Bruner 2004) 
where ‘the culturally available narrative form is seen as a type of deep-structure that 
underpins everyday thinking and expression (Stapleton and Wilson 2017, p. 60). Extending 
this beyond the individual, Wertsch (2002, pp. 30-66) empirically examines the process of 
collective remembering and interpretation, and narrative texts as cultural tools.41 These 
narrative texts, or templates, provide ‘accounts that are “usable”… for various political and 
cultural purposes’ (Wertsch 2002, p. 66). Stapleton and Wilson (2017) argue that a shared 
narrative template underlies the production of individual and group-based stories. In their 
study, they identify the narrative structure within which different actors, event sequences and 
causal relationships are articulated as a way of making sense of the community’s 
experiences and actions (Stapleton and Wilson 2017, p. 73). Their study ‘provides empirical 
insight into how narrative operates across different social actors to provide a shared 
meaning structure’ (Stapleton and Wilson 2017, p. 74). Such approaches offer powerful 
mechanisms which could be employed in an assessment of success regarding the ways in 
which citizens trusted that the Public Inquiry made sense of events. 
At the individual level, the meaning-making literature provides profound insights (Park 2010, 
2016). Park’s (2016) work on resilience after traumatic events like natural disasters, states 
that responses like uncertainty, distrust and anger are common where people perceive some 
elements of human responsibility (Norris, Friedman, Watson, Byrne, Diaz and Kaniasty, 
2002).42 Park (2010) applies a meaning-making model as a framework for conceptualising 
processes of coping and recovery after natural disaster events. The model comprises two 
levels of meaning:  
 global - people’s fundamental beliefs about themselves, their place, sense of 
meaning and purpose, goals and values; and  
                                                          
41 Wertsch (2002, p. 59) describes narratives as providing both a referential and dialogic function. The 
referential function concerns ‘the relationship between narratives and the settings, actors and events 
they depict’, whereas the dialogic function’ concerns the relationship between one narrative and 
another’. 
42 For instance, as is evidenced by the subsequent Sofronoff Inquiry (2015) post the QFCI (2012) to 
further investigate, inter alia, the extent to which the floods were caused or exacerbated by man-made 
structures. 
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 situational -  how global meaning and the context of a particular situation influences 
one’s interpretation and reactions to a situation, that is, the meaning assigned to 
these experiences. 
Traumatic events may shatter or violate global meanings. Meaning-making processes, like a 
Public Inquiry, play a critical role in recovery and post disaster resilience. There is potential 
in a research agenda which explores the relationship between broader social processes and 
meaning making; specifically, the extent to which a Public Inquiry, as a meaning-making 
process, assists or hinders recovery and reduces distress.  
These theoretical perspectives and empirical approaches offer promising ways to assess the 
ways in which a Public Inquiry was trusted to make sense of the events.  
 
Reframed Proposition 2  
 
To hear: An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in 
which people were heard. 
 
Table 6. Revised analytical framework to assess the ways in which the Public Inquiry is one in 
which people were heard. 
Possible elements of 
success 
Possible indicators Possible measures Possible sources of 
evidence 
Were the processes 
and structures of the 
Public Inquiry 
equitable, accessible 
and inclusive? 
What was the ‘level’ 
and ‘type’ of 
participation 
(Arnstein,1969) 
Was the Public Inquiry 
a moral actor? Did the 
Public Inquiry bring 
out the truth, did it 
‘Publicness’ of the 
Public Inquiry, that is, 
the institutional 
arrangements and 
mechanisms to 
facilitate equitable and 
inclusive participation 
(Renn, Webler and 
Wiedmann 1995). 
The extent of citizen’s 
power in influencing 
the outcome, as 
assessed by the ‘level’ 
and ‘type’ of 
Evidence of extent to 
which voices of 
participants integrated 
into record, report and 
recommendations. 
Availability, 
dissemination, 
accessibility and 
readability of Public 
Inquiry record and 
evidence.  
Extent to which 
recommendations 
Dissemination of 
participant’s stories, 
testimony, evidence, 
experience (Ainsworth 
and Hardy 2012). 
Breadth and range of 
participation and 
communication 
mechanisms. 
Inquiry record/Report 
and communications. 
Feedback from 
individuals, families 
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hear and record the 
truth? Did the Inquiry 
uncover different 
truths? (Stanley 2001) 
Did the Public Inquiry 
bear witness? Did it 
bridge the divide 
between the elite and 
private spheres and 
the public spheres? 
Did it link the ‘public 
sphere’ and the state/ 
the strong public 
sphere with the weak 
public sphere? 
(Kulynch 1997, pp. 
320-321) 
Did the Public Inquiry 
provide a platform and 
process for people to 
tell their stories and, if 
relevant, obtain some 
form of redress? 
Did the Public Inquiry 
help the healing of 
individuals, families 
and communities who 
have suffered loss, 
fear or deprivation? 
Did the Public Inquiry 
provide any form of 
capacity building to 
build ‘competent 
understandings’ and in 
order to support those 
who may otherwise 
not participate? 
participation (Arnstein, 
1969) 
Capacity building to 
ensure equitable and 
inclusive participation. 
Fairness and 
transparency of 
participation.  
Forms of participation, 
for example, was there 
the possibility of 
dialogue with the 
Inquiry, could people 
ask questions and 
receive answers? 
Timing of participation. 
At which points in the 
process could people 
participate, for 
example, in developing 
terms of reference, in 
gathering evidence, in 
monitoring and 
evaluation. 
Equity of access to 
participation, including 
assistance and 
support to participants 
to ensure participation 
is non-discriminatory. 
For example, particular 
measures for those 
with visual or hearing 
impairments, who 
travel long distances, 
have caring 
align with or depart 
from Government 
policy positions, 
citizen’s views, and 
why. 
Evidence of short, 
medium and long -
term efforts to provide 
support and help 
healing. 
Evidence of testimony 
and stories in 
recommendations. 
 
and communities who 
have been impacted, 
and other participants. 
Evidence of, and 
feedback about, 
support measures to 
ensure accessibility 
and inclusiveness, for 
example, information 
materials which 
includes meaning of 
all terms, definitions 
and concepts in 
accessible formats. 
Evidence of support, 
and feedback about, 
measures for 
debriefing/post 
participation support 
or counselling. 
Detail of who 
participated and on 
what basis, for 
example, whether they 
were invited, selected, 
self-nominated or 
representative. 
Evidence of how the 
Public Inquiry has 
balanced the views of 
experts, advocates 
and those with lived 
experience. 
Evidence of ongoing 
participation 
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(Renn, Webler and 
Wiedmann 1995) 
Did the Public Inquiry 
provide appropriate 
and accessible 
support to those who 
told their story to 
ensure no further 
damage was suffered 
from the process of 
telling? (Brahm 2007; 
Stauffer 2015) 
responsibilities, require 
financial assistance. 
Did it support the 
participants in the 
healing/debriefing? 
Extent to which 
people’s testimony and 
stories were recorded 
and included in the 
report verbatim 
(Ainsworth and Hardy 
2012). 
Extent to which 
people’s testimony and 
stories informed 
findings and 
recommendations. 
mechanisms post 
Inquiry. 
Community attitudes 
and behaviours over 
time with respect to 
the subject matter. 
Media and academic 
commentary. 
Changes in public 
discourse including 
social media 
(Habermas 1996). 
Quality of deliberation 
(Steenbergen, 
Bachtigerb, Spörndlib 
and Steinerab 2003). 
 
7.5.4 Promising theoretical lenses – participation perspectives and knowledge 
production 
Participation 
The literature establishes that public participation is a cornerstone of Public Inquiries 
(Chapter 2). As previously argued, however, ‘giving voice’ is not the same as ‘being heard’ 
(Ross 2003, p. 327). What does participation mean in the context of a Public Inquiry? A 
Public Inquiry can be a form of deliberation (Gutmann and Thompson 2004) but as a 
process governed by its terms of reference and typically legalistic norms and practices how 
applicable are notions of public participation and deliberative democracy?   
A Public Inquiry is not a forum for collective, consensual and non-hierarchical decision 
making. Whilst participation is a hallmark of descriptions of Public Inquiries, and an 
expectation of the societies in which they are conducted, what exactly is the purpose of 
public participation in a Public Inquiry? Is it to reveal ‘the collective conscience’, inform 
decision makers, or to acquire the public support necessary to implement change (Renn, 
Webler and Wiedemann 1995, pp. 5-6)? In their seminal, comparative work on citizen 
participation, Renn, Webler and Wiedemann (1995, p. 24) note that despite their ubiquitous 
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nature, public hearings and inquiries, are the ‘least studied form of participation’. In their 
extensive comparative analysis, they explicitly exclude ‘traditional methods such as public 
hearings or inquiries’ as they cannot be ‘seriously considered as candidates for ideal 
discourse’ (Renn, Webler and Wiedemann 1995, p. 10). 
It is pertinent to begin with the terms of reference for each Inquiry examined in this thesis. 
None of the terms of reference include an explicit requirement about how to conduct the 
Inquiry, nor is there any obligation to ensure public participation.43 This may be an 
‘expectation’, but the form and breadth of participation is typically a matter for the 
Commissioner to determine. Each Inquiry Report includes an outline of the approach it has 
taken to addressing its terms of reference and its processes of participation but this does not 
reference any pre-determined benchmark or required practice.  
Nor does participation necessarily mean that the ‘voice’ of individuals and groups will be 
heeded, integrated into recommendations, actions or text. However, giving voice is 
consistently espoused in the literature as an important feature of Public Inquiries (Chapter 
2). 
Arnstein’s ladder (1969) offers a heuristic which is based on the relative power of citizens 
and decision makers.  In Arnstein’s typology, each of the rungs of the ladder corresponds to 
‘citizens’ power in determining the plan and/or program’ (Arnstein 1969, p. 216) of 
participation. The eight rungs of the ladder range from ‘manipulation and therapy’ (which are 
forms of non-participation and are designed for powerholders to ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ 
participants); through to ‘partnership, delegated power and citizen control’ (representing 
increasing degrees of citizen power (Arnstein 1969, p. 216). The middle three rungs 
represent various degrees of tokenism (informing, consultation and placation). With regard to 
informing and consultation, ‘citizens may indeed hear and be heard. But under these 
conditions they lack the power to insure that their views will be heeded by the powerful’ 
(Arnstein 1969, p. 217, italics in original). Placation is ‘simply a higher level tokenism’ 
because while citizens may advise, the powerholders continue to have the right to decide. 
(Arnstein 1969, p. 217). 
 
                                                          
43 Section 7 of the QFCI Terms of Reference and Section 8 of the QCPI Terms of Reference state 
that the Commissioner ‘may hold public and private hearings in such manner and in such locations as 
may be necessary and convenient. The Cole Inquiry’s consolidated Letters Patent include no 
reference to public participation, only that the Inquiry be conducted ‘to the extent possible, so as to 
avoid public disclosure of commercially sensitive or confidential material’ (Cole Report 2006, 
Appendix 2, p. 15).  
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The analysis of the three case studies confirms that the forms of participation in the Public 
Inquiries have hovered around these three middle rungs. Arnstein’s heuristic provides a 
powerful model against which to assess levels of participation and whether citizen’s voices 
were heard. 
It is also argued that assessing the success of a Public Inquiry with regard to the ways in 
which it has ‘given voice’ reinforces the power, position and perspective of government. In 
the context of a Public Inquiry it is government that establishes the Inquiry and sets the 
agenda. This is enshrined in the terms of reference. Establishing the terms of reference is 
not typically done on the basis of consultation or participation. Further, it is the Public Inquiry 
itself which then sets the rules for engagement and deliberation. Inquiries usually resemble 
quasi-judicial venues and as such it is these norms, rules and procedures which usually 
govern engagement and participation. 
Renn, Webler and Wiedemann (1995, p. 24) note that ‘[t]o a citizen, the thought of attending 
a public hearing immediately conjures up negative images. Citizens often picture the public 
hearing process as disempowering…To regulatory officials, experts and project sponsors, 
the public hearing hall is a battle zone’. A number of studies indicate that hearings are overly 
technical (Checkoway 1981, p. 568); favour participants who are more educated, politically 
active and better informed than non-participating community members (Godschalk and 
Stiftle 1981) and are dominated by those with economic interests (Checkoway 1981, pp. 
568-569). Further, differential access to data and information means that experts are often 
more empowered than citizens (Hadden 1989). 
 
As such, participation processes may not always be equitable. Using Habermas’ theories of 
society and human action, Webler (1995) ‘operationalises’ Habermasian theory into practice 
and develops an evaluative model against which to assess a range of participation 
processes. Webler’s procedural normative model of public participation articulates the goals 
of fairness and competence, based on Habermasian notions of communicative competence 
and the ideal speech situation. Webler’s focus is on procedure, not outcomes. When 
participation is fair, everyone takes part on an equal footing. In the context of a Public Inquiry 
this would include technical experts, politicians, members of the public, affected individuals 
and academics. Webler argues that competence within a shared social construction (as 
distinct from Habermasian notions of individual competence) relates to competent 
understandings of terms, concepts, definitions and language, through established 
procedures and rules that coordinate interaction. In order to ensure equitable participation, 
this may require some capacity building, information and support for some participants. 
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Webler’s (1995) model establishes that the conditions for fairness are that anyone may 
participate (attend), initiate discourse (make speech acts), challenge and defend claims 
(discuss) and influence the final determinations (decide). These aspects are relevant to each 
of the levels of public participation: agenda setting and rule-making; moderation and rule 
enforcement; and discussion. The conditions for competence are minimal standards for 
cognitive and lingual competence, access to knowledge (information and interpretation), 
procedures for knowledge selection and use of the most reliable methodological techniques 
available. 
Webler (1995, pp. 78-86) provides a fulsome and detailed list of the discursive standard 
criteria which may be applied to assess the extent to which participation has been fair, 
equitable and inclusive according to the conditions described above. Different criteria attach 
to different forms of discourse. Webler acknowledges that there are applications where some 
criteria matter more than others and some where particular criteria may be inappropriate. For 
example, in the context of a Public Inquiry, criteria regarding agenda setting and process 
rules may not be relevant, but fairness considerations around who is invited or selected to 
attend, and how, may be highly relevant (for example: via selection; subpoena; random 
methods; calling for volunteers; or open forums). Competence criteria regarding: clarifying 
the purpose of participation; ensuring barriers to access are removed; ensuring equal access 
to information, terms, definitions and expert advice; enough time and supports to resolve 
comprehensibility problems; ensuring sufficient time to participate; promoting a variety of 
ways of gathering information (for example, stories as well as statistics); and seeking 
feedback are also highly relevant. 
Webler’s work draws from Habermasian notions of discursive participation. For Habermas, 
discursive participation is a very broad idea and the public sphere is an abstract concept. 
The public sphere is a ‘network for communicating information and points of view’ (Kulynych 
1997, p. 322). It is not defined by a physical presence, but rather by a ‘communicative 
structure’ (Kulynych 1997, p. 322). Habermas offers insights beyond his time which are of 
direct relevance in the current era of social media, blogs, on-line campaigning and advocacy. 
Habermas argues that ‘being present in a “central locale” is unnecessary for the public 
sphere’ and that ‘“simple and episodic encounters” in which actors “reciprocally attribute 
communicative freedom to each other, unfolds in a linguistically constituted public space”’ 
(Kulynych 1997, p. 322). These are the ‘faceless public spheres made possible by the new 
electronic technologies’ (Habermas 1996, p. 373). These types of communicative structures 
also make participation easier, are extremely inclusive and less resource intensive. 
Participatory mechanisms for Public Inquiries typically comprise hearings, being called as 
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witnesses and receiving submissions. Habermasian strategies for more inclusive, equitable 
participation could extend to blogs, social media, live streaming, chat rooms and simple 
email exchanges. 
Not everyone is equally capable of participating. Some people will require additional 
supports, information or considerations to ensure they have truly equitable access to 
participatory processes. Different Inquiries have addressed these particular issues in 
different ways, usually by travelling to rural and regional locations. However, in none of the 
case studies analysed has there been a consideration of capacity building to support the 
participation of those who may be vulnerable, or whose voices are less likely to be heard. In 
the instance of the QFCI information and counselling were provided if requested however, 
this is different to capacity building. Capacity building typically focuses on strengthening the 
skills, competencies and abilities of people to enable them to participate and engage in the 
Inquiry’s processes and deliberations fully and equally.  
There is potential to establish evaluative criteria relevant to each Public Inquiry around the 
dimensions of how fair and competent its processes have been, and the extent to which they 
‘bring relatively more communicative reasoning’ (Eriksen and Weigård 2003, p. 200, italics in 
original) into their deliberations. One example is Steenbergen, Bachtigerb, Spörndlib and 
Steinerab’s (2003) Quality Deliberation Index which offers a reliable instrument based on 
Habermas’ discourse ethics and empirically tests the quality of discourse in deliberation. 
Knowledge production 
How does a Public Inquiry come to know something? Building on previous work on 
knowledge production Ainsworth and Hardy (2012, p. 1709) argue that Inquiries may be 
considered as epistemic communities whose members are brought together to construct 
epistemic objects, that is, the ‘problem’ under examination. In the context of the three case 
studies analysed for this research the epistemic object may be constructed as ‘practices of 
the AWB Board and executive’, ‘children at risk of harm’, ‘loss of life and damage from 
flooding’. However, in each of the cases, the object is also an epistemic subject who appears 
before the Inquiry and is a member of the epistemic community: ‘If epistemic objects are that 
which come to be known, epistemic subjects are those who know. And like epistemic 
objects, epistemic subjects do not come to inquiries fully formed’ (Ainsworth and Hardy 
2012, p. 1709).  
How is knowledge formed through the process of participation? Ainsworth and Hardy 
empirically demonstrate that participation is not a neutral process and that discursive 
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conventions used by the Inquiry they studied cast the subject in particular ways, for example, 
as ‘helpless’, as an ‘expert’ or ‘lay witnesses’. This can result in positioning subjects in a 
particular light emphasising particular attributes of their evidence over others, for example, 
stories over statistics, or the original meaning and ownership of stories being lost in the 
process of transcription and recording (Ainsworth and Hardy 2012, p. 1709). Gabriel (2004, 
p. 182) emphasises ‘the importance of experts “honouring” story-tellers by respecting their 
narratives and giving up the presumption that they can understand them better than they 
understand themselves’. Ainsworth and Hardy argue, therefore, that Public Inquiries must 
record original meanings and ownership of stories, rather than re-tell or re-interpret them. 
The extent to which a Public Inquiry has done this could be an indicator of success. 
The circumstances under which witnesses appear before a Public Inquiry or give evidence 
can impact on an Inquiry’s capacity to ‘get to the truth’. However, truth is rarely, if ever ‘a 
single objective reality waiting to be discovered or found’ (Chapman and Ball, 2001, p. 3). 
Truth ‘turns out to be a surprisingly elusive goal’ (Tepperman 2002, p. 6). There are ‘social, 
technical and methodological constraints, as well as epistemological limitations of what can 
be known’ (Chapman and Ball 2011, p. 3).  
There are significant lessons which can be drawn from the Truth Commission literature on 
this question. For example, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final 
Report (Stanley 2001, p. 528; Chapman and Ball 2001, p. 10) details four overlapping 
notions of truth: 
 Factual or forensic truth - based on legal and scientific notions of presenting 
corroborating evidence obtained through impartial and objective procedures; 
 Personal or narrative truth - premised on a culmination of individuals’ subjective 
stories to provide a multi-layered set of experiences; 
 Social or dialogue truth - constructed through the debate and discussion of facts on a 
collective level; 
 Healing and restorative truth - truth that places given facts ‘in context’ in an attempt 
to acknowledge individual’s experiences. 
This heuristic provides a useful delineation of the various truths that co-exist and legitimises 
different forms and functions of truth. Importantly it can also drive the processes of gathering 
evidence and the extent to which the Public Inquiry’s efforts to ‘discover the truth’ were 
holistic or partial and hence assess the extent to which the Public Inquiry heard people’s 
truths. 
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This is particularly important as while Truth Commissions, like Public Inquiries, can be 
‘constructed and guided by elite political interests, infusing them with publicness has the 
potential to mitigate some of the pernicious effects that result… A public truth process, in 
other words, may help compensate for some of the dubious motivations that elites bring to 
the commission’s formation and work’ (Taylor and Dukalskis 2012, p. 682).  
The Truth Commission literature also confirms that participation is not neutral and that it is 
not necessarily the case that appearing before, or participating in such a process is healing, 
cathartic or even helpful (Byrne 2004; Brounéus 2008; Rose, Bisson, Churchill and Wesley 
2003). Truth can rekindle anger and trigger post-traumatic stress (Brahm 2007, p. 20).  In 
the context of Truth Commissions, Stauffer (2015, p. 55) states that ‘it is simply not safe to 
say that testifying before a court – local or international – or truth commission leads to 
healing or catharsis for victims’. The same may be said for appearing before a Public Inquiry. 
It becomes critical therefore to ensure that such considerations are integrated into the 
operation and deliberations of the Public Inquiry and that relevant supports are in place and 
readily accessible. This is an assessable element of success. 
 
Reframed Proposition 3  
 
To prevent: An assessment of the success of a Public Inquiry should examine the ways in 
which the Public Inquiry rights wrongs and changes policy, processes or outcomes for the 
better. 
 
Table 7. Revised analytical framework to assess the ways in which the Public Inquiry 
rights wrongs and changes policy, processes or outcomes for the better. 
Possible elements of 
success 
Possible indicators Possible measures Possible sources of 
evidence 
Did the Pubic Inquiry 
find out what exactly 
needs to change? Did 
the Public Inquiry get to 
the heart of the matter?  
Did the Public Inquiry 
speak truth to power? 
Did its analysis 
Identification and 
analysis of the root 
cause of the problem. 
Analysis which is 
descriptive (how the 
breach came about), 
retrospective 
(establishing a view of 
Regulatory, structural, 
cultural and normative 
changes. 
Perpetrators are 
identified and held to 
account. 
Report and its 
evidence base. 
Degree to which 
findings or conclusions 
are challenged or 
disputed. 
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‘connect knowledge 
with power’ (Wildavsky 
2004, p. 9) 
Do the Report and 
recommendations 
serve as a focal point 
for continued pressure 
for change and to hold 
government and elites 
to account? 
Did the Commission 
‘impart moral strength 
and urgency to 
recommendations to 
reform institutions’ or 
put in place 
mechanisms to prevent 
the recurrence of such 
events? (International 
Centre for Transitional 
Justice 2008). 
Did the Inquiry build 
advocacy for repair? 
(Herepath and 
Kitchener 2016, p. 
1135) 
Did the Inquiry outline 
the form repair must 
take? (Stauffer 2015) 
Will implementation of 
the recommendations 
make a difference, lead 
to better outcomes or 
reduce the chances of 
this happening again? 
the past and why 
things have to change), 
prescriptive (what 
should be done), 
selective (who should 
do what), objective (as 
it compares to other 
alternatives), 
argumentative (to 
justify and build 
support for its 
recommendations) 
(adapted from 
Wildavsky, 2004, p. 14) 
Was the Inquiry’s 
analysis based on 
accurate and 
appropriate data; was 
the evidence 
believable, from 
diverse sources and 
tested for credibility; 
are the arguments 
persuasive and 
balanced rather than 
one sided (Adapted 
from Wildavsky 2004, 
p. 401). 
Construction of 
alternatives and clear 
criteria and rationales 
for choosing its 
recommendations. 
Do recommendations 
for institutional reform 
cover regulatory, 
normative and cultural-
cognitive spheres? 
Accuracy of technical 
detail and analysis. 
Number of 
recommendations 
implemented and 
accessible progress, 
tracking and reporting 
of outcomes. 
 
 
Subsequent Inquiries, 
processes or legal 
action to investigate 
the same or similar 
matters. 
Recurrence of the 
same or similar events. 
Implementation of 
recommendations by 
agencies and 
associated monitoring 
and reporting on 
progress and 
outcomes. 
Prosecutions or 
processes to 
implement sanctions. 
Improved transparency 
and accountability 
mechanisms. 
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(Brown, Ainsworth and 
Grant 2012, Herepath 
and Kitchener 2016). 
Is legislative, structural 
or other change 
required to avoid 
repetition of events or 
abuses? 
Is there the political 
and administrative will 
to implement, be 
accountable, monitor 
and report? 
Extent to which there is 
a shift in public 
discourse, social norms 
and expectations. 
 
7.5.5 Promising theoretical lenses – building advocacy for repair  
 
As stated in Chapter 2, it is acknowledged that using the criterion of implementation of 
recommendations is an ‘unfair’ measure by which to assess the success of a Public Inquiry. 
A defining challenge of this thesis is how to assess the success of a Public Inquiry in full 
knowledge that it has no power of implementation. Reiterating Banks (2013), 
recommendations are presented to government on a ‘take it or leave it basis’. Governments 
will always have their own agendas and purposes for setting up a Public Inquiry. The 
literature is also bountiful on the forces that agencies will bring to bear to facilitate or resist 
implementation (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge 2007; Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004; 
Lindquist,and  Wanna 2011; Kingston and Caballero 2009; Hood 2002; Furusten 2013; 
deLeon and deLeon 2002; Matland 1995; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). However, 
Wildavsky (2004, p. 387) reminds us that the distinction between analysis and 
implementation should not be ‘an impassable line’. Policy analysis includes ‘thinking up 
ideas’ as well as ‘facilitating their application’ (2004, p. 10). 
However, from the point of view of citizens, implementation matters. Preventing recurrence 
matters. Better outcomes matter. Otherwise what purpose did the Public Inquiry serve? How 
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can a Public Inquiry be considered a success if nothing happens as a result, or if nothing 
improves? This may, of course, be exactly the outcome government seeks but it will never 
be the outcome sought by society when there has been a violation of norms or expectations, 
and a breach of public trust. It is therefore central to assessing success. The Public Inquiry is 
a powerful symbol of, and force for change. If things do not change for the better how is the 
expense, time or effort justified? This is a legitimate question.  
Turner (2017) encompasses this expectation when, on the release of the Report of the Royal 
Commission into the Protection and Detention of Children in the Northern Territory (White 
and Gooda 2017), she stated; ‘You don't set up a royal commission and then walk away 
from its recommendations’. 
 
Or, in another expression that powerfully expresses this expectation of the same Royal 
Commission (Anderson 2017): 
I would go so far as to say the very survival of Aboriginal people in the Northern 
Territory depends on this commission making a real impact here; that it not just be 
that we all feel good talking about it, and we go away feeling all warm and fuzzy, and 
it’s dropped in a filing cabinet somewhere... The pattern of having “a feel-good 
moment” from doing a report and then leaving it [has] to end. That cannot happen 
here today, [with] this report...Please, I beg you just do not drop it into the filing 
cabinet. You are morally bound to not just talk about it. 
When a Public Inquiry reports, the community’s expectations for change are high. While it 
may not be appropriate to assess how successful a Public Inquiry has been by way of the 
implementation of its recommendations, it is possible to assess the extent to which an 
Inquiry has ‘built advocacy for repair’ (Herepath and Kitchener 2016). As outlined in Chapter 
2, Inquiry reports are not neutral. Inquiry reports ‘build advocacy for repair’ (Herepath and 
Kitchener 2016, p. 1135; Stauffer 2015): they are political texts employing rhetorical 
strategies ‘that legitimize institutional logics leading to social and managerial policies’ 
(Brown, Ainsworth and Grant 2012, p. 298). They outline the form repair must take (Stauffer 
2015, p. 35). 
According to Brown, Ainsworth and Grant (2012, p. 313) ‘change in institutional practices is 
accomplished by rhetorical strategies’. In their examination of a Public Inquiry Brown, 
Ainsworth and Grant (2012) analyse how an Inquiry text makes a case for institutional 
change. Brown, Ainsworth and Grant (2012, p. 313) make a powerful case for the role and 
power of Inquiry texts to use ‘language to affirm one logic…, deligitimate and replace an 
existing logic…and marginalize other competing logics’ which ‘mostly required dominant 
actors to do things differently’. A ‘hegemonically successful report’ refers to the extent to 
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which a Public Inquiry’s Report has constructed an official narrative which ‘makes sense’, is 
plausible, fair, largely accepted, and authoritative (Brown 2004, Boudes and Laroche 2009). 
Herepath and Kitchener (2016) use Aristotle’s three classical rhetorical justifications in their 
comparative case study of six ‘iconic scandals’ in the United Kingdom’s National Health 
Service: 
 Logos - rational calculations conferring pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy; 
 Ethos - impacting on cultural norms or ethical sensibilities conferring moral 
legitimacy; and  
 Pathos - impacting on emotions constructing pragmatic legitimacy. 
Herepath and Kitchener (2016) examine forensic rhetoric, which focuses on the causes of 
the breach, and deliberative rhetoric, which is used to convey the recommendations to effect 
repair of the Inquiry reports. Their examination demonstrates how this ‘repair work’ is 
primarily directed at regulative and normative pillars of the breached institution, though their 
consequential effects also seek to realign the cultural-cognitive pillar’ (Herepath and 
Kitchener 2016, p. 1115). 
This analytical model provides a powerful template against which to examine the extent to 
which Inquiry reports have built advocacy for repair, or whether they are ‘small bandages’ on 
a ‘gaping wound’ (Herepath and Kitchener 2016, p. 1118). The foundational analytical 
questions are whether the Inquiry’s findings and recommendations focus sufficiently on the 
three pillars of institutions (Herepath and Kitchener 2016, p.1116, p. 1134; Brown, Ainsworth 
and Grant 2012; Brown 2004; Scott 2014): 
 institutional reform - regulation, rules and laws; 
 normative - values, norms and social expectations; and 
 cultural-cognitive - beliefs, scripts and symbolic systems which guide behaviour.  
Do the Inquiry texts link the cause of the crisis, or breach, to the recommendations for repair 
to mitigate future occurrences (Herepath and Kitchener 2016, p. 1115)? As discussed in 
Chapter 2, while implementation of recommendations may not be a ‘fair’ measure by which 
to assess success of a Public Inquiry, the ways in which the Public Inquiry has successfully 
built advocacy for repair is an entirely appropriate measure and can be empirically assessed 
using Herepath and Kitchener’s (2016) analytical construct. 
High quality analysis further builds advocacy for repair. The quality of analysis undertaken by 
a Public Inquiry can be assessed against of range of criteria (see in Table 7). For example, 
Wildavsky’s exposition of the art and craft of policy analysis (2004, p. 386) acknowledges 
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‘that problems are not so much solved as alleviated, superseded, transformed and otherwise 
dropped from view’. It is the art and craft of analysis that can and should be judged. In the 
context of Public Inquiries this refers to the way in which the Inquiry has practised the art of 
problem solving (discovering new ways to solve a problem) and the craft of justification 
(persuading others that recommendations and proposed alternatives are feasible and 
desirable), (Wildavsky 2004, p. 388-389). Solutions may be temporal and iterative, and 
‘truths’ can be eclipsed (Wildavsky 2004, p. 402), however, the quality and integrity of 
analysis remains an assessable element of success.  
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the findings of the case study analyses. The application of the 
analytical framework derived from the literature has yielded ambiguous results. It has also 
demonstrated that the propositions of success are weighted to the perspective of 
government, not citizens.  
The implications of these findings for scholarship and further research are articulated. The 
case study analyses have enabled the researcher to build theory inductively. For Public 
Inquiries positioned as an expression of a significant dimension of the social contract, the 
perspectives of citizens must be more effectively incorporated. An overarching, unifying 
purpose and three enduring functions of Public Inquiries are theorised which incorporate 
citizens’ perspectives and expectations. A nascent analytical framework is built around these 
reframed constructs and promising literatures which offer ways in which to assess success 
on these criteria are presented. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The central argument of the thesis is that Public Inquiries express a significant dimension of 
the social contract between state and citizens, the reciprocal acceptance of obligations, and 
that the overarching purpose of a Public Inquiry is to rebuild the social contract after it has 
been breached.  
 
This thesis acknowledges that social contract ‘is a strongly evocative phrase’ (Dobuzinskis 
2000, p. 688) and is highly contested. Yet ‘for more than two centuries, it has stood as a 
symbol of a political order founded on agreement among rational individuals who are equal 
participants in the political process’ (Dobuzinskis 2000, p. 688). 
 
Weale (2013, pp.22-23) argues that: 
Social contract is a representation of the implicit logic in the normative order of a 
society, [that is] that the political legitimacy that any social order requires has to be 
built upon substantial agreement about the social bases of authority… Individuals 
have to accept certain collective practices and norms if their individual interests are to be 
secured…In this sense the basic institutions of a society may be regarded as the product 
of a social contract…Pressure to renegotiate the social contract suggests that 
dominant institutions are not serving the general interest to a sufficient degree.  
 
Public Inquiries are established by governments when the social contract has been 
breached by way of a crisis, a scandal, problematic policy, or when inadequacies have been 
revealed and can no longer be tolerated. This thesis has asked how the success of Public 
Inquiries can be assessed.  
The thesis positions Public Inquiries as a tool of society, not just government. Given their 
significance to society, the importance of the matters they investigate, and their significant 
cost to the public purse, theoretically informed, evidence-based assessments of the success 
of Public Inquiries is a justifiable aspiration. Further, if as Prasser and Tracey (2014, p. 393) 
argue, Public Inquiries are to continue to be a powerful tool available to government, there is 
value in pursuing this question. 
Frameworks and mechanisms that go beyond the internal processes and workings of a 
Public Inquiry and have at their heart citizens’ perspectives and assessments of success are 
central to this task. Further, learnings from such assessments may serve to inform the future 
conduct of Public Inquiries to maximise the extent to which they do perform their important 
functions and repair the breach of the social contract. 
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The central objective of the thesis was to assess the success of Public Inquiries in Australia. 
The thesis has built an analytical framework to assess the success of Public Inquiries 
incorporating the perspectives of citizens. It began with the propositions for success drawn 
from public administration and political science literature which properly go to questions of 
politics, public administration and management.  
Each Public Inquiry examined represents a breach of the social contract, of our shared 
expectations and norms. The Cole Inquiry was triggered by the allegedly corrupt and 
unethical actions of AWB executives which could no longer be denied, and accusations that 
government and its agencies had turned a ‘blind eye’ to these practices. The QCPCI was a 
powerful acknowledgement that the child protection system was failing children and families. 
The QFCI was triggered by perceptions of an inadequate response to, and possible 
exacerbation of disastrous flooding. 
However, assessing success using the analytical framework drawn from the examined 
literature sheds limited light on the extent to which the Inquiries were able to repair these 
breaches, from the perspective of citizens. The propositions of how to assess the success of 
a Public Inquiry focus primarily on the perspective of government. That is, the ways in which 
the legitimacy of government was restored; the ways in which government (through the 
independent Inquiry) gave voice; the ways in which government policy, processes and 
outcomes were improved. 
Given the significance of these powerful bodies, this research, through the case study 
analyses, has concluded that these perspectives are necessary but insufficient in assessing 
success. An assessment of success must include the perspectives of citizens and address 
the extent to which the Public Inquiry rebuilds the social contract, repairs the breach of public 
trust and the violation of expectations. By extension, it therefore must include a 
consideration of the ways in which the Public Inquiry is trusted to make sense of the events, 
people are heard, wrongs are corrected, and policies, processes or outcomes will change for 
the better. If a Public Inquiry does not do these important things it has fallen short of 
success. 
It is entirely possible that assessments of success using this more holistic perspective will 
also yield equivocal results and reveal the ‘asymmetries’ identified by Bovens, ‘t Hart and 
Peters (2001). Success ‘is not all or nothing’ (McConnell 2010, p. 55), it is a judgement. 
However, to make this judgement, citizen perspectives are critical - and are currently 
missing. 
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Given the lack of evaluative efforts of Public Inquiries to date, the various theoretical and 
empirical approaches offered which may be utilised to begin to assess success may seem 
almost radical. Yet such evaluative efforts are expected, and indeed standard fare, in 
assessment of many government policies, programs and initiatives (for example see New 
South Wales Government Program Evaluation Guidelines 2016). Evaluations might typically 
include: consulting on terms of reference; seeking advice from experts in community 
engagement and participation methodologies; designing effective communication strategies 
and measuring impact and reach; developing and implementing monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms at commencement; establishing advisory structures or processes to test 
recommendations; and evaluating impact from the perspective of all stakeholders. These are 
considered good practice principles for evaluating any program of activity. It is 
acknowledged that there are fundamental differences between Public Inquiries and public 
administration and programs. However, why Public Inquiries have been quarantined from 
such ‘ordinary’ evaluative efforts is itself a fascinating question44. 
As detailed in Chapter 1, assessing the success and impact of Truth Commissions appears 
to be as elusive as that for Public Inquiries. However, unlike Public Inquiries, part of the 
reason for this is that they are relatively newly constructed institutions (Stauffer 2015, p. 59). 
Growing pressure to present evidence based assessments of the impacts and outcomes of 
Truth Commissions (Bell 2009, p. 11) has led to a proliferation of ‘wide ranging social 
science methods (including surveys, focus groups, interviews, oral histories, transcript 
analysis, community studies, institutional change and analysis, policy analysis, and 
quantitative analysis)’ (Ben-Josef Hirsch, MacKenzie and Sesay 2012, p. 391). There have 
also been ‘several critical and enduring weaknesses and challenges in these approaches’ 
(Ben-Josef Hirsch, MacKenzie and Sesay 2012, pp. 391-396) including assertions of 
professional, epistemological and methodological biases. Nevertheless, some promising 
principles are emerging which may have relevance to assessing the success of Public 
Inquiries.  
Ben-Josef Hirsch, MacKenzie and Sesay (2012) and Brahm (2007) offer insights which are 
pertinent to the task of this thesis. In summary, an integrative approach to assessing the 
success of a Public Inquiry would: 
 be part of the initial design and construction of the Public Inquiry; 
 not be conducted by anyone who is part of, or a participant in, the Public Inquiry; 
 include a multi-method approach to minimise biases; 
                                                          
44 Perhaps, it is as Wildavsky (2004, p. 6) posits, ‘[r]esistance to evaluation is part of self-protection’. 
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 be multi-layered assessing success for the individual, families, community, society 
and institutions; 
 occur over relevant time periods, that is, short, medium and long term; 
 include an analysis of the extent to which the outcomes could have been achieved in 
the absence of a Public Inquiry. 
 
In the context of this thesis, these principles are offered as a starting point to design ways in 
which to assess the success of Public Inquiries which incorporate citizen perspectives. 
Chapter 7 has also offered a range of promising literatures to assist in this task. 
Even if Public Inquiries are cast as ‘witch-hunts’, initiated for highly politicised reasons, or 
appear to be genuine attempts by government to investigate and resolve vexed public policy 
issues or events, Public Inquiries are serious, weighty instruments of society, not just 
government. This thesis recasts the wide variety of purposes, forms and types of Public 
Inquiries into one unifying purpose - to rebuild the social contract. The three essential 
functions are identified as: to respond; to hear; to prevent. This acknowledges the breach of 
the social contract and the expectation of repair and suggests ways in which we may assess 
success incorporating the view of citizens, not just government. 
Citizen perspectives provides a powerful means by which to assess the ways in which a 
Public Inquiry has been successful in repairing the breach of the social contract. This is an 
important task because, if for no other reason, then ‘when they succeed, they start to build a 
shared narrative that may make repair possible for those who most need it’ (Stauffer 2015, 
p. 49). 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Selection of Public Inquiries 
This appendix outlines the process and rationale for each case study selected for analysis in 
this research. 
Selection of Policy Advisory Inquiry - Child Protection Inquiries 
Chapter 3 outlines the rationale for focussing on one policy area. The policy area selected is 
child protection. In all Australian states there have been a series of Inquiries into child 
protection and/or investigations into particular cases of child abuse.45 At the time of case 
study selection, only the most recent Public Inquiries were subject to this selection process.  
 
The Public Inquiries reviewed for possible selection were: 
 Children in State Care Commission of Inquiry, South Australia 2008 
 ‘Growing Them Strong, Together’, Promoting the Safety and Wellbeing of the 
Northern Territory’s Children 2010 
 NSW Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection 2008 
 ‘Putting the Picture Together’, Inquiry into Response by Government Agencies to 
Complaints of Family Violence and Child Abuse in Aboriginal Communities, Western 
Australia 2002 
 Report of the Protecting Victoria’s Vulnerable Children Inquiry 2012 
 Select Committee on Child Protection, Parliament of Tasmania 201146 
 Taking Responsibility, A Road Map for Queensland Child Protection 2013 
                                                          
45 There have been no Commonwealth Inquiries into child protection as this is a matter of State 
jurisdiction. 
46 The Select Committee of the House of Assembly was established because of community concern 
arising from the former Commissioner for Children’s Inquiry into the circumstances of a 12-year-old 
child under the Guardianship of the Secretary, 2009. One of the terms of reference for the Select 
Committee (1e) was to assess ‘the appropriateness, and need for, any further inquiry including but not 
limited to a Commission of Inquiry as established under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1995’. The 
Select Committee recommended that ‘Given the large number of reports and recommendations over 
recent years, a further broad ranging inquiry into the Child Protection system is not warranted’ 
(Recommendation 172). The Tasmanian Government however, did respond to the Select 
Committee’s recommendations in 2011. For the purposes of this research the Commissioner for 
Children’s Inquiry into the circumstances of a 12-year-old child under the Guardianship of the 
Secretary, 2009 was also examined for suitability for inclusion. However, this report did not meet all 
the criteria for inclusion as it was undertaken by the Government’s Commissioner for Children, an 
ongoing independent statutory officer responsible to Parliament. 
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 ‘The Territory as Parent’, Review of the Safety of Children in Care in the ACT and of 
ACT Child Protection Management, 2004.47 
 
Using Prasser’s (2003, pp. 85-91, after Hallett 1982) classification system, the above are 
classified as Policy Advisory Inquiries, that is, they share the following features: 
 broad policy analysis and less prescriptive policy advice; 
 gain information by cooperative consultation and supplementary research; 
 rely on their status as executive appointed bodies to attract submissions and support, 
less reliant on use of coercive powers; 
 avoid excessively formal legalistic processes; 
 usually comprise more than one member. Members are drawn from a wide range of 
different professional groupings, interest groups or academic disciplines. This reflects 
the broad role of the Inquiry. 
 
Table 8.  Assessment of Child Protection Policy Advisory Inquiries by criteria for 
possible inclusion in research. 
Features NSW 
2008 
Vic 
2012 
Qld 
2013 
SA 
2008 
WA 
2002 
NT 
2010 
Tas 
2011 
ACT 
2004 
Ad hoc, temporary. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Appointed by 
executive 
government. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y 
Funded totally by 
government. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Discretion of 
executive 
government, not 
Parliament. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y 
Discrete 
organisational unit. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
                                                          
47 Conducted by the Commissioner for Public Administration as a management review under sections 
21 and 22 of the Public Sector Management Act 1994. 
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Members drawn 
from outside public 
service, 
government. Does 
not include 
Ministers or 
backbenchers. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
Promote to wider 
community. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Clear terms of 
reference, publicly 
stated. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Seek public 
participation. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Produce report. 
Report made public 
within reasonable 
time span. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Advisory powers 
only. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Possible to include 
in thesis? 
Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
 
Of the Public Inquiries eligible for possible inclusion in this research, the most recent has 
been included as the focus of a case study, that is, the Queensland Child Protection 
Commission of Inquiry, 2013. However, two other child protection inquiries, the NSW Special 
Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection 2008 and the Protecting Victoria’s Vulnerable 
Children Inquiry 2012, are also examined in Appendix 5 to provide a contextual analysis. 
Selection of Investigatory/Inquisitorial Inquiries 
Using Prasser’s (2003, pp. 85-91, after Hallett 1982) classification system, the following are 
classified as Investigatory/Inquisitorial Inquiries, that is, they share the following features: 
 Seek to ascertain/verify facts about an event, accident, disaster, or 
corruption/maladministration; 
 Reliant on witnesses through hearings/cross examinations;  
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 Use of coercive powers; 
 Usually single membership; and 
 Legal/judicial appointment. 
 
As Prasser’s (2003) research indicates these types of Public Inquiries are more likely to be 
Royal Commissions. Where there were a number of Public Inquiries in a jurisdiction which 
met the criteria, the most recent has been chosen. At the time of case study selection there 
were no Public Inquiries in the Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory (ACT) or 
Tasmania which met these criteria.  
 
The following were chosen for review: 
 Commonwealth - Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation to the UN Oil 
for Food Programme 2005-2006; 
 NSW Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service 1995-1997; 
 Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2012;48  
 Report of the Kapunda Road Royal Commission, South Australia 2005; 
 Royal Commission into whether there has been Corrupt or Criminal Conduct by any 
Western Australian Police Officer 2004; 
 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2009. 
 
Table 9. Assessment of Inquisitorial/Investigatory inquiries by criteria for possible 
inclusion/exclusion in research. 
 NSW 
1995-97 
Vic 
2009 
Qld 
2012 
SA 
2005 
WA 
2004 
Cwlth 
2005-06 
Ad hoc, temporary. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Appointed by executive 
government. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
                                                          
48 The Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry was initially not chosen for inclusion as ‘the 
Commission’s approach across the terms of reference has not been one of seeking to attribute blame; 
its brief was not to seek out wrong-doers but, as the Order in Council establishing it specifies, to make 
recommendations for the improvement of preparation and planning for future floods and emergency 
response in natural disasters, as well as for any legislative change needed’ (Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry, Final Report 2012, p. 30). However, as it had both investigatory and policy 
advisory elements it has been included as the most recent example of a Hybrid Public Inquiry. 
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Funded totally by 
government. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Discretion of executive 
government, not 
Parliament. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Discrete organisational 
unit. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Members drawn from 
outside public service, 
government and do not 
include Ministers nor 
backbenchers. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Promote to wider 
community. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Clear terms of 
reference, publicly 
stated. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Seek public 
participation. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Produce report. Report 
made public within 
reasonable time span. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Advisory powers only. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Possible to include in 
thesis? 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Using the schema above, all of the above case studies appear eligible for inclusion as a 
case study. However, on closer examination both the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 
2009 and the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry 2012 are examples of hybrid 
Inquiries, that is they have both investigatory and policy advisory functions. The most recent 
Investigatory Inquiry, the Commonwealth Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation 
to the UN Oil for Food Programme 2005-2006 is therefore included as the focus of this case 
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study. The most recent example of a hybrid Public Inquiry, the Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry 2012 is included as an example of a hybrid case study. 
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Appendix 2 
The Oil for Food Task Force and post-script to the Cole Inquiry 
The then Attorney-General, Philip Ruddock, announced the establishment of the Oil for Food 
Taskforce (OFFTF) on 20 December 2006. The task force was established as a direct 
outcome of Commissioner Cole’s finding that breaches of the law might have occurred and 
that these matters be referred to the appropriate authority for consideration whether 
proceedings should be commenced for breach of the law. Commissioner Cole 
recommended that a task force be established comprising the Australian Federal Police, 
Victoria Police and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission in consultation 
with the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and Victorian Director of Public 
Prosecutions. Responsibility for the conduct of the task force was to reside with the 
Commonwealth Attorney General (Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, pp. lxxxi-lxxxii). 
The terms of reference 
The terms of reference for the Oil for Food Task Force (Work undertaken by the Australian 
Federal Police’s Oil for Food Taskforce 2015, p.1, henceforth OFFTF Report 2015) were to: 
 consider the Commissioner’s findings in relation to possible breaches of the law in 
the context of the report and information obtained by the Cole Inquiry; 
 co-ordinate consultation between agencies and authorities with an interest in the 
findings; 
 undertake investigations into possible offences and other breaches of the law that 
are referred to in the findings of the Cole Inquiry report; 
 consult with prosecuting and other relevant authorities on the question of whether 
prosecutions, or other legal proceedings, should be instituted against any person in 
connection with the Commissioner’s findings; 
 refer briefs of evidence and other relevant material to prosecuting or other authorities 
to enable the appropriate authority to consider whether prosecutions or other 
proceedings should be commenced for breach of a law; and 
 investigate, or refer to appropriate authorities, matters relating to possible breaches 
of the law not referred to in Commissioner Cole’s findings that are discovered during 
the Task Force’s investigations. 
Process 
The OFFTF conducted wide ranging inquiries including interviewing a large number of 
witnesses and examining approximately 900,000 pages of documents submitted to the Cole 
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Inquiry together with documents obtained from the UN, shipping records, and banking 
records (OFFTF Report 2015, p. 2).  
However, the Victorian Police withdrew from joining the Task Force, stating that they ‘stood 
ready to help if required’ but had decided not to participate as ‘the matter should stay with 
the feds’ (Baker 2006). This prompted The Age to report on 9 December 2006, that the ‘Cole 
inquiry’s plan’ was now in ‘tatters’ (Baker 2006). 
In July 2007, ASIC determined it would pursue a separate investigation into whether 
offences had been committed contrary to the Corporations Act 2001 and, in August 2007, it 
also withdrew its members from the OFFTF. 
In July 2009, the then AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty engaged Peter Hastings QC to 
'undertake a review of the material gathered to date and to consider the likelihood, or 
otherwise, of a successful conclusion to the matter, including future avenues of enquiry and 
further evidence to be gathered'. Mr Hastings QC advised that the resources required to 
mount a prosecution would be disproportionate to the prospects of the criminal prosecution 
succeeding (OFFTF Report 2015, p. 3).  
 
Based on this advice, on 28 August 2009 the Australian Federal Police dropped its 
investigation (OFFTF Report 2015, p. 38). This decision meant that no former employee or 
director of AWB would face criminal charges. Some media reported that ‘[i]t has hardly been 
a secret that the AFP investigation was under-funded and under-resourced, and it received 
little co-operation from AWB, which sees itself as a new entity, with all staff associated with 
the corrupt dealings having left’ (Overington 2009). 
'Getting the bad guys can be futile’ (Hanrahan 2016) 
Civil convictions were recorded in two cases. Mr Lindberg (former Managing Director, AWB) 
admitted four contraventions of section 180 of the Corporations Act 2001 (C’wlth) and was 
ordered to pay an aggregate penalty of $100,000. Mr Ingleby (former Chief Financial Officer, 
AWB) admitted one contravention of section 180 and was ordered to pay a pecuniary 
penalty of $10,000 which was increased to $40,000 on appeal (Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission 2013). 
On 16 October 2014 ASIC told the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Reference 
Committee that ‘there are extant ASIC civil penalty proceedings against the former Chairman 
of AWM Limited, Trevor Flugge, and Peter Geary a former executive of AWB Limited. At a 
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directions hearing on 25 September 2014 the matters were listed for trial on 5 October 2015’ 
(OFFTF Report 2015 Appendix 3, p. 2).  
The Report of the OFFTF was tabled on 24 March 2015, nine years after the task force had 
been established. In its Final Report (2015, p. 4) the Task Force notes that:  
already the Food-for-Oil issue had been subjected the Cole Inquiry, a parliamentary 
inquiry which reported in June 2013 and made no recommendations about the work 
of the OFFTF, substantial investigations (with a budget of $26 million) by the AFP 
and ASIC; and the independent investigation by ASIC which has resulted in civil 
convictions and the imposition of substantial penalties. 
In its Report the OFFTF (2015, p.4) noted that it had faced ‘considerable challenges’ 
including: 
 Evidence obtained from Cole inquiry witnesses was not in an admissible form for use 
in criminal proceedings and had to be re-collected in an admissible form using 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cwlth) powers and in accordance with the requirements of the 
Evidence Act 1995 (Cwth). In addition, the AFP could not force witnesses to provide 
statements in relation to the matter; 
 Much of the material relevant to the investigation was held by international entities, 
which required time-consuming legal processes and the cooperation of overseas 
agencies; 
 When the AFP sought relevant material from ASIC, under section 127 of the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cwlth), the 
dissemination of this material was challenged through court action by AWB. 
The majority report made one recommendation; ‘that this matter should not further exercise 
the resources of the Federal Parliament’.49  
The problem with Royal Commissions 
Significantly, the OFFTF Report (2015) includes the Chair’s minority report, which presented 
the Senate with a contrary view.50 The minority report posed significant questions about ‘the 
value of using a royal commission such as the Cole inquiry as an investigatory body’ and 
concluded that ‘this inquiry has evinced serious limitations in the use of a royal commission 
to investigate potential criminal conduct if prosecutions are to proceed’ (OFFTF Report 2015, 
p. 50). The AFP noted that ‘one of the biggest challenges faced by the OFFTF was that the 
oral evidence gathered in the Cole Inquiry was not in a form that would have been 
                                                          
49 The majority report is signed by Senator the Hon Ian MacDonald, Deputy Chair, and Senator the 
Hon Joe Ludwig, Labor senator from Queensland. 
50 The minority report was signed by Senator Penny Wright, Chair, and Senator Christine Milne, 
Leader of the Australian Greens. 
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admissible in a court of law and therefore a great deal of time was spent trying to reconstruct 
this evidence’ (OFFTF Report 2015, p. 50). 
ASIC also submitted that ‘the findings of royal commissions are not always based on 
evidence that is admissible in court’ (OFFTF Report 2015, p. 50). Experienced investigators 
had also advised the OFFTF that there was a significant difference between evidence which 
was given to the Cole Inquiry, and evidence which they could use to support prosecutions. It 
was pointed out to the OFFTF that evidence given to the Inquiry was obtained by coercion 
and, therefore, was not available for use in criminal prosecutions (OFFTF Report 2015, p. 3). 
‘That’s how it ends, not with a bang, but a whimper’ (Overington 2016). 
On 15 December 2016 ASIC lost its long running case against Trevor Flugge, former AWB 
Chairman, and Peter Geary, former executive, on all but one of its allegations of breaches 
under the Corporations Act 2001 (C’wlth). Mr Flugge faced four breaches and Mr Geary 
faced 13 breaches. Justice Robson of the Victorian Supreme Court stated that ASIC had 
failed to establish that Mr Flugge or Mr Geary knew that AWB was making payments to Iraq, 
contrary to UN sanctions (Durkin 2016). ASIC appealed the verdict (‘ASIC appeals verdict 
AWB directors did not know about Iraqi bribes’, 2017) but lost. 
A further postscript was delivered on 12 April 2017 when Mr Flugge was fined $50,000 and 
banned from managing a company for five years for ‘failing to inquire about the company’s 
case payments to Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq’ (Lee 2017). Justice Robson confirmed 
that this was a breach of his duties ‘but not so egregious as to warrant the $200,000 penalty 
ASIC had sought’ (Lee 2017). Mr Flugge and other AWB executives have never faced 
criminal charges over the scandal. The AWB’s former CEO and managing director, Andrew 
Lindberg was previously fined $100,000 and disqualified from managing a corporation for 
two years and 35 days. Former Chief Financial Officer, Paul Ingelby was found to have 
breached the Corporations Act 2001 (C’wlth) and was fined $40,000 and disqualified for 15 
months. Other AWB executives have escaped any penalty. 
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Appendix 3 
Changes to Australia’s wheat marketing arrangements after the Cole Inquiry 
‘The gloves are off’ (Donald 2006). 
The Oil for Food scandal and Commissioner Cole’s recommendations highlighted deep and 
long-standing divisions within the Liberal and National Party coalition and prompted ‘open 
bickering’ (Donald 2006). After the Cole Inquiry delivered its findings media reported that 
(Donald 2006): 
[T]he gloves are off between the Liberals and the Nationals over what sort of system 
Australia should have for selling wheat overseas. A group of Liberals from Western 
Australia want AWB to lose its power to veto others from exporting the grain, while 
Nationals like Queensland's Senator Barnaby Joyce want the single desk 
arrangement to stay. 
The Labor Opposition exploited these divisions, for example, ‘[t]he National Party has let [the 
Liberal Party] down and the Liberal Party has no capacity to deal with its partners in this 
complicit fraud on the nation’ (Crean, Hansard, 29 November 2006, p. 145). The Opposition 
framed the scandal as being due to the ‘long-established cosy relationship between National 
Party ministers and the leadership of the wheat industry who have been protected ever since 
World War One’, and the single wheat desk as ‘a monopoly arrangement that like all other 
monopolies is a breeding ground for corruption’ (Danby, Hansard, 29 November 2006, p. 
179). 
For some in the Liberal Party, the AWB was ‘a great example of the problem of monopoly 
power’ (McArthur, Hansard, 28 November 2006, p. 178) noting that ‘any monopoly has 
serious risks because of the capacity to generate anti-competitive conduct and to distort 
proper market operations’ (McMullan, Hansard, 28 November 2006, p. 178). 
Shortly after the release of the Cole Inquiry Report, on 29 November 2006, the Australian 
Wheat Industry was listed as a matter of public importance in the House of Representatives. 
Tony Windsor, one of the few wheat growers in the parliament at that time, spoke at length 
of the need for reform, but not without thorough consultation with wheat growers themselves: 
‘the focus has to be on what the wheat farmers of this nation want, not on what the political 
operatives within this place think they can do in making life difficult for one another’ 
(Windsor, Hansard, 29 November 2006, p. 96). Windsor advocated that a number of options 
be put to a poll of registered wheat growers (Windsor, Hansard, 29 November 2006, p. 95, 7 
December 2006, pp. 148-149).  
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The government did not support this idea. On the last sitting day for 2006 the Prime Minister 
announced that there would be consultation but that ‘we are going to legislate… to transfer 
the veto, which is now held by AWB(I), for a period of six months to the minister’ (Howard, 
Hansard, 5 December 2006, p. 36).  
On 7 December 2006 the Wheat Marketing Amendment Bill 2006 was read a second time 
against ‘a degree of background, public discussion and debate that is somewhat unusual’ 
(McGauran, Hansard, 7 December 2006, p. 61). McGauran (a self-confessed ‘single desk 
purist’, Hansard, 7 December 2006, p. 48) stated that (Hansard, 7 December 2006, pp. 61-
62): 
the changes are not intended to pre-empt or pre-determine any long term policy 
considerations by the government, nor does the government intend to hold the veto 
in the long term...The movement of the veto does not represent a change to the 
Australian government’s single desk policy. 
The government acknowledged that ‘the single desk wasn’t to blame for the failures at AWB’ 
and great care must be taken not to inadvertently punish the innocent’ (Brindal 2006). The 
measures were described as temporary, to enable consultation.  
The Opposition called these measures a ‘stopgap…trotted out by a desperate government 
on the last day of parliament’ but claimed it had ‘no choice but to go along with this proposal 
in the interim’ (Crean, Hansard, 7 December 2006, p. 65). However, the Opposition 
proposed an amendment which would ‘set in place a rigorous process that would ensure that 
all aspects of export wheat marketing [were] subject to an independent inquiry’.  
Andren, an independent member, voiced the ‘suspicions’ of many growers who were 
concerned about the ‘catalyst the Cole inquiry had given for the breakup of the single desk’ 
(Andren, Hansard, 7 December 2006, p. 71) and urged the government not to ‘throw away 
our marketing advantage’ for what he described as a ‘free market issue for the government, 
not a fair market one’ (Andren, Hansard, 7 December 2006, pp. 70-71). Andren questioned 
how the government’s commitment to the single desk ‘fit in with the red hot free market 
interests of the Treasurer and Prime Minister and framed the wheat ‘scandal’ as an ‘irritation’ 
that ‘has allowed the government to get off the hook’ (Andren, Hansard, 7 December 2006, 
p. 71). He described the Cole Inquiry as simply, ‘a very timely funeral for the single desk’ 
(Andren, Hansard, 7 December 2006, p. 144). Many speakers asserted that most wheat 
growers wanted the single desk to remain51 and that to dismantle it would be playing in to 
the hands of Australia’s competitors who wanted to ‘continue their corruption of world 
markets’ with the ‘export subsidies that they pay’, who were ‘trying to steal our markets, 
                                                          
51 Moylan, p. 153; Forrest, p. 145; Scott, p. 155; Anderson, p. 157; Hansard, 7 December 2006. 
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including Iraq’, and that ‘honest wheat farmers…should not be the losers’ (‘Nationals back 
AWB retaining single desk monopoly’ 2006).  
Taking the opposing view, Mitchell (2006) reported in The Australian Financial Review 
newspaper that Howard ‘should bury the single desk for the sake of farmers and even the 
AWB’. Mitchell stated that economists suspected that ‘most of what AWB does could be 
done better if the wheat farmers were allowed more choice’ and ‘whether the costs of 
conferring an export monopoly are likely to outweigh the gains’. 
The Bill was passed through both Houses without the amendments put forward by the 
Opposition (Crean, Hansard, 7 December 2006, p. 162) or by Mr Windsor (Hansard, 7 
December 2006, p. 164). 
On the first occasion that the Minister exercised his veto announcing that two other grain 
groups would export Australian wheat his National Party colleagues framed it as ‘a disaster 
for farmers’ (Lewis 2006) which ‘could only be interpreted as a step towards undermining the 
ongoing viability of the wheat single desk export marketing system’ (Crawshaw, Brinsden 
and Mulvey 2006).  A member of the Minister’s own party described it as ‘the worst bit of 
government policy I’ve ever seen’ (Crawshaw and Austin 2006). Ahead of the Minister’s 
decision rallies were held all over the country to ‘save the single desk’ (Hopkins 2006; 
Veness 2006; ‘Farmers rally to back AWB’s monopoly’ 2006). According to the Deputy 
Nationals Leader, Warren Truss, there was still ‘overwhelming support among grain growers 
for the single desk and I think, if pressed, also a single desk operated by AWB’ (Sutherland 
and Lee 2006).  
On 12 January 2007, the Australian Government announced the appointment of a Wheat 
Export Marketing Consultation Committee to undertake extensive consultation with the 
Australian wheat industry, particularly growers, about their wheat export marketing needs. 
The Committee undertook 26 public meetings and received 1,200 written submissions 
(McGauran, Hansard, 14 June 2007, p. 1). According to Ralph, the Chair of the Committee, 
‘We're not required to recommend what should happen; it's simply to find out what growers 
think’ (Price 2007; Peake 2007). The Wheat Export Marketing Consultation Committee 
reported to Government on 29 March 2007. The Ralph Report has never been released. 
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Various action groups became active in pushing their positions to government.52 Notably, 
however, there was no unified voice among wheat growers. Surveys were done,53 rallies on 
the steps of Parliament House were well attended (‘Riverina farmers join wheat export rally’, 
2008) and The Land (2008) reported that the Wheat Growers Action Group had taken its 
fight for the single desk to the United Nations (‘Action group takes fight for single wheat desk 
to the UN’ 2008). 
On 14 June 2007 the Wheat Marketing Amendment Bill 2007 was read a second time which 
retained the single desk for wheat export but extended the Minister’s temporary veto power 
for another year (McGauran, 14 June 2007, Hansard, p. 1). Wheat growers were given until 
1 March 2008 to establish a new entity to manage the single desk – which could be anyone 
except AWB Ltd. A number of other changes were also made including strengthening the 
scope of the Wheat Export Authority and restructuring it as the Export Wheat Commission 
and deregulating wheat exported in bags and containers. The Opposition supported the Bill 
in principle but moved a number of amendments which would make explicit the 
government’s ‘role in the now infamous “Wheat for Weapons Scandal”’ (McClelland, 
Hansard, 19 June 2007, p. 89), note that the Government had ‘failed to act on at least 34 
substantial warnings about the role of the Australian Wheat Board in the scandal’ 
(McClelland, Hansard 19 June 2007, p. 89), and had ‘limited the terms of reference of the 
Cole Inquiry’ (McClelland, Hansard 19 June 2007, p. 92). The Opposition also proposed that 
the legislation be split to refer the details of the proposed marketing arrangements to the 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry for 
further inquiry and scrutiny (O’Connor, BPJ, Hansard, 19 June 2007, pp. 81-82). The 
Opposition’s amendments did not pass. 
In the Senate, Labor argued that the government was ‘ramming through’ the Bill without 
adequate consultation and had not yet responded to Commissioner Cole’s recommendation 
to review the powers, functions and responsibilities of Australia’s monopoly wheat exporter’ 
(O’Brien, Hansard, 21 June 2007, p. 34), and that the Bill be referred to the Rural and 
                                                          
52 The main protagonists for the single desk were: the AWB; The National Party; Wheat Growers 
Association; Grains Council of Australia; National Farmers Federation; and the Grain Growers 
Association. Those who opposed the single desk included: former state grain authorities which 
handled most domestic grain; large international trading houses which had domestic trading 
businesses in Australia but were keen to gain access to the export market; some ‘vocal liberals’ like 
Wilson Tuckey, MP; the Pastoralists and Graziers Association of Australia; and the Australian Grain 
Exporters Association, an advocacy group sponsored by international grain traders (Askew and Freed 
2006). 
53 For example, the Ralph Report in 2007 which was never released, a survey of 20,000 wheat 
growers conducted by Tony Windsor, MP, and a survey of growers in the electorate of Pearce 
conducted by Judi Moylan MP (Moylan 2008) 
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Regional Affairs and Transport Committee. This did not occur and the Bill received assent on 
28 June 2007. 
The model put forward was widely seen as a compromise which ‘soothed tensions between 
the Nationals and the Liberals’ (Hart 2006a); ‘The Government is now in a desperate search 
for a wheat marketing compromise that will see it through the election without a damaging 
brawl between hardline Nationals and deregulatory Liberals’ (Grattan 2007). However, the 
AWB continued to enjoy preferential treatment over competitors as it would not need to 
apply for bulk export permits. This was seen as ‘a victory for the Nationals, who now have 
more time to distance the single desk from the kickbacks scandal (Hart 2006a).  
The government changed as a result of the 2007 federal election. It was the new Labor 
government that tabled the Exposure drafts of the Wheat Export Marketing Bill 2008 and the 
Wheat Export Marketing (Repeal and Consequential Amendments) Bill 2008 in the Senate in 
March 2008. The Bills were referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and 
Regional Affairs and Transport for inquiry and report by 11 April 2008 (Report of the Senate 
Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 2008).54 The Committee 
received 48 submissions, held four public hearings and heard evidence from 87 witnesses 
who appeared in private capacity or as representatives of one of 29 different stakeholder 
groups (Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and 
Transport 2008, Appendix 2, pp. 77-80). The Senate Standing Committee concluded that 
‘consultation with the grower community is not without its challenges’ (Report of the Senate 
Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 2008, p. 16, p. 54). 
Despite the recurring concern that ‘government had not consulted directly with them in 
developing the proposed changes’ (Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and 
Regional Affairs and Transport 2008, p. 15) the Committee noted that ‘there does not appear 
to be a single grower organisation that could confidently claim to represent the grower 
community on a national basis’ (Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and 
Regional Affairs and Transport 2008, p. 17).  
The Senate Standing Committee made a series of recommendations to amend the Bill when 
it was introduced into Parliament to address the key issues raised55 and recommended that 
the Bill be introduced as soon as practicable.  
                                                          
54 The reporting date was subsequently extended to 24 April 2008 and then 30 April 2008, Report of 
the Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 2008, Exposure drafts of the 
Wheat Export Marketing Bill 2008 and the Wheat Export Marketing (Repeal and Consequential 
Amendments) Bill 2008, viewed 30 August 2016, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/wheat_2008/report/report.pdf 
55 For example, accreditation of exporters and access to bulk storage and handling infrastructure. 
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Additional comments were provided by Liberal Senators and a Dissenting Report was 
provided by the National Party Senators. National Party Senators wanted the draft Bill 
withdrawn and AWB International to retain the single desk, stating that (Report of the Senate 
Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 2008, p. 67): 
[T]he oil-for-food scandal has been used very successfully as a means of leverage to 
destroy one of Australia’s greatest wheat marketing advantages. The motivation for 
the contrived uproar was far from the protestation of an informed conscience but 
more of a financial opportunistic ploy for certain market players to set themselves up 
as regional monopolies with the windfall gain to those who had a financial interest in 
them. 
National Party Senators claimed it was a ‘travesty’ that wheat growers would lose the single 
desk, noting the refusal to table the Ralph report as ‘but one of many indications of this lack 
of transparency’ (Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 
and Transport 2008, p. 68), quoting Socrates that ‘no man qualifies as a statesman who is 
entirely ignorant on the problems of wheat’ (Report of the Senate Standing Committee on 
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 2008, p. 69).  
The Bill was passed and brought about the deregulation of the wheat industry. The Wheat 
Export Marketing (Repeal and Consequential Amendments) Act 2008 effectively abolished 
the single desk arrangements which had been operating in various forms since 1939 
(Pyburn 2012).  
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Appendix 4 
Implementation of Commissioner Cole’s recommendations by the Australian 
Government 56 
The Cole Inquiry Recommendations 
The first recommendation requires the certification of accuracy and completeness of 
contractual documents said to constitute agreement with a foreign entity (Cole Report 2006, 
p. lxxxiii).  
The second recommends an insertion to the Commonwealth Criminal Code offences for 
acting contrary to UN sanctions that Australia has agreed to uphold.  
The third recommends conferring an appropriate body with the power to obtain evidence and 
information of any suspected breaches or evasion of sanctions.  
The fourth recommends consideration be given to amending the Royal Commissions Act 
1902 (C’wlth) to permit the Governor General to determine that in relation to the whole or 
particular aspect of matters subject of the inquiry that legal professional privilege should not 
apply. This was to address circumstances where it is appropriate for the public interest in 
discovering the truth should prevail over the private interest in the maintenance of legal 
professional privilege (Cole Report 2006, p. lxxxv).  
Finally, and in recognition that the Wheat Export Authority failed in its duty to monitor the 
AWB’s performance, Commissioner Cole recommended that there be a review of the 
oversight bodies of any Australian monopoly wheat exporter because a ‘strong and vigorous 
monitor is required to ensure that proper standards of commercial conduct are adhered to” 
(Cole Report 2006, Vol. 1, plxxxv). 
The Australian Government response 
In response to Commissioner Cole’s recommendations regarding enforcing UN sanctions, 
the International Trade and Integrity Act 2007 was the Government’s attempt at addressing 
the paradox of natural or corporate citizens being required to uphold international sanctions 
                                                          
56 This section is drawn from Appendix 1 – Australian Government response to the Report of the 
Inquiry into Certain Australian Companies in relation to the UN Oil for Food Programme, International 
Trade Integrity Bill 2007 [Provisions], Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
1 August 2007, viewed 21 June 2015, 
https://www.aph.gov.au/sitecore/content/Home/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_a
nd_Constitutional_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/2004-07/international_trade/report/e01  
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(Botterill and McNaughton 2008). This Act details offences for contravening a UN sanction 
enforcement law and for giving information which is false or misleading in relation to a UN 
sanction enforcement law. The Act also considers bribery of foreign officials and amends the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 and the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997.  
The Government accepted Commissioner Cole's recommendation that Australian law should 
require complete and accurate information in support of any permission to export goods 
which are subject to UN sanctions and impose significant consequences for any breach of 
that obligation. The government committed to implementing this recommendation for other 
Australian UN sanction regimes as well. Amendments were made to the Customs 
(Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 and the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 
1956, Customs Act 1901, increased financial penalties and amended the Customs Act and 
the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 to introduce criminal offences for providing false 
or misleading information in connection with the administration of UN sanction regimes. 
The Government also accepted Commissioner Cole’s recommendation to ensure Australian 
law properly criminalises conduct which breaches UN sanction regimes. Government 
committed to inserting a new offence into the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 and 
imposed strict liability on corporations. Government also gave agencies responsible for 
granting permits in relation to UN sanctions appropriate powers to undertake due diligence 
before any permission is granted; monitor compliance with any conditions or requirements of 
the permission, and identify any possible breaches of the law for referral to relevant law 
enforcement agencies. 
Government also introduced penalties for failure to comply with providing required 
information or documents. Government also committed to addressing two issues that did not 
flow directly from Commissioner Cole’s recommendations, but on which Commissioner Cole 
commented in his Report. These issues were foreign bribery and tax deductions. 
Government amended the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 and Division 70 (Foreign 
Bribery) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 
 
Recommendation 4 related to the application of legal professional privilege in Royal 
Commission proceedings. On 30 November 2006 the Australian Government announced an 
inquiry by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) into legal professional privilege as 
it relates to the activities of Commonwealth investigatory agencies. The ALRC provided its 
report to Government Privilege in Perspective, a Review of Legal Professional Privilege and 
Federal Investigatory Bodies, in February 2008.  
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Recommendation 5 concerned Australia’s wheat export marketing arrangements. On 12 
January 2007, the Australian Government announced the appointment of a Wheat Export 
Marketing Consultation Committee to undertake extensive consultation with the Australian 
wheat industry, particularly growers, about their wheat export marketing needs. The 
Committee reported to the Government on 29 March 2007 (known as the Ralph Report), 
however the Report has never been made public (Appendix 3). 
 
Commissioner Cole also recommended a Task Force be established to consider possible 
prosecutions in consultation with the Commonwealth and Victorian Directors of Public 
Prosecutions. On 20 December 2006 the Australian Government announced the 
establishment of the Oil for Food Task Force (Appendix 2). 
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Appendix 5 
The Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry in context - a comparative 
analysis 
The Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry (QCPCI) was not unique. In fact, in 
most respects, it was typical of child protection Inquiries undertaken in other Australian 
jurisdictions around the same time, namely in New South Wales and Victoria. 
This appendix examines the QCPCI in the context of these other child protection Inquiries. It 
is instructive to look at this broader context as doing so reveals striking similarities between 
the Public Inquiries with respect to terms of reference, considerations, and 
recommendations, and in some cases, participants. This analysis reveals the considerable 
isomorphic pressures at play on child protection systems in order to restore legitimacy. It 
also highlights the similarity across mechanisms used by the Inquiries to give voice, as well 
as the considerable overlap in the voices attended to by the Inquiries. The comparative 
analysis also reveals the similarity in the directions of policy reform.  
This appendix compares: Public Inquiry inputs (participants, submissions) (Table 10); report 
structure and recommendations (Table 11); issues (Table 12); approach to reform (Table 
13); government response (Table 14); and measures of success (Table 15). 
The Public Inquiries 
Around the time of the QCPCI similar inquiries were also held in New South Wales and 
Victoria. These were the New South Wales Special Commission of Inquiry (NSW SCI) into 
Child Protection in 2008 and the Protecting Victoria’s Vulnerable Children Inquiry (VCPI) 
which reported in 2012. The NSW SCI was established in the wake of two horrific child 
deaths in late 2007 and extensive media criticism of the Department of Community 
Services.57 In Victoria, improving child protection services and responses was part of both 
the Labor and Liberal party’s election platform (Nader 2010).  
 
 
 
                                                          
57 The deaths of Shellay Ward and Dean Shillingsworth 2007, ‘DOCS “warned repeatedly” about 
starved girl’s family’, 9 November. 
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Isomorphic pressures to restore legitimacy 
Scope of the Inquiries 
In Queensland, as in New South Wales and Victoria, there had been previous child protection 
reviews and inquiries, however these had tended to be issue or case specific, or focussed on 
the particular child protection agency.58 Yet despite these reviews, increased investment and 
scrutiny there had not been ‘any marked change’ (VCPI Report, 2012, p. xxiii). 
None of the three Public Inquiries were established to investigate particular cases or matters 
of concern but were systemic, broad reaching attempts to look at child protection in the 
context of child rearing, community expectations and norms, and government responses. 
The three Inquiries were all tasked with reviewing the whole child protection system, that is, 
not only the relevant child protection agency but also other government agencies including 
Police, Health, Education, oversight agencies and non-government agencies like out of 
home care (OOHC) service providers. 
 
A central theme to the QCPCI was that ‘children will thrive only in a society where everyone 
concerned with child welfare takes responsibility for their own particular role’ (Carmody 
Report 2013, p. xiii); ‘No single service or agency is in a position to respond effectively to all 
the needs of vulnerable children and families all the time’ (QCPCI Discussion Paper 2013, p. 
53). 
This theme was also identified as the first principle of the NSW SCI (NSW SCI Report, 2008, 
p. v): 
Child protection is the collective responsibility of the whole of government and of the 
community. Primary responsibility for rearing and supporting children and young 
people should rest with families and communities, and with government providing 
support where it is needed, either directly or through the funded nongovernment 
sector. 
Victoria also took a holistic approach. The purpose of the Inquiry was ‘to meet the needs, 
improve the lives and secure the rights of Victoria’s vulnerable children and young people, 
now and in the future’ (VCPI Report 2012, p. xxiii). The Inquiry considered Victoria’s system 
for protecting its vulnerable children and young people as a whole and ‘aimed to produce a 
report that was forward-looking and solutions focused’ (VCPI Report 2012, p. xxiii).  
                                                          
58 In NSW, see, Volume 1, NSW Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection 2008, pp. 8-12. 
In Victoria, see Report of Protecting Victoria’s Vulnerable Children 2012, p. xxiii. 
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All three Public Inquiries also considered the public’s confidence in the system and 
specifically addressed the issue of oversight of the system (VCPI Report 2012, p. 21; 
QCPCI, p. 395; NSW SCI 2008, p. 900) 
Composition and processes 
Each Public Inquiry was established through Letters Patent received from the State’s 
Governor under their respective legislation. These Letters Patent included the terms of 
reference for the Inquiry and specified the reporting timeframe. In all instances the terms of 
reference were very broad requiring a systemic Inquiry rather than an Inquiry into particular 
incidents or events, or an Inquiry seeking to attribute blame for specific cases.  
In New South Wales and Queensland, a Commissioner was appointed to head the Inquiry. 
In Queensland it was The Honourable Justice Tim Carmody QC, a barrister, former 
Queensland Crime Commissioner and a judge of the Family Court of Australia. In NSW the 
Honourable Justice James Wood AO, QC was appointed. Justice Wood was a former 
Supreme Court judge who also served as the Commissioner of the Royal Commission into 
the New South Wales Police Service 1995.   
In Victoria a panel was established. The Honourable Phillip Cummins a former Victorian 
Supreme Court Judge, was appointed as the Chair. Other panel members were Emeritus 
Professor Dorothy Scott OAM and Mr Bill Scales AO. Professor Scott was an active 
participant in both the New South Wales and Queensland Inquiries and is a recognised 
expert academic in child protection. Mr Scales has a broad range of experience in 
government, and public policy as well as business. 
The QCPCI engaged a 12-member advisory group which included specialists in child 
protection and safety, which met twice during the course of the Inquiry. The Commissioner 
was also assisted by members of the Queensland bar at various stages. 
In New South Wales, Counsel Assisting was appointed to assist the Inquiry and specialists 
were engaged as required. A retired Family Court Judge was engaged as a consultant as 
were additional barristers from time to time. In Victoria, a Reference Group was established 
which met on three occasions to advise the Inquiry. 
The Inquiries were hosted by their respective State Departments of Premier and Cabinet. 
Each Inquiry received funding from state government and was supported by a number of 
staff who were seconded from various State agencies or appointed through temporary 
employment contracts. However, there was wide variation in the number of staff supporting 
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the Inquiries. The QCPCI Report lists 54 staff over the course of the Inquiry while the NSW 
SCI Report lists ten staff. The Victorian Report does not provide any detail of the number of 
staff working on the Inquiry. 
Each Inquiry placed advertisements in state and national media; established a website, 
which included terms of reference, how to make a submission, publishable submissions, 
schedules of visits, transcripts, and issues papers; wrote to key agencies requesting 
information; obtained some information under summons; invited submissions; conducted 
regional visits or hearings (open and closed); visited services and non-government 
organisations; held public forums and key stakeholder meetings. The New South Wales and 
Queensland Inquiries also undertook case file reviews and audits. The QCPCI also 
conducted focus groups and surveys. 
Participants 
The QCPCI received 443 submissions: 196 from non-government organisations; 235 
individual submissions, and 12 from government agencies. 
The NSW SCI NSW received 669 submissions: 423 public submissions; 118 from non-
government organisations; 284 from individuals, and 21 from government agencies. 
The Victorian Inquiry received 225 submissions: 120 from non-government organisations; 65 
from individuals, and 40 from government agencies.  
Submissions included personal stories and grievances, details of policy and operational 
failures and options for change. Table 10 reveals that each Inquiry received submissions 
from the same groups of organisations and in many instances from the same specific 
individuals and academics. For example, in terms of organisations, each Inquiry received 
submissions from church-based groups, particular non-government organisations, relevant 
professional associations, women’s services, unions, legal services, particular advocacy 
groups. Table 10 clearly demonstrates the significant overlap in the community of interest in 
child protection and the actors intending to influence the policy agenda. 
Report structure  
There is striking similarity between the structure and considerations of the three Inquiry 
Reports (Table 11). Each Report is highly detailed and comprehensive. Each Report 
variously describes the current situation, structure and the need for reform. There is a 
detailed description of: the legislative context and legal system; current statistics and 
performance of all parts of the child protection system; workforce capacity and constraints; 
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funding; regulation and oversight; research; relationships with other key providers, including 
interagency collaborations and the non-government system; and specific issues like 
domestic violence and the overrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
children.  
Table 12 details the key issues discussed by each Inquiry and demonstrates the complete 
overlap in the issues outlined in each Report as needing to be addressed. 
Recommendations 
In addressing the many aspects of the child protection system and in keeping with the 
foundation principle that child protection is a shared responsibility, each Inquiry makes a 
large number of recommendations.  The Reports all describe a way forward to address the 
raft of issues identified. While Governments and their agencies have a key role to play, child 
protection is a community wide responsibility. As such, recommendations address reform of 
the child protection system as a whole, as well as universal services.  
Each Report makes recommendations about the same areas including: restructure and 
reform of child protection services; additional resources; whole of government policy and 
practice; family support service; reporting and response; court processes and legislative 
amendments; out of home care; workforce training and development; collaboration; specific 
needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and children from culturally and 
linguistically diverse backgrounds; and regulation and oversight (Table 12).  
Table 12 highlights that the nature of recommendations across all three reports are 
conspicuously similar. These include: changes to mandatory reporting; better training and 
professional development of the workforce; better interagency collaboration; better family 
support services and more early intervention; better supported transition for young people 
moving out of home care; and better information management systems. Consistent across 
all Reports are recommendations for an increased focus on, and funding of, early 
intervention and support for vulnerable families, as well as an increased role for the non-
government sector. 
All three Inquiry Reports outline an approach to reform and acknowledge that reform takes 
time. Each Report claims that the Inquiry had been ‘responsible’ in mapping a way forward 
and has set realistic expectations (Table 13). 
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Government responses 
All of the Government responses accept the position that child protection is a shared 
responsibility. Each State Government response commits to system wide reform. 
The Queensland government response, Supporting Families Changing Futures reform 
program, commits to seven areas of reform: 
• Sharing responsibility for children's safety and wellbeing; 
• Supporting families earlier; 
• Working better with families in the child protection system; 
• Improving out-of-home care and post-care for children and young people; 
• Working better with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander families; 
• Delivering quality services through a capable, client-focused workforce; 
• Building a transparent and cost-effective system; 
• Services provided to vulnerable children and families will be high-quality and 
provided in an efficient, transparent and accountable manner. 
The Victorian government response, Victoria’s Vulnerable Children – Our Shared 
Responsibility, commits to five areas of reform: 
• Building effective and connected services; 
• Enhancing education and capacity building; 
• Making a child friendly legal system; 
• Providing safe, stable and supportive out-of-home care; 
• Introducing accountability and transparency. 
The New South Wales government response, Keep Them Safe commits to seven areas of 
reform: 
• Changes to mandatory reporting; 
• Establishment of Child Wellbeing Units in major Government Departments; 
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• Regional Intake and referral services; 
• A bigger role for the NGO sector; 
• Building the capacity of aboriginal organisations; 
• Prevention and early intervention; 
• Enhanced interagency cooperation. 
A summary of the Government responses is provided at Table 14. 
Giving voice 
Each Public Inquiry expanded the networks of those who have a voice in the system.59 
In Victoria, prior to the Inquiry, the Children’s Services Coordination Board (CSCB) had 
existed to bring together key decision makers across agencies and to ensure coordination of 
activities impacting on children. However, the Inquiry found ‘[n]o evidence that the Children’s 
Services Coordination Board is effective in its role of coordinating and driving government 
action to address the needs of vulnerable children (VCPI Report, p. 485). 
The Government agreed with Inquiry recommendations to: 
 Give the Children’s Services Coordination Board greater operational responsibility for 
coordinating policy, programs and services that affect children and young people 
(Recommendation 83); 
 Strengthen the role of the Victorian Children’s Council (VCC), a ministerial advisory 
body established to provide high-level policy advice to government. VCC members 
are recognised experts in a broad range of children’s policies and services 
(Recommendation 84); 
 Establish Area Reference Committees to oversee the monitoring, planning and 
coordination of services and management of operational issues within each 
catchment. The Committees are co-chaired by the Department of Human Services 
area manager and the chief executive officer or area manager of the lead community 
service organisation, and comprise a representative of each community service 
organisation in the local Alliance (Recommendation 16). 
 
                                                          
59 The QCPCI is examined in detail in Chapter 5 in the body of this thesis. 
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A key recommendation of the NSW SCI was the establishment of Regional Intake and 
Referral Services (NSW SCI Report 2008, p. vi). These services were to be located within a 
non-government organisation (NGO) and would determine the nature of the services 
required and refer the family to the appropriate NGO or other state or Commonwealth 
agency for services such as: case management; home visiting; intensive family support 
brokerage; quality child care; housing and/or parenting education. At least one Regional 
Intake and Referral Service was to be established in each Department of Community 
Services Region (NSW SCI Report 2008, p. viii). 
Further, a number of recommendations explicitly aimed to ensure the ongoing input of non-
government actors including: 
 Recommendation 24.2 - Each human services and justice agency CEO should have, 
as part of his or her performance agreement, a provision obliging performance in 
ensuring interagency collaboration in child protection matters and providing for 
measurement of that performance; 
 Recommendation 24.3 - The Director-General, each Deputy Director-General and 
each Regional Director of the Department of Community Services should have, as 
part of his or her performance agreement, a provision obliging performance in 
ensuring interagency collaboration in child protection matters and providing for 
measurement of that performance; 
 Recommendation 24.7 - An improved structure should be established for regular 
regional meetings between the key human services agencies and NGOs to facilitate 
collaborative cross agency work, and to be accountable to the Human Services and 
Justice Chief Executive Officers Cluster. 
There is also evidence that there is a great deal of overlap in the participants in each Inquiry, 
particularly in the non-government agencies and academics. As may be expected, there is 
less overlap in the individuals who participated, presumably as those affected by the policies 
and operation of the child protection system in their relevant jurisdiction took their issues 
forward to the particular relevant State-based Inquiry. 
However, as detailed in Chapter 5, a number of policy elites appear to have been very 
successful in their attempts to lobby and influence each Inquiry and its outcomes. A number 
of key agencies and academics feature as participants in all three Inquiries (Table 10).  
Three academics were discussed in Chapter 5: Professors Eileen Munro, Dorothy Scott and 
Judy Cashmore. Professor Munro’s key ideas are reflected in each Inquiry’s 
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recommendations about the professionalisation and training of the child protection workforce 
and decision-making tools and processes. For example: 
 QCPCI Recommendations 7.1 - practice framework/decision making, 10.1 and 10.2 
regarding the need for tertiary qualifications and professional development;  
 VCPI Recommendation 67 regarding professional development and training; and 
 NSW SCI Recommendations: 3.1 regarding qualifications; 9.1 and 10.2 regarding 
structured decision-making; and 9.5 regarding professional development. 
Professor Scott’s ideas are foundational to the integrated systems approach taken in all 
three Inquiry Reports as well as the introduction of ‘significant’ risk of harm as one means of 
reducing the burden on the system. For example: 
 QCPCI Recommendations 4.1 regarding risk of significant harm; 4.2 regarding a 
whole of government approach; 
 VCPI Recommendation 2 regarding a whole of government approach/policy 
framework; Recommendation 6 encouraging participation in universal services; and 
 NSW SCI Recommendations 6.1 and 6.2 regarding risk of significant harm and 
reporting. 
 
The NSW SCI, drawing directly from Professor Scott, states that a key area of reform is that 
(NSW SCI Report 2008, p. viii): 
Non-government organisations and state agencies should be funded to deliver 
services that should cover the continuum of universal, secondary and tertiary 
services and should target key developmental stages and transition points in 
the lives of children and young people. 
Professor Cashmore’s research is reflected in the recommendations and outcomes of each 
Inquiry’s consideration of the need for better transition arrangements and post out of home 
care placement support for young people. For example: 
 QCPCI Recommendations 9.1 to 9.3 regarding transition from care;  
 VCPI Recommendation 25 regarding a 5-year plan for out of home care; and 
Recommendation 28 regarding leaving out of home care; and 
 NSW SCI Recommendations 16.1 to 16.16 regarding out of home care, and 
Recommendations 20.1 to 20.3 regarding transitioning from care. 
As demonstrated above there is clear evidence that each Inquiry provided a forum to allow 
new ideas and knowledge to have an impact on the policy and operation of the child 
protection system. 
 
225 
 
Providing the opportunity for policy change and improved outcomes 
Each government response nominates its own measures of success (Table 15).60 However, 
across all three Inquiries there is evidence of policy change but no compelling evidence of 
better outcomes for children and families. A brief analysis is provided in Appendix 6.  
In terms of implementation of recommendations, as part of its considerations, the Royal 
Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (2017) commissioned the 
Parenting Research Centre ‘to evaluate the extent to which 288 recommendations from 67 
inquiries selected by the Royal Commission had been implemented, and the possible factors 
that determined, contributed to, or were barriers to successful implementation’ (Parenting 
Research Centre 2015, p xiii). The Queensland, NSW and Victorian child protection Inquiries 
examined in this Appendix are included. However, while no specific detail is available on the 
implementation of the specific recommendations of these three Inquiries, the evaluation 
does conclude that of all the recommendations it evaluated, ‘the majority of 
recommendations were rated as implemented either in full (48%) or partially (16%). Twenty-
one percent were rated as not implemented, and the implementation status of 14% could not 
be determined’ (Parenting Research Centre 2015, p. xiv).61   
Generally, the Parenting Research Centre (2015, p. 153) found that: recommendations 
relating to systems had the highest proportion of recommendations that had been 
implemented in full; recommendations regarding legislation had the highest proportion that 
were ‘not implemented’; and that policy oriented recommendations had the lowest proportion 
of ‘not implemented’. As stated however in Chapter 2 this is not necessarily an indicator of 
the failure of the Inquiry but possibly a failure of implementation. 
In New South Wales, the government’s response to the SCI was the Keep Them Safe (KTS) 
reform process and strategy. To date, of all the Government responses, KTS is the only one 
to have had a formal evaluation conducted by five years after its implementation by an 
independent agency (Social Policy Research Centre [SPRC] 2014). In summary, this 
evaluation reveals that whilst KTS has been a good start, progress has been slow or 
                                                          
60 Please note: some of these measures have shifted over time as new governments in both 
Queensland and Victoria have ‘repackaged’ their responses to the Queensland and Victorian Inquiries 
respectively. Current government responses can be found at, viewed 16 January 2018, 
https://www.communities.qld.gov.au/campaign/supporting-families/background, and, 
https://www.vic.gov.au/health-community/children/child-protection.html 
61 In NSW 59% of recommendations were rated as having been implemented in full, 63% in 
Queensland and 45% in Victoria. However, these ratings include recommendations beyond those 
made by the Inquiries which are the subject of this analysis, Parenting Research Centre 2015, p. xiv. 
 
226 
 
uneven. Given the consistency of recommendations across all three Inquiries, the SPRC 
report offers some insights which may be generalisable across jurisdictions (SPRC 2014, pp. 
82-85). In summary, the results are equivocal: 
 Evaluations of many of these interventions did not provide reliable enough findings to 
make a definitive statement in this respect; 
 In the child protection system, the gap between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
children does seem to be narrowing, especially for young children. However, 
Aboriginal children still tend to experience worse outcomes across a range of child 
protection indicators; 
 There is compelling evidence that KTS has led to substantial changes in the way 
agencies collaborate to prevent harm to children and to intervene early to divert them 
from being involved in the child protection system; 
 There are positive signs of improvements in outcomes for vulnerable children not at 
risk of serious harm and children who encounter the child protection system, but the 
evidence is mixed; 
 One of the paradoxical findings of this evaluation is that some of the basic 
assumptions behind KTS, and indeed all early intervention programs, have not, or 
not yet, been borne out; 
 Most of the funded components of KTS which were evaluated appear to have been 
effective, but the evidence from the project evaluations is generally not robust 
enough to draw definitive conclusions about their effectiveness in terms of improving 
outcomes for children and families.  
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Table 10. Comparison of inputs, submissions and participants to each of the three child 
protection Inquiries 
 Queensland Child 
Protection 
Commission of 
Inquiry 2013 
Protecting Victoria’s 
Vulnerable Children 
Inquiry in Victoria 
2012 
NSW Special 
Commission of 
Inquiry into Child 
Protection 2008 
Number of 
organisation/individual 
submissions 
196 non-government 
organisations 
235 individuals 
12 government 
agencies 
 
Total: 443 
submissions 
120 non-government 
organisations 
65 individuals  
40 government 
agencies 
 
Total: 225 
submissions 
118 non-government 
organisations 
284 individuals 
21 government 
agencies 
 
Total: 669 
submissions (423 
public) 
Church based groups 
and services 
Y Y Y 
The Royal Australian 
and New Zealand 
College of 
Psychiatrists – State 
branch 
Y Y Y 
Children’s 
Guardians/Child Safety 
Commissions 
Y Y Y 
Professional 
associations: 
Psychiatrists, 
Social workers 
 
 
Y 
Y 
 
 
Y 
Y 
 
 
Y 
Y 
Commonwealth and 
State Government 
disability services 
Y Y Y 
State Councils of Social 
Services 
Y Y Y 
State Law Societies Y Y Y 
Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander 
government and non-
government services 
Y Y Y 
Women’s services Y Y Y 
Teachers and principals Y Y Y 
Youth services Y Y Y 
Uniting Care Y Y Y 
Public Advocate Y Y  
Public Sector Unions Y Y Y 
State Legal Aids Y Y Y 
Academics Y Y Y 
Health and medical 
professionals 
Y Y Y 
Parents, carers, 
grandparents, kinship 
groups 
Y Y Y 
Youth advocates Y Y Y 
Culturally and 
linguistically diverse 
services 
Y  Y 
State and Federal MPs Y Y Y 
NGOs    
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Bravehearts Inc. Y Y Y 
Create Foundation Y Y Y 
Life without Barriers Y Y Y 
Academics    
Professor Eileen Munro, 
Professor of Social 
Policy, London School 
of Economics 
Y Y Y 
Associate Professor 
Judy Cashmore, 
University of Sydney 
Y Y Y 
Professor Cathy 
Humphreys, 
Department of Social 
Work, The University of 
Melbourne 
Y Y Y 
Professor Dorothy Scott Y Y – one of the three 
Commissioners 
Y 
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Table 11. Comparison of structure and content of the three child protection Inquiry Reports 
Carmody 2013, Report of the 
Queensland Child Protection 
Commission of Inquiry. 
Cummins, Scott and Scales 
2012, Report of the 
Protecting Victoria’s 
Vulnerable Children Inquiry, 
Victoria. 
Wood 2008, Report of the 
NSW Special Commission of 
Inquiry into Child Protection. 
Chapter 1 - The case for 
reform. 
Part 1 - The impact of abuse 
and neglect. 
Vol. 1 - Part 1 
Department of Community 
Services structure and 
workforce. 
Inquiry terms of reference, 
scope. 
Inquiry task and processes. Structure and reform. 
Workforce capacity. 
A system under stress, why 
child protection matters. 
Vulnerability and impact of 
abuse and neglect. 
Risk factors. 
Child protection reports. 
Impacts and costs of abuse 
and neglect. 
 
Chapter 2 - current system. Part 2 - current system and 
performance. 
Part 2 - early intervention and 
child protection. 
Child protection legislation. 
Responsibility. 
Statutory system. 
Intake and notification data and 
performance. 
Out of home care (OOHC). 
Oversight. 
Drivers of demand. 
Risk factors. 
History. 
Legislation. 
Child protection research. 
Child protection data. 
Risk of harm reports. 
Early intervention. 
Assessment and response. 
Way forward. 
Chapter 3 – Funding. Performance. 
Conceptual and data issues. 
Measures – statutory 
protection and OOHC. 
Child protection reports. 
OOHC placements. 
Comparisons with other 
states. 
Ombudsman reports and 
child death inquiries. 
Vol. 2 - Part 3 - Legal basis of 
child protection. 
Funding service delivery. 
Adequacy of current budget. 
Efficiency. 
Performance monitoring. 
Economic impacts of abuse and 
neglect. 
Whole of government approach. 
Future investment. 
Issues from submissions, 
sittings and consultations. 
Prevention and early 
intervention. 
Role of department. 
Multidisciplinary approaches. 
Out of home care and leaving 
care. 
Poor educational outcomes. 
ATSI programs. 
CALD issues. 
Child sexual abuse. 
Children’s court. 
Professional child protection 
workforce. 
Community sector’s role. 
Funding. 
Regulatory and governance 
issues. 
Statutory basis of child 
protection. 
Other models of decision-
making. 
Court processes. 
Interface with family law. 
Criminal justice system. 
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Service capacity and 
demand. 
Use of research. 
Regional and remote 
challenges. 
Chapter 4 - Diverting families 
from statutory system. 
Part 3 - Policy framework. Part 4 - Out of home care. 
Reduce demand. 
Other cases of rising demand. 
Reformed system. 
Oversight of reform process. 
Child focussed. 
Child needs. 
Role of family/parents/ 
government/ community. 
Systems approach. 
Public health approach. 
Data. 
Accreditation and monitoring. 
Casework. 
Carers. 
Health. 
Education. 
Adoption. 
Chapter 5 - Designing a new 
family support system. 
Part 4 - Protective elements. Part 5 - Specific issues. 
Stocktake of currently available 
services. 
Intensive services. 
Early intervention and family 
support. 
Universal services. 
New system. 
Prevention. 
Early intervention. 
Domestic violence. 
Overrepresentation of ATSI 
children. 
Case study. 
Chapter 6 - Child protection 
and non-government sector. 
Funding.  
Regulation. 
Services. 
Role. 
Impediments – relationship with 
government, regulatory and 
administrative demands, 
capacity. 
Statutory system. 
Legislative and service 
framework. 
Statistics. 
Performance. 
Volume 3. 
Young people leaving care and 
homelessness. 
People with disability. 
Disaster recovery. 
 
 
Chapter 7 - A new practice 
framework. 
Out of home care. Part 6 - Oversight and 
interagency cooperation. 
Ombudsman. 
Child deaths. 
Interagency cooperation. 
Department of Community 
Services funded non-
government agencies. 
Performance measurements. 
Decision-making. 
Casework and practice. 
Case planning. 
Family group meetings. 
Planning for stability. 
Planning for education and 
health needs of children in 
OOHC. 
Leaving care. Part 7 – Implementation. 
Chapter 8 - Options for kids 
in out of home care. 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander children. 
 
Assessment. 
Family based care. 
Residential care. 
Secure care. 
Alternative care. 
Children from culturally and 
linguistically diverse 
backgrounds. 
 
Chapter 9 - Transition from 
care. 
Part 5 - The law and courts.  
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Current practice. 
Nature and level of post care 
support. 
Age. 
Role of non-government 
agencies. 
Coordination. 
Strengthening the law. 
Crime. 
Reform. 
Mandatory reporting. 
Religious organisations. 
Interaction with 
Commonwealth laws. 
Sex offences. 
Homicide and filicide. 
Realigning court processes to 
meet needs of children. 
Access and sensitive 
information. 
Adversarial nature of legal 
system. 
Court culture. 
Structural and process 
reforms. 
 
Chapter 10 - Building 
capacity in the child 
protection workforce. 
Part 6 - System supporting 
capacities. 
 
Government workforce. 
Non-government workforce. 
Workforce planning and 
development. 
Workforce.  
Chapter 11 – Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander 
children. 
Community sector capacity.  
Reducing overrepresentation. 
Prevention and early 
intervention. 
Improving practice in statutory 
system. 
Strengthening ATSI agencies. 
Discrete communities – 
violence, alcohol. 
Court clinical services. 
Funding. 
 
Chapter 12 - Improving public 
confidence. 
Part 7 - System governance.  
Current oversight. 
Concerns. 
Reform. 
Government agencies.  
Chapter 13 - Legal system. Regulation and oversight.  
Case management. 
Specialisation. 
Legal representation. 
Part 8 - Implementation and 
conclusion. 
 
Chapter 14 - Legislative 
review. 
  
Policy and practice. 
Legislative amendments. 
  
Chapter 15 - Implementing 
the reform roadmap. 
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Table 12. Comparison of issues and reforms detailed in each child protection Inquiry Report 
Key Issues Carmody 2013, 
Report of the 
Queensland Child 
Protection 
Commission of 
Inquiry. 
Cummins, Scott and 
Scales 2012, Report 
of the Protecting 
Victoria’s Vulnerable 
Children Inquiry, 
Victoria. 
Wood 2008, Report 
of the NSW Special 
Commission of 
Inquiry into Child 
Protection. 
Increasing numbers of 
reports /need to divert 
from statutory child 
protection system. 
Y Y Y 
Overrepresentation of 
ATSI children. 
Y Y Y 
Need for increased 
investment in 
prevention and early 
intervention. 
Y Y Y 
Need for coordinated 
government action/case 
management. 
Y Y Y 
Need for an area 
focus/regional systems. 
Y Y Y 
Need to increase 
efficiency and 
effectiveness of 
statutory child 
protection services. 
Y Y Y 
Stability in out of home 
care and leaving care. 
Y Y Y 
Increase capacity of 
non-government 
organisations. 
Y Y Y 
Reforms of the 
Children’s Court and 
processes. 
Y Y Y 
Better oversight and 
transparency of the 
child protection system. 
Y Y Y 
Need for increased 
participation of young 
people in decisions. 
Y Y Y 
Reforms    
Holistic/integrated Child 
and Family Strategy 
comprising universal, 
secondary and tertiary 
services/government 
and non-government 
providers. 
Y Y Y 
Clearer departmental 
and agency 
accountability. 
Y Y Y 
Better /earlier decision 
making and 
assessment. 
Y Y Y 
Expanded Child and 
Family services 
Y Y Y 
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/networks/hubs at 
local/regional/ level. 
Specialist services 
including Drug and 
Alcohol, Domestic 
Violence. 
Y Y Y 
More early intervention 
services. 
Y Y Y 
Co-located services. Y Y Y 
Strengthening law and 
legal institutions – 
changes to relevant 
Acts, protocols between 
agencies, operation of 
Children’s Courts. 
Y Y Y 
Facilitate information 
exchange between 
agencies. 
Y N because this issues 
had been previously 
addressed in 2005. 
Y 
Increased out of home 
care funding and 
services aligned to 
child’s needs/ transition 
from care. 
Y Y Y 
Increased role and 
improved community 
sector capacity. 
Y Y Y 
Improving regulatory 
and oversight 
framework. 
Y Y Y 
Addressing needs of 
Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander 
children/maintaining 
cultural connection. 
Y Y Y 
Sector wide approach 
to professional 
education/workforce 
strategy. 
Y Y Y 
Better 
support/information 
/training for carers. 
Y Y Y 
Better information 
management. 
Y Y Y 
Change to child death 
review 
structure/process. 
Y Y Y 
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Table 13. Approach to reform in the child protection Inquiry Reports 
Carmody 2013, Report of the 
Queensland Child Protection 
Commission of Inquiry. 
Cummins, Scott and Scales 
2012, Report of the 
Protecting Victoria’s 
Vulnerable Children Inquiry, 
Victoria. 
Wood 2008, Report of the 
NSW Special Commission of 
Inquiry into Child Protection. 
‘We are not saying that the 
reforms have to be introduced 
and funded in toto within the 
next couple of years. In a 
climate of fiscal restraint, the 
government can only do what it 
can with what it has to meet 
rival priorities and demands. 
The systemic changes 
proposed in this report are 
designed, therefore, to be 
phased in over time as the 
State of Queensland is in a 
position to afford them. Some 
improvements can be made 
within the next 12 months; 
others will take a number of 
years to properly design, 
evaluate and pay for. From the 
Commission’s perspective, late 
is still better than never. After 
all, more than a dozen years 
have already been lost through 
gross public under-spending 
on early intervention and 
voluntary support services for 
families. We have charted a 
roadmap, not a fixed timetable 
or inflexible funding schedule. 
Nonetheless, sooner is 
generally better and cheaper in 
the long run. Childhood is short 
and every moment counts’ 
(Carmody Report 2013, pp. 
xiv-xv). 
‘The Inquiry recommends 
extensive and far-reaching 
changes to Victoria’s current 
system for protecting children. 
However, it has decided to be 
circumspect in the extent to 
which it recommends such a 
volume of reform that might of 
itself put the lives, safety or 
welfare of vulnerable children 
at risk, both now and in the 
future. Change and reforms 
take time, particularly within a 
system as complex and as 
fragile as Victoria’s system for 
protecting children. The Inquiry 
has been careful only to 
recommend changes that it 
believes are necessary, can be 
successfully implemented and 
within a reasonable period of 
time, and would not put the 
current system at unnecessary 
or unwarranted risk’ (VCPI 
Report, p. xlvii). 
 
‘This report is focused on the 
further changes to the child 
protection system in NSW that 
are needed to take account of 
the current and projected 
demands on that system, and 
the changed environment in 
which it is to operate, including 
the extended participation of 
other government agencies 
and the non-government sector 
in providing for the safety, 
welfare and well-being of 
children and young persons. 
For the purpose of 
implementation, the 
recommendations made in this 
report have been ranked in 
order of priority, that is: 
“immediate”, where the Inquiry 
considers that the necessary 
changes should be 
substantially commenced 
within six months; “short term” 
where implementation should 
be substantially commenced 
within 12 to 18 months; and 
“long term”, where it is 
anticipated that such work 
should be substantially 
commenced within two to three 
years’ (NSW SCI Report 2008, 
p. 1034). 
 
‘The recommendations of the 
Inquiry’s report are far reaching 
and will involve significant 
change. The successful 
implementation of change 
requires committed leadership 
from the Directors-General of 
the key agencies and 
executives, clear and 
consistent communication 
about the imperatives for 
change and what is required of 
each agency, as well as 
attention to transparency and 
accountability. Much will be 
required of staff to bring about 
the changes required. There 
are already significant 
pressures on staff, some of 
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whom have experienced 
‘change’ or ‘reform’ fatigue 
since commencement of the 
2002 reform process and 
timing of changes will need to 
be carefully managed’ (NSW 
SCI Report 2008, p. 1036). 
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The Queensland, New South Wales and Victorian government responses to their respective 
child protection Inquiries have been examined and are compared in the table below. 
Excerpts are taken from each government response and are grouped thematically. 
Table 14. Comparison of Government Responses to three child protection Inquiries 
 
Theme Taking Responsibility: A 
Roadmap for Queensland 
Child Protection, 
Queensland Government 
response to the 
Queensland Child 
Protection Commission of 
Inquiry 2013. 
Victoria’s Vulnerable  
Children – Our Shared 
Responsibility – Directions 
Paper, 
Initial Government 
response to the Protecting 
Victoria’s Vulnerable 
Children Inquiry 2012. 
Keep them Safe, New 
South Wales Government 
response to the NSW 
Special Commission of 
Inquiry into Child 
Protection, 2009-2014. 
 
Shared 
responsibility 
Caring for children and 
keeping them safe is a 
shared responsibility. 
 
Our shared responsibility for 
protecting children…We all 
have a responsibility for 
protecting children from 
abuse and neglect. 
 
A shared approach to child 
wellbeing.   
Safe, 
supported  
children 
Raise children who are safe, 
well, healthy and supported. 
Vulnerable children are kept 
safe from harm. Vulnerable 
children have every 
opportunity to succeed in 
life. 
 
All children in NSW are 
healthy, happy and safe, and 
grow up belonging in 
families and communities 
where they have 
opportunities to reach their 
full potential. 
Systemic 
reform 
The government is 
determined 
to deliver a reformed child 
protection system in 
Queensland that better 
provides for the 
safety, wellbeing and best 
interests of our most at-risk 
children when they cannot 
be properly 
cared for at home. 
 
 
The Victorian Government is 
committed to system-wide 
reform and improvements 
that aim to prevent child 
abuse and neglect, reduce 
the impact when it does 
occur, and improve the 
outcomes for children and 
young people in the statutory 
child protection system. 
Universal service system - 
system wide reform. 
 
Prevention 
and early 
intervention 
Our strategic goals are: 
Prevent abuse and 
neglect  
Act earlier when children 
are vulnerable. 
Vulnerable families and 
children will have access to 
high-quality services at the 
right time to help them to 
maintain the family unit. 
Child protection practice will 
be focused on engaging with 
families earlier and, where 
appropriate, keeping 
children safely at home. 
We also know that we need 
to focus more effort on early 
intervention and support for 
vulnerable families. 
Prevention and early 
intervention. 
 Enhanced service 
provision, 
including prevention 
and early 
intervention services 
and acute services. 
 
 
Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait 
Islander 
children 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander children and 
families will have access to 
culturally appropriate 
Tailored, flexible approaches 
must be available for groups 
or communities with specific 
needs or preferences, 
Support Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander 
children. 
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Indigenous-specific and 
mainstream services and 
care. 
including Aboriginal children 
and their families. 
 
 Providing better 
services 
to Aboriginal 
children and young 
people, with the aim 
of reducing their 
over-representation 
in the child 
protection system. 
Collaboration Government, non-
government agencies and 
communities are working 
together to build an 
integrated child and family 
support system that will 
deliver efficient, effective 
and sustainable support to 
Queensland children, young 
people, families and 
communities. 
We need to join up 
government and community 
leadership at a more local 
level if we are to achieve the 
community ownership 
necessary to achieve 
change. 
 
Strengthen partnerships with 
non-government 
organisations. 
 
Geographic 
reform and 
focus 
Central and regional 
governance structures 
established to oversee the 
reform program and promote 
strong collaborative 
partnerships across the 
government and non-
government sectors. 
 
There are geographic areas 
and specific communities in 
Victoria where disadvantage 
is significant and 
entrenched, and the 
Victorian Government will 
concentrate effort in these 
areas to reach those families 
who are most in need of 
support. We will work in local 
areas. 
Regional /local focus 
 Establishing Child 
Wellbeing Units in 
the major 
government 
reporting agencies. 
 Establishing a 
network of Family 
Referral Services. 
 
Better, more 
accountable 
services 
 Services provided to 
vulnerable children 
and families will be 
high-quality and 
provided in an 
efficient, transparent 
and accountable 
manner. 
 
The Queensland Family and 
Child Commission will 
provide independent advice 
on the effectiveness of child 
protection reforms to help 
make Queensland the safest 
place in Australia to raise a 
child. 
 
A new, independent and 
multidisciplinary Child Death 
Case Review Panel has 
been established. 
A performance and 
accountability framework – 
with clear goals, measurable 
outcomes and monitoring 
and reporting at both state 
and local levels. 
In addition, this government 
will take a number of steps 
to better ensure public 
accountability for services 
provided to vulnerable 
children and families. We will 
improve oversight 
mechanisms and structures, 
and bring a new focus to 
measuring client outcomes, 
in both government provided 
services and services 
delivered by the community 
services sector. 
Better accountability and 
transparency. 
Changes to 
mandatory 
reporting 
Consolidation of mandatory 
reporting requirements 
Changes to the mandatory 
reporting requirements have 
Changes to threshold and 
reporting of risk of significant 
harm 
Changes to mandatory 
reporting 
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clarified when a report must 
be made to Child Safety 
about a child. 
 Increasing the 
threshold for 
reporting children 
and young people to 
the Child Protection 
Helpline from ‘risk of 
harm’ to ‘risk 
of significant harm’. 
Out of home 
care 
Where there are no 
acceptable alternatives, 
children and young people 
will be taken into care, and 
protected and cared for. In 
care, they will receive the 
support they need to enjoy 
their childhood, feel safe and 
cared for, and develop into 
adulthood 
Providing safe, stable and 
supportive out of home care. 
 
 Changes to out of 
home care. 
 
Children’s 
court 
processes 
Improved Children’s Court 
processes. 
Amendments to the Child 
Protection Act 1999 to give 
Chief Magistrate powers, 
functions and associated 
responsibility to ensure that 
Children’s Court matters, 
including child protection, 
youth justice and adoption 
matters are dealt with by 
magistrates and justices of 
the peace in an efficient and 
orderly manner. The 
changes also facilitate the 
development and 
implementation of a 
judicially-led case 
management system. 
Making a child friendly legal 
system. 
Amendments to The 
Children, Youth and Families 
Amendment (Permanent 
Care and Other Matters) Act 
2014.  
 
 Changes to 
processes in the 
Children's Court. 
 Legal changes: 
Children Legislation 
Amendment (Wood Inquiry 
Recommendations) Act 
2009).  
Participation 
and child 
focus 
In collaboration with our non-
government partners, we are 
also engaging directly with 
Queensland children and 
families to ensure their views 
and needs are at the centre 
of the new child and family 
support system.  
Children and young people 
will be at the centre of the 
new system, with supported 
and supportive parents, 
families and communities. 
Place the needs of their 
children front and centre. 
 
Vulnerable children at the 
centre of reform. 
 The child protection 
system should be 
child-focused, with 
the child's or young 
person's safety, 
welfare, and 
wellbeing of 
paramount concern, 
while recognising 
that supporting 
parents is usually in 
the best interests of 
the child or young 
person. 
 
Enhanced 
workforce 
Vulnerable children and 
families will receive quality 
services from a highly 
skilled, capable and 
professional workforce 
across government and non-
Expanding service, 
workforce and system 
capacity. 
Enhanced workforce. 
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government family and child 
sectors. 
Summary of 
reforms 
Changes to mandatory 
reporting. 
Increased role for non-
government sector. 
Diverting families away from 
the child protection system. 
Supporting those who have 
left care until the age of 21. 
Reducing overrepresentation 
of ATSI children.  
Amending legislation and the 
role of children and families 
in court (Child Protection 
Reform Amendment Act 
2014). 
Forming a new Family and 
Child Commission to 
oversee the child protection 
system and align 
Queensland with other 
jurisdictions. 
Independent statutory body 
to provide individual 
advocacy for children in child 
protection system and will 
have the right to administer 
a child visiting program and 
appear in legal proceedings 
to assist children.  
Increasing the use of 
boarding schools for children 
in care. 
Working with Children 
checks to be undertaken by 
Queensland police. 
Child death review panel. 
Sharing information between 
agencies. 
More resources to 
prevention and early 
intervention. 
Building effective and 
connected services. 
Enhancing education and 
capacity building. 
Making a child friendly legal 
system. 
Providing safe, stable and 
supportive out of home care. 
Introducing accountability 
and transparency. 
 
Changes to mandatory 
reporting. 
Establishment of Child 
Wellbeing Units in major 
Government Departments. 
Regional Intake and referral 
services. 
A bigger role for the NGO 
sector. 
Building the capacity of 
Aboriginal organisations. 
Prevention and early 
intervention. 
Enhanced interagency 
cooperation. 
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Table 15. Measures of success as articulated by governments in their response to the child 
protection Inquiry 62 
Queensland Government63 Victorian Government64 
 
NSW Government65 
 
Reduce the number of 
children and young 
people in the child 
protection system. 
 
Revitalise frontline 
services. 
 
Refocus on learning, 
improving and taking 
responsibility for a better 
child protection system. 
 
Better health outcomes for 
vulnerable children. 
 
Improved participation and 
attainment of children in 
universal services, especially 
school. 
 
Earlier and appropriate attention 
by adult services to the needs of 
children. 
 
Reduction in the impact of 
parental risk factors that 
contribute most to child abuse 
and neglect. 
 
Lower rates of abuse and 
neglect. 
 
Lower rates of children requiring 
out of home care.  
Improved placement stability for 
children and young people in out 
of home care.  
Improved life outcomes for 
children and young people in out 
of home care. 
Children have a safe and healthy 
start to life. 
 
Children develop well and are 
ready for school. 
 
Children and young people meet 
developmental and educational 
milestones at school.  
 
Children and young people live 
in families where their physical, 
emotional and social needs are 
met.  
 
Children and young people are 
safe from harm and injury.  
 
Children, young people and their 
families have access to 
appropriate and responsive 
services if needed. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
62 Please note: some of these measures have shifted over time as new governments in both 
Queensland and Victoria have ‘repackaged’ their responses to the Queensland and Victorian Inquiries 
respectively. Current Queensland and Victorian Government responses can be found at: 
https://www.communities.qld.gov.au/campaign/supporting-families/background  and  
https://www.vic.gov.au/health-community/children/child-protection.html 
63 viewed 1 November 2016, https://www.communities.qld.gov.au/campaign/supporting-
families/background 
64 viewed 15 November 2016, 
https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/191083011?selectedversion=NBD52841837 
65 viewed 8 November 2015, http://www.keepthemsafe.nsw.gov.au/ 
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Appendix 6  
Child protection data 
Trends in rates of children in the child protection system 
National data from annual Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) Child Protection 
Reports shows that over the 5 year period between 2010-11 and 2014-15, the rate of 
children in substantiations,66 on care and protection orders67 and in out-of-home care68  
continued to rise. Between 2011 to 2012, and 2015 to 2016, rates per 1,000 children (AIHW 
Child Protection Report 2015-2016, p. vii): 
 in substantiations rose from 7.4 to 8.5   
 on care and protection orders rose from 7.9 to 9.6   
 in out-of-home care rose from 7.7 to 8.6. 
 
With specific reference to Queensland data, the following is taken from AIHW Child 
Protection Reports for each of the specified years. 
 
Table 16. Queensland child protection data, 2009-10 to 2014-15 
Queensland Notifications69 Substantiations Children on care 
and protection 
orders 
2009-2010 21,885 6,22 (31.6%) n/a 
2010-2011 21,655 6,598 (30.5%) 4,353 
2011-2012 24,823 7,681 (30.9%) 4,282 
2012-2013 24,763 8,069 (32.6%) 4,368 
2013-2014 23256 7406 (31.8%) 3808 
2014-2015 22350 6435 (28.8%) 1841 
                                                          
66 Substantiation of notification: Child protection notification made to relevant authorities during the 
current year that was investigated (with the investigation finalised by the relevant reporting date) and 
where it was concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that the child had been, was 
being, or was likely to be, abused, neglected or otherwise harmed. Substantiation does not 
necessarily require sufficient evidence for a successful prosecution and does not imply that treatment 
or case management was provided. Substantiations may also include cases where there is no 
suitable caregiver, such as children who have been abandoned or whose parents are deceased. 
Glossary, viewed 17 December 2017,https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/bce377ec-1b76-4cc5-87d9-
d0541fca586c/20479.pdf.aspx?inline=true  
67 Care and protection order: A legal order or arrangement that gives child protection departments 
some responsibility for a child’s welfare, viewed 17 December 2017, 
https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/bce377ec-1b76-4cc5-87d9 
d0541fca586c/20479.pdf.aspx?inline=true  
68 Out-of-home care: Overnight care for children aged 0 to 17, where the state makes a financial 
payment or where a financial payment has been offered but has been declined by the carer, viewed 
17 December 2017, https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/bce377ec-1b76-4cc5-87d9-
d0541fca586c/20479.pdf.aspx?inline=true  
69 Notification: Contact made to an authorised department by persons or other bodies alleging child 
abuse or neglect, child maltreatment or harm to a child, Glossary, viewed 17 December 2017, 
https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/bce377ec-1b76-4cc5-87d9-
d0541fca586c/20479.pdf.aspx?inline=true,  
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The QCPCI reported in 2013. There is a slight drop in notifications and substantiations from 
2012-2013 to 2014-2015. However, the ratio of substantiations to notifications remains 
steady at about 30 percent each year except in 2014-2015 when it drops to 28.8 percent. 
Children on care and protection orders has steadily declined from 2012-2013 to 2014-2015. 
 
Table 17. Children in Out of Home Care (OOHC) in Queensland, 2010 to 2015 
 
Year Number of children 
in OOHC (number 
per 1,000 children) 
2010 7,350 
(6.9) 
2011 7,602 
(7.1) 
2012 7,999 
(7.3) 
2013 8,136 
(7.4) 
2014 8,185 
(7.3) 
2015 8,448 
(7.5) 
 
The number of children in OOHC has continued to grow in Queensland. 
 
Table 18. Indigenous children in OOHC in Queensland, 2011-12 to 2014-15 
 
Year Number of 
Indigenous children 
in OOHC 
2011-12 3,041 
2012-13 3,095 
2013-14 3,659 
2014-15 3,864 
The number of indigenous children in OOHC in Queensland continues to increase. 
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Appendix 7 
Government implementation of the recommendations of the Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry 
State government agencies 70 
In each relevant State Government agency implementation groups were established which 
were tasked with implementing the agreed recommendations of the QFCI.  
Five key streams of activity were described: 
 Planning group which would implement recommendations from Chapters 2-8, QFCI 
Report 2012; 
 Building group which would implement recommendations from Chapters 9-10 QFCI 
Report 2012; 
 Environment and mines group which would implement recommendations from 
Chapter 13 QFCI Report 2012; 
 Emergency management which would implement recommendations from Chapter 15 
QFCI Report 2012; and 
 Dams group which would implement recommendations from Chapters 16-17 QFCI 
Report 2012. 
Each implementation group was chaired by the Director-General of the most relevant 
agency. Progress of the implementation groups was monitored by a CEO committee chaired 
by the Director-General of the Department of Premier and Cabinet. 
For each implementation group the purpose, membership, key responsibilities, lead agency, 
milestones, completion date are included (Queensland Government Response to Final 
Report of QFCI, Appendix 2, pp. 51-62). Annual Reports of the each of the relevant agencies 
includes detail on progress of the implementation of the Inquiry’s recommendations. 
Implementation updates were provided by the Queensland Government in 2013, 2014 and 
2015.71 Each update details those recommendations which had been completed and those 
                                                          
70 Information is taken from the Queensland Government response to the Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry, n.d. viewed 15 July 2016,  
https://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/publications/categories/reports/assets/gov-response-floods-
commission-inquiry.pdf) 
71  viewed 15 July 2016, https://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/publications/categories/reports/response-to-
flood-inquiry.aspx 
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which were still ongoing. The updates, however, only detail the areas for which the State 
government is responsible. The updates do not detail the progress on recommendations 
where the lead agencies are Local Councils, the Commonwealth, or the private sector.  
By October 2014 the remaining 17 recommendations noted as ‘ongoing’ had all been 
transferred to the relevant Chief Executives as part of their agencies’ core business. Some 
of the most sensitive recommendations regarding the operations of the Wivenhoe, Somerset 
and North Pine Dams were reported as completed in the 2015 update (2015 update, p. 3). 
One series of recommendations relating to the Brisbane River Catchment studies is not due 
to be completed till 2018 (2015 update, p. 4). 
Commonwealth Agencies 
In the Commonwealth Response to the Final Report of the Queensland Floods Commission 
of Inquiry 2012, the Commonwealth outlines its position on the recommendations directed to 
it, as well as those that are of relevance to the Commonwealth. In relation to those 
recommendations specifically directed to it, the Commonwealth states the following: 
 In relation to the recommendation that the Commonwealth keep a repository of data 
of the type used in flood studies (Recommendation 2.11) the Commonwealth 
supported the recommendation in part and referred to ‘progressing a range of 
projects that will address some of the intent of the recommendation (2012, p. 2). 
 With respect to telecommunications carriers, councils and the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) should take into account the risk of 
flooding when considering the placement of telecommunications facilities 
(Recommendation 10.22), the Commonwealth supported this recommendation in 
part, but stated that this Recommendation misinterprets the role of the ACMA (2012, 
p. 10). 
 The Commonwealth supported Recommendation 13.5 that it should work 
collaboratively with the Queensland Government and mine operators to ensure co-
ordinated and effective monitoring of salts, metals and other contaminants in marine 
environments that may be affected by mine discharges (2012, p. 13). 
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